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              This study is a unique systematic quantitative effort to decipher and interpret the 
complex multi-dimensional associations and trade-offs between university governance and 
performance in the UK. It is unprecedented in its scope and breadth and breaks with 
traditional discourses in corporatised university governance that are the extant paradigm. 
A seven element multi-theoretical framework is used to investigate the large decade-long 
collated empirical data set of university-year governance-performance metrics in the 
country. Five distinct subsumed research objectives are targeted in the study. These are 
used to explicate empirical insights about the trade-offs involved in the four inter-related 
aspects overlooked by the current corpus of governance performance research here, i.e., 
the multiple dimensions in either construct, the quality assurance/cultural connotations 
therein, the embedded process like elements and longitudinal relationships. The study, thus, 
richly expands the body of knowledge in university governance and performance. 
 
            Singularly in the thesis 31 variables capturing varied dimensions of university 
governance and performance for the eleven years between 2005 and 2015 are collected 
mixing hand written means with other standard approaches. Across this data horizon, in a 
sample consisting of 132 UK universities, these variables are extensively analysed, 
resulting in a variegated, comprehensive and distinctive panoply of triangulated findings. 
From a methodological perspective the research is largely knit using eclectic and advanced 
regression analysis. However, it is not limited to this. The project splices the empirical UK 
data set in innovative ways and coalesces critical discussions and narratives across 
univariate, bivariate, multivariate pooled and panel analyses. While GLS Fixed Effects 
regressions are the base model chosen, a series of five other sensitivity-assessing 
regressions and a battery of related tests are done to achieve full academic rigour.  
 
            The thesis uncovers strong robust evidence for the multi-dimensional and complex 
links between UK university governance and performance. In six different complex models 
of multivariate regressions it finds a range of nuanced complex yet highly tractable and 
explainable relationships between multidimensional governances and performances of the 
UK university. 
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              These findings allow for novel contributions to the body of knowledge. Thus, 
uniquely the thesis conceptualises university governance and performance crafting holistic 
definitions of either construct. It expands the vocabulary of the discourse using theory to 
identify five new missing dimensions of university governance. By analysing the rich panel 
data set of several governance performance variables, it establishes an inflexion point to 
differentiate the future research trajectory in this area. Providing a robust basis for the 
existing normative and argumentative policy literature it assesses the credibility of the 
many scholarly critiques. The thesis also formally tests the validities of many existing and 
recent policy changes introduced in UK HEI and uncovers trade-offs and complexities that 
may have been missed by regulators. Finally, it provides an empirical basis for key 
concepts in governance such as culture/quality assurance concerns, process like 
characteristics and teaching/learning regimes. These novel contributions result in a highly 
original set of recommendations to university governors, HEI regulators and future 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This research aims to critically evaluate the multi-dimensional links between a university’s 
governance and its performance in the UK. The university occupies a unique status among 
the knowledge institutions of any economy. It is charged with the vital and complex task 
of generating and transmitting knowledge across society. This task has many inter-related 
dimensions and levels that make it difficult. A university has to necessarily satisfy the 
conflicting requirements of large sets of diverse stakeholders. These impose trade-offs 
within the governance of this institution, especially at its various levels and in its multiple 
dimensions. If calibrated optimally, such tarde-offs result in a sustained improved 
performance of the institution. However, such calibrations are far from easy or 
straightforward. This explains the need for an integrated and systematic effort to study 
multi-dimensional university governance and its effects on performance.  
 
In what follows the rationale for this research is comprehensively explained debated and 
justified. Section 1.1 presents a background and context for university governance and 
performance. It is neatly divided into two sub-sections: Section 1.1.1 presents a brief 
annotated history of reforms in university governance in the UK. The main focus here is to 
provide the reader with an up-to-date understanding of how and why UK university 
governance remains conflicted despite several waves of reforms. Section 1.1.2 presents the 
current status of the regulatory landscape in UK university governance and performance. 
From this the reader can obtains a grasp of the many dimensions of university governance 
in the UK, the complexities of the overseeing apparatus and the nature of governance-
performance trade-offs.  
 
Section 1.2 builds on this background and context to rationalise the multiple motivations 
underlying this research. In Section 1.2.1, UK universities are shown to be multi-
dimensional entities.  This is illustrated in the complex trade-offs they face in almost every 
dimension of governance and performance. In the process, this sub-section shows how and 
why the research is topical and interesting. In Section 1.2.2, the need for new insights into 
 17 
university governance and performance in the UK is established. Finally, Section 1.2.3 
presents the principal research motivations of the thesis. This is followed by Section 1.3, 
which elucidates the main research question and related research objectives. From this, a 
wider understanding of the overall scope of the research project is obtained. This is then 
expanded upon in Section 1.4 where the proposed methodology is also briefly enumerated. 
Section 1.5 then concludes this introductory chapter to the thesis with a detailed elaboration 
of the novel contribution to knowledge that is intended here.  
1.1 Background and Context 
 
Universities are on the cusp of rapid and transformative change. As the global economy 
integrates and expands, knowledge has become the most important currency of exchange; 
it is also the source of competitive advantage among nations (Collini, 2005; Collis, 2004; 
Shattock, 2013a, b). Universities as the repositories, creators and transmitters of this 
knowledge have come to occupy centre stage in economic development. A country’s status 
is increasingly being linked to the international rankings of its institutions of higher 
education. Inevitably, however intractable questions are being asked about the multi-
dimensional governance and performance of these institutions in society (Parker, 2011; 
Parry, 2011; Rowlands, 2013; Hordern, 2013). Academics, researchers, practitioners and 
other interested constituencies are voicing important conflicts about the way universities 
govern themselves, transmit/generate knowledge and assess/examine competences 
(Gornitzka & Maassen, 2014; Vukasovic et al., 2018). It is within this context that studying 
university governance and its impact on performance has become vital.  
 
The UK has traditionally been at the very forefront of higher education reform (Ntim et al., 
2017; Shattock, 2013a, b). Given its important historical role as an engine of enlightenment 
and scientific development this is hardly surprising. The best-known universities of the 
country remain at the cutting edge of teaching and research featuring regularly on the lists 
of the top 100 institutions in the world (Times Higher Education, 2016; 2017). The country 
is also among the countries with top rankings in research and development (R&D). On 
paper, the Government has always accorded the highest priority to university funding and 
governance reform. Yet despite this the university sector in the UK remains one of the 
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deeply contested areas in popular and academic discourse. Academics researchers and 
teachers alike raise contentious issues about the way universities are governed in the 
country and how this affects their performance (Parker, 2011; Ntim et al., 2016).  
 
There is an added geographical context within the UK higher education sector that makes 
university governance highly complex. The UK is, after all, a federal union of four 
disparate regions, i.e., England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Universities in each 
region differ significantly in their governance processes and mechanisms. They imbibe and 
articulate cultural, social and intellectual beliefs of each different regional part of the UK 
(Bruce, 2012; Shattock, 2006; Shattock & Horvath, 2019: 2020; Brennan et al., 2018; 
Gallacher, 2009: 2014; Riddell et al., 2015). England and Scotland are notable here. The 
two regions, although comparable, differ significantly in research/teaching emphases in 
higher education pedagogy and political perspectives on student fees and 
commercialisation of higher education.  To compound these differences in line with the 
growing decentralisation of political governance in the country the regulatory apparatus 
and funding bodies for higher education were also devolved across each region. Especially 
after 1992 this has led to four distinct regulatory and governance-based regimes in the 
country (Shattock & Hovrath, 2020; Cremonini et al., 2015). Studying UK governance and 
performance therefore does needs vital and explicit consideration of its geographical 
context.  
 
However, the only way to fully appreciate the background and context of UK HEI is 
through a deeper understanding of its historical and regulatory evolution. Sub-section 1.1.1 
historically analyses the many waves of governance reform in UK HEI and how these 
complicated the university landscape in the country. The next sub-section 1.1.2 details the 
regulatory landscape on governance in the country showing the more recent changes and 





1.1.1 The history of UK Higher Education Reform 
 
There has been a definitive change within UK higher education in the last few decades. 
Highly elitist traditional universities have metamorphosed into publicly accessible 
institutions charged with the task of ‘educating and skilling the masses’. Table 1, below, 
maps out the main changes in the UK Higher Education Sector during the past century.  
 
Table 1: UK Higher Education Reports-Acts and Key Recommendations 
Reports and Acts Key Recommendations 
Robbins Report 
(1963) 
• Expansion of the Higher Education sector by upgrading former 
technical institutes. 
• Introduction of new types of vocationally oriented Higher Education 
Institutions such as polytechnics and colleges. 
• Introduced and encouraged mass education. 
• Higher level of external governance and scrutiny of existing 
institutions  
• Neoliberal ideas of universities as serving a global, corporate and 
economic benefit that need to be exploited to support economic 
development 
•  Formed the main backbone for the development of the university 
sector until present. 
Jarratt Report 
(1985)  
• Focused mainly on improving efficacy in Universities and that they 
should run as normal profit making businesses or commercial 
enterprises.  
• Argued that old traditional university’s two-tier governance with 
excessive academic authority tended to be slow and bureaucratic in 
decision-making.    
• Suggests a one-tier governance with a majority of lay members who 
are responsible and accountable for the governance of the 
institution.  
• Lay members should be supported by corporate-like sub-
committees, such as audit, remuneration, and nomination, etc.  
• Wanted to weaken the influence of academics in university 
governance, while strengthening lay members and those with 
commercial experience and success.  
• Board size to be between 12-25, and Vice-Chancellor’s position and 
authority should be elevated to that of a CEO. 
• Passed in 1988 into law. 
Education Reform 
Act (1988) 
• Established University Funding Council (UFC) to replace the long-
standing University Grant Committee. Also established the 
Polytechnics and Colleges and Funding Council (PCFC) 
• Ended academic tenure rights 
• Introduced stricter accountability measures for universities.  
Further and Higher 
Education Act 
(1992) 
• Allowed polytechnics and colleges to assume university status. A 
total of 35 institutions become universities in the first year. These 
are often referred to as new or post-1992 universities.  
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• Removed Colleges and Further Education from local authority 
government control.   
• Effectively ending/abolishing the binary system divide in higher 
education. 
•  Created a national unitary funding council - Made changes to the 
funding of Higher Education Institutions by creating new funding 
bodies for each country, HEFCE, HEFCW, NIHEC (advised by 
HEFCE), and Scottish Higher Education Funding Council SHEFC 
(now Scottish Funding Council) to replace the UK-wide University 
Funding Council (UFC) and PCFC. Setting into motion the 
devolution of UK HE that became more marked in 1999.  
• Created a quality assurance arrangement, QCA and HEQC, that set 
the stage for the emergence of the QAA in 1997.  
• The privy council was awarded sole power to grant degree-awarding 




• focused on governance structures in the ‘new’ post-1992 and 
‘old”’pre-1992 universities.  




• Focused on reforming governance and funding in the HE sector. 
• Dearing was more critical than Nolan (1996) and argued that board 
size for pre-1992 universities of “34” on average were too large and 
recommended that it is to be reduced to “25”, as with the post-1992 
universities.  
• It proposed a code of governance for HEI which is heavily 
influenced by the Cadbury (1992) report.  
• With regard to funding, it recommended a fundamental change in 
tuition fees from being funded only by free government grants to a 
mixed system of government grants and student fees, supported by 
low interest government loans. Effectively ended free HE system 




• Influenced by the Dearing 1997 recommendations, the Government 
published its response in 1998. Changes have been made in how 
universities are run, e.g. smaller and clearly identified governing 
bodies.  
• The title of ‘university college’ is available not only to colleges that 
are fully part of a university but also to higher education institutions 
with the power to award taught degrees. 
• Allowed universities to charge tuition fees up to £1,125.  
• Introduced the student loan system and the creation of the Income 
Contingent Loan (ICL) student plan which was later modified in 
2004.  
 
Lambert (2003) • Included a code of governance for all HEIs, with financial penalties 
for non-compliance; this included pre-1992 universities.  
• CUC incorporated the report into its 2009 guide. 





• Made adjustments to the student loan arrangements to allow 
students to only repay their loan after graduating and when they 
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 were earning a yearly income above £15,000 rather than pay it 
yearly during the course.  
• Creation of Office For Fair Access (OFFA) 
• Replace the fixed fee of £1,125 with a new system that enables 




• Focused on reforming HE funding, including student finance, 
especially after the banking crisis that led to UK government budget 
cuts.  
• The introduction of full-tuition fees with maximum cap of £9,000. 
• Removal of control caps in terms of the number of students that the 
UK HEI can admit.  
• The report has introduced a quasi-market economy in the HE sector 
with the aim of improving quality and reducing costs by increasing 
competition among UK HEIs. 
• Governance and funding reforms led to greater demand for public 
accountability transparency and performance, mainly through 
regulatory scrutiny and funding conditions.  
Higher Education & 
Research Act 
(2017) 
• Widely viewed as the most important legislation for the sector in 25 
years and a replacement for the Further & Higher Education Act 
(1992).  
• Established Office for Students (OFS) that is responsible for 
regulating the HE sector. This super regulator has replaced: 
- Hefce as the funding body for the sector; 
- Privy Council - Royal Charter as the body with granting degree 
rewarding powers i.e. university status; 
- Office For Fair Access (OFFA). 
• OFS has been given authority to make grants, loans, payments and 
might attach any terms and conditions. 
• Amended prior legislation on student financial support/compliant 
procedure.  
• Establish UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) that is responsible 
for regulating and funding research. Ultimately merging seven 
existing research councils into one.  
• Address various issues such as data sharing. 
 
Source: (Brwone, 2010; Watson, 2014; Shattock, 2004; Buckland, 2004; Du & Lapsley, 
2019; Scott, 2014) 
 
As shown in Table 1 above it is quite obvious why the UK has been widely perceived to 
be at the forefront of Higher Education policy reforms. Scholars such as Toma (2007), 
Vidovich & Currie (2011), Parker (2012) and Rowlands (2013) concur that the changed 
focus on sound financial management through good internal governance arrangements, 
greater public accountability/transparency and stronger performance is at the base of this 
perception. However, just a few decades earlier at the start of the last century UK 
universities were elitist institutions. The traditional view that characterised these 
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institutions was that ‘university education is not for everyone’. It was felt that only the 
crème de la crème needed to go to university and higher education was an “earned 
privilege” (Parker, 2011; Collini, 2005; Ntim et al., 2017). Knowledge acquisition was for 
its own sake and university education did not have a utilitarian objective. Supporting this 
notion were the core ideas of academic freedom and university autonomy. The oft-quoted 
argument was that the university needed to be autonomous in its governance arrangements 
if it was to preserve its role as the ‘pure’ knowledge generator and transmitter to future 
generations (Bennett, 2002; Shattock, 2002; Middlehurst, 2004). Therefore, for almost six 
decades universities in the UK remained self-governing institutions. A collegial form of 
internal governance evolved where the academic faculty populated all major governance 
and performance committees, and took all major decisions.   
 
This went largely unchallenged until the influential Robbins report (1963), which 
recommended a significant expansion of the higher education sector and a higher level of 
external governance and scrutiny of existing institutions. Based on the neo-liberal notion 
that directly challenged the then existent view of ‘knowledge for its own sake’, Robbins 
argued that for the large majority of students there were instrumental outcomes such as 
obtaining a range of work-related skills that required them to acquire a higher education 
(Salter & Tapper, 2002; Knight, 2002; Kim, 2008: Trakman, 2008). Greater coverage of 
the student population was thus important. Therefore, he recommended new types of 
vocationally orientated higher education institutions such as polytechnics/colleges that 
gave students the option to acquire vocational and professional skills. This was the first 
major change in the HEI sector in the UK, and introduced economic instrumentalism and 
mass education within the country’s HE sector.  
 
The next major change in the sector came with the Jarratt report (1985), which questioned 
the efficiency of the existing universities. Jarrat’s overriding emphasis was to change the 
way universities were structured by incorporating them into public corporations so that 
they could be run to generate a profit as with Public Sector entities (Sizer & Howells, 2000; 
Hordern, 2013; Parry, 2013). At the board level he recommended a one-tier governance , 
and a big increase in the numbers of lay and independent board members with experience 
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of running commercial enterprises and a reduction in the number of academics. The aim 
was to make the board less bureaucratic and more responsive to changes in higher 
education. For the first time these, changes introduced a commercial orientation into the 
HEI sector in the UK. The Jarratt report proved so influential that it was enacted into law 
through the Educational Reform Act, 1988 (ERA, 1988). Universities in the UK now 
exhibited a two-tier structure, i.e., the Polytechnics (the corporations) and the older 
established universities (Royal Charter) (Dearlove, 2002; Shattock, 2002, 2004; 
Middlehurst, 2004: 2013). While the Jarratt report has helped to improve efficiency, access 
and quality, it coincided with a rapid influx in the number of students in UK HEIs. It 
quickly became apparent that mass HE is expensive, leading to an increase in public 
funding, stretching UK governments’ public budgets (Watson, 2014; Jarrat, 1985; 
McGettigan, 2013; Deem et al., 2007; Brown & Carasso, 2013).  
 
Beset by these problems, after just four years of the two-tier functioning institutions, the 
UK government once again reformed the structure of UK universities with the Further and 
Higher Education Act of 1992. The immense pressure on the Government to remove the 
divide in the higher education between traditional higher education institutions and the 
polytechnics was a major motivation here. A second important concern was the need to 
achieve good governance and value for money in the sector which was increasingly viewed 
as a costly white elephant for the Government. The UK Privy Council was authorised to 
issue new Royal Charters to the polytechnics to function as universities. As a consequence, 
in waves new universities from among these institutions began joining and complicating 
the structure of UK HEI. Not all polytechnics became universities and, in many places, 
arbitrarily enforced mergers combined existing universities with selective polytechnics or 
two or more such institutions were amalgamated into one. Nevertheless, these changes 
created a fierce and acrimonius debate (Collini, 2012; Molesworth et al., 2011; 
McGettigan, 2013; Halsey, 2000) in the university sector about how these newly 
constituted post-1992 universities differed from their pre-1992 counterparts. The 
nomenclature stuck and this explains why so much university governance and performance 
research in the empirical literature uses the divide to neatly segregate the UK university 
sector. To date there are significant differences between the internal governance structures 
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in pre-and post-1992 universities that suggest the polarisation of UK HEI along this divide. 
Undoubtedly the newer universities have been at the forefront of shouldering the burden 
of mass higher education, welcoming large numbers of students who would not otherwise 
have had access to university education. Yet there continues to be widespread perception 
at least within the conservative academic community, that post-1992 universities continue 
to be vocational institutions with low levels of higher education pedagogy (Scott, 2012: 
2014).  At least one future governance policy paper, i.e., the Nolan Report (1997) continued 
to stress these divides to the detriment of UK HEI although this has now been reversed by 
Dearing. 
 
Meanwhile some of the most exclusive, powerful and research rich universities of the UK 
formed an exclusive alliance much in the nature of the Ivy league in the US (Fitzgerald & 
Petermam, 2005; Havergal, 2015). Feeling a strong need to emphasise their own distinctly 
superior pedagogical ambiance 24 such universities formed the Russell Group in 1994. 
This elite grouping soon became the touchstone of academic excellence in the UK 
commanding a significant 60% of all lucrative research projects in the country (Boliver, 
2015; Scott, 1995; Tight, 1996; Russell Group, 2012: 2014; Corbyn, 2008; HCSTC, 2010; 
pg. 30, REF, 2014; Ball, 2017).  To date there seems to be an expectation that these 
exclusive elite institutions are invariably the superior academic performers in UK HEI. In 
recent times, however, there is growing anecdotal evidence that non-Russell group 
universities are outperforming at least some of their peers in the Russell group.  However, 
the post-1992 universities faced a very difficult challenge soon after their incorporation. In 
the era of still free higher education in 1990s while the government continued to reduce 
funding to the sector, these institutions lacked the credibility to be self-financing. 
Therefore, they began to search for alternative research-based funding opportunities. This 
meant striking alliances and parterships with peer institutions with higher research profiles. 
A range of exclusive alliances and advocacy fronts were formed as shown in table 2 below 
and these further complicated the institutional landscape in the sector (Scott & Callender, 




Table 2: Higher Education Institution Alliances  




A self-selected association of 24 major research intensive universities in the UK 
that are committed to high research standards.  
 
Million+ Group An association made up of former polytechnics and Scottish central institutions 
that claim to have educated over a million students hence the name. Traditionally 
focused more on vocational work-related education, prioritize teaching, and have 
low research resources.  
 
1994 Group A group of smaller research orientated pre-1992 universities – disbanded in 2013 
after losing members to Russell Group. 
 
GuildHE An Association of 28 smaller and specialist post-1992 universities & colleges that 
was formed in 2006 and has 28 members – It represents institutions specialising 




 A group of non- aligned universities became which became the largest post-1992 
university group. It was formed in 2006 and has 26 members – With a focus on 
science technology, links with industry, and research environment in partnership 
with industry/profession.  
 
Source: (Morgan, 2014; Fazackerley, 2013; Watson, 2014) 
 
Most of these post-1992 alliances were formed with the intention of improving the 
academic credibility of these institutions. By joining one or other of these formations, the 
former polytechnics had an even chance of sharing and building on research and teaching 
expertise and collaboration. In recent times there is anecdotal and argumentative evidence 
that many of these ‘92 universities have been successfully collaborated and partnered 
globally in higher education. In addition, a range of new subject disciplines, multi-
disciplinary courses and world class research has emerged from amongst these institutions 
(Tatlow, 2012; Scott, 2012). 
 
Many of these changes made the UK higher education sector much more responsive to the 
economy’s needs by improving access, quality and efficiency. However, several other 
developments in UK HEI made these improvements pale into insignificance. Rapid 
increases in higher education student enrolment from 8% in 1960 to nearly 43% in 2000 
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meant that funding for institutions became a critical constraint. This put severe pressure on 
UK Government finances. Universities became increasingly dependent on Government 
funds to support their larger student cohorts. The proportion of Government funding in 
university budgets climbed from a mere 33% in 1930s to over 90% in the 1970s (Dearlove, 
2002: 259; Kim, 2008).  
 
Such difficulties led to three different important investigations into the sector initiated by 
the UK Government in 1997, 2003 and 2010.  The Nolan report (1996) largely 
recommended the continuation of separate Governance mechanisms for both pre-and post-
1992 institutions and the post-1992 ones. On the other hand, the Dearing report (2003) 
suggested fundamental changes in board level governance, student fees/support and 
Government grant assistance. Dearing advocated smaller university boards with sizes not 
exceeding 25: he also suggested a code of governance for all UK universities. In the area 
of student fees, Dearing, for the first time in UK history argued for a mixed approach of 
student fees and government bursaries combined with improved access to subsidised 
student loans (Shattock, 2013a; 2004). Acceptance of these recommendations led to 
dramatic declines in Government funding of nearly 37% per student and the era of free 
higher education in the UK came to an end (Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008).  
The Lambert report (2003) and the Browne report (2010) constitute some of the latest 
initiatives in the UK Higher Education Sector. The latter in particular introduced a quasi-
market in higher education by espousing the core principle that students are allowed 
flexibility to choose between universities. In 2010, it also expanded the principle of student 
fees by allowing universities to charge domestic students up to a ceiling of £9,000 per 
annum through legislation (Browne Review, 2010; DBIS, 2011). Caps on student 
enrolment were ended and universities were freed to decide on student strength, i.e., student 
population.  All in all, market-based reforms were made the bedrock of the Higher 
Education Sector.  
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While these radical reforms were initiated, simulataneously public accountability concerns 
about universities and their functioning became widespread (FSSG, 2011; UUK, 2011; 
CUC, 2006a, b; Prondzynski, 2012; Havergal, 2015a; 2015b). In response, the Government 
increased regulatory oversight by setting up a bewildering variety of institutions aimed at 
overseeing the multiple dimensions of university governance and performance. Some of 
these institutions and their different and sometimes overlapping roles have recently been 
amalgamated into the institution of a super regulator for the sector named the Office for 
students (OFS).  
The 2017 UK Higher Education Act and associated regulatory reforms have ushered in 
some badly needed regulatory changes;  however, these are still insufficient and more 
importantly not backed by rigorous empirical research (Ntim et al., 2017). Reforms have 
been pushed through on the notion that universities are institutions similar to corporate 
firms. therefore, corporate governance norms should necessarily apply to them. This is 
flawed reasoning. Universities are unique multi-dimensional institutions with role 
complexities. There are complex trade-offs involved in their governance and performance. 
This explains why several scholars (See Ntim et al., 2017; Schofield, 2009; Knight, 2002; 
Trakman, 2008; Parker, 2011) call for empirically driven governance reforms in the sector. 
The current research project answers this call and aims to provide a sound rationale for 
data driven university governance reforms.  
1.1.2 UK Higher Education Regulatory Landscape 
 
Having examined the historical progression of university governance and its inadequacies, 
this section presents the current complex state of regulation in higher education in the UK, 
consisting of a rapidly changing panoply of institutions playing complementary, 
supplementary and overlapping roles that characterises the UK Higher Education Sector. 
Universities, 164 at last the count (HESA, 2016; Universities UK, 2016) comprise the main 
players while several different regulators and policy-making bodies constitute other parts 
of this maze. The latest piece of legislation, namely the Higher Education and Research 




















Source: McGettigan, 2013; Collini, 2012; DBEIS, 2017 
 
As is evident from figure 1 above, it appears that the last two decades of intensified 
regulation and oversight of the sector has now culminated in this new legislation. The act 
creates two newly established and recently amalgamated agencies namely the OFS and the 
United Kingdom Research and Innovation ( UKRI ). The OFS seems to be a super regulator 
that has taken over the regulatory and funding responsibilities of HEFCE as well as the 
University Title and Degree awarding powers of the Privy Council.  The UKRI is the 
institution that has amalgamated the seven research funding councils, INNOVATE UK and 
Research England but seems to be designed as more of an advisory/consultative body. Two 
separate quality related institutions, the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA ) and 
Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) continue to exist as independent institutions tasked with 
monitoring the universities and advising the OFS. The OFS emerges from this act as the 
core body establishing rules, guidelines and best practice in the sector. A complex 
Figure 1: The UK Higher Education regulatory Landscape 
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regulatory picture therefore emerges with one nodal super-regulator, OFS and, three other 
important agencies, i.e., the UKRI, HESA and QAA, jointly monitoring, evaluating, and 
calibrating universities and other institutions in the Higher Education sector.   
 
Obvious inter-institutional linkages exist between these regulatory bodies. This is 
illustrated in figure 1 by the many lines drawn between these bodies. For example, although 
the Secretary of State is the formal statutory authority licensing and certifying degree 
awards, this power is governed by the formal advice given by the OFS which on its part is 
mandated to consult with HESA, QAA and UKRI in the process. Similarly, although the 
quantum and timing of research grants and funds to various institutions are largely 
determined by the UKRI, this institution has to take account of the ratings and metrics 
developed by HESA and the QAA while making these. These inter-institutional linkages 
and consultations in many ways reflect and substantiate the multi-dimensionality of a 
university’s governance and performance. They can also be inferred to imply the need for 
robust and comprehensive research into the relationships if any between university 
governance and performance (Hordern, 2013; Parry, 2011; Rowlands, 2013; Collini, 2008; 
Middlehurst, 2013). Undoubtedly this is why scholars like Ntim et al (2016) stress the need 
for such comprehensive empirical research.  
1.2 Motivation for he Study 
 
The repeated and often drastic changes in the UK higher education regulatory landscape 
suggest the complexity and multi-dimensionality of university governance and 
performance. Governing a university is neither simple nor easy. There seems to be several 
dimensions along which a university’s governance needs to be assessed and aligned. The 
institution also performs in different ways and at different levels and their performance has 
many complex trade-offs embedded within it. Therefore, universities face unique 
challenges in calibrating their internal governance that then have manifold and complex 
impacts on their performance.  
 
Three distinct aspects of these challenges within UK HEI motivate this research and are 
detailed in the three sub-sections that follow. Sub-section 1.2.1 shows the significant 
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difficulties in identifying parameters for university governance and performance. 
Clarifying a reasonably complete set of definitional parameters is a crucial need for the 
sector and represents a prime motivation here. In sub-section 1.2.2 the unique multi-
dimensional role of the UK university and the complex trade-offs it imposes on this 
institution are delineated. These very difficult trade-offs need rigorous empirical 
investigation if the UK HEI sector is to be intelligently governed and regulated. Therefore, 
this is a second important motivation here. Finally, sub-section 1.2.3 shows how UK HEI 
is significantly under-researched especially from the perspective of governance 
performance relationships. The need for new insights for university governance reform are 
most pressing in the country especially within the context o several piece-meal reform 
efforts being undertaken in the sector. This is the third and final important motivation 
driving the research. Each of these sub-sections feed into the overall research motivation 
for this project and thus enable the formulation of its principal research question which 
follows.  
 
1.2.1 The Parameters of University Governance and Performance  
 
University governance and performance are hard to identify and measure. There is 
significant ambiguity in what constitutes a university’s governance (Huisman et al., 2008; 
Amaral et al., 2009; Neave & Van Vaught, 1994; De Boer et al., 2007; Findkli, 2017). This 
is because as a knowledge institution the university does not fully resemble either corporate 
or public entities: It stands apart in a class of its own. Governance processes and 
mechanisms in the university pervade it and are rarely located in a single institutional 
location. Several different actors in the university including staff, students, governors and 
external commentators play an inricate and interlinked part in developing these processes 
and mechanisms. There are complex trade-offs in each process and mechanism (Quyen, 
2014; Wise et al., 2020; Shattock, 2004a, b; Taylor, 2013a, b; Buckland, 2004). At the 
same time university academic and non-academic performance itself is unusual. Research 
and teaching performance are separate and yet inter-related with there being trade-offs as 
well as conformances aspects within them. The university is also a financial entity and its 
sustainability is crucial. 
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The difficulties in defining the parameters of university governance and performance are 
two-fold. First, the usual board level and audit related governance common to the corporate 
and public sector are also present in universities too (Armstrong et al., 2005; Dahya et al., 
2002; Cadbury, 1992; Bhagat & Black, 2002). However, such governances itself do not 
fully capture many other dimensions of this entity’s governance challenge. These include 
crucial governance policies related to its academic and non-academic functions in which 
the institution often displays a wide range of discretionary decisions (Jongbloed et al., 
2018; Gayle et al., 2003; Buckland, 2004; Gohari et al., 2019; Vukasovic, 2018). These 
policies are not solely framed by the board but are actually are the result of complex 
interactions across the institution. Therefore, to effectively identify university governance, 
a much wider set of parameters may be needed than what is currently common in the 
empirical literature (Ntim et al., 2017; Olson, 2000; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & 
Armstrong, 2015; Harris, 2014; Tarbert et al., 2008; Johnes & Virmani, 2019). 
 
Second university performance itself is a composite of research, teaching and financial 
performance. However, research and teaching performance are hard to identify and 
measure by themselves (De Boaer et al., 2015; Abubakar et al., 2018; Taylor, 2001; Ball 
& Wilkinson, 1994; Kells, 1992; Asif & Searcy, 2014). Researchers’ performance can be 
measured from the perspective of the institution’s ability to sponsor and win approval for 
new research ideas. It can also be measured from the quality of the university’spublished 
output. Finally, research performance can also be identified with the institution’s ability to 
help research students complete their PhDs (Cave , 1997; Asif & Searcy, 2014; Jongbloed 
et al., 2018; Parker, 2012: 2011; Neuman & Guthrie, 2006; Pollitt, 1990; Linke, 1995; 
Dario et al., 2015). Each of these three different perspectives may only be partial and have 
to be combined to obtain a full picture of the university’s research performance.  
 
Similarly, teaching performance is even more difficult to assess because the student 
consumer of teaching services is an uninformed consumer of what is often classed as a 
“credence good”. This makes student satisfaction levels a poor indicator of university 
teaching performance (Van Vught & Ziegele, 2012; Bonroy & Constantatos, 2008; Dulleck 
& Kerschbamer, 2006; Brown, 2015; Yorke, 2009a, b). Once again there are at least two 
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other measures that can be used here namely the students’ graduate prospects/completion 
rates and independent teaching grant provider assessments of the institution. All these 
teaching performance measures may have to be combined to effectively define its 
parameters.   
 
The difficulties in identifying university governance and performance parameters have 
propelled extant scholarship to measure both constructs in different ways. A large number 
of scholars have used the existing corporate template to identify the usual board and audit 
related governance antecedents and associate them with academic and non-academic 
performance of universities. Notable examples here include Harris (2014) and Olson 
(2002). Lokawaduge (2011) represents the first systematic attempt to study the two 
constructs and their associations in detail using a fine division between the institution 
research, teaching and financial performance. Once again, the author replicates the usual 
board level and audit related corporate governance templates in her analysis. 
 
As such, the present thesis adopts a singular attempt to effectively identify and define the 
parameters of university governance and performance in UK HEI. It does so by carefully 
defining either construct, theorising each using seven selected theories and operationalising 
the two constructs using a wide range of carefully chosen parameters for each (See Chapter 
5, table 4).  
 
1.2.2 The Multi-dimensional Role of the University in the UK HE sector 
 
A University is a unique multi-dimensional institution with myriad roles and functions that 
often conflict with each other and create unique and difficult trade-offs (Gayle et al., 2003; 
Shattock, 2010; Kim, 2008; Melville-Ross, 2010; Hordern, 2013). This is one major reason 
why a university has traditionally been a bastion of independence free from governmental 
or bureaucratic oversight. A range of scholars (See Toma, 2007; Parker, 2011; Trakman, 
2008; Christensen, 2011) advocates that UK universities should retain these independent 
and special governance arrangements. Their argument is that academics alone have the 
experiential expertise to calibrate the difficult trade-offs that permeate every dimension of 
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a university’s governance and performance and integrate them together. Many of their 
arguments reflect the multi-dimensional and complex nature of university governance and 
performance. At this stage therefore it seems fruitful to engage with these strands in this 
scholarship discourse and analyse them.   
 
Authors such as Furedi (2002) and Kreysinv (2002) ask a series of inter-related questions. 
For example they seek to resolve if governance structures and mechanisms should 
encourage universities to pursue ‘knowledge without fear or favou’ or instead create 
incentives for it to become an ‘applied knowledge portal’ content with developing 
incremental technical knowledge? Should governance emphasise the university’s role as a 
‘skilling class’ with the limited objective of developing the managers and leaders of the 
future? Or should these institutions be encouraged to embrace an holistic vision of 
themselves both as creators of radically new scientific knowledge as well as the related 
professional scientists? These questions are not easy to answer. Inter- and Intra-
departmental governance, interdisciplinary coordination, teaching and research protocols 
and intra-organisational culture are all strongly implicated here. It is fairly obvious that 
complex trade-offs need to be fine-tuned at many levels of the university to resolve such 
dilemmas.  
 
Others, such as Barnet (1994:22) and Apple (1988:120) have questioned if good 
governance will only result in the university becoming a ‘metric driven academic factory’ 
rather than a transformational institution’? This raises difficult questions for teaching and 
research priorities, fund raising strategies and assessment criteria. In relation to each of 
these governance aspects, a university has multiple aims and objectives and the above 
questions underline how the achievement of one may conflict with that of another.  
 
Elsewhere, Collini (2012: 198) draws attention to the fact that universities are complex 
organisms fostering an extraordinary variety of intellectual, scientific and cultural activity. 
He avers that these multiple performance criteria cannot and should not be seen from the 
perspective of a single nation, generation or academic discipline. For instance, a university 
cannot narrowly focus on the achievement of just national competitiveness, the needs of 
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current generations of knowledge users, or the requirements of one subject. It has to 
achieve an incredible balance between conserving, understanding, extending and handing 
on to subsequent generations the intellectual scientific and cultural heritage of mankind. 
Such a balance implies that a university must necessarily be multi-dimensional in its 
governance approach and strategy (Collini, 2012; Furedi, 2002; Christensen, 2011).  
 
The university’s fundamental trade-off between Teaching and Research further illustrates 
this multi-dimensional nature. Both are core functions of a University. Doing both well is 
difficult although there is much evidence (RAE results, 1996-2008; League tables of 
Times, Guardian, Sunday Times, Independence League; cited by Shattock, 2010:13-15) 
that each complementarily supports the other in a virtuous cycle especially within the better 
performing university. For the average university, however, time, money and skilled 
human resources are limited.  It is quite plausible that a universitythat focuses on world-
class research ends up compromising on teaching efficiency and vice versa. This explains 
why improving the governance structures of a university from just the teaching perspective 
by designing teaching protocols that take up much of the time and effort of the faculty 
might reduce the research quality of the institution (Shattock, 2013a; Gayle et al., 2003: 
Foskett, 2010). More significantly many universities that are considered research intensive 
tend to neglect teaching, a fact that has been stressed by surveys undertaken in the UK by 
the HEA in 2009 (HEA, 2009; Shattock, 2013a: 111). The trade-off between research and 
teaching is, therefore, another illustration of the multi-dimensional nature of university 
governance and performance. An holistic combined view of both functions is essential in 
the governance of the institution, and yet this delicate calibration is challenging to apply.  
 
The classic conflict between basic and applied research illustrates yet another aspect of 
the multi-dimensionality of university governance. Basic fundamental Science and Arts 
research is difficult, expensive, and time consuming; such research is difficult to finance 
or justify economically (Collini, 2012; Shattock, 2013). On the other hand, applied research 
is commercially viable, finding easy sponsors among the myriad corporate and charitable 
foundations. A university could very easily ignore its primary responsibility to expand the 
realms of fundamental knowledge, preferring to create incremental technological 
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knowledge that is commercially viable. In fact, this is exactly what scholars (Collini, 2012; 
Moriarity, 2011) claim the UK university funding and governance reform is currently 
doing. This would not show up in the short run but may harm the competitiveness of 
universities and, in turn, the country in the long run. Making decisions on the inter se 
priority between applied and basic research is not easy. It would require a level of domain 
knowledge and expertise that is often simply unavailable outside academia. Clearly, 
establishing effective governance protocols for research would need to take account of 
these types of complexities.  
 
A rapidly emerging recent discourse in European university governance (Vukasovic et al., 
2018; Hooghe & Marx, 2003; Piattoni, 2010; Braun, 2008: Chou & Gornitzka, 2014; Chou 
et al., 2017; Eitken, 2015: Peters, 2015) focuses on the multi-level, multi-actor and multi-
issue dimensions of such governance. The three governance aspects highlighted in this 
discourse are highly relevant to the discussion here. They expand on many of the concerns. 
For instance, there is the multi-level aspect, implying the many different levels (national, 
regional, state, local, top and middle) of university governance and its regulation. Then 
there is the multi-actor aspect involving different state and non-state stakeholders including 
student/parent bodies, research/teaching funding councils and quality assessment agencies 
in this sector. Finally, there is the multi-issue aspect, encompassing a range of complex 
trade-offs including those between research and teaching, basic and applied research, 
different generations of higher education students, and many others as discussed above. 
Clearly each of these aspects is yet another confirmation of the multi-dimensional role of 
university governance. 
 
Elsewhere Jongbloed et al (2018) identify an emerging perspective in transparency 
related aspects of university governance. The authors show how information disclosure 
about university learning and research outcomes is becoming more important. This 
importance stems from the growing realisation that higher education can be inferred to be 
either an ‘experience good’, i.e., one whose quality consumers can only judge after 
consuming it, or a ‘credence good’, i.e., one whose quality is largely a matter of trust and 
may never be truly assessable (Bonroy & Constantatos, 2008; Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 
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2006; Van Vught et al., 2012).  This makes the quality assurance of higher education multi-
layered complex and multi-dimensional. A student might never know the true value of this 
education yet there is even more need here for full information disclosure, credence 
evaluation and independent rating of the university to enable him or her to make an 
informed choice. Therefore, there is a rapidly growing body of literature (Stoker, 2006; 
Provan & Kenis, 2007; Benington & Moore, 2011; Jongbloed et al., 2018) that emphasises 
networked governance structures and mechanisms in the higher education sector where a 
central government authority intermeshes with lateral and independent specialised 
agencies to regulate it. This complex networked external governance in the higher 
education sector is nevertheless a primary reflection of its multi-dimensional nature. 
 
The above discussion makes clear the fact that universities, both in general and in the UK, 
are expected to perform at different levels and in different dimensions. There are complex 
trade-offs inherent in many of these multiple governance and performance aspects. To 
achieve optimal multi-dimensional performance, universities must necessarily design 
internal governance mechanisms at different levels and in different ways. Therefore, 
empirical university governance research needs to study the university in relation to these 
different dimensions. 
1.2.3  University Governance and Performance: the need for new insights  
 
Universities are multi-dimensional and complex institutions. They need to be governed 
across many inter-related dimensions and their performance needs to be assessed 
holistically combining many different aspects (Shattock, 2010: 105). Yet there is a dearth 
of analytical studies that examine these different dimensions and levels of governance 
within a university or their impacts on performance. Worryingly, despite the several recent 
changes including the institution of a super-regulator in the OFS, there is growing evidence 
of empirically unsubstantiated policy and regulatory action in the higher education sector 
(Ntim et al., 2017; Bradshaw & Fredette, 2009; Helms & Price, 2005). Universities are still 
being viewed as ‘knowledge factories’ charged with producing voluminous research and 
graduating large student populations with small regard for quality or long-term outcomes 
(Shattock, 1998; Parker, 2011; Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013). Despite growing public 
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accountability pressures and an increasing worry about the quality of higher education in 
the UK (Frankel, 2011; Taylor-Gooby & Staker, 2011; DOE, 2018) the Government has 
continued to focus on greater university coverage of the student population by expanding 
existing universities, licensing new ones and remaining obsessed with just creating a level 
playing field for entry into the sector (DOE, 2017; 2018).  
 
Simultaneously, given the limits to government finances, universities have borne the brunt 
of almost every public austerity initiative. They have been left to find means to finance 
themselves through private tuition fees and other commercial and quasi-commercial 
arrangements. This has led to declining public university funding, falling research and 
teaching quality, expanding student populations, growing private/corporate involvement in 
fundraising, and growing numbers of “independent” watchdogs and regulators aimed at 
enforcing a modicum of quality assurance in the sector (Ntim et al., 2017; Brown, 2011a; 
Foskett, 2010; Hemsley-Brown, 2011). A raft of reform measures in the UK has been 
driven through within a short span of two decades (Robbins, 1963; Jarratt, 1985; ERA, 
1988; FHEA, 1992; Nolan. 1995; 1996; Dearing, 1997; THEA, 1998; Lambert, 2003; 
HEA, 2004; Browne, 2010; DOE, 2016, 2017, 2018) without any empirical evidence that 
these actually work. Extensive bureaucracies with wide ranging powers to certify check 
and make policy recommendations have been set up, each with its own separate agenda 
and goals.  
Although the recent move to simplify the regulatory landscape by amalgamating several 
institutions into the OFS and the UKRI seems to be a step in the right direction, yet scholars 
have problematised these moves. Many of them have located these initiatives within a 
broader market-based reform initiative in the UK intended to commercialise and 
professionalise the university and introduce a quasi-market for both universities and 
students. This has naturally led to a large body of critical literature (Mintzberg & Rose, 
2003; Minor, 2003; Campbell, 2003; Meyer, 2002; Sora, 2001; Collini, 2005; Parker, 2011; 
McGettigan, 2013; Ntim et al., 2017; Jongbloed et al., 2018) questioning the implications 
of these reforms for the complex multi-dimensional aspects of university governance and 
performance. 
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1.2.4 Overall Research Implications 
 
University governance and performance and the likely multi-dimensional links between 
them have been under-researched in extant research (Lamm, 2003; Larner & Le Heron, 
2005; Ntim et al., 2017). Given a university’s unique nature, neither its governance nor its 
performance can be easily assessed, monitored, reformed or recalibrated. At the same time 
each of the myriad aspects and dimensions of university governance potentially affect this 
entity’s multi-dimensional performance. Studying these complex inter-linkages and trade-
offs in a rigorous manner is essential. The universities, their varied stakeholders and 
multifarious regulators need such empirical research. Without this, neither will the task of 
setting the right governance/performance standards for the sector be accomplished, nor will 
such standards be monitored or evaluated effectively (Salter & Tapper, 2000).  
This explains the fundamental research motivation underlying this research project. It 
directly leads to the following principal research question.  
1.3 Research Question and Objectives 
 
What are the missing multiple dimensions of university governance in the UK? How does 
multi-dimensional university governance impact upon its performance? 
 
These research questions encapsulate at least five different yet inter-related research 
objectives as listed below: 
1. To identify and uncover missing dimensions of university governance in the UK. 
2. To evaluate how all dimensions of university governance impact on its research, 
teaching and financial performance. 
3. To critically unpack the trade-offs and interrelationships within each dimension of 
university governance. 
4. To analyse how the governance trade-offs and interrelationships identified in 
objective 3 impact upon a university’s research, teaching and financial 
performance. 
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5. To assess the role played by external governance regulators within the UK HEI 
upon university governance. 
 
1.4 Research Scope and Methodology 
This research provides a rigorous evaluation of a range of quantitative governance and 
performance metrics in the higher education sector of the UK. The use of these metrics is 
primarily in the shape of a longitudinal dataset covering ten years of university functioning. 
It is only through such a dataset that the governance-performance relationship may be 
explored across time and entity simultaneously. This is vital due to the very nature of such 
inter-relationships that change across universities as well as across years. 
 
The scope of the empirical data used in the thesis is derived from a range of secondary 
sources such as the HESA and university financial/annual reports. It must be stressed that 
many key metrics have been framed out of the extensive policy-based changes 
implemented in the sector across the period 2005 to 2015. This is why the thesis chose this 
decade as the most appropriate for the analysis.  
 
The overall geographical scope of the project encompasses all 132 universities licensed to 
operate in the UK (See Appendix 9). A very large list of firm-year governance and 
performance variables is targeted in the project (See Chapter 5, Tables 4 and table 5 ). 
These include standard board composition governance variables such as board size, board 
independence, and board diversity. They also include audit related ones such as the use of 
a BIG4 auditor firm or the size of the internal audit committee. However, the research also 
evaluates a range of multi-dimensional governance variables including entry standards, 
student-staff ratios, pedagogical orientations in student body diversity, 
research/teaching/gender staff level diversities, and unique asset revenue structures 
reflected in endowment and tuition fee dependences. In addition, university performance, 
both academic and non-academic, is subsumed in the study. Within academic performance 
a range of research and teaching metrics including research quality, research grants, 
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teaching grants, student satisfaction, graduate prospects, completion rates, good honours 
proportions are used, while non-academic performance is measured through the asset 
turnovers of universities. The larger list of governance and performance variables used, it 
is hoped, will decipher the many dimensions of these constructs as well as the complexities 
and trade-offs inherent in them. From a methodological perspective it will also enable a 
thorough parametrisation of the governance performance linkage in the chosen UK HEI 
sample. 
The thesis adopts a rigorous methodology (see Chapter 4). To uncover the many 
dimensions of the academic performance of a university, it begins with a factor analysis. 
Research and teaching performance are each measured by a composite of individual 
variables and index variables. The indices are based on the factor analysis while the 
individual research and teaching measures selected are those with a potential for capturing 
unique dimensions of either performance (see Chapter 5, Tables 7 and 10). In the 
independent governance variables, the research begins with a descriptive uni/bivariate 
analysis and cross-correlation analysis of all the collated variables (see Section 5.2.1). A 
battery of tests is implemented to identify heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, 
abnormalities in distributions, multicollinearity and endogeneity (see Appendix, 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6). This is done to carefully examine all peculiarities of the dataset including errors, 
assumptions and biases. Theoretical indications are then used to identify the most 
appropriate set of independent (governance) variables that span the research gap of the 
thesis. This results in three models in research performance, two models in teaching 
performance, and one model in financial performance, respectively. Each model is first 
estimated in GLS fixed-effects. This is primarily done to adjust for the abnormalities 
evident in most variables in the dataset. However, robustly a set of additional regressions 
are estimated using GLS Maximum Likelihood, GLS Auto Regression, and two 
instrumental regressions the 2-stage least squares (2SLS) and the 2-stage Generalised 
Method of Moments (2SGMM) (Sections 6.1.1.2, 6.1.2.2, 6.1.3.2, 6.2.1.2, 6.2.2.2, and 
6.3.2). To show the biases inherent in simple estimations, a panel OLS regression is also 
implemented and shown for reference (see Appendix 7).  
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Overall, it is hoped that the rich and expanded data set and robust set of methods employed 
will enable the thesis to answer its main research objectives outlined earlier.  
 
1.5 Novel Research Contribution 
 
The thesis intends to contribute to the body of knowledge in university governance in the 
UK in at least six distinct ways. First and foremost, it seeks to depart from the extant 
emphasis on corporate style governance in Higher Education. A central contention of the 
thesis is that universities are unique knowledge entities that are significantly different from 
firms. Although they deliver a service the very process of education delivery is unlike any 
other service delivery in the economy. Research and teaching are highly interactive 
complex services. The first creates original knowledge while the second transmits and 
applies it: it also feeds into the first. This knowledge creation and dissemination loop is 
what helps these higher education institutions to expand and enrich societal understandings 
in different subject domains. Governance and performance at this institution cannot be like 
ordinary economic institutions such as firms. Therefore the thesis aims to expand the 
contours of debate in higher education towards a more holistic conception of the university. 
  
Second, it seeks to construct and define university governance and performance in the best 
possible way so that the full scope of parameters underlying each are fully captured. This 
thesis also aims to move away from an over reliance on corporate-centric definitions. 
Instead it combines a range of definitions to craft an holistic one here. It is hoped that the 
very creation of a non-corporate definition of university governance and performance 
would expand the lexicon of the debate and enable greater clarity for the sector as a whole.  
Third, the research intends to operationalise a multi-theoretical framework to study UK 
university governance and performance. It is anticipated that this conjoint use of different 
theoretical perspectives will allow a deeper and richer uncovering of multi-dimensional 
university governance and performance. The four core theories and the three ancillary ones 
used should expand the field of investigation and act as a fundamental template for all 
future theoretical exploration. At another level, it is anticipated that many new theoretical 
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indications would become available through this. These indications would prove 
invaluable in framing a range of different research trajectories in the future. 
Fourth, the research targets an institution-wide approach in the higher education 
governance performance debate. Instead of focusing on just the university board-level or 
audit-based governance antecedents, it intends to dig deeper into this unique knowledge 
institution. To do so it uses a much wider range of variables in a rich panel dataset of UK 
HEIs covering a recent full decade of governance performance metrics (i.e., 2005-2015). 
It is expected that this will help the thesis uncover not only many hidden dimensions of 
university governance but also the complex nature of interrelationships between such 
governance and the institution’s performance. In that sense it should provide a rich and 
robust source of empirical proof for what has worked and what has not in the UK HEI 
sector. A fuller field level picture is intended here that could both corroborate or contradict 
normative, qualitative and argumentative voices in extant literatures. 
Fifth, the research’s longitudinal aspect has another intention. Governance and 
performance relationships in a university are blurred. Where governance ends and 
performance begins is difficult to identify. They are both processes as well as outcomes. 
By its use of many new governance metrics of UK universities recently made available, 
the study aims to unpack these process-like characteristics and demonstrate a set of 
complex trade-offs that exist here. It is hoped that this will detail the true significance and 
enormity of the challenge facing university governors.   
Finally, the robust and rigorous analysis intended by the research is expected to inform 
regulatory reform in UK HEIs with hitherto missing empirical elements. By evaluating 
currently prescribed statutes/mandates in the country within the governance performance 
data of the universities, it expects to add credible empirical evidence to substantiate 
regulatory reform. It is hoped that a sensible and appropriate blueprint for effective UK 





This introductory chapter has presented and contextualised the core problem of university 
governance and performance. It begins with Part one, which is a detailed background and 
context for the study. In the main this part discusses the rich and varied historical 
background of the higher education landscape in the UK.  The features and differentiated 
patterns of universities in the UK and how they have changed over time are the key focus 
here. The chapter then presents the changing contours of the regulatory landscape in the 
country showing the complexities embedded in them. The next section of the chapter 
discusses the main motivations underlying the research. The section divides into four main 
parts. Part one articulates the parameters of university governance and performance. This 
then leads to a rich discussion of the multi-dimensional role of the university in UK higher 
education in Part two. From this discussion, Part Three pulls together themes that reflect 
why there is a need for new insights in associating university governance and performance. 
Having justified this need for new insights part four draws them into the overall research 
implications relevant to this research. 
 
Drawing on the last two parts of the previous section, the third section of the chapter 
formulates the central research question for the thesis. It then fleshes out this question into 
five research objectives that constitute its core. The section then moves to outline the 
unique research methodology sample and scope intended to unravel the complex multi-
dimensional association between university governance and performance in UK HEIs. 
 
The final section of this introduction presents the six important novel contributions targeted 
by the thesis. It gives a bird’s eye view of what the reader can expect in terms of the addition 
to the body of knowledge in this domain.
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2. Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
2.1 Overview 
 
This Literature review is structured into two main parts presented in Chapters 2 and 3 
respectively. Part one presented in this chapter is the theoretical literature review. It can broadly 
be divided into two segments. The first segment comprising Sections 2.2 and 2.3 is definitional 
in its scope, while the second segment in Section 2.4 is a multi-theoretical framework 
underpinning university governance and performance. 
 
The first section starts by critically searching extant definitions of university governance and 
performance with a view to framing the most optimal definition of both constructs. Without 
such definitional clarity it would be impossible to shed light on the multiple missing 
dimensions of university governance and performance. Linking governance with performance 
through well-defined parameters would also prove intractable if such governance and 
performance themselves were ill-defined. The second section analyses the multi-theoretical 
framework underpinning both constructs.  
Part two is presented in Chapter 3 and establishes the empirical research gap motivating the 
thesis. It then develops a range of inter-linked hypotheses evaluating the many aspects of the 
research question. Read jointly, these two chapters theoretically and empirically define this 
multi-dimensional investigation of the links between university governance and performance.  
 
This chapter defines university governance and performance and then critically evaluates a 
multi-theoretical framework underpinning the links between them. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 review 
the extant definitions of university governance and university performance respectively. Each 
section then frames an operational definition for each construct that is most appropriate to the 
objectives of this thesis. Section 2.4 first justifies why a multi-theoretical framework composed 
of seven different theories is essential for any detailed study of university governance and 
performance. It then critically evaluates each of these seven different theories that arguably 
encompass the theoretical underpinning for this research. The chapter then concludes in 
Section 2.5 with the contours of a full-fledged theoretical framework to evaluate the research 
question of the thesis. 
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2.2 University Governance 
2.2.1. Definitions of University Governance 
 
Defining university governance is fraught with contradictions and pluralities. Governance of 
such a multi-dimensional entity such as a university works at different levels of its hierarchy, 
is constituted by complex combinations of structures/policies and has both internal as well as 
external aspects. Ironically such multi-level multi-tier governance has not really been 
adequately or comprehensively defined in the extant literature. Scholars have assumed that 
either corporate governance or public sector governance literature will provide definitions that 
apply. This is a fallacy. Universities are very different from either corporate or public firms 
and transcend either entity due to their unique knowledge creation and dissemination function. 
In what follows this is shown explicitly. Many such narrow definitions from both discourses 
are compared and analysed before an optimal operational definition is framed. This carefully 
crafted optimal definition of university governance helps to better articulate both the missing 
and multiple dimensions of the theoretical construct and its, therefore, a logical foundation for 
all the theoretical analysis that follows.. 
 
2.2.1.1 The Corporate Governance-Based Paradigm 
 
Universities are unique entities but they still provide a service to the students who populate 
them. In that they are much like corporate service providers, and so the logical place to start 
the search for a definition of university governance must begin with corporate governance 
literature. This is why many HEI scholars define university governance on templates developed 
in the corporate sector.  
 
Armstrong, Jia & Tonkidis, (2005), Spiller (2002), Dahya et al. (2002), Williamson, (2005) 
and Shore and Wright (2004) collectively argue that University Governance like Corporate 
governance can be defined as “the organizational structures and processes for decision-making, 
accountability, control and behavior at the top of its organizational pyramid”. Clearly such a 
definition ignores not only the several ways in which a university decides its governance 
structures and processes, but also misses the many dimensions in which university governance 
is reflected. Decision-making, accountability, and control within such an institution are not 
always displayed at its top, and are often collegial and decentralised. The university board is 
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not the sole foucus of governance processes unlike its corporate counterpart. In every 
committee or sub-committee on academic affairs including salary structures, audit aspects, 
marking schemes, subject syllabi, and staff contracts, governance decisions are taken severally 
and jointly. Financial and administrative governance likewise pervades the institution as 
students and staff interact to make the university campus a fulfilling and creative learning 
environment. This explains why Jongbloed et al. (2018) and others argue that unlike the 
corporate firm, governance in a university is multi-dimensional, multi-actor and multi-issue 
(Jongbloed et al., 2018). Therefore it is very definitely not governed solely from the top. 
 
Similarly, Morin and Jarrell (2001), Bhagat and Black (2002), Kahan and Rock (2003), 
Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2004), Babic (2003), and Chowdary (2003) jointly aver that 
university governance “is the framework that controls and safeguards the interests of the 
relevant stakeholders of this institution”. However, university governance cannot just control 
and safeguard the interests of its “relevant stakeholders”. There are several other multiple 
actors and issues with which universities are inevitably linked. For example, while deciding 
teaching and research governance the interests of future generations of stakeholders might need 
to be accounted for. As usual there are complex trade-offs here; between the interests of current 
students and future students, current instructors and future instructors, current researchers and 
future researchers and so on. Governance might similarly have to trade-off commercially viable 
applied research against much needed fundamental research. Different constituents of society 
have multifarious expectations from a university and it has an important function to establish 
a sustainable balance against these many competing stakeholder claims.  
 
Cadbury (1992:15) and OECD’s (2004) simple yet effective definition of corporate governance 
as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” is entirely inapplicable to 
universities. A university’s multi-dimensionality implies that there can never be a single 
unitary governance system exerted from the top of the organisational pyramid by which it may 
be directed or controlled.  Research and teaching, the core functions of a university, need 
direction and control in some aspects from board level but in many other aspects independently 
at the departmental or sub-departmental level. Such governance is also subject to a range of 
complex trade-offs that go far beyond the confines of neatly definable operational parameters 
so characteristic of the governance of the corporate firm. For instance, Quality assurance 
concerns permeate the governance of teaching and research in a university in multi-
dimensional ways. These are not always directed or measured from the top or even in a given 
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standardised way. In contrast firms’ quality assurance is much simpler and easier to 
operationalise. 
 
It is therefore evident that the single unitary system of firm governance espoused by Cadbury 
and others is a complete misfit in university governance. Yet it is surprising to find a fairly 
large set of university governance scholars (Armstrong, Jia & Tonkidis, 2005; Dahya et al., 
2002; Bhagat & Black, 2002; Kahan & Rock, 2003) subscribing to definitions derived from 
the corporate governance paradigm. This is highly unfortunate and is arguably the artifact of 
the growing prominence of right-of-centre managerial and utilitarian discourses in university 
literature. 
2.2.1.2 The Public Sector Governance Paradigm 
 
Even when privately run, a university is often based on a public purpose. Like public sector 
firms, a university is also entrusted with public funds and it too is required to demonstrate its 
competence to balance the competing governance needs of widely disparate knowledge 
function stakeholders such as staff, students, parents, researchers, firms and the Government. 
This is why some strands of university governance scholarship (Nelson, 2003b; Fredrickson & 
Smith, 2003; Edwards, 2000; Fielden, 2007; Coaldrake Stedman & Little, 2003, Dixon & Coy, 
2007; Shattock, 2004a, b; Bennett, 2002) have based their definitions of public sector 
governance templates. This also explains why scholars like Buckland (2004) contend that 
university-governing bodies should shoulder their top policy level responsibilities instead of 
representing and advocating the narrow interests of their diverse stakeholders. After all they 
are like the public sector firm and must first and foremost earn an adequate return for the 
taxpayer who has entrusted them with public funds. However, such a stand once again conflicts 
with the very idea of a multi-dimensional governance definition for a university. A university 
is clearly unlike a public firm and has responsibilities to a much larger, more diverse set of 
societal constituents. It does not merely exist to earn a return on invested public funds. Even a 
public sector firm’s expanded notion of governance falls short of encompassing this 
institution’s multi-dimensional governance.  
 
This is why it is difficult to accept Nelson’s (2004b; 2004) view that Vice-Chancellors’ should 
be referred to as “CEOs of public entities” or Dixon & Coy’s (2007) opinion that they must 
exert managerial power and be accountable to the public exchequer. The VC’s role is much 
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broader and wider, and they need to deliver multi-dimensional governance and performance. 
Improved definitions within these strands see university governance as:  
“the set of responsibilities and practices, policies and procedures exercised by an agency’s 
executive to provide strategic direction, ensure objectives are achieved, manage risks and use 
resources responsibly and with accountability” (ANAO, 2006: 6; ASX, 2007: 3).  
 
There is still no mention, however, of the range of different stakeholders, their differing 
concerns, research and teaching functions or multi-dimensional trade-offs here.  
2.2.1.3 A definition that is partially encompassing 
Gayle et al. (2003: 1-10) arguably present the first contours of an expanded definition of 
university governance. The authors opine: 
 
“University Governance refers to the structure and process of authoritative decision making 
across issues that are significant for external as well as internal stakeholders within a 
university. Effective University Governance provides institutional purpose clarifies strategic 
direction identifies priorities and exerts sufficient control to manage outcomes. The attitudes 
and values of individual leaders together with the underlying organizational culture are at 
least as important for governance as institutional structure.”  
This definition effectively engages with the multi-dimensional nature of the university. For 
example the fact that it refers to how university governance deals with external as well as 
internal stakeholders recognises the multiple stakeholders in this institution and the scope for 
potential conflict and trade-offs between them (Gordon et al., 2002; Coy and Dixon, 2004). 
Similarly it rightly underlines that university governance clarifies strategic direction and 
identifies priorities. Such emphases presages and subsumes within itself the likelihood that 
university governors will most likely debate conflicting strategies and disagree on the ranking 
of different organisational priorities (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Michelon & Parbonetti, 
2012). Finally, a unique contribution of this definition is that it implicates organisational 
culture as an important determinant of university governance. The very nature of a university 
as an institution of knowledge creation and dissemination makes it vitally dependent on the 
attitudes and values fostered by its organisational culture. To illustrate universities imbued with 
a culture that encourages “knowledge for its own sake” and prefers “students who challenge 
the status quo” will potentially govern themselves in very different ways from counterparts that 
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are more focused on “contributions that are directly relevant and useful”. There are those like 
Wilmott (1993) and Trowler (2008: 114) who patently argue that universities should be like 
the former, i.e., be dialogical rather than mono-cultural. Strands in the literature on socio-
cultural approaches to learning, teaching and research in universities (Ashwin, 2008; Trowler, 
2008:19) often decry how the current psychological approaches completely neglect 
institutional cultural context. Entwistle (2007) suggests that student learning outcomes, 
teaching protocols and research routines at universities are critically dependent on how syllabi 
are defined and assessed. These are governance policies rooted in the organisational culture 
and so must not be ignored. Similarly, universities with a multi-ethnic orientation might view 
internal and external governance processes in different ways. Overall, by placing 
organisational culture in the centre of the debate on university governance, this definition 
correctly extends its breadth and scope. 
2.2.1.4 Operational definition of Multi-dimensional University Governance 
 
Despite these ameliorating features, the definition still falls short on at least three counts in 
terms of the research objectives of this thesis. First and foremost it fails to account for the many 
dimensions of governance structure processes and mechanisms within a university.  As argued 
earlier, the university as an institution is unique. Its larger societal purpose and function creates 
needs for multi-dimensional governance that pervades this institution, unlike a corporate firm. 
Complex trade-offs are inherent in such governance and need to be explicitly accounted for in 
any definition. Second the definition does not even refer to teaching and research. These are 
the major functions of a university and have inter-related dimensions that are complex and 
synergistic: University Governance has to be defined with specific reference to these. Finally 
the definition falls significantly short when it suggests that Universities only need “sufficient 
control to manage outcomes”. This is not true since much empirical literature (Hordern, 2013; 
Parry, 2013; Shattock, 2010; Middlehurst, 2013; Rowlands, 2013) has already shown how 
universities have shown declining levels of governance and performance precisely because 
they have focused on just adequate or sufficient control rather than studied and optimal control. 
Given their multi-dimensional nature universities are more in need of studied and optimal 
control. For these reasons three adaptations are made to Gayle, et al.’s (2003) definition as 
follows: 
“University Governance refers to the structure and process of authoritative decision making 
across both issues that are significant for its diverse external/internal stakeholders as well as 
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in multiple dimensions that exhibit complex inter-related trade-offs. University Governance 
provides institutional purpose, clarifies strategic direction and identifies 
teaching/research/administrative priorities. In all of these functions it exerts studied optimal 
and effective control at different levels within the organization. The attitudes and values of 
a university’s leaders and its organizational culture are importantly implicated in its 
governance.” 
 
This revised and adapted definition is operationalised in this thesis.  
2.3 University Performance  
2.3.1 Definition of University Performance 
 
Performance in a tertiary education institution like a university is contentious. Scholars often 
criticise the use of any performance indicator in a university; The argument made is that 
universities perform in so many different dimensions for their diverse sets of stakeholders 
(Braun, 2008; Piattoni, 2010) that measuring these in an integrated way is almost impossible. 
In this vein, Linke (1995) suggests that performance indicators can rarely if ever can reflect the 
“true purpose of higher education”, and are therefore are irrelevant. Similarly, Pollitt (1990) 
and Neumann and Guthrie (2006) aver that the considerable confusion that often exists over 
even the definitions of different organisational performance indicators makes their usefulness 
in universities doubtful. Cave et al. (1997) argue that the inherent complexity of university 
performance makes the use of surrogate proxy variables here inevitable. The true performance 
of the institution consequently tends to get distorted in the varying interpretations of these 
proxies. Despite these fundamental objections, defining the performance of a university, in all 
its complexities and trade-offs is important. Such a vital societal institution cannot be allowed 
to remain subjectively determined. The following section critically evaluates a range of 
proposed definitions of university performance from the extant literature. From this, and a 
review of historical developments in UK higher education a relevant definition of multi-
dimensional university performance is forged here.  
 
Some strands of the literature forward narrow definitions of university performance. 
Worthington and Lee (2005) aver that the university is primarily an institution that generates 
and transmits original knowledge. It is in these two core functions i.e. one of generating new 
knowledge (which is research) and the other of transmitting it (which is teaching), that it must 
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demonstrate originality and innovation. Performance here must therefore be solely measured 
in terms of teaching and research innovation. Such innovation requires the university to invest 
significant time, effort, and resources into these functions. Abbott and Doucouliagos (2003b) 
and Warning (2007) even show how high-performance universities differ significantly from 
their peers precisely on these metrics. Therefore, this strand suggests that university 
performance must necessarily focus entirely on a large set of research and teaching related 
metrics (Flegg et al., 2004; Askiran, 2001; Izadi et al., 2002). However, this restricted 
definition of university performance clearly fails to capture the many complexities and 
dimensions of a university’s performance. For example, although teaching and research 
constitute the primary functions of a university there are still a range of other functions such as 
student recruitment, staff training, career placement and so on that are nevertheless extremely 
important. Similarly, administrative and financial support functions, without which teaching 
and research will not get delivered cannot be ignored as they play a vital role in the delivery of 
these functions.  
Therefore, a large group of scholars agrees that a university delivers a range of different 
services to its widely disparate stakeholders. They underline that plural definitions of university 
performance should be used. These must be directly linked to the entire range of output levels 
of the many different services the institution provides to different salient stakeholders. A few 
such definitions are highlighted below. Crowther (1996) suggests that different dimensions of 
university performance must each be defined with respect to some relevant stakeholder 
grouping. For students, for example, university performance would be reflected in graduation 
rates, student satisfaction scores, job placement rates and starting salary levels. In research, 
however, output, its quality, number of citations and ability to attract research funding is what 
would constitute performance. Marketing performance would have to measure the university’s 
ability to attract students, researchers, highly skilled lecturers and professors, while 
administrative performance would have to assess the value-for-money of staff and facilities 
employed in many different parts of the institution. Therefore, defining university performance 
is decidedly complicated from such a multiple stakeholder perspective.  
To add to this complexity, Vidovich (2002), Currie and Vidovich (2000) and Vidovich and 
Slee (2001) raise the intractable question of quality. The authors argue that any appropriate 
definition of university performance must necessarily capture the quality of the multi-
dimensional services that the institution provides. The authors convincingly show that the 
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quality of the myriad university performance dimensions exhibit “chameleon like” 
characteristics changing in synch with the background environment.  
 
A large measure of personal subjectivity and reliance on indirect symbolic proxies such as 
prestige (McGettigan, 2013: 60) is inevitable when assessing the quality of a university’s 
performance. Warning (2007) suggests that much of the intractability of resolving questions of 
quality while defining university performance stem from the fact that a large part of the 
institution’s output tends to be tacit knowledge. Such knowledge is intangible making it both 
difficult to quantify and measure. This argument clearly resonates within the latest European 
university scholarship, referred to in the previous chapter (Bonroy & Constantatos, 2008; 
Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; van Vught et al., 2012). These scholars contend that 
universities provide “experience” or “credence” goods that are difficult to rate before during 
or often even after their consumption. The so-called objective measures of teaching quality at 
a university often fail to capture what students have actually obtained from a course. 
Mcgettigan (2013: 59) convincingly shows how such measures of university service quality 
have to be based on “inputs” rather than “ouputs”. The selectivity of the institution/course, the 
type of students who attend it, the money spent per student and so on are used to determine 
intra-university differences in quality.  
 
Laband and Lentz (2004) raise the related issue that research and teaching performance are 
processes rather than outcomes. Teaching and learning are painful and intricate processes for 
both the teacher and the student. They teach and learn from each other in iterative cycles. It 
remains extremely difficult to quantify this process or ever compare it across peer groups. 
Similarly research is an open-ended, highly creative and innovative process that does not fit 
within the straight jackets of measurement.  How does one ever fully assess the quality of 
research output objectively, or even compare it amongst colleagues? This is why relevant 
proxies of process measurements have to be incorporated into any sensible definition of 
teaching or research performance; this remains a considerable challenge.  
 
At another level, process measurement in university performance may actually conflate with 
university governance. For example, while measuring teaching processes, such as part-time to 
full-time staff, and ranking them across universities, it would be important to consider that this 
ratio is also discretionary and does indeed also reflect intra-university governance priorities. 
Similarly, staff to student ratio at a university is a clear indicator of the quality of teaching and 
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research processes in a university. At the same time, however, it is also a key governance 
variable that is often targeted and calibrated by a university’s governors. This perhaps explains 
why Abbott and Doucouliagos (2003a) and Rutherford (1983) contend that performance 
indicators at universities must be derived from within the institution and not imposed from 
without.  
 
Overall, it is evident that there is no easy consensus within the literature about what constitutes 
university performance and how it ought to be measured. Yet within this unsettled context, UK 
regulators and policy framers have pushed a reform agenda that has recently taken a highly 
metricised view of university performance. This is briefly reviewed in the next sub-section. 
 
2.3.1.1 Historical developments in defining UK university performance 
 
Historically the UK policymakers began by defining university performance in terms of ideal 
stereotypes derived from the insular elitist tradition of universities, as noted earlier. Pre- 1980s, 
the traditional perspective was that universities were homogenous and should necessarily 
operate in the Oxbridge style of academic mystique and opacity.  Any performance differences 
were an aberration and these should be actively stamped out through affirmative regulatory 
action (UGC, 1975; Robins, 1963; Shattock, 2002, 2010). This approach was bound to fail and 
it did so, spectacularly, when departmental and other funders of university research started 
making the case for funding only a small group of high performance institutions (RAE, 1985-
86; Shattock, 1994). Gradually under the influence of the US Higher Education sector and the 
fast emerging neo-liberal paradigms the idea that it was vital to distinguish the performing 
universities from the non-performing ones gained currency (DEFS, 2003; Shattock, 2001: 
2010).  
 
A range of teaching and research related metrics were hurriedly designed and universities 
coerced to report on them. An overactive higher education press took this up and a range of 
performance league tables started being provided by so-called independent analysts like the 
Times Good Universities guide. These lists were and are intended for the student who is now 
increasingly being considered a consumer with specific rights. However, even within these 
detailed lists of performance metrics there is evidence that university performance is not fully 
defined or categorised in its complex and comprehensive shape (Kelly, 2002; Financial Times, 
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1999; Shattock, 2010). Although countries like Australia have developed monitoring and 
reporting requirements for universities across financial, non-financial, academic and non-
academic performances (Guthrie and Neumann, 2006; McMillan and Chan, 2006), these 
remain somewhat superficial. There is still a dearth of metrics that enable critical analysis of 
the complexities/trade-offs that characterise these performances, the potential endogenous 
relationships between them and the university’s governances and the problems of quality 
assurance or processes that permeate them (Ntim et al., 2017; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Brown, 
2004).  
 
It is within this historical policy context that definitions of university performance such as “the 
output of the university relative to some predetermined benchmarks linked to its stated 
objectives” Nelson (2003a, 2004) are singularly objectionable. There is no mention of the 
range, multi-dimensionality or complexity of the myriad outputs of the university here.  
Elsewhere even the definitions of Rashid, Islam & Anderson (2008), Warning (2007) and 
Worthington and Lee (2005), who jointly integrate university performance to be “the total 
amount of utility or benefits derived from its functioning by its diverse stakeholders” remain 
unconvincing. The complexity of trade-offs and competing priorities deeply embedded in every 
aspect of the universities’ performance in the UK (Neumann & Guthrie, 2006; Worthington & 
Lee, 2008) are overlooked here. There is a clear need to calibrate and forge a definition of 
university performance that engages with its breadth, diversity and complexity.  
 
2.3.1.2 A suitable operational definition of university performance 
 
In order to erect a suitably comprehensive definition of university performance it is important 
to remember that a university performs both academically and non-academically. Within the 
academic function a clear division can be made between teaching and research. Similarly in 
the non-academic function financial and non-financial performances can be clearly 
distinguished. These divisions are shown in the figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2: University Performance Divisions 
 
Any comprehensive definition of university performance should partake of these broad 
divisions: combine and contrast different types of performances; engage with the critical trade-
offs between these performances and resolve the vexed problems of quality assurances and 
process like characteristics of such performances.  It should also take account of the fact that 
its diverse stakeholders perceive each of the different performances of a university in 
conflicting ways. The different interpretations of university performance by students, staff, 
research sponsors, employers and Government are graphically illustrated in figure 2 above. 
Any definition should necessarily allow for the rich expression of these conflicting 
interpretations and reconcile them. Therefore, for operational purposes the thesis defines 
university performance as follows: 
 
“University Performance is the total amount of academic and non-academic utility or benefits 
derived from a university by its diverse stakeholders. Good university performance recognizes 
and accounts for the entire range of complex trade-offs characterizing each of its teaching, 
research, and financial and non-financial functions. Such performance also needs to be 
benchmarked in terms of its quality vis-à-vis peer universities. Finally the performance of a 
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university might need to be measured in terms of process rather than output. Doing so sensibly 
may need to adjust for potential endogenous governance implications.” 
 
The above definition clearly brings out the expanded reach of university performance and its 
several complixities, dimensions and trade-offs. It therefore establishes that research, teaching 
and financial performances of these institutions are multi-dimensional in themselves and in 
need of such interpretation.  
2.4 Theoretical Underpinning for University Governance and Performance 
 
Having defined university governance and performance in a comprehensive and multi-
dimensional sense, this section critically analyses the theory underlying both constructs. The 
principal purpose here is to erect a complete theoretical understanding of how a university 
governs itself and the implications of this for its performance. In what follows section 2.4.1 
first justifies why a multi-theoretical framework is essential here. The section establishes that, 
given the multi-dimensional nature of university governance and performance, the use of just 
one or two theories runs the real risk of missing vital explanations. Next section 2.4.2 critically 
links the choice of seven different theories for this research are critically linked to the research 
question and justifies them. Finally the chapter ends with section 2.4.3 where each chosen 
theory is debated and critically analysed. Elements of each theory that are pertinent to the 
multiple dimensions of university governance and performance and their inter-linkages are 
elucidated. Theoretical expectations of relationships between university governance and 
performance are therefore established here. 2.4.1 Justifying the multi-theoretical framework 















2.4.1 Justifying the multi-theoretical framework for University Governance 
 
Figure 3: Multi-Theoretical Framework 
Usual Board & Audit Related Governances       Theory Missing Governance Dimensions 
 
University governance is under-researched. The governance of firms by contrast has been 
extensively studied over the years. Corporate governance scholars have used several theories 
jointly and severally to explain and link firm governance and performance. Scholars such as 
Lino et al (2015) Low et al (2015) Mallin (2013) and Ntim et al (2015) have used theories as 
diverse as Agency, Stakeholder, Resource dependency, Optimal contracting, Transaction Cost 
Economics and managerial power to explain and debate it. This explains meta scholars Zattoni 
et al.’s (2013) strong argument that corporate governance cannot be studied without the use of 
a multi-theoretical framework. Without the complementary and supplementary perspectives of 
these different theories, the predictive power of corporate governance research would be 
difficult to improve (Christopher, 2010; Pugliese et al., 2014; Zattoni et al., 2013). 
 
If corporate governance, which is more straight forward requires such a combination of theories 
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Christopher, 2012; Letza et al., 2008) so must university 
governance that, after all is far more complex and multi-dimensional (Jongbloedet al., 2018; 
Dario et al., 2015; Van Vught, 2009) in nature. It plays out at different levels and in different 
ways within the institution and so needs the rich complementarity of perspectives stemming 
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from multiple theories. This is why extant scholarship here has often used a combination of 
theories (See Ntim et al., 2017; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015). The 
former shows how public accountability, legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder 
theories have direct relevance to the university and its governance. these four different theories 
provide the rich panoply needed to establish how and why university governance affects its 
voluntary disclosure standards. The latter further extends this multi theoretical framework to 
include stewardship, neoclassical and institutional paradigms. However, both scholars agree 
that such a wide theoretical framework is crucial to the university sector. Elsewhere, many 
other empirical studies (Dnes & Seaton, 1999; Soh, 2007; Tarbert et al.,2008; Lee & Watson, 
2008; Bachan & Reilly, 2015) invariably discuss university governance aspects using more 
than one theory.  
 
There is however, another important policy-based reason for the inclusion of so many theories. 
A large policy-based normative scholarship in HEI studies (Brown et al., 2011; Parker, 2011; 
Taylor, 2013a, b; Toma, 2007; Browne, 2010) avers that universities need to be investigated 
from several different plural perspectives. Without these different lenses the rich range of trade-
offs and complexities embedded in the multiple dimensions of university governance and 
performance will remain hidden and unexplored. 
The public and multi-dimensional role of a university in society makes the use of at least four 
different theories of Stakeholder, Legitimacy, Resource Dependence and Public Accountability 
directly relevant to it. A university is uniquely accountable to the public as it is a knowledge 
institution with several multiple roles. The legitimacy of this institution is also complex with 
many outstanding questions about its valid interface with society. A wide range of disparate 
stakeholders have interests in this higher education institution, which are often at conflict with 
each other. Finally, resource dependences remain an important factor that motivates the 
governance conundrums facing the university. The use of these four theories is therefore 
uniquely appropriate to a study of university governance and performance. More importantly, 
however, at least three other theoretical lenses are vital for this public institution. Stewardship, 
Culture/Quality Assurance and Managerial Power/Optimal Contracting have many important 
implications here. A public institution like a university has a ‘good steward’ role in society. 
The institution is culturally rich and each of its functions has quality connotations for different 
segments of the public. Finally, managerial power relationships and search for optimality in its 
public roles are critical to decipher the validity of this institution. A seven-theory framework 
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is therefore advanced here as an important group of lenses to study the governance-
performance question in universities.  
 
However, it is important to note that the seven chosen theories of university governance and 
performance have crucial interlinkages that further justify their inclusion here. For example, 
Public Accountability theory (Coy et al., 2001; Coy & Dixon, 2004; Deem & Bird, 2019; Banks 
et al., 1997; Kreysing, 2002; Shore & Wright, 2004) stresses accountability university in all its 
governance and performance aspects to the general public and this obviously includes both the 
salient and non salient stakeholders of the university. Similarly, Resource dependence theory 
(Verbruggen et al., 2011; Verschuere & De Corte, 2014; Fowles, 2014; Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978) argues that a university’s governance policies will be crucially dependent 
on its resource dependences but such resource dependences include the staff, the students, the 
board and the executive teams in the institution all of whom are stakeholders here. At another 
level, chasing resources, whether they be in assets, revenues or academic expertise may impose 
negative burdens on student coverage and other such socially relevant and morally legitimate 
objectives of the university. Culture and Quality Assurance (CQA) concerns (Vidovich, 2002; 
Salter & Tapper, 2002; Brown, 2004; Kim, 2008; Trowler, 2008; Trevino, 1990; Alvesson, 
2012; Filippakou & Tapper, 2008) pervade the entire institution and determine whether or to 
what extent a university optimally contracts outwards.  
 
Clearly then each of the seven chosen theories are interlinked in many ways. More importantly, 
however, such interlinkages help further enrich and illustrate the main objectives of this 
research. Whether it be to uncover missing dimensions of university governance or to 
understand the multi-dimensional associations between such governance and the performance 
of the institution or even to explicate the complexities and trade-offs characterising such 
associations, the inter-meshing of the seven theories could prove invaluable. These inter-linked 
explanations could help decipher patterns that defy straightforward interpretation and therefoe 
enrich the overall debate. 
 
To summarise a seven theory framework is advanced here to uncover missing dimensions of 
university governance and then decipher how the multiple dimensions of such university 
governance affects the performance of the institution. Both these objectives can only be 
achieved if the many dimensions of the two constructs of governance and performance can be 
theorised effectively. The seven theoretical lenses used here are essential to unravel the 
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complexities and trade-offs in the multi-dimensional associations between university 
governance and performance. This is what will throw in to sharp relief which dimensions are 
missing. It will also unpack the richly different trade-offs that exist in governance-performance 
relationships. Each perspective views the multi-dimensional associations between university 
governance and performance in unique ways. Without these rich and differing perspectives, 
the many complexities and trade-offs will remain unsolved. What follows justifies each of the 
seven theories separately and shows how they may help unpack the research objectives and 
richly add to the overall theoretical underpinning for university governance and performance.  
 
2.4.2 Selected theories and their relevance 
 
The four core theories of Public Accountability, Stakeholder, Resource Dependence and 
Legitimacy theories are undoubtedly the primary means to understand and explain university 
governance and performance. This is why they are extensively used in the extant university 
governance literature (Ntim et al., 2017; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; 
Bachan & Riley, 2015; Tarbert et al., 2008). The theories are essential to any multi-dimensional 
understanding of how university governance affects its performance. In what follows the 
choice of each of these core theories in this research is justified.  
 
Public Accountability 
Universities have a higher public purpose that cannot and should not be limited to the private 
entrepreneurial motive. Authors (See Parker, 2011; Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013; Rowlands, 
2013; Bleiklie, 1998) therefore opine that universities must hold themselves accountable to the 
wider public and their legitimate concerns. There is a sense in the debates of university 
governance that in a morally advanced society, higher education cannot be confined to the few 
and the privileged. Governance at an institution has to be held accountable to overall public 
purpose (Collini, 2005; Ntim et al., 2017; Bleiklie, 1998). Its subsequent performance must 
also be investigated from such an overall stance. Studying university governance and 
performance has to account for the public purpose. 
 
Uncovering and explaining the multiple dimensions/associations of university governance and 
performance requires active engagement with this public gaze. Almost every governance 
decision taken by a university has a wider impact in society. Research, teaching and financial 
performances of an institution need to account to the country’s tax paying public. Additionally, 
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higher education and its positive externalities imply that a strong public orientation is inevitable 
in all university governance processes. Finally, there is a need to guard the non-utalitarian 
sacred dimensions of university governance and performance from a crass commercial 
mindset. This is only possible if the rich public motivations of an institution are made explicit 
and emphasised at every stage.  
 
Stakeholder Perspective 
Universities even more than firms, have disparate stakeholders with divergent and complex 
concerns. The interests of current researchers, professors, parents, students and administration 
have to be traded off against each other. The tricky question of which stakeholder is most 
salient and whose interest is paramount has undergone drastic change in universities in recent 
decades. Student and staff interests and their conflict will never really emerge if stakeholder 
perspectives are ignored. Inter-generational and abstract societal concerns have also to be met 
(Collini, 2005; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Gordon et al., 2002; Coy and Dixon, 2004). The 
potential generations of future students, scholars and staff have a vaild claim on the university. 
The institution cannot ignore the fact that current research may foreclose options for future 
research. Similarly, society may have a distinict need for today’s research which may have 
unfortunate unintended concequences on generations to come. Such a complex balancing acts 
in governance and performance that are so unique to the university, need the enriching gaze of 
stakeholder theory.  
 
Stakeholder theory naturally accommodates divergence in views and perspectives (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004). Staff organisation, student recruitment targets, student 
body diversity targets, syllabi/subject offers and balance between income sources are perceived 
differently and voiced by the many stakeholders of a university (Wise et al., 2020). 
Understanding and unpacking these differences effectively is what will help determine many 
missing dimensions of university governance. Stakeholder theory is cruicial to this. Similarly, 
governance impacts on research teaching or financial performance are not perceived 
uniformaly. Students might view such impacts in a very different way from staff or governors. 
Such conflicting perspectives on governance-performance associations will remain 





A university has several resource dependences. This unique knowledge institution is 
importantly dependent on good leaders i.e. governering board, skilled teaching/research staff 
and students, and a very effective governance leadership. Resource Dependence (Pfeffer, 1987; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Callen et al., 2010) as a theory focuses attention on the wide range 
of human resource in an organisation and the dependencies created by them (Adams et al., 
2005). By unmasking these competing concerns, the theory creates space for the many missing 
elements of the university governance puzzle (Fowles, 2014; Taylor, 2013a, b, c; Parker 2013). 
From another perspective, however, resource dependance theory also suggests how university 
research, teaching and financial performance are artefacts of competing resource dependencies 
in different parts of the organisation (Festo & Nkote, 2007; Ferry & Eckersley, 2011; 
Toutkoushian, 2001). The theory sheds unique light on these trade-offs between various 
resource dependencies and in the process clarifies important aspects of the governance 
performance link.  
 
At the same time, a University needs to be financially sustainable to face up to its multi-
dimensional objectives. In the fast-changing landscape of higher education, an institution is 
already at great risk of losing traditional sources of funding from the Government and Public 
sector (FSSG, 2011; UUK, 2011; Brown, 2011a; Foskett, 2010; Hemsley-Brown, 2011). Its 
increasing dependence on other non-traditional resource providers to bridge the gap constrains 
its governance and performance in many ways. Any investigation of how university 
governance affects performance must necessarily consider the complex trade-offs involved in 
an institution’s resource dependence.  
 
Legitimacy 
Finally, complex trade-offs in legitimacy pervade both university governance and performance 
(Hordern, 2013; Melville-Ross, 2010; Zeghal, 2008). For example, universities have to appear 
legitimate to different constituents in society by encouraging age/class/ethnicity/gender 
diversity in various governance processes mechanisms. At the same time they must also 
demonstrate legitimacy in research, teaching and financial performance; this would imply 
employing the best talent without regard to age/class/ethnicity/gender. Therefore, these two 
opposing legitimacy objectives may and do often clash. Understanding and unpacking these 
does require a direct consideration of the legitimacy perspective. 
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However, in the increasingly markeitised HEI, new contitutents have become the focus of 
attention. These include fee-paying students, both international and domestic, and research and 
teaching grant providers with their deep pockets (Molesworth et al., 2010; Hemsley-Brown, 
2011; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Brown, 2015; Shattock & Hovath, 2019). There is a concern 
that UK universities might bend over backwards to appear legitimate to those players. As a 
theory, legitimacy balances out these considerations and enriches the debate here. Without it, 
many such hidden governance aspects and their performance distortions would remain 
unexplored.  
 
The multi-dimensionality of university governance and performance demand the use of at least 
three other ancillary theories, namely the stewardship precepts, culture/quality assurance tenets 
and managerial power/ optimal contracting paradigms. Each of these is separately justified in 
the following sections. 
 
Stewardship precepts 
It should be stressed that stewardship tenets in university governance are the equivalent of 
agency theory in corporate governance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997; Clarke, 
2004). The unique nature of the university, the inter-realtionships between departments and its 
collegial atmosphere imply that governance here is less an agency conflict and a more a holistic 
balance. After all, Agency conflicts are natural within any organization run on behalf of others. 
In corporate firms these conflicts between managers and owners have to be considered central 
to their governance. By contrast universities are collectivistic and not solely profit orientated. 
Their governance and performance have to account for this. Agency conflicts within them have 
to reflect a stewardship perspective. Here principals i.e. the VC and the Board need to empower 
agents rather than merely control or monitor them. It is this positive interaction between the 
two that needs primary consideration here (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1994). This 
is why stewardship precepts are so important to the university sector. The positive role of 
governance stressed by the theory nevertheless recognizes that such governance might need to 
be unpacked in terms of several dimesnions some known and other hidden. Otherwise the 
complex checks and balances idea might not be implementable. Amongst extant scholarly work 
in university governance and performance Lokuwaduge (2011) recognizes this need and 
incorporates stewardship precepts in her analysis. This thesis follows her lead and does 
likewise. 
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Culture/Quality Assurance Tenets 
The principles underlaying culture and quality assurance are widely emphasized in university 
governance (Shattock & Hovath, 2019; Gayle et al., 2003; Trowler, 2008, 2009; Vidovich, 
2002; Salter & Tapper, 2002; Brown, 2004; Kim, 2008; Alvesson, 2012; Filippakou & Tapper, 
2008; Cremonini et al., 2015). These interlinked perspectives have a unique relevance to 
Higher Education. Universities are distinctly cultural entities and their cultural differences 
importantly influence their governance and performance (Gayle et al., 2003; Trowler, 2008, 
2009; Wilmott, 1993). Two aspects of culture make it indispensable to university governance. 
First universities are knowledge institution delivering both teaching and research. Crucial to 
this delivery are the teaching and learning regimes developed by such institutions over a long 
period of time. TLRs are cultural and play a central role influencing many hidden and 
interlinked antecedents of both functions. Second, universities are geographically dispered. 
Their locations act as a significant cultural influence on how they carft craft their governances. 
Culture is thus an underlying aspect that needs to inform any debate on multiple dimensions of 
university governance and performance.  
 
Quality assurance is a key guiding principle of university governance and performance 
(Filippakou & Tapper, 2008; Brown, 2004; QAA, 2006). These institutions have an even 
greater need than corporate firms to meet tangible and intangible quality aspects of their 
internal governances and performances. For instance, the internal and external audits of such 
an institution might uncover serious quality defects in all the multiple dimensions of its 
governance and performance (Bachan, 2017; Jones & Soo, 2013). Similarly, superficially 
higher academic performance may actually hide serious plagiarism and liberal marking 
concerns. At a second and even more serious level university governance is multi-dimensional 
and there are several indications that there are hidden aspects within these dimensions that may 
exhibit quality-based trade-offs. Staff organisation, student recruitment, income and revenue 
sources all impose quality limits on the university governance performance challenge. 
Therefore, the principles of quality assurance have a direct relevance to university governance 
and performance. 
 
Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting 
A managerial perspective is essential in university governance studies due to this institution’s 
special power structure as compared to a corporate firm, and for the growing trends to run the 
university like a corporate firm (Parker, 2012; Deem et al., 2007;  Collinson, 2004Lambert, 
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2005; Middlehurst, 2013; Rowlands, 2013; Parry, 2013). The Vice Chancellor’s executive 
team, the university board and the heads of departments wield different levels of power with 
respect to the many tacit and explicit governance elements here. This is why collegiality is the 
theme stressed across the HEI sector. Power dynamics within universities are a complex 
combination of cooperation and conflict. None of the many governance decisions are taken in 
isolation. There is a large amount of give and take across the many managerial power centers 
in the university. These power dynamics need to be critically unpacked. Managerial power 
theory incorporates and analyzes such dynamics in different ways and from different angles 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen et ak, 2015). Hence it must be a part of any theoretical 
framework for university governance and performance. 
 
University Governance and performance are both constituted by many contractual 
relationships between different parties. It is obvious that the university must necessarily seek 
optimality in such relationships if it is to improve both internal governance and performance. 
What makes this much more challenging here is the fact that these relationships are multi-
dimensional and one governance decision may have ramifications for othet governances as 
well as performances. Optimal contracting as a framework (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin 
et al., 2015) is extremely suitable to such multi-dimensional trade-offs and complexities 
providing keen multiple understandings of the problem. This is why it is an essential 
component of the tool kit to decipher university governance performance associations.   
 
2.4.3 Theories explaining University Governance & Performance 
 
Having justified the choice of seven different theories to this research the chapter delves deeper 
into each theory and its implications for the university governance performance question. Each 
sub-section here deals with one theory. First the theory’s implications are carefully and 
critically enumerated. Second limitations of the theory are briefly discussed. Finally the 
theory’s relevance to UK university governance and performance is delineated.  
 
2.4.3.1. Public Accountability (PA) 
 
Firms are accountable principally to their owners. Hence corporate governance primarily 
assesses whether a firm accounts fairly to its shareholders. Although in recent times a wider 
accountability to diverse stakeholders has been stressed, private firms are not considered to be 
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accountable to the general public.  Public accountability (PA) as a theory contradicts such a 
perspective. According to this theory institutions especially those in the public sector like 
universities are directly responsible and accountable to broader societal concerns. Such 
institutions cannot afford to be opaque even in dimensions of governance and performance that 
would be considered legitimately private in corporate firms. This is why PA scholars like Coy 
et al (2011) argue that universities should exhibit transparency of institutional process and 
mechanism to constituents of the general public even those that are not salient to them.  Others  
like Nelson et al (2002) stress that good stewardship of public entities like universities is “rights 
based” and not “utilitarian” like firms. Hence they should demonstrate fairness, accessibility 
and distribution in all internal governances and performances. 
 
2.4.3.1.1 Implications of Public Accountability to university governance and 
performance 
 
Three principal implications of the theory to university functioning must be stressed. First, PA 
requires that the university remains open and responsive to legitimate public interests. Such 
openness implies transparency in both governance and performance. University board and 
lower level compositions, internal governance protocols, and performance standards need to 
be seen to be fair and equitable by all the diverse constituents of society. Not only in the board 
but also in various other parts of the institution the university must reflect a careful trade-off 
incorporating the plural interests of different segments of society. Academic and non-academic 
performance must also take account of this trade-off.  
 
From an accountability perspective the public also has a right to know that their university is 
fair in its admissions, teaching, research, grading and staffing (Nelson et al., 2003; Coy et al., 
2011). Its governance structures and mechanisms should reflect such fairness. Here then are 
clear indications from the theory that tacit aspects of student recruitment, teaching/research 
efficacy and staff organisation at a university are its most important governance priorities. It is 
in these that a clearer picture of how the university responds to its public role becomes manifest.  
But PA also requires the university to transparently demonstrate its compliance to public 
interest (Coy et al., 2001; Coy & Dixon, 2004; Bleiklie, 1998; Banks et al., 1997; Deem & 
Baird, 2019). In this, the theory seems to highlight the entire range of governance processes 
from admission protocols to grading accuracies to overall academic and non-academic 
integrity. So the theory seems to be arguing for larger numbers of lay members on the board, 
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board diversity, effective internal and external audits to be dovetailed with independence, 
diversity and auditory control in all the other dimensions of the university.  
 
Second public accountability implies that a larger societal purpose other than narrow 
accountability to resource or grant providers or powerful corporate interests should 
characterize universities (Kreysing, 2002; Coy & Dixon, 2004; Parker, 2013; Shore & Wright, 
2004; Toma, 2007). Society needs to know that the university does not pander exclusively to 
sectarian, commercial or even single generational interests. This institution must deliver a 
balanced knowledge function that caters to all segments of society even those that are yet to 
come. Research must be undertaken with an objective and neutral mandate and not merely to 
comply with corporate grant provider interests. Teaching should be conducted in a manner that 
improves outcomes for the average student not just the privileged one. So, the theory seems to 
imply that the university’s endowment choices, its levels of research grants and tuition fees, its 
pedagogical orientation towards certain types of students or courses and its adherence to a strict 
protocol of staff student interaction levels should matter. After all, by choosing or not choosing 
certain levels of endowments or fee-paying students the university shows its desire to balance 
corporate/non-corporate research interests and monetary/societal goals. Similarly, by choosing 
certain types of staff student interaction levels it flags its governance priorities in the coverage 
versus teaching efficacy trade-off.  
 
Finally, Public interest changes as societies advance and develop. PA requires universities to 
be alive and adapt rapidly to these changes. A university’s internal governance should adapt 
quickly to changes in external regulation. Regulatory mandates must be rapidly complied with 
and the university should exhibit a pro-active stance here. Similarly the institution’s research 
and teaching performance must closely corroborate and tie-in with the country’s changing 
academic goals. It’s internal governances must help attain such performance. In all of this 
Public Accountability seems to highlight the important influence of external governance 
regulation. The implication seems to be that regulatory changes are an important influence on 
governance performance links in higher education. Tacitly it seems to emphasize the 
importance of empirically derived and substantiated regulatory change.  
 
Overall Public Accountability flags important themes in the way a university governs itself. 
The theory underlines the university as an important public institution tasked with the 
extremely important role of nurturing the intellectual and knowledge base of a society. Such a 
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public institution must be run in the public interest and the public should be able to see this 
(Toma, 2007; Shore & Wright, 2004; Bleiklie, 1998; Allen & Allen, 1998; Kim, 2008). 
Transparency of this kind needs effective governance across many board level and audit related 
aspects. But PA also enjoins that university governance and performance in all its dimensions 
must exhibit fairness and distributive justice. A whole new range of missing aspects of 
university governance and performance are thus implicated here. It is these that will enable 
good governance and also allow for easy dissemination of enhanced disclosure of information 
to the general public. Finally, PA suggests that a university’s governance structures must 
flexibly respond to changes in external governance mandates. Effective external regulation 
based on robust empirical research is a key requirement of the theory (Kim, 2008; Power, 1994; 
Ntim et al., 2017).   
 
2.4.3.1.2 Limitation of PA 
 
Important limitations however characterize Public Accountability theory. There are important 
questions about what a university must do when faced with inevitable conflicts between the 
different segments of society. Further recent trends to corporatize the university and manage it 
like a firm downplay the role of public accountability. It is also clear that PA is not the only or 
even the most important consideration driving internal governance or performance priorities of 
the university. The theory remains rather peripheral to the day-to-day functioning of this 
institution.  In fact empirical work by Mitchell et al (1997) and Roberts (1992) suggests that 
universities do prioritize the governance needs of important instrumental stakeholders and 
neglect the larger and amorphous public interest. Similarly universities often prioritize strongly 
salient employer interests over abstract public concerns when faced with situations of student 
bargaining in on-campus placements. Can this be avoided and what must be the theoretical 
implication? PA has no answer. Accounting to the public interest is therefore definitely not the 
most important priority for a university. Ntim et al’s (2016) suggestion that universities might 







2.4.3.1.3 Public Accountability’s Relevance to UK Higher Education 
 
Nevertheless, the tenets of public accountability are extremely relevant to the UK higher 
education environment. The introductory chapter has mentioned a number of contextual issues 
that underline this. Historically traditional UK universities started life as unbridled autonomous 
institutions accountable largely to only themselves (Dearlove, 2002, Kim, 2008; Trakman, 
2008). Their internal governance structures and mechanisms were largely collegial and faculty 
dominated. Senior academics took all the important administrative and academic decisions and 
the university was held out as a model of academic freedom and democracy although it was 
necessarily exclusionary and elitist (Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013; Taylor, 2013a, c). This 
changed with the influential Robinns report in 1963 when stricter external regulation of 
universities, expansion of the sector and a direct emphasis on economic development were 
initiated. For the first time this introduced the concept of public accountability of the university 
and this institution was made a channel for achievement of national goals (Knight, 2002; Salter 
& Tapper, 2002; Shattock, 2004a, b). Subsequent regulatory developments in the sector 
including the Jarratt report, the Educational Reforms Act (ERA), the Lambert and Browne 
reviews introduced mass higher education, the idea of a fee-paying university student and 
consequently much greater public accountability (Melville Ross, 2010; Taylor, 2013b, c). 
 
UK’s waves of higher education reforms have led to demands for public scrutiny of university 
budgets and academic outcomes through a range of specialist public institutions such as the 
Quality Assurance Agency, the Research Assessment Framework, the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency, the Postgraduate Taught Experience Survey and the Postgraduate Research 
Experience Survey (Ntim et al., 2017).  Such external scrutiny has naturally curtailed any idea 
of autonomous academic freedoms at these institutions. But important philosophical questions 
remain and this explains why PA tenets are contextually relevant in UK higher education. For 
example there is the important debate that continues to rage about public accountability 
expressed as corporatized performance outcomes against the need for academic creativity and 
innovation (Parker, 2012; Middlehurst, 2013; Shattock, 2004a, b; Bennett, 2002; Kim, 2008; 
Burrows, 2012). This is closely related to the left-center-right debate that cuts across all the 
literature on higher education (McGettigan, 2013; Newfield, 2008; Smith, 2011). Similarly 
there are other voices in the literature (Toma, 2007; Collini, 2012; Oxholm, 2005; Havergal, 
2015a) that question the wisdom of PA imperatives for universities already saddled with 
government funding restrictions and private sector style competition dynamics. The Overall, it 
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is apparent that Public Accountability is a theory that squarely applies within the UK Higher 
Education context. The many trends highlighted above such as growing marketisation, reduced 
government funding, greater scrutiny of the institution’s financial practices and sustainability 
have meant that the spot light of even regulators like the CUC has firmly been on the financial 
health and well being of the university. The UK University has become a vehicle for the 
Government’s oft quoted objective to transition towards a knowledge economy retaining the 
UK’s top economic position. A carefully crafted and calibrated public accountability must 
pervade this institution if it is to deliver this challenging goal of financial sustainability. The 
governance of this institution must embrace and resolve many non-academic concerns and 
trade-offs to imbibe this public accountability. 
 
2.4.3.2 Stakeholder Theory (ST) 
 
Corporate governance has long recognized that stakeholder interests apart from those of just 
owners or shareholders are important to a firm (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Freeman, 1984). In 
fact as early as 1999 Freeman opined that even a firm that wishes to maximize shareholder 
value can only do so if it aligns with the interests of wider stakeholders. These wider 
stakeholders include those like suppliers, employees and customers who have a direct stake in 
the firm and others like the wider community or Government with mainly indirect stakes in it 
(Polonsky, 1996; Schilling, 2000). Thus stakeholder theory (ST) postulates that governance 
structures within the firm must align with the interests of not just owners and managers but 
also these larger constituencies of stakeholders who have broader indirect but reasonable 
interests in it (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004; Gunasekerage & Reed, 2008).  
 
However this postulation in itself implies that the theory has to necessarily embrace a diverse 
and complicated approach to firm governance. Each stakeholder’s interests are naturally 
different. The governance structures and mechanisms must achieve the complex optimal trade-
offs between those interests and those of other stakeholders. ST consequently calls upon firms 
to erect governance structures and mechanisms that allow suppliers, customers, employees, 
communities, managers and shareholders to jointly achieve the best win-win solutions 
(Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004; Phillips et al., 2003). Such a win-win goal, can only be 
achieved if this internal governance takes full account of potentially normative (i.e. value 
driven) or instrumental (i.e. output driven) or somewhat unpredictable managerial behaviors of 
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such diverse stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004). At 
the same time it must also fully engage with differing powers and influences of different 
stakeholder groups stemming from their different legal or formal authorities (Donaldson, 1990; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Gomes & Novaes, 2005). Overall it is undoubtedly clear that ST 
is highly relevant to the governance of any corporate firm that wishes to achieve sustained 
performance in the long run.  
2.4.3.2.1 Implications of Stakeholder Theory to university governance and performance 
 
University Governance has to contend with an even wider set of stakeholders than the corporate 
firm. Stakeholder Theory is therefore highly relevant to it. Managing the diverse interests, 
behaviors, values and powers of academics, administrators, students, researchers, regulators 
and employers requires an even greater balancing role (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Gordon 
et al., 2002; Coy and Dixon, 2004). Yet that is not all. University Governance pervades its 
many levels and dimensions as pointed out earlier (Gayle et al., 2003). There are necessarily 
many more complex trade-offs here than in the case of the corporate firm. For example, how a 
university prioritizes between academic and non-academic functions, chooses its subject offers 
and syllabi and calibrates its teaching/research staff contracts have wildly different impacts on 
each stakeholder. Teachers may like flexible contracts but students would not. A wider set of 
courses on offer at a university might enable students interested in one discipline but hurt the 
quality of teaching or instruction in other disciplines. Similarly the effective design of 
internal/external audit or choices of VC or his pay may need to be governed addressing the 
differing stakeholder interests. Merely ensuring that the board membership is representative of 
different stakeholders or that board convention and protocol take account of the salience of 
these stakeholders may not be sufficient for a university as it is for a corporate firm. Thus, 
stakeholder surely has an expanded significance for university governance. 
 
Stakeholder diversity has an important implication for diversity across the university not just 
in its board as well. ST suggests that ensuring adequate representation to ethnic and gender 
groups in different parts of the organization especially within the staff and students would 
enhance its performance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Reed, 
1983). It is ST’s contention that by doing so the voice and opinions of these underrepresented 
gender/ethnic groups would be heard and incorporated into the governance process leading to 
a more rounded performance of the institution (Mitchell et al., 1997; Polonsky, 1996; Wise et 
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al., 2020). This would modulate conflict, encourage pluralism and enhance the institution’s 
ability to grow. But ST also has implications for another type of diversity in its student 
population coverage. The theory raises concerns that universities if left unchecked could 
become elite and exclusive academic clubs (Woodward, 1996; Wise et al., 2020; Mitchell et 
al., 1997). Its emphasis on invoking all stakeholder interests not just those of the elite, suggests 
how detrimental this could be for the overall academic purpose of this institution. 
 
At another level certain instrumental versions of ST as underlined by Ntim et al (2016) bear a 
direct relevance to multi-dimensional university governance and performance. After all 
Roberts (1992), Mitchell et al (1997) and Nelson et al (2003) demonstrate how a university 
might target its voluntary disclosure levels to only assuage important salient and instrumental 
stakeholders such as resource/grant providers. In the process it may alienate other wider yet 
concerned parties. This argument could surely be extended to both internal governance 
mechanisms as well as performance. For example, in a given university fee paying student 
concerns may be over emphasized. Not only would such universities encourage certain types 
of pedogogical ambience but also prioritize better teaching functionalities which could lead to 
poor research. Similarly, in other universities an over emphasis on staff welfare due to union 
pressures could result in poor teaching or research efforts or even badly implemented 
teaching/research staff contracts. ST would surely help dissect such governance and 
performance trends and identify crucial associations. 
 
Overall, it is quite obvious that ST presents an important tool to study different university 
governance mechanisms and their impact upon performance. The theory in itself provides an 
important fundamental perspective to dissect multi-dimensional university governance and 
performance. By flagging the competing interests of the diverse stakeholders in such an 
institution the theory ensures that complex trade-offs that are inevitable here are fully 
accounted for. 
2.4.3.2.2 Limitations of Stakeholder Theory 
 
Yet the theory itself is not without limitations. First and foremost is the singular concern that 
ST might not necessarily prioritize the core teaching and research function of a university 
correctly. For a university its governance and performance must necessarily emphasize 
academic achievement over all other achievements. A broad and dissipated focus on a wide 
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range of diverse stakeholders might undermine such important academic goals.  Second 
stakeholder concerns cannot always be balanced. There will surely arise events and 
circumstances in a university’s life that force its governors to have to choose one or a group of 
stakeholders whose needs have to be prioritized and justified over others. ST does not always 
have a compelling insight about how this is to be done. Similarly at different levels in a 
university such as board levels versus intra-departmental levels, stakeholder interests, play out 
in different ways. Governance structures and mechanisms at these different levels may have to 
accommodate these differences while still remaining consistent with the overall organizational 
mission. Apart from discussion, dialogue and negotiation among the interested stakeholders 
ST does not have any concrete suggestions here.  
 
2.4.3.2.3. Stakeholder Theory’s Relevance to UK Higher Education  
 
Recent university literature (Jones et al., 2001; Toma, 2007; Vidovich & Currie, 2011; 
Rowlands, 2013) has highlighted the substantial changes that have been wrought in the UK. 
These include changes in university recruitment guidelines leading to a quasi-market in student 
places, tuition fee introduction for domestic students, extensive changes to government grants 
and funding and a complete overhaul of the regulatory framework (Ntim et al., 2017; DOE, 
2017; 2018). In this changed market-based scenario university governance need a different 
emphasis. The balance between international and domestic students, the need to appease 
research/teaching fund granters and a market orientated student emphasis has become vital.  
Elsewhere  radical governance changes have emphasized salient stakeholders such as parents 
and students over others such as resource providing public agencies and funding bodies in 
universities. ST is therefore extremely topical to such a rapidly changing UK university 
governance context. 
 
In a similar vein the UK Government’s oft expressed objective to stay at the forefront of the 
rapidly emerging global knowledge economy has put the spotlight on the ability of the higher 
education sector to deliver the world class skills sought by employers everywhere (Michelon 
& Parbonetti, 2012; Hordern, 2013; Taylor, 2013a, c). This has fundamentally transformed the 
way teaching and research governance is seen at leading universities. Trade-offs inherent in 
stakeholder management lie at the heart of such a transformation. Thus ST is crucially relevant 
to any governance-performance research amongst UK universities.  
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2.4.3.3. Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Kessner and Johnson (1990), Pfeffer & Salancik (2003) and Hillman & Dalziel (2003) posit 
that corporate boards are important not just for monitoring managers but also to connect the 
firm to the resources and networks crucial to its existence and competitive advantage. The 
Board of directors of any given firm make three important objectives achievable namely, the 
attainment of knowledge and expertise (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), acquisition of social and 
business networks to improve reputation (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Udayasankar, 2008) and 
the gain of legitimacy to reduce environmental uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2000; Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2007). It must be stressed that resource dependence theory (RDT) underlines how the 
corporate governance structures and mechanisms within a firm should be strategically used to 
acquire and maintain resources and thus improve the firm’s longitudinal performance.  
 
RDT avers that board of directors especially those who are independent and from outside the 
firm bring varied expertise to it. Such expertise can complement that already existing within 
the board. Using this the firm would be able to enhance its marketability, financial viability, 
legitimacy and reputation (Amran et al., 2014; Branco & Rodriguez, 2008). RDT is 
complementary and supplementary to both PA and ST theories of corporate governance. For 
instance achieving public accountability (PA) in itself would be made easier by the presence 
of distinguished directors on the board with a wider appeal in the community. Government 
departments, regulatory institutions and public bodies would all be more approachable and 
amenable to a board constituted by distinguished independent directors. Similarly, expert 
directors with expanded reach and social capital would enable easier maintenance of good 
relations with important stakeholders, crucial for the maintenance of networks or resources of 
the firm (Christopher, 2010; Bouwman, 2011). 
 
Resources are an even more important consideration for a university. This institution has 
definite limits to the amount of resources that it can generate whether from fee paying students 
or from the Government budget. It has to definitely rely on the board as well as other reputed 
faculty members to enhance its resource generating capabilities. Therefore the university 
scholarship resonates with calls to use RDT as a theoretical lens to decipher the complexities 
and intricacies of university governance and performance (Callen et al., 2010; Verbruggen et 
al., 2011; Verschuere & De Corte, 2014).  
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2.4.3.3.1 Implications of RDT to university governance and performance 
 
A university’s governance and performance is enacted in different dimensions unlike a 
corporate firm. Consequently within a university resource dependence takes on an extremely 
different and expanded connotation. Board composition, independence and expertise are 
undoubtedly important. But there are many other aspects in a university that might need to be 
decoded using the tenets of RDT. For example faculty expertise and networks are resources 
that are crucial for a university. Even when a university board boasts some of the best names 
in higher education it might still be unable to attract the right talent among staff, students and 
researchers simply due to its lack of certain critical professors in its faculty.  The theory thus 
seems to be making the case that staff organization is important. University staff choices could 
reflect both a current resource and a future liability and must therefore constitute an essential 
ingradient of governance performance investigations. From another angle how well the 
university calibrates its staff to student ratio to prioritize staff workload considerations will 
surely have budgetary resource implications. By choosing very high students to staff ratio the 
university would not only jeopardize its own business model but also reduce available 
resources for other equally important knowledge generating cutting edge research. 
 
Gender and ethnic diversities in a university matter at various levels not just at the board. But 
RDT implies that such diversities across the university would surely have resource 
implications. For example a university with a good ethnic and gender balance in staff, and 
student populations would find it easier to attract women and ethnic minorities in the future. 
Such staff would be able to better identify and exploit research opportunities in gender/ethnic 
research and achieve higher rated research simply because of their innate talent and ability to 
advocate and implement it.  
 
Many RDT scholars (Amran et al., 2014; Branco & Rodriguez, 2008; Christopher, 2010; 
Bouwman, 2011) argue that the theory implies that organisations should calibrate their 
governance to achieve the financial resources that are needed. Naturally this would mean that 
in a marketized HEI environment the fee-paying student would be an important focus for this 
institution. The theory thus seems to signal that governance processes dealing with pedagogical 
balances in student bodies on the one side and those dealing with financial balances among 
university income sources may both be crucial to the institution’s performance. 
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But at another level RDT also implies an overriding concern in relation to the effective use of 
existing resources and budgets. After all resource dependence ought to mean an equally 
important focus on resource conservation. Thus, the theory might be construed to suggest that 
the university should take steps to properly utilize its existing academic staff and their talents 
in the best possible way. At the same time the institution must ensure that its asset base is rich 
enough to support the entire range of its research and teaching functions.   
 
Some important strands of RDT scholarship like Callen et al. (2010); Verbruggen et al. (2011) 
and Verschuere & De Corte (2014) use the theory to uncover the tendencies of large not-for-
profit institutions to design governance mechanisms or manage performance to exclusively 
meet certain vested resource provider concerns. This is particularly worrisome and relevant for 
universities since they too share a disproportionate resource dependence on research/teaching 
grant providers. Typically internal governance or performance could reflect an exaggerated 
research or teaching emphasis.  This would be easily deciphered, if RDT is used within the 
theoretical framework. 
 
Overall RDT stands out as an essential lens with which to unpack complex and multi-
dimensional university governance and performance. Resources are one of the vital 
considerations that drive various internal governances of the organization. Simultaneously the 
complex trade-offs that characterize multi-dimensional university performance stem directly 
or indirectly from resource considerations.  
 
2.4.3.3.2 Limitations of Resource Dependent Theory 
 
RDT has clear limitations. The resource dependence perspective is often not the sole or even 
important guiding consideration in universities.  For example it is often seen that a  university 
motivated by PA or ST considerations ignores the RDT. Some resource rich board, faculty 
members or even VC may not be recruited simply because they do not fit with the prevailing 
ideology (PA) or salient stakeholders (ST) of a given university. Similarly despite explicit 
directives from an important research grant provider a given university might conduct research 
in controversial areas of a given subject and risk losing the grant in future simply in a bid to 
enhance its neutral reputation. Therefore, the use of RDT does not assure the researcher of a 
comprehensive view of multi-dimensional university governance and performance. 
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2.4.3.3.3 Resource Dependence Theory’s relevance to the UK Higher Education  
 
UK higher education is rapidly changing in terms of its resource providers. The growing 
squeeze on public sector budgets has meant that universities need to search for other sponsors 
such as fee-paying domestic students, international students, corporate bodies and even 
philanthropic individuals for balancing their budgets. Naturally these new resource providers 
are now acquiring greater importance. To appease the concerns of these resource providers it 
is but natural that not only university boards but also departmental heads and even lecturers are 
co-opting governance protocols and mechanisms tailored to their concerns. But the nagging 
question in current policy-based literature remains whether such a focus on high fee paying 
domestic and international students or corporate bodies is necessarily salutary for the UK 
university. 
 
Parker (2011; 2012; 2013), Nagy & Robb (2008) and Taylor (2013a, b) underline how 
university dependences on resource providers has led to both subtle and not-so-subtle shifts in 
governance. The consequent impacts on university performance have attracted widespread 
criticism both in the popular press as well as the academia. For example board level 
appointments and even Vice Chancellor selection at some universities in recent times has been 
aimed to generate goodwill among research sponsors. Similarly, Questions and fingers have 
been pointed at large sums of money donated by philanthropic trusts and consequent changes 
in research priorities of departments or subtler changes in syllabi of social sciences disciplines 
at certain institutions. Although in the increasingly marketized environment of UK HEI many 
institutions can hardly be faulted for chasing resources wherever they find them still external 
governance of regulation must provide the checks and balances to ensure the greater good.  
RDT is thus increasingly implicated within a UK HEI context and can hardly be ignored.  
 
2.4.3.4. Legitimacy Theory  
 
The legitimacy theory (LT) contends that any given organization exists and thrives only 
because it is perceived as legitimate by society as a whole or at least those constituents of 
society that depend on it. LT avers that a university can only survive, sustain and flourish in 
any given society if its value systems and structures are congruent with those considered 
legitimate in that society (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). All the 
governance practices of such an institution have to be considered desirable, proper or 
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appropriate within the socially constructed system of norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 
1995; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006). Similarly the institution must perform in such a way 
as to meet those very same norms values and beliefs. 
2.4.3.4.1 Implications of Legitimacy Theory to university governance and performance 
 
Legitimacy theory implies that a university’s internal governance and performance should be 
deemed legitimate by society. Given its public role and its sanctioned tax funded status it is 
even more imperative that a university is seen to be legitimate by all important societal 
constituents. Only then will this institution be considered credible neutral impartial and fair. 
 
Yet Legitimacy itself can be pragmatic, moral or cognitive. Legitimacy theory argues that 
moral and cognitive legitimacy must be prioritized (Suchman, 1995. But often it is the case 
that institutions prioritize pragmatic legitimacy over the others. For example in the growing 
quasi market for higher education in the UK universities have focused directly on the 
immediate concerns of grant providers and fee-paying students (Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013). 
Sensitive information has only been exclusively disclosed to such constituencies while other 
interested parties have been neglected. Internal governance and performance targets have also 
been calibrated to meet the needs of important fee payers such as international students as 
opposed to their domestic peers. Legitimacy theory as a critical lens seems to be strongly 
advocating that universities must step up to the task of expanding their concepts of governance 
and unravel ways in which the different legitimate concerns of a range of societal constituents 
may be traded off optimally against each other. 
 
In a different vein Legitimacy theory implies that generating, expanding and sustaining 
legitimacy is a direct performance goal for any university. Every aspect of a university’s 
performance may have a positive, neutral or negative impact on its legitimacy among its 
diverse constituencies (Hordern, 2013; Melville Ross, 2010; Zeghal, 2008). The trade-offs here 
would naturally create conflict. For example a university’s superior performance in corporate 
sponsored research would generate legitimacy among funders and sponsors but its exclusive 
focus on corporate research would surely lose it credibility among other constituencies. 
Similarly, when a university allows higher grades to its graduates based on its easy assessment 
criteria the benefited graduates would undoubtedly recommend it to potential students. But 
when later the very same graduates are seen to lack vital skills then it would lose credibility 
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with employers and arguably with those students as well. In all of these implications one is 
able to infer a range of different trade-offs in the many governance aspects of the institution. 
The theory itself seems to be drawing attention to these and highlighting missing narratives 
and perspectives. 
 
Legitimacy theory has an overweening gaze on the top of the organisational pyramid. 
Especially with regard to audit, LT strongly avers that independent audit and appraisal 
mechanisms should form a mandatory part of internal governance of a university. This would 
check or at least shed light on any such tendency by the board or other powers that be prioritize 
pragmatic legitimacy. At the board level the theory obviously implies greater diversity and 
independence. A diverse or independent board would be more likely to balance expedient 
pragmatic legitimacy concerns with a moral compass.  
 
Moral or cognitive legitimacy by contrast is targeted at no one constituency but aimed to 
demonstrate a general adherence to moral beliefs and values. Legitimacy theory argues that by 
remaining true to moral or cognitive legitimacy a university balances various societal interests 
in its functioning.  Suchman (1995), Lindblom (1994) and De Villers & Van Staden (2006) 
decompose moral legitimacy into three different types namely consequential, procedural and 
structural forms of legitimacy. Consequential legitimacy implies that universities must appear 
generally credible to society at large in terms of a well-defined set of financial performance 
and governance metrics. Legitimacy theory thus suggests that metrics like number of graduates, 
student employability ratios, NSS research/teaching excellence scores and value of research 
funding among many others might need detailed analysis (Ntim et al., 2017). Peer comparisons 
and benchmarks in terms of these consequential outcomes of university functioning are 
important parameters by which to assess the governances and performances of this institution. 
These are theoretical indications that LT at least in its moral version is strongly evoking 
pictures of unconventional governance performance relationships and related trade-offs. 
 
Procedural legitimacy on the other hand implies that universities must be seen to be neutral 
independent and unbiased creators and purveyors of knowledge. A strict and rigorous academic 
and ethical orientation would therefore need to be demonstrated by a university in both its 
internal governances and performances. Clearly then Legitimacy theory implies a robust 
external and internal audit protocol as well as an independent and diverse board. Finally 
structural legitimacy requires universities to maintain moral superiority in the way they 
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structure themselves. In this Legitimacy theory argues that the organizational pyramid, staff 
hierarchies and board-executive relations must demonstrate a fine balance of power. Such 
checks and balances also strongly imply that the governance performance debates should 
engage with tacit dimensions of governance that reflect in the different parts of the university. 
 
2.4.3.4.2 Limitations of Legitimacy Theory  
 
Legitimacy theory has its own limitations. Appearing legitimate may not be as much of a 
necessity for the university as the theory would like to infer. In fact often public accountability, 
stakeholder or resource dependence concerns intervene to change university strategy. This is 
exactly why pragmatic legitimacy often predominates. Moral legitimacy is often the first to be 
sacrificed on the altar of expediency as the university chases funds, sponsors, fee-paying 
students or regulatory compliance. Legitimacy theory does not advance any structural or policy 
recommendations to correct such expediency. At another level appearing legitimate is often 
costly as the university needs to invest in various communication channels and structure itself 
in many different ways. This may prove economically unviable to the institution. Yet 
Legitimacy theory has no recommendations about how to achieve a correct trade-off between 
legitimacy and viability. 
 
2.4.3.4.3 Legitimacy Theory’s Relevance to the UK Higher Education  
 
Pragmatic and strategic legitimacy concerns have become widespread in UK Higher Education 
(Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013: Suchman, 1995). The introduction of “Quasi market” conditions 
in the form of full-tuition fees, competition for students and other reforms aimed at improving 
the governance and performance of universities (FSSG, 2011; UUK, 2011) has led to an 
external discourse. This discourse has focused on issues of accountability and transparency 
within universities in the UK. Appearing legitimate as per these socially constructed systems 
of norms, values and beliefs has thus acquired primacy. Institutions have begun to change 
governance structures and mechanisms to appear legitimate to all the powers that be in higher 
education on these terms. Nagy and Robb (2008) and Parker (2011) show how UK universities 
like their counterparts elsewhere have calibrated internal governance, disclosures and 
performances to appear legitimate in terms of financial metrics such as value-for-money and 
teaching/research efficiency. The theoretical lens of Legitimacy theory is therefore a highly 
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relevant tool to unpack and criticize many of these developments and their links to university 
performance. Legitimcy Theory’s contextual relevance to UK HEI has grown enormously in 
recent times but more importantly this relevance has thrown in to sharp relief the fact that 
norms, values and beliefs may hide certain aspects of the governance-performance puzzle. The 
challenge seems to be to include as many of these aspects within the debate and unpack them. 
  
2.4.3.5 Stewardship and Agency perspectives (S&A) 
 
As mentioned earlier at least three other ancillary theoretical constructs bear direct relevance 
to university governance and performance. Among these it is useful to begin with the 
stewardship variant of agency perspectives. The governors of a corporate firm view its agents 
i.e. the CEO and his/her specialist team with suspicion because the latter are considered to be 
motivated by personal ambitions and vested self-interests. Therefore, the principal-agent 
conflict is given central attention in corporate governance literature. But university governance 
is different. This institution is often run for collectivistic purposes and subsumes within itself 
a range of non-utilitarian objectives connected to societal welfare. Smallman (2004), 
Donaldosn & Davis (1991) and Davis, Schooorman and Donaldson (1997) stress how in 
collectivistic organisations agents must be viewed more as stewards whose utilities are only 
maximized in the collective utility of the institution. It is not agency conflict that is central 
here. Therefore one has to accept the argument of university governance scholars like Saltman 
et al. (2000) that university executives are leaders who must work to instill a common set of 
values and understanding within the organization. Stewardship precepts apply squarely to 
university governance and performance.  
 
2.4.3.5.1 Implications of Stewardship and Agency perspectives to university governance 
and performance 
 
University governing boards entrust conduct of administration to administrative officers i.e. 
the general administration and day-to-day management of the institution to the vice-chancellor 
and his/her executive team and the conduct of teaching and research to the heads of department 
and senior faculty but maintain a general overview. This complex yet nuanced balance of 
powers and delegations is best deciphered using stewardship precepts (S&A). S&A stresses 
that universities should try to attain a delicate balance between the board, the VC and his 
executive team and the heads of department in different faculties (Marginson & Considine, 
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2000; Swansson, Mow & Bartos, 2004; Lazerson, 1997). Such a delicate balance is 
undoubtedly difficult to attain and maintain but nevertheless essential in a university. Unlike 
as with the CEO in a corporate firm the VC cannot and indeed must not purport to be the single 
focal point of power in a university.  Different levels in the hierarchy of a university would 
necessarily share power and responsibility and this delicate balance would have to be carefully 
fostered. S&A therefore implicates the entire sets of checks and balances at different levels in 
the university hierarchy and in particular the Board versus VC executive team dynamics . it 
advocates appropriate self-limitation and power sharing at different levels and in different 
dimensions of university governance and performance (Seyama, 2015; Lazerson, 1997; 
Swansson, Mow & Bartos, 2004). Thus, the theory itself stresses the importance of good 
stewardship. In doing so it invoke the need to sustain multiple dimensions of university 
governance and performance. 
 
The independence of the board is another key concept emphasized by S&A. After all It is only 
a university board populated by independent directors that will play an active interventionist 
role. Such directors with no executive role in the university will act without fear to engender 
the complex sets of balances of power across the university (O’Meara & Petzall, 2007; 
Trakman, 2008). This is what will provide different alternate centers of power lower down in 
the university hierarchy the ability to vent differences and ensure that the VC and executive 
team do not arrogate more than their fair share of power. Such a balanced perspective seems 
to highlight the role of the entire range of internal audit mechanisms and their crucial need in 
universities.  
 
The twin aspects of power balance and independence have another very important implication. 
The good steward in the form of the Vice Chancellor must ensure effective balance in staff 
organisation, student body diversity and asset/revenue stream choices. In this the theory seems 
to stress a holistic concept of the Vice-Chancellor. As the head of a knowledge institution 
tasked with a complex and unique objective it is his/her duty to ensure a rounded perspective 





2.4.3.5.2 Limitations of Stewardship and Agency perspectives 
 
Yet S&A does have its limitations. The theory is normative and fails to consider that stewards 
are real people with vested self-interests. The VC and executive team would naturally stress 
their narrow interests over and above broader multi-dimensional organizational goals (Clarke, 
2004; 2007). Self-limitation by a powerful VC is certainly a laudable goal but the theory is 
quiet on how this can be structurally achieved. After all unfettered power once obtained is very 
difficult to relinquish (Smallman, 2004; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997).  
 
The theory is also silent on how power sharing may be achieved especially in a complex multi-
layer multi-dimensional university setting (Davis et al., 1997; Saltman, 2000). In particular 
there is no specific advice on how the VC’s executive team, heads of department, academic 
affairs committees or the board are to share power. S&A has little concrete recommendations 
other than normative prescriptions.  
2.4.3.5.3 Stewardship and Agency perspectives’ relevance to the UK Higher Education 
 
The good steward argument has been repeatedly contested in UK HEI (Coy et al., 2011; Nelson 
et al., 2003; Ntim et al., 2017; Shattock, 2006; Perez & Ode, 2013). Vice-Chancellors have 
proven themselves to be extremely inept in some post-1992 universities paying themselves 
very high salaries (Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Hubble & Bolton, 2019). This has invited the wrath 
of the university press which has highlighted the huge conflict of interest in the pay 
determination of the top most executive in the university. This has raised the issue of university 
boards not really being independent and effective to act as a check or balance on the steward. 
External regulation of UK HEI in recent times has initiated some action here in the form of 
CUC mandates prescribing higher levels of board independence (CUC, 2009; Dearlove, 2002; 
Schofield, 2009; Shattock, 2002: 2004).  
 
Elsewhere a series of poor governance scandals in the Higher Education sector in the UK 
emerged during the decade of the 90s. These set into motion debates focusing on whether 
boards and other governance mechanisms in universities were “fit for purpose” (Shattock, 
2004a ,b; 2013 a, b). Concerns have repeatedly surfaced regarding whether boards are 
independent enough and take account of wider public concerns. The good steward concept has 
been challenged especially within the context of the many Vice Chancellors drafted from the 
private sector in the post-1992 universities (Middlehurst, 2004; 2013; Bennett, 2002; Knight, 
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2002). There have been repeated calls for more representative boards with larger proportions 
of lay members to ensure that errant steward VCs are kept in check. This vibrant context makes 
S&A highly topical to any analysis of governance reform and university performance in the 
UK.   
 
2.4.3.6 Culture and Quality Assurance (CQA) 
 
A university’s governance is rooted in its prevalent culture. Geertz (1983), Kuh & Whitt (1988) 
and Trowler (2008: 1) stress that the multiple levels and dimensions of this institution are each 
significantly impacted by the socio-cultural milieu in which it is located. Importantly teaching 
and research regimes, subject and syllabus choices and the priority given to academic 
attainment by a university are each a direct function of its culture (Peter & Waterman, 1982; 
Handy, 1993). At a different level universities with predominantly left leaning departments 
dominated by social science disciplines can be expected to resist managerial and private sector 
style governance reforms. On the other hand right leaning business orientated instrumental 
universities might embrace such reforms. Therefore a large set of university governance 
scholars (Bess, 1992; Cole, 1993; Terenzini, 1993; Gayle et al., 2003) argue for incorporation 
of culture. 
 
University governance and performance are subject to quality concerns. A university that 
shows high graduation rates might be doing so on the back of high rates of plagiarism and 
relatively easy marking schemes. Similarly a university may mask its lack of academic rigor 
by marketing an informal friendly internal environment. Thus, Quality assurance is inevitably 
an important dimension that ought to form part of any study of governance and performance 
in a university. 
 
2.4.3.6.1 Implications of Culture and Quality Assurance to university governance and 
performance 
 
Culture and quality assurance concerns are important axes in the university governance 
performance debate. The university is a knowledge institution that delivers two important 
complex functions of research and teaching. But the process of delivery of these functions 
crucially depends on protocols developed over time in the institution often termed Teaching & 
Learning Regimes (TLRs). The theory implies that TLRs show up in different ways across the 
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institution (Trowler, 2019, 2008; Gayle et al., 2003; Trowler and Cooper, 2002). Academic 
staff involved in pedagogy both research and teaching are constantly calibrating their inputs 
based on the existing and continuously evolving TLRs of the institution. TLRs are 
academically influenced. Universities with a high research orientation exhibit a different type 
of TLR when compared with peers who are more teaching or vocationally focused. Yet TLRs 
show up in the different range of academic staff contracts, the selectivity of students and choice 
of student staff interaction levels at any given university. The theory thus implies that these 
facets of governance will surely matter to the institution’s academic performances.  
 
Culture in CQA has important implications for university governance and performance (Bess, 
1992; Cole, 1993; Terenzini, 1993; Gayle et al., 2003; Alvesson, 2002). At one level it suggests 
that university location would have a deep and abiding cultural influence. For example an Irish 
university might have very different cultural norms for board size, diversity or independence 
than its English counterpart. Extant empirical research in Ntim et al. (2017) confirms that this 
is indeed the case. Similarly direct collaboration in research with corporate entities may be 
culturally acceptable in English universities but frowned upon among Scottish counterparts. 
The latter might insist that academic research be neutral and independent of corporate 
commercial bias. Thus, university location must be used as an important factor in any analysis 
of governance in this institution.  
 
At a second level Culture is necessarily implicated in teaching and research governances 
designed by universities. Scholars like Kezar & Eckel (2004), Alvesson (2002), Trowler 
(2008), Kochan & Useem, (1992), Gilmore (1997and Altbach et al. (2005) cite several case 
studies to demonstrate how the culture of a given university impacts upon teaching, research 
and administrative and recruitment processes and thus improves or declines its academic and 
non-academic performance. Therefore, culture and quality assurance has two fold-implication 
for University governance and performance; First, it implies that relations between governance 
mechanisms such as training spends or administrative staffing priorities and academic and non-
academic performance in a university would be strongly influenced by its culture. Second, it 
gives an expanded scope to the cultural considerations embedded in university governance and 
performance suggesting there could be complex trade-offs and interactions here that may need 
consideration. Teaching and Learning Regimes driven by the academic culture at a university 
could result in certain types of staff contracts or student staff interaction levels that although 
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producing research or teaching performance desired may harm the university’s mission in its 
totality (Trowler, 2008: 2019; Mouwen, 2000; Kim, 2008; Rowley, 1996).   
 
From another perspective culture of a university would surely limit its ability to recruit and 
retain the best talent on offer at all levels of its hierarchy and particularly in its VC.  Culture 
and Quality Assurance (Parker, 2011; Nagy & Robb, 2008; Altbach et al., 2005) both imply 
that VC remuneration levels would critically affect the performance of the institution. On the 
one hand the pay itself would be limited based on cultural notions of what each university 
board felt was justified. But on the other hand, quality assurance concerns would highlight that 
a high-quality candidate might not even consider an offer that does not value his/her 
contribution. Thus, internal governance at the university would face a challenging trade-off 
here and the theory seems to imply this. 
 
Culture and Quality Assurance avers that both university governance and performance are 
strongly subject to quality considerations. Large swathes of argumentative scholarship (Canado 
in Blessinger & Anchan (eds), 2015:55; Eurydice, 2010:24; Brown & Carasso, 2013: 144-163; 
Attwood, 2008b; Yorke, 2009a, b; Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; Palfreyman, 2010;  Ehrenberg & 
Zhang, 2006; Himanen et al., 2009)  here emphasize the rapid decline in academic standards, 
dumbing down of research/teaching assessment protocols, rising use of part-time staff, 
increasing incidences of plagiarism/grade inflation, lowered access of students to 
teaching/research input and consequent drop in teaching/research quality across Higher 
Education. All of these suggest that Quality assurance might have complex and non-linear 
impacts on the governances of research teaching or administration in a university. Culture and 
Quality Assurance therefore stresses effective internal and external audit mechanisms, 
independence and diversity in different levels and dimensions of governance and a careful 
calibration of teaching research and administrative priorities. This is what will improve the 
quality of the multi-dimensional performance of a university. 
 
2.4.3.6.2 Limitations of Culture and Quality Assurance 
 
Culture and Quality Assurance has its own set of drawbacks. First and foremost is the fact that 
both culture and quality assurance are complex constructs and difficult to proxy or 
operationalize. They might need a level of detail that is out of the scope of this research. Second 
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is the fact that both constructs are prone to different interpretations. Different constituencies 
and stakeholders in a university would construe quality assurance or culture differently and 
generalization of findings would not be easy. Finally, culture and quality assurance may also 
interact and depend on each other making it difficult to unpack their interactive influence on 
the university governance performance relation. Yet despite these shortcomings there is no 
escaping the fact that university governance performance studies necessarily must incorporate 
both culture and quality assurance or risk ignoring vital mechanisms at work here.  
2.4.3.6.3 Culture and Quality Assurance’ relevance to the UK Higher Education 
 
Recent events in Higher Education in the UK underline how culture and quality assurance 
concerns are becoming widespread here. Scholars such as Middlehurst (2013), Nagy & Robb 
(2008) and Parker (2013) underline a shift in university governance in the UK with the rise of 
the corporatized university. In particular these authors decry the “top down management style 
and culture” increasingly being promoted at these institutions. It seems fairly obvious that 
university cultures are changing rapidly and the staid conservative university of the past is 
giving way to a vibrant open entrepreneurial organization. There is thus a greater need to 
incorporate cultural considerations in university governance performance studies.  
 
Regional disparities are an important theme of UK HEI and there has been growing evidence 
of this in recent policy and empirical literatures here (Ntim et al., 2017; Brennan et al., 2018; 
Brock, 2015; Huisman et al., 2007; Croxford & Raffe, 2015). For example, Scottish 
universities have very different ideas of gender diversities, staff contracts and student fees than 
their English peers. Such universities also seem to be less focused on distinguishing between 
research and teaching arguing for a holistic approach where either function robustly 
complements the other. These cultural differences have been growing across the decade and 
making it more and more difficult to integrate UK HEI in all the regions of the country (Scott, 
2012; Shattock & Horvath, 2019; Bruce, 2012; Trench, 2008). There is little doubt that region 
and culture are becoming vital to governance performance studies. 
 
Recently governance policy scholarship both generally and in the UK (Canado in Blessinger 
& Anchan (eds), 2015:55; Eurydice, 2010:24; Brown & Carasso, 2013: 144-163; Attwood, 
2008b; Yorke, 2009a, b; Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; Palfreyman, 2010;  Ehrenberg & Zhang, 
2006; Himanen et al., 2009; Bachan, 2017; Jones & Soo, 2013; Barron, 2006; Anyanwu, 2004)  
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emphasize the rapid decline in academic standards, dumbing down of research/teaching 
assessment protocols, rising use of part-time staff, increasing incidences of plagiarism/grade 
inflation, lowered access of students to teaching/research input and consequent drop in 
teaching/research quality across Higher Education. All of these suggest that Quality assurance 
is at the heart of governance performance debate in UK HEI. Now more than ever effective 
internal and external audit mechanisms, independence and diversity at board level is 
increasingly focused on delivering quality in university performance (Salter & Tapper, 2002; 
Brown, 2004; Shattock, 2006; Pollitt, 1990; Kim, 2008; Middlehurst, 2013).  Yet the debate is 
now highlighting the many other processes within academic governance that have a crucial 
quality connotion. These include the way staff teaching/research contracts are calibrated or 
how part time staff levels are chosen or whether students have adequate interaction times with 
supervisors (Rowley, 1996; Patrick & Stanley, 1998; Yorke, 2000; Locke, 2016; Bradley et al., 
2008). The theory is thus centre stage in the debates of UK HEI. 
 
Elsewhere self-financed students are on the rise and Government aid to higher education is on 
the decline. Students and their financiers are increasingly asking more probing questions about 
the quality of university education that they receive (Mcgettigan, 2013; Browne, 2010). Firms 
are questioning whether incoming university graduates really represent value for money 
(Shattock, 2013a; Taylor, 2013a, b, c) . University research is being criticized widely in terms 
of its independence, worth and effective contribution to knowledge (Hordern, 2013; Rowlands, 
2013). Regulation of the sector especially the recent introduction of the OFS and 
amalgamation/rationalization of different agencies has been driven in large part by the quality 
of university governances and performances (DOE, 2017; DOE, 2016; Shattock, 2013a, b; 
Mcgettigan, 2013). Undoubtedly quality assurance in university governance and performance 
is now at the center of the debate in UK Higher Education. 
 
2.4.3.7 Managerial power and Optimal Contracting (MPOC) 
 
Managerial power is reflected in the many dimensions of University Governance and 
performance. Teaching/Research staff and members of the VC’s executive team exercise 
different degrees of power vis-à-vis the board and therefore the tenets of Managerial power 
theory apply squarely here. Extant scholarship (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Schleifer & Vishny, 
1997; bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen et ak, 2015; Kalyta & Magnan, 2008; Byrd et al., 2010) 
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therefore emphasizes that governance studies should examine the modalities and dynamics of 
these power relations in the different dimensions of university governance and performance. 
 
The university, like a firm contracts with a wide range of intermediate institutions and 
individuals to fulfill its complex and multi-dimensional mandate. Many trade-offs need to be 
effectively managed by university governors and powers that be if the institution is to deliver 
on its multiple objectives. (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012). 
Therefore, the tenets of optimal contracting theory must necessarily be applied within any 
governance performance study of a university.  
 
The two separate theories have a joint impact on university governance and performance. 
Governance structures and mechanisms in a university are radically different from the 
corporate firm. Collegiality is the way it has often been described in the university governance 
literature (McNay, 1995: 2011a, b; Elton, 2008; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010; Meyer, 2007; 
Bess, 1992). The amorphous manner in which governance and managerial decisions are taken 
across this institution emphasize debate, coordination and collaboration across many levels. 
The divide between the board and the executive is not sharp but fuzzy. Therefore, managerial 
and strategic power combine in different ways across the organisation. This is why it makes 
sense to combine the use of managerial power theory with optimal contracting here. How a 
university contracts outward is essentially intricately linked to the balance between strategic 
powers vested in the board and managerial powers vested in the VC and his team. 
 
2.4.3.7.1 Implications of Mangerial Power & Optimal Contracting to University 
Governance and Performance 
 
Mangerial Power (MP) has direct and indirect implications for university governance and 
performance. There is the direct inference that academic subject domain managers such as 
heads of departments have a vital balancing role to play in several hidden dimensions of 
university governance. Whether it be how staff are organised or which courses are prioritised 
or even what income sources are predominantly courted these academic managers exert very 
powerful vested influence. The theory suggests that this academic power might be hard to 
counteract especially given the specialist status of these subject domain expert managers 
(Bebchuck et al., 2002; Exworthy & Halford, 1999). From a different angle there are 
indications that managerial power complicates the complex trade-offs that might exist in these 
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missing dimensions of university governance and how they impact the institution’s 
performance (Meyer, 2002; Deem et al., 2007).  
 
But MP also has an important indirect implication for the debate. Academic managers at 
universities often act as robust checks. They are the advocates of academic integrity contesting 
even a so-called independent board or external audit from distorting the academic focus. The 
theory seems to thus imply that managerial influence even within an academic institution could 
play a complex role in balancing executive or board level excess.  
 
Strongly linked to this balancing role of Managerial Power there is the question of how well a 
university contracts with its many stakeholders across its multi-dimensioanlity. Optimal 
contracting implies that this contractual efficiency should matter to both governance and 
performance at the institution. The university faces trade-offs in many tacit aspects of its 
governance particularly how it selects students, recruits’ staff, organises assets and 90rioritises 
income sources. In each of these dimensions the theory suggests that an important optimality 
criterion should be applied. Universities should consider and balance out the many competing 
demands on every dimension before deciding on it. In this Optimal Contracting (OC) is much 
like MP exposing the complex trade-offs that exist in each governance dimension. But there 
are other aspects of the optimality criterion that apply even to board and audit related 
dimensions of university governance. The theory (OC) implies that VC pay levels, board and 
audit committee compositions are challenges in themselvcs. In each of these governance 
dimensions the university’s ability to effectively optimize would make a significant difference 
to its performance (Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Soh, 2007; Tarbert et al.,, 2008).   
 
2.4.3.7.2 Limitations of Mangerial Power & Optimal Contracting 
 
Managerial power and optimal contracting have their limitations. Both theories are limited in 
terms of their insights into how complex multi-dimensional aspects of university power 
relations and/or contractual structures can be remedied or optimized (Cambini et al., 2015; 
Carver et al., 2013; Luo, 2015). They do not  advance models of power relations or optimal 
contracts specifically aimed at universities or non-profit institutions. In that sense the theories 
are too rooted in neoclassical and neoliberal paradigms to afford any holistic insights that 
incorporate plural non-corporate ideologies. Therefore  a University Governance Performance 
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study should only apply MPOC in a balanced and critical manner and this is what is intended 
in this research. 
 
2.4.3.7.3 Managerial power and optimal contracting’s relevance to the UK Higher 
Education 
 
In recent years managerial power and particularly its excess has attracted much attention in 
university governance discourse within the UK. Three illustrations must be advanced here. 
First is the growing regulatory pressure on university boards to include more lay members in 
order to impose checks on the growing unfettered powers of the Vice Chancellor and his/her 
executive team (Xiao et al., 2004; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Chan & Gray, 
2010; Gisbert & Navallas, 2013). Clearly the implication here is that independent board 
members will act as a critical balancing force that corrects the excessive executive power at 
least at the top of the university governance pyramid. Recent investigations by Ntim et al. 
(2016) reveal that most UK universities have complied. At least half of their board  is now 
indeed composed of non-executive members. Clearly universities at least on the surface seem 
have realized the importance of fostering checks and balances in their internal governances.  
 
Second, there is much evidence that universities especially the research intensive world class 
institutions are singularly resisting pressures to implement the “top-down” corporatized styles 
of internal governance being advanced by regulators. Shattock (2017) cites much evidence to 
show how in the period between 2000 and 2016 world class research institutions in the UK 
have indeed successfully resisted calls to corporatize themselves. Consensual and collegiate 
governance continues to be remarkably robust here. Managerial power theorists would thus 
argue that academics at least in these institutions do indeed seem to be demonstrating the power 
to remain impervious to external pressures.  
 
Finally detailed guidelines have been issued recently with regard to internal and external audits 
of university finances (CUC, 2008; 2009; Pearson, 2009; DOE, 2016; 2017). The idea here too 
seems to be to ensure that executive power is kept under surveillance. Narrow spending 
agendas or empire building tendencies of the VC and his powerful team are intended to be 
subject to external independent scrutiny. Such moves illustrate how balancing managerial 
power is increasingly becoming relevant in the UK university sector.  
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On the other side the value for money debate in UK university governance (Lambert, 2003; 
2005; FSSG, 2011; UUK, 2011; CUC, 2006a, b) is rooted in optimal contracting ideologies. It 
is hard not to see it as a direction to the university to optimally contract. The underlying 
implication seems to be that the institution must achieve efficient calibration of its contracts 
with students, staff and other stakeholders. In each of its many contracts with diverse parties 
the university is now expected to deliver a compelling return on its invested financial and social 
capital (Browne, 2010; Dearlove, 2002; Shattock, 2013; Ntim et al., 2017). Whether in staff 
teaching/research contracts, student body compositions or even in its resource contracts the 
university is increasingly expected to be as astute if not more astute than a corporate firm. 
Optimality seems to be the main concern in the context of increasing corporatization of the UK 
HEI. Growing incidences of universities chasing research grants, fee paying international 
students, larger endowments, and leverage have raised concerns about their financial 
sustainability. Clearly an expanded range of tacit governance dimensions and the optimality 
elemets in them need explicit consideration. In particular there are so many questions being 
asked now about universities and their optimal balance between academic integrity and 
financial sustainability. External regulation seems to be veering round to a more holistic view 
of this institution. Universities must not just chase research garnts, student fees, endowments 
or loans without recognising the dangers and risks that could potentially derail their 
performances here.   Optimal contracting tenets are thus now-more-than-ever infallibly 




This Chapter has conducted a systematic theoretical review of university governance and 
performance. It began by searching for the best taxonomical definitions for each construct. 
Recognising that governance and performance in higher education are both multi-dimensional 
and complex, the Chapter successfully crafted an expanded yet internally consistent set of 
definitions for each. These not only captured their multiple dimensions but evoked important 
missing governance proclivities/discretions and performance variants. The Chapter therefore 
established a sound foundation for the development of a theoretical framework for a 
governance performance study in higher education. 
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Directly stemming out of the newly crafted definitions, the second part of the Chapter identified 
and justified the use of a seven-theory framework to study university governance and 
performance. It showed that this mesh of seven theories with their interrelationships were vital 
to unpacking the multi-dimensional associations between the two constructs. This was then 
followed by a detailed discussion of each selected theory’s implications for the governance 
performance debate. In each narrative here, theoretical indications were marshalled to show 
that university governance and performance are far from straightforward with many tacit and 
explicit elements. Simultaneously these theoretical narratives were threaded together to 
demonstrate their relevance to several recent and critical policy-based debates in UK HEI.  
 
On the whole then, the Chapter theoretically framed the conundrum of multi-dimensional 
governance and its association with performance in the university sector. It clarified the 
theoretical boundaries of this puzzle highlighting its many missing parts. By doing so, it helped 
to justify why this research is topical, relevant and highly appropriate at this juncture. 
 
The next Chapter builds on this theoretical foundation. It reviews empirical literature to reveal 






3.Chapter Three:  Empirical Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
 
The primary purpose of this Chapter is to critically review the empirical literature in university 
governance and performance in such a way as to derive important hypotheses regarding the 
likely links between these two constructs. In the process of this derivation there is a natural 
elucidation of the primary research gaps that constitute the fundamental research objectives of 
this thesis. Therefore, the chapter begins with section 3.1, which describes the main empirical 
gaps in the extant literature in university governance and performance. This is then followed 
by Section 3.2 which derives a range of inter-linked hypotheses that emerge from these debates 
and gaps in the empirical literature. Finally, Section 3.3 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.1 The principal empirical gaps in extant literature 
 
As discussed in the introductory chapter university governance and performance are multi-
dimensional complex and interlinked. Unlike the corporate firm, the university is governed in 
a range of complex dimensions and its performance too needs to be interpreted in various inter-
linked ways (Vukasovic et al., 2018; Hooghe & Marx, 2003; Piattoni, 2010; Braun, 2008). Its 
multi-dimensional societal role and myriad obligations to wider sets of constituencies and 
stakeholders are at the root of this (Chou & Gornitzka, 2014; Chou et al., 2017; Eitken, 2015: 
Peters, 2015).  
 
This is why seven-theory framework proposed in Chapter 2 was shown to be highly relevant 
to deciphering such multi-dimensional university governance and performance. But in the very 
process of analysing and justifying this framework several indications became available that 
the current lexicon of university governance and performance is far from sufficient to 
investigate such complex constrcuts and their associations. There is a need to expand the scope 
of empirical investigations beyond the extant paradigm.  
 
Be that as it may extant empirical scholarship has not engaged with this multi-dimensionality 
or complexity especially in a rigorous quantitative way. While many argumentative and 
normative papers exist on the subject the discussions in them have remained largely theoretical 
and speculative. There is a distinct lack of investigative work operationalizing the many 
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hypotheses linking university governance and performance ( Ayoub & Massoud, 2012; Bachan 
& Riley, 2015; Maingot & Zehgal, 2008; Coy et al., 2001; Olson, 2000; Ntim et al., 2017; 
Gordon et al., 2002; Gray & Haslam, 1990; Banks et al., 1997; Nelson et al., 2003). The few 
quantitative studies that do exist simply extend the corporate governance paradigm to the 
university (Ntim et al., 2017; Olson, 2000; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 
2015; Harris, 2014; Tarbert et al., 2003; Jones & Virmani, 2019). This overlooks important 
key  aspects of this complex institution, and is one of the main reasons for lack of empirical 
substance in the existing debates in higher education.  
 
In what follows the three main empirical gaps that exist in the university empirical literatures 
are identified. But more importantly in the analyses of each empirical gap an expanded range 
of university governance is identified that are missing and need to be actively incorporated 
here.  
 
3.1.1 Extant research missing the multiple dimensions of university governance and 
performance 
  
Discussions in chapters 1 and 2 have cogently argued how and why universities are unlike 
other public or private organizations. The unique multi-dimensional nature of these institutions 
makes their governance more complex and unusual. Studying governance and performance in 
a corporate firm can afford to take on a narrow view based on one or two dimensions (Cadbury, 
1992:15; Armstrong, Jia & Tonkidis, 2005; Shore & Wright, 2004; Dahya et al., 2002). Even 
in a public utility or charity governance and performance may be conceptualized simply and 
easily.  
 
By contrast university governance and performance are multi-dimensional and pervade the 
institution (Gayle et al., 2003; Collis, 2004: McGettigin, 2012). The theoretical underpinning 
here seems to strongly suggest that existing governance and performance variables originating 
in corporate governance may be insufficient to map out several missing dimensions. For 
example there is a need to capture how teaching regimes and protocols get created and 
innovated in  universities (Shattock, 2010; Rowlands, 2013; Gayle et al., 2003). This might 
need variables that demonstrate a university’s teaching ambiance and priorities. Similarly, 
research agendas are significantly fine-tuned in a range of different ways that reflect 
governance priorities or research and knowledge specializations of a given university (Collini, 
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2012; Gayle et al., 2003; Locke & Bennion,  2011). Even ranking teacher or student 
performance could be department or subject specific and may not have a universal basis 
(Middlehurst, 2013; Shattock, 2010).  
 
Yet extant scholarship has largely treated university governance just like corporate governance 
(Middlehurst, 2013; Parker, 2011; 2013; Nagy & Robb, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Collis, 2004). 
There has been an inordinate focus on a small set of governances mostly focused within the 
board. Performances of this multi-dimensional institution too have been coalesced into single 
measures of academic and non-academic performance. Most studies either investigate a smaller 
subset of governance performance relationships in the university or conflate missing 
dimensions of governance with performance (Olson, 2000; Boliver, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017; 
Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Dolton & ma, 
2003; Ayoubi & Masoud, 2012; Asif & Searcy, 2014). In what follows, some important sets 
of existing studies are highlighted to underline this missing multi-dimensionality.  
 
Among the university governance performance literature there is one significantly large 
quantitative study i.e. (Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015). The author 
evaluates the governance performance link in the Australian Public University Sector. Her 
sample consists of just 37 public universities across Australia representing only a slice of the 
higher education sector in the country. Time horizons are restricted to the three years between 
2005 and 2007. Further even across these 3 years the author only uses averages thus treating 
the 3-year panel as just a cross section. But to her credit she compares and contrasts a wider 
range of governance and performance variables than before and finds complex relationships 
between different governance and performance variables. Her study is also the first one to 
decompose university performance in to research teaching and financial performances. The 
author is also among the first to accept that university performance may be multi-dimensional 
and so study it using more than one variable. 
 
Yet in her study dimensions of governance beyond board level composition are ignored. Even 
where the author rightly identifies the student staff ratio as an important indicator in HEI studies 
she uses the ratio as one of her teaching performance measures. At another level many of her 
findings remain unresolved because her sample is too small and is only a cross section. Overall, 
then there is a distinct impression that Lokuwaduge’s impressive study still does not carefully 
distinguish between university governance i.e. a discretionary policy variable and university 
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performance i.e. an outcome variable determined by the chosen set of governances. In addition, 
despite her trailblazing effort to include at least some dimensions of university performance 
the author still misses hidden governance discretions at this complex institution. 
 
An important rigorous quantitative study in the university governance - voluntary disclosure 
literature bears mention. Ntim et al. (2017) find many interesting relationships between the two 
constructs in their UK sample. For the first time the authors use governances related to the 
VC’s executive team as a likely interacting influence on voluntary disclosure. Nevertheless, 
important staff, student, academic and non-academic governances are overlooked even here. 
Therefore, there are many indications in the paper that a richer picture of multi dimensional 
university governance might be lurking beneath the surface. To their credit the authors 
recognize this fact and themselves recommend that there is a need for expanded studies of 
university governance and performance. 
 
Elsewhere, empirical quantitative studies within the Vice Chancellor pay, origin and tenure 
literatures examine some of the multi-dimensional aspects of university governance and 
performance. For example Dalton & Ma (2003) link VC pay with financial and research 
performances while Soh (2007) uncover a significant negative size effect on VC pay. 
Elsewhere to their credit, Tarbert et al. (2008), Bachan & Reilly (2015) and Mcmanus et al. 
(2017) do investigate hidden governance discretions displayed in total numbers of students, 
change in post graduate students, change in overseas students and change in research income 
but do so only in relation to VC pay. But invariably the focus of all these studies remains 
narrow and focused around the remuneration question of the top executive of the university. 
 
Other studies of university financial performance like Olson (2000) expand the concept to 
include a range of measures such as total revenue, total gift income, endowment gifts and total 
number of gifts but correlates these with only board level compositions. Similarly, Festo & 
Nkote (2013) and Harris (2014) do add some variables to both university governance and 
performance. But their efforts remain focused on board effectiveness, board roles or board 
diversity respectively. similar narrowly focused studies here include Sherer & Zakaria (2016), 
Rossi (2010), De Boer et al. (2010), Safavi & Hakanson (2013), Braun et al. (2015), 
Montondon & Fischer (1999), Vidovich & Currie (2011) and Meyer (2007); Ayoubi & 
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Massoudi (2012) all of which either investigate small subsets of the governance performance 
association or remain normative/argumentative in scope.  
 
However, several pointers to tacit dimensions of university governance emerges individually 
in key strands of empirical work in the HEI literature. Notable here are (Boliver, 2015; 2013; 
Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Gorard et al., 2019; Jerrim & Vingoles, 2015; Johnes & Soo, 2013; 
Bachan, 2017; Chowdary, 2008; 2013) who study how universities develop entry standards for 
student recruitment; (Nyamapfene, 2018; Locke, 2014; 2016; Metcalf et al., 2015; Santos & 
Van Phu, 2019; Blake & La Valle, 2000; McFarlane, 2001; Skelton, 2012; Brew et al. 2017) 
who examine the diversity of university staff contracts; who investigate the role played by 
student body compositions in universities and (Sawir, 2013; Marshall & Chilton, 1995; 
Anyanwu, 2004; Morrison et al., 2005; Angell et al., 2008; Donaldson & McNicholas, 2004) 
who evaluate university endowments and their impact on research and teaching at the 
institution. Yet invariably each of these studies is focused on its narrow theme. A single 
missing dimension is explored and investigated on its own and no attempt is made to relate it 
to other missing or multiple governance dimensions or even university performance. Thus, the 
debate about the larger question of multi-dimensional university governance performance 
linkage remains unresolved.  
 
While this serious gap in the empirical literatures remains unfilled it is indeed ironic to find 
large swathes of policy and argumentative scholars such as Shattock (2010), Middlehurst 
(2013), Jarvis (2013), Parker (2011), Collini (2012) Bennett (2002), Davies (2001), Gayle et 
al. (2003) criticizing the “top down” corporate approach being adopted in governance reform 
in the higher education sector in the UK. Using anecdotal evidence these authors concur albeit 
for different reasons that the governance and performance in universities cannot and should 
not be regulated from single perspectives like those in corporate firms. For example, Shattock 
(2010: 195) shows the distinct irrelevance of corporate style regulation in universities where 
collegial internal governances and holistic integrated management should necessarily be the 
order of the day.  In a similar vein Parker (2011), Bennett (2002), Davies (2001) and Jarvis 
(2013) question many of the trends to corporatize teaching and research through metricized 
governance and performance directives. According to them these do not take account of the 
multi-dimensional trade-offs faced by universities in research and teaching.  Using a theoretical 
model Gayle et al. (2003) demonstrate university governance as a series of overlapping circles. 
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These circles each representing one different element of university governance intersect at 
various points. There is thus the clear implication in the author’s arguments that university 
governance is multi-dimensional and any study of it must incorporate this.   
 
In totality this section has established a primary gap in the empirical investigations in university 
governance and performance to date. Studies have overlooked important missing dimensions 
of either construct that have crucial ramifications for the interrelationships between them. Most 
studies have simply treated the university like a firm and used the standard template of board 
and audit related governances and associated them with the institution’s performance. Even 
where some scholars have discovered tacit governances in universities they have not 
systematically or comprehensively evaluated them to decipher the larger connections and 
associations. This is clearly misplaced and needs to be redressed. This thesis intends to expand 
the range of university governance and performance to include all relevant dimensions of either 
construct and evaluate their interconnections with the express purpose of filling this gap. 
 
3.1.2 Missing cultural and Quality Assurance aspects in extant university research 
 
In the theoretical review conducted in Chapter 2 and in several discussions in the introductory 
chapter (1.1, 1.1.1 & 1.2.3) mention has been repeatedly made of important culture and quality 
assurance elements in a university’s governance and performance. While these two elements 
remain important in the governance and performance of a corporate firm yet they can afford to 
be treated as distinctly secondary level influences. By contrast in a university cultural 
differences and quality concerns play a more central role (Shattock & Hovarth, 2019; Trowler, 
2008; Alvesson 2002; Gayle et al., 2003; Boliver, 2015; Salter & Tapper, 2000; Yorke, 2002). 
Both aspects are two central dimensions of the several that constitute the multi-dimensional 
governance and performance at this institution. Therefore, they need active and primary 
consideration.   
 
The  culture/quality assurance connection to university governance and performance is widely 
referred to in a large theoretical normative and anecdotal literature that harps on its  importance. 
For example, Harvey & Williams (2010) summarize rich and copious theoretical and normative 
literature on quality assurance concerns in university governance. Many of their collated 
studies argue how quality issues critically modify and constrain internal governances and have 
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consequent impacts on university performance. In a similar vein a large theoretical literature 
(Bonroy & Constantatos, 2008; Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; van Vught et al., 2012) is 
presented by Jongbloed et al. (2018) that puts quality assurance concerns at the very heart of 
the governance performance debate. The primary contention of this strand is that universities 
are providing a credence or experience based good to student consumers whose quality is very 
difficult to assess upfront.  
 
Culture is likewise an important influence on both university governance and performance and 
this is stressed by a large set of normative scholars. Scholars like Kezar & Eckel (2004), 
Trowler (2008), Kochan & Useem, (1992) and Gilmore (1997) argue about how culture of a 
university defines limits and modifies teaching/research routines, assessment protocols and 
administrative mechanisms. Many of them provide interview-based case studies or other 
qualitative evidence to show this.  Alvesson (2002) and Altbach et al. (2005) on the other hand 
develop theoretical paradigms to illustrate these culture-based influences on university 
governances and performances.  
 
Surprisingly extant empirical research in university governance and performance largely 
ignores these aspects. Lokuwaduge (2011) in her detailed analysis of 37 public universities in 
Australia does not  consider their different locations.  While it is to be anticipated that 
universities are both influenced by and active influencers of their regional communities and 
localities and their cultures the author does not incorporate any regional variables in her 
analysis. Additionally, the author does not introduce any other culture or quality assurance 
related variable to moderate the test of her primary hypotheses in any way. Elsewhere in the 
empirical literature (Sherer & Zakaria, 2016; Rossi, 2010; De Boer et al., 2010; Safavi & 
Hakanson, 2013; Harry, 2013) board level gender diversity, board roles and board effectiveness 
are evaluated in many ways within universities but once again the authors miss a valuable 
opportunity to analyse how culture or quality assurance might moderate these aspects. Even 
Ntim et al. (2017) in their university voluntary disclosure study include some elements of 
quality assurance in their computation of an index but do not really unpack it in any great detail. 
Neither do they examine cultural influence within the governance voluntary disclosure link. 
 
VC pay empirical scholarship likewise does not pay detailed attention to the culture of a 
university or its quality assurance imperatives in their discussions. For example, Soh (2007) 
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classify universities based loosely on governance types but fail to draw explicit connections to 
cultural differences embedded therein. Similarly, Tarbert et al. (2008) conduct several 
investigations using different performance variables but do so in line with their narrower 
objectives of mapping the effects on VC pay. Again although they segregate universities by 
governance types they do not discuss cultural or location based differences in any detail. 
Quality assurance concerns are very briefly hinted at but there is no attempt to draw out the 
obvious implications for VC pay. Elsewhere similar oversights are spotted in Bachan & Reilly 
(2015) and Macmanus et al. (2017). 
 
All in all, this section has confirmed how culture and quality assurance elements have been 
insufficiently explored in extant university governance and performance empirical research. 
Yet it is obvious that these two elements are crucial influence of the governance performance 
linkage. It is this gap that this research wishes to squarely address. This is done in two principal 
ways. First Chapter 2 has already included Culture & Quality Assurance as one of the seven 
theories included in the theoretical underpinning of this research. The intention behind this is 
to explicate culture and quality assurance aspects in all of the empirical explanations attempted 
by the thesis. Second as mentioned earlier a diverse set of university governance performance 
and control metrics are included in this research. Many of these are intended as proxies of 
quality, region, and culture aspects within the governance performance relationship. 
 
3.1.3 Missing Longitudinal Analysis  
 
Longitudinal analysis is missing in extant university governance studies (Lokuwaduge, 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2017; Harris, 2014; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Olson, 2000). Three closely 
related problems emerge out of this. First, the fact that most studies use a cross-section of 
governance and performance variables implies that year to year and university to university 
comparisons are difficult. If the sample of analysis only includes a large set of university-based 
governance and performance variables in one year then the dynamic time relationships and 
changes in them cannot be studied. This makes inferences about the impacts of changes in 
governance policies by universities on their performances difficult. Second, university 
governance and academic performance are both processes as well as outcomes. . It is difficult 
to distinguish where one begins and the other ends. For example, entry standards are a 
discretionary governance choice that a university may determine at one point of time. But 
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across time this governance may also be viewed as the outcome of the academic quality and 
reputation of the institution accrued over previous periods. Similarly student staff ratio can be 
viewed as a governance process but also an outcome and this is why Lokuwadge (2011) 
associates it with teaching performance. Elsewhere this process like characteristics of 
university governance are highlighted in the post graduate intensity of institutions that have 
been used as a measure of academic performance by (ref) despite the fact that universities do 
have discretion over the numbers of post graduate places offered. Therefore, they need to be 
studied across a time horizon. Cross sections are unable to do justice to the process like 
characteristics embedded in either construct. Finally, endogeneities between university 
governances and performances are strongly indicated by almost all theories included in the 
seven-theory framework developed in Chapter 2. Without a sufficiently wide panel of data 
such endogeneities cannot be studied.  
 
Among the most detailed university governance performance studies is Lokuwaduge (2011). 
But the author collects all her governance and performance variables across Australian 
universities for only three years of 2005, 2006 and 2007. Even more puzzlingly she averages 
the three years and uses the dataset only as a cross-section. This clearly limits her analysis. 
None of the year to year changes in governances or performances in universities across her 
sample are revealed. The process like characteristics of university governance and performance 
remain hidden as the author is unable to examine the interlinkages between the two constructs 
across time. Finally, she is unable to shed any light on likely reverse causal relationships that 
might be interfering or moderating the governance performance associations in her sample. 
 
Elsewhere Olson (2000), Festo & Nkote (2013) and Harris (2014) study even smaller cross-
sectional samples and once again are constrained to ignore yearly variations, process-like 
characteristics and endogeneities in them. Although Ntim et al. (2017) do control for 
endogenous relationships in their cross-sectional sample their voluntary disclosure study is too 
narrowly focused to generate any insights about the larger constructs of university performance 
and its governance antecedents. This is why the authors recommend that future researchers use 
longitudinal datasets to measure the university governance problem. To their credit a few VC 
pay investigations such as Tarbert et al. (2008), Bachan & Reilly (2015) and McManus et al. 
(2017) do analyse longitudinal samples within the UK. All these papers do in fact study inter-
year variations in VC pay and connect them with variations in types of governance and other 
performances. But given the narrow nature of their research there is very limited analysis of 
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the larger problem of year to year linkages between the many other dimensions of university 
governance and performance.  
 
Having identified three important research gaps that exist in the empirical literature in 
university governance and performance the next section 3.2 uses the seven-theory framework 
identified in Chapter 2.4 to develop key hypotheses that answer the research objectives 
formulated in Chapter 1.4.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Having established the principal research gaps in the previous section the thesis now moves to 
the important task of hypothesis development. The theoretical indications from the seven-fold 
theoretical framework already 103nalysed in Chapter 2 form the core here. Every theoretical 
tenet and debate is marshalled to develop a set of key hypotheses that answer the different 
facets of the multi-dimensionality problem of university governance and performance 
identified in the distinct research objectives of Chapter 1. With this intention sub section 3.2.1 
establishes the need and justification for five singular missing dimensions of university 
governance and their likely performance associations. A principal hypothesis is advanced in 
respect of each association but the subsequent discussion fleshes out key expectations for 
several linked sub-hypotheses within each dimension. Sub-section 3.2.2 advances other key 
hypotheses in the extensively studied board level and audit related university governances. 
Finally sub-section 3.3 presents a concise summary of Chapter 3 and its links to the analytical 
work in the Chapters that follow. 
 
3.2.1 Missing dimensions of Governance based Antecedents of University Performance  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters the rare studies of university governance and 
performance that do exist in the empirical literature study the links between the two constructs 
predominantly at the top levels of the institutional pyramid. Be that as it may it is fairly clear 
that the university’s governance extends far beyond board compositions or audit peculiarities. 
Unlike a corporate firm a university is a knowledge institution. It is governed in many different 
ways and dimensions and performs for a far wider range of stakeholders (Buckland, 2004; 
Middlehurst, 2013; Parker, 2011; 2013; Nagy & Robb, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Kim, 2008; 
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Taylor, 2013a, b). This is why the university’s governance extends far beyond the confines of 
just its board level compositions. It percolates to the nooks and crevices of the institution and 
expresses itself in different ways. Therefore, it needs to be investigated through new hitherto 
rarely defined or discussed variables and constructs.  
 
The knowledge creation and dissemination functions of the university are crucially dependent 
on these types of new variables and constructs. Invariably in each of these the university is 
faced with complex inter-linked trade-offs. The decisions made here make the crucial 
difference to research, teaching and financial performances of the university. In fact it is these 
discretionary governance proclivities that express the institution’s chosen pedagogical market 
position in the overall higher education market.  
 
The new variables and constructs identified here are concrete governance choices of the 
institution. They are abstract yet have important implications for the teaching, learning and 
research here. But they all are invariably decided not in one location or body within the 
university but instead collegially across the entire institution. At one level this represents a 
challenge in itself but at another level it is the reason why university governance is so unique 
and multi-dimensional. 
 
To map each of the missing dimensions five different sub-sections follow. Each presents the 
theoretical basis for a missing dimension of university governance followed by the empirical 
work done to date in that dimension. This is then followed by the formulation of an ex ante key 
hypothesis with regard to the dimension and a discussion of any related important sub-
hypotheses.  
3.2.1.1 Selectivity in Entry Standards  
 
Three core theories of university governance stress the need for wider student population 
coverage. Public Accountability, Stakeholder and Legitimacy scholars (Blanden, & Machin, 
2004; Coy et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2002; Parker, 2012: Middlehurst, 2013: Boliver, 2013; 
Burrows, 2012; Gunasekerage & Reed, 2008; Wicks & Parmar, 2004; De Villiers & Van 
Staden, 2006) aver that universities should have wider student representation by recruiting 
students from all socio-economic backgrounds. The scholas argue that this would fit within the 
neo-liberal narrative of higher education and give equal opportunities to all students. It would 
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avoid creating pockets of exclusion and elitism in the higher education (Adnett, 2006; Freeman, 
2015). The interests of all relevant stakeholders in public universities would be served by such 
an approach. The legitimacy of the institution in society would also be enhanced.  
 
Yet this is not as straightforward as it seems. Academic attainment and the systematic work 
needed to achieve it is equally important. If the university does not have a fair filter to winnow 
its student applicants, it might seriously compromise its academic integrity. Such an argument 
underlies Quality assurance concerns (Eurydice, 2010:24; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Allen, 
2011; Jack, 2008; Palfreyman, 2010; Yorke, 2009a:2000; Boliver, 2013) with the dilution of 
entry standards. An important part of the student preparation for academic life at the university 
is the attainment of an established academic standard. If universities do not emphasize this, 
they risk a compromised academic ambience in the incoming cohort. The quality of pedagogy 
whether it be in teaching or research will suffer due to inclusion of unqualified non-meritorious 
students. This would imply a suboptimal knowledge creation and dissemination function at the 
institution (Bachan, 2017; Bright 2004; Anyanwu 2004; Barron 2006; Furedi 2004). 
 
Thus, the theoretical framework of university governance seems to highlight the important 
challenge faced by universities in establishing their student entry standards. Neither can the 
university entirely ignore its public role of inclusion nor can it be blind to its moral imperative 
of improving the quality of higher education (Schwartz, 2004; Baker, 2008; Waller et al., 
2017). This is the difficult to resolve governance trade-off that these institutions face. Entry 
Standards once chosen are not easily reversible and are likely to have severe repurcussions on 
research teaching and financial performances of the institution. Consequently, this thesis 
proposes that selectivity in Entry Standards is a missing dimension of university governance 
that merits detailed investigation. 
 
Argumentative and normative strands of literature in university governance have recognised 
the importance of Entry Standards as a discretionary governance policy (Warning, 2007; 
Laband & lentz, 2004; Schwartz, 2004; Murdoch, 2002; OFFA, 2004). But most of the scholars 
here locate this governance as an important policy parameter within the context of a rapidly 
changing higher education landscape especially in the UK (Shattock, 2000; Meek, 2000; 
Brown & Carasso, 2013; Scott & Callender, 2013). Once again just as among the theories there 
is a strong policy divide among experts and commentators here. One set of scholars argue 
against dilution of entry standards suggesting that this is at the base of a rapidly deteriorating 
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quality of mass higher education in the country (Furedi, 2004; Bright, 2004; Bachan, 2017; 
Johnes & Soo, 2013). The other set point to exclusivities in student selection at high performing 
universities and decry this trend of retaining elitism here (Zimdars, 2016; Reay, 2018; Boliver, 
2013; Chowdry et al., 2008; Zimdars et al., 2009). Clearly this challenging trade-off in crafting 
an appropriate entry standard is pulled in opposite directions by each set of scholars. 
 
One strand of policy scholarship identifies the dilution in entry standards at some institutions 
as a direct attempt to bolster student recruitment/fees while a second strand see it as a means 
to attract international students with their deeper pockets (Bekhradnia & Beech, 2015; 
Mouwen, 2000; Eurydice, 2010:24; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; 
Palfreyman, 2010; Yorke, 2009a). Yet others here argue how dwindling government funding 
to universities is the single most important factor motivating universities to lower their entry 
standards (Raffe & Croxford, 2013; Coy et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2002; Parker, 2012: 
Middlehurst, 2013) and thus generate greater tuition fees. Invariably all these scholars concur 
that a diluted ES will lead to a reduced quality in the academic function of the university.  
 
In direct contrast significant sets of authors (Zimdars et al., 2009; Glennerster, 2001; Chowdry 
et al., 2008; 2013; Harrison, 2011; OFFA; Harris, 2010) argue that fair access issues are 
increasingly the most important consideration in higher education in the UK. According to 
these scholars many universities in the UK are becoming elite and constraining access to even 
deserving students from underprivileged backgrounds. The ever-higher entry requirements 
stipulated year after year at the top universities makes these portals inaccessible to large 
segments of the student population. This is detrimental to the development of a fair and 
balanced higher education sector in the country and so regulatory attention too has been 
focused on this trend.  
 
Quantitative investigations in to ES and its links with a university’s performance have been 
few and far between (Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Bachan, 2017; Jones & Soo, 2013). Most 
empirical studies have studied ES as a discretionary governance within the university 
highlighting its importance. There is no attempt to link it to university performance.  
 
For example, in a meta analysis of existing research Gorarad et al. (2019) find that entry 
standards defined in terms of previous academic attainment are a better selection tool than the 
omnibus recruitment interview. But interestingly the authors find robust evidence that older 
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and established universities are less likely to recruit students from under privileged 
socioeconomic backgrounds than their newer peers. In a similar vein Jerrim & Vignoles (2015) 
in their across country study of 4-english speaking countries (England, Canada, Australia and 
USA) find that selectivity in student recruitment is more pronounced in the UK than in the 
other developed countries. Such a pronounced selectivity in top UK universities especially 
within the Russell Group creates distinct fair access issues and this is further evidenced in 
Bolivar’s (2013) ten-year longitudinal sample. The author strongly avers that this exclusivity 
and elitism creates a distorted HEI sector in the country that detracts from holistic academic 
growth. Elsewhere Chowdry et al. (2008; 2013) corroborate such trends but show other 
complexities in their UK sample. The authors find that students from highly educated 
neighbourhood pockets are more likey to enrol in established universities than their peers from 
working class neighbourhoods. But this exclusivity in their sample is hardly monotonic. 
Controlling for academic attainments of the candidates the same sample reveals that certain 
types of minority ethnicities are more likely to attend such universities than even their white 
british peers.  
 
Yet some strands of empirical work do associate entry standards with academic and non-
academic performance of universities. A noteworthy example here is Ayoubi & Massoud 
(2012). These scholars use a single cross section of 100 UK universities to investigate whether 
there is a link between entry standards and research and teaching performances. The authors 
find a strong positive association between the published research quality of an institution and 
entry standards. Interestingly they also uncover evidence for reverse causality and cycles of 
reinforcement in this link i.e. higher entry standards raises research performance which in turn 
improves the reputation of the institution allowing it to raise standards further.  Bolivar (2015) 
uses a cluster analysis of UK universities to show how Russell group and pre-92 universities 
differ in terms of both research/teaching functionalities and their respective entry standards. 
The author finds strong evidence once again for selectivity in ES contributing to research and 
teaching performances in older well-established universities. In similar explorations in the UK 
Bachan (2017) uncover positive associations between entry standards and the level of good 
honours degrees awarded by a university while Johnes & Soo (2013) evidence positive linkage 
between degree outcomes, student satisfaction and entry standards. On the whole then the 
previous scholarly work robustly confirms that entry standards is an important university 
governance discretion. Not only is this variable an important mechanism to express the 
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university’s chosen internal governance priorities but also has well defined impacts on research 
and teaching performances. Therefore, a key ex-ante hypothesis is advanced here. 
 
 H1: Entry standards are positively associated with the academic performances of the 
university. 
 
H1a: There is a positive association between entry standards and the research performance 
of a university. 
H1b: There is a positive association between entry standards and the teaching performance of 
a university. 
3.2.1.2 Instruction Intensity in the Staff to Students Ratio 
 
Universities are knowledge institutions. The academic process of knowledge creation and 
dissemination at the university is crucially dependent on how effectively the institution 
marshalls its staff resources to deliver instruction and make interaction possible in research and 
teaching. Of the seven theories included in the underpinning for university governance in 
Chapter 2 at least four reference and substantiate this argument. Optimal contracting focuses 
on deriving the best value for money in the knowledge function. The theory suggests that the 
student to staff ratio must be high enough to ensure the largest student coverage but not too 
high so as to lose the quality of academic instruction and interaction (Trowler, 2008; Gayle et 
al., 2003; Parry, 2013). Resource dependence views the student staff ratio from an effective 
staff resource utilization perspective. Scholars (Shattock, 2013a, b; Parry, 2012; Rowlands, 
2013) suggest that university governance must ensure that its existing staff are fully engaged 
and enabled to contribute with their academic resources to instruction and interaction across 
the institution. Stakeholder perspectives (McDonald, 2013; Hagenauer & Volet, 2014; Koenig 
et al., 2015) detail the likely conflicts between staff work life balance concerns, student/parent 
academic quality requirements and the university’s need to balance its budgets. A likely 
triangular trade-off here is often expressed in these stakeholder conflicts and the theory 
suggests that these need careful mitigation by the university. Finally, Quality Assurance 
(Yorke, 2009a, b; Varouchas et al., 2018; Salter et al., 2000; Parker, 2011; Collini, 2012; Collis, 
2004) adds to this theme by suggesting the direct association between higher student staff ratios 
and lower quality of the academic pedagogy. Theorists here argue that institutions should aim 
to prioritize quality in the academic function and so avoid an overloading of the staff function.  
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From a purely theoretical angle it is apparent that university governance is crucially dependent 
on this tacit dimension of student staff ratio. However, what is more interesting is that most of 
the theoretical debates in the literature treat the variable as though it is just one governance 
decision whereas it clearly has separate student and staff recruitment decisions embedded 
within it. Either decision is a complex governance discretion that is decided collegially across 
the institution. Both decisions are characterized by the triangular trade-offs already highlighted 
by theory. Neither can a university simply expand student population coverage without paying 
attention to the dwindling research/teaching quality and/or drop in work/life balance amongst 
its academic staff. Nor can it simply improve the latter but ignore its vital and important student 
population coverage mandate (Mcdonald, 2013). This is the singular challenge of crafting an 
optimal instruction ratio that faces every university. Therefore, this thesis identifies the SSR as 
an important missing dimension of university governance and includes it as a vital antecedent 
of university academic performance.   
 
SSR debates are rife in the extant governance normative and policy related literatures in both 
UK HEI and around the globe. This focus has grown in recent times especially after concerns 
recorded by the official Deering report in 2002 that emphasized how student learning outcomes 
were being adversely affected by larger class sizes. Many normative scholars (Shattock, 2013a, 
b; Parry, 2012; Rowlands, 2013) have criticised the immense pressure on universities to 
achieve value for money at the expense of quality in higher education delivery Similarly (Cui 
et al., 2019; O’leary et al., 2019; Collini, 2012; Collis, 2004; Yorke, 2009a) have decried the 
poorer quality of teaching standards achieved in the classroom due to unrealistic work burdens 
placed on teaching staff. Elsewhere there have been arguments made suggesting that the 
increasing need for universities to conserve financial resources in an environment of dwindling 
government support for universities have forced an increase in SSRs and this has lowered the 
quality of academic instruction and interaction in the UK university (Trowler, 2008; Parry, 
2013; Middlehurst, 2013; Hagenauer & Volet, 2014; Lamport, 1993; Denzine & Pulos, 2000). 
Such narratives have received robust support from data in the university sector that shows how 
in the last decade alone student numbers in universities have increased by 30% while staff 
numbers have remained more or less static. A large number of questionnaire surveys (Palmer 
et al., 2009; Halawah, 2006; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005; Cuseo, 2007; Davern et al., 2006; 
Dillon et al., 2002; Harfitt & Tsui, 2015) explore this theme among staff and students and find 
evidence for this lowered quality of academic interaction in larger classes. Similar arguments 
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are stressed in other Government sponsored reports especially in Australia and the US. Bradley 
et al. (2008) stress how high levels of SSR jeopardize the quality of teaching at universities 
and thereby threaten the student learning experience.  
 
Due to this increased policy focus on SSR the empirical work in relation to this dimension of 
university governance is large and needs some organisation. Three broad strands of literature 
can be identified here. First there are studies that conflate SSR with teaching performance 
and/or teaching standards. Notable here are Lokuwaduge (2011), Ayoubi & Massoud (2012) 
and Lokuwaduge & Armstrong (2015). Each of these authors in their different samples seem 
to have assumed the perspective of the student consumer of higher education who does use 
SSR as a forward-looking indicator of the likely teaching performance he/she would likely 
receive. But this confuses the university governance-performance association. While SSR does 
have process like characteristics that make it seem like an outcome for some stakeholders 
(Bandiera et al., 2009) it is nevertheless truly a governance discretion for the university and 
should be modelled as such. 
 
The second strand consists of two large meta studies Glass & Smith (1979) and McDonald 
(2013) that examine large sets of previous studies on the class size problem. The first study 
collates 77 empirical studies in university governance across the globe and finds overwhelming 
evidence that teaching and learning occurs best in smaller class rooms. According to the 
authors, the higher level of one to one interaction in such classes improves the learning 
environment and creates a higher quality academic ambience overall. Both staff and students 
feel more motivated with either side adapting better to the learning at hand. On the whole they 
seem to suggest on the basis of their large sample of earlier studies that more is learned in 
smaller classes. The second study is more recent and collates large numbers of Australian and 
international studies. While the author too finds lots of evidence in his sample for the negative 
teaching performance impact of higher SSRs, he makes at least two other important and related 
observations. First, he suggests that there is growing resource burdens on universities that force 
them to consider utilizing staff without regard to their work-life balance and motivation. 
Second, he points to the overall evidence that higher SSRs reduce teaching and learning quality 
which must not be lost sight of especially in higher education. In totality this strand of meta 
studies confirms inter-alia the importance of SSR and its negative impact on university 
teaching performance.    
 
 111 
The final and largest strand of studies explicitly models the impact of class sizes on 
academic/teaching performance at the university. The findings are rather mixed and complex 
here. The first important study here is by Edmonson & Mulder in 1924 and it finds that SSR’s 
association with academic performance is ambiguous. Many other studies that follow this study 
corroborate this finding. The growing evidence for such mixed associations (Kennedy and 
Siegfried, 1979; Zietz and Cochran, 1997; Lopus and Maxwell, 1995) forced Johnson (2010) 
to prove how the intriguing problem of obtaining different associations in the variable despite 
using the same sample was entirely due to changes in methods of data analysis chosen. 
Therefore, the author addresses these problems of data methods and sample in his study and 
robustly finds that higher SSRs have a significant and non-linear negative impact on student 
learning and achievements. 
 
Scholars in other longitudinal samples across the globe and in the UK (Bandiera et al. 2009; 
Bedard & Kuhn, 2008; Shane, 1961; Gannaway et al., 2018) have continued in this vein to find 
evidence for non-linear negative impacts of SSR on teaching quality and performance. 
Important US based studies here include Kokkelenberg et al. (2008) which has over 760,000 
observations from 1992 to 2004, and Arias & Walker (2004) both of which are longitudinal in 
scope and uncover a negative association between SSR and student achievement. At least one 
study in Australia (Gannaway et al., 2018) and another one in Munich (Mandel & Sussmuth, 
2011) from 1998 to 2004 find similar evidence for a negative and non-linear association here. 
Finally, within a UK context, from 2000 to 2004 Bandiera et al. (2009) confirm the existence 
of a significant non linear association between the variables. 
 
Overall, then, there seems to be enough evidence that the instruction intensity of student staff 
ratio is an important missing dimension of university governance with likely negative impacts 
on the academic performance of the institution. Therefore, it is appropriate to advance the 
following key hypothesis.  
 
H2: There is a negative association between student to staff ratios and the academic  
performance of a university. 
 
H2a: There is a negative association between student to staff ratios and the research 
performance of a university. 
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H2b: There is a negative association between student to staff ratios and the teaching 
performance of a university. 
3.2.1.3  Research, Teaching & Gender Modalities in Staff Contracts 
 
Universities are primarily research and teaching institutions. Unlike other public or private 
entities, the university is distinguished by its delivery of these highly complex intertwined 
functions.  This is why the operational definition of university governance framed in Chapter 
2 specifically mentions the two functions as important constituents of the governance construct. 
Despite this most university governance theorization does not explicitly include research or 
teaching antecedents of performance. There is a complete lack of engagement with the likely 
discretionary governance challenges that this institution faces in this respect. 
 
Yet the seven different theories of university governance underpinning this research have 
distinct under and over tones that emphasize important research/teaching discretionary 
challenges facing this institution.  
 
First, it is important to draw attention to the cultural governance imperatives embedded in 
universities. As a unique knowledge institution, the university is characterized by teaching and 
learning regimes (TLRs) that constitute a core aspect of their research and teaching functions 
(Gayle et al., 2003; Trowler, 2008, 2009; Trowler and Cooper, 2002; Alvesson; Albatch et al., 
2005). These TLRs develop over long periods and impact many teaching and research 
governances subliminally. Such influence is not overtly discernible. Instead it works behind 
the scenes to force universities to prefer prioritize and calibrate certain staff contracts over 
others. Such staff contract choices then have important ramifications for the performances of 
the institution. Cultural considerations in university governance thus highlight staff contracts 
as a very important governance choice emerging from TLRs but impacting all of research 
teaching and financial performances (Mouwen, 2000). 
 
Second, the staffing decision is more critical to universities than firms due to key differences 
in quality assurance considerations in the two entities (Vidovich, 2002; Salter & Tapper, 2000; 
Shattock, 1999; 2001; 2008; Yorke, 2000). While human resource contracts are important in 
both, in universities, they singularly determine whether the institution will even be able to 
deliver both original knowledge as well as help its dissemination in society. This is why if the 
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governance implications of culture & quality assurance theories are correctly interpreted in 
higher education, staff contracts have to be seen as an important likely antecedent of research 
and teaching performances. 
 
Third, Resource Dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Nelson, 2000b; Flowes, 2014; 
Verchuere & De Corte, 2014) as a theory is primarily concerned with the institution’s 
resources. But in higher education it is staff resources that are at the very heart of the 
institution’s knowlededge creation and dissemination. The nature and types of staff contracts 
and the incetives they create for staff incumbents naturally play a vital part in their eventual 
academic interventions that show up in the performance of the institution.  This is why a key 
narrative that can be extracted from this theory is that the different types of staff resources that 
a university employs should reflect its chosen research and teaching emphases (Thewlis, 2003; 
Metcalf et al., 2005; Whitchurch & Gordon, 2013). Choosing single function part time or other 
types of contracts would flow from these differing research and teaching emphases. It is in 
these choices of different staff contracts that a university faces complex resource-based trade-
offs (Shelton et al., 2001; Brennan et al., 2007; Kogan, 1994; Parker, 2013).  
 
Fourth, the core concept of optimality in all external contracts is a vital tenet of the theory of 
optimal contracting (Collinson, 2004; McLeod & Malcomson, 1998; Raff & Summers, 1987; 
Banker). But when one takes this core concept and applies it to a university’s singular functions 
of research and teaching an important theorization emerges. Staff contracts and embedded 
incentive/penalty structures in them are a governance choice (Gunn, 2018; Vajoczki et al., 
2011; Oxford, 2008; O’leary et al., 2019; DBIS, 2015:8). The principle of optimality should 
form the central plank on which such choices are made. Fifth, as a good steward the university 
should seek and achieve the effective husbanding of all its resources. But given the unique 
importance of staff resources here these concerns must be even more central to the stewards of 
this institution.  
 
Public Accountability, Stakeholder and Legitimacy evoke other university governance angles 
with regard to staffing. To be truly accountable to society, Public Accountability argues that a 
university should demonstrate an effective balance between pedagogical cocerns and student 
coverage aspects in its staffing choices (Coy et al., 2011; Coy & Pratt,1998; Horden, 2013; 
Blackmore, 2016; Locke et al., 2016). Stakeholder theory maintains that gender diversity 
should be fully acknowledged across a university, an institution that is characterized by a 
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multiplicity of stakeholders and particularly salient ones such as the academic staff (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Bryson, 2004; Sutherland & Gilbert). Legitimacy in its 
pragmatic and moral versions implies that while crafting staff contracts universities must 
simultaneously trade-off utilitarian concerns of value for money/academic specialization with 
moral concerns of staff morale and motivation (Suchman, 1995; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
 
On the whole then the inter-mesh of seven theories makes it amply clear that staff contracts 
and their research, teaching and gender modalities are an important overlooked dimension of 
universities. There are discrete choices facing university governors here that would have far 
reaching implications for the academic performances of this institution. Therefore, departing 
from existing scholarly trajectories this thesis posits that staff contracts and their diverse 
patterns represent a key missing dimension of university governance.  
 
H3: There are significant associations between the university’s staff contractual 
structures and its academic and financial performances. 
3.2.1.3.1 Teaching Only Staff, Research Only Staff and Teaching & Research Staff 
 
Despite this, theoretical significance of research/teaching modalities expressed in staff 
contracts empirical quantitative work associating academic divisions of staff contracts with 
university performances are non-existent. Most of the empirical work here is either anecdotal 
and qualitative survey based or policy based and normative. Although the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA) has recently made available longitudinal data about the divisions of 
academic staff into teaching only (TONLY), research only (RONLY) and teaching and 
research (TRST, the old tenure track) scholars have been slow to recognize and use these 
directly in their work. Nevertheless, the earlier empirical work here has important insights that 
must not be overlooked. These would need to inform the formulation of any hypothesis or sub-
hypotheses regarding likely associations here. 
 
Although the traditional TRST tenure track contract remains one of the most popular type of 
academic staff contracts accounting for more than 45% of all university staff there are several 
indications that it is problematic (Locke et al., 2016). The lack of incentives in a life long 
academic contract that is secure and pensionable is obvious. Given the onerous nature of the 
twin academic burdens of research and teaching it is probably likely that such a contract will 
prove suboptimal to the latter. Staff will privilege research tasks and teaching might be 
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neglected (Bexley et al., 2011; Probert, 2013; Geschwind & Brostorm, 2015). This might then 
raise concerns that the university is not adequately tending to it more important public goal of 
knowledge transmission (Norton, 2013; Oancea et al., 2010; Sikes, 2006; Nyamapfene, 2018). 
At another level as an important stakeholder in the university the average staff member 
employed as an omnibus TRST contractee may lose motivation in the face of the excessive 
academic workloads in this contract (Bryson & Barnes, 2000a, b; Locke, 2012; MacFarlane, 
2011; Bexley et al., 2011). This could then evolve into a staff morale problem with obvious 
resource implications. These are the many trade-offs of TRST that are often discussed 
normatively in the empirical literature. Scholars point towards the incentive and motivational 
problems in this contract with the implicit suggestion that the contract might actually prove 
harmful to the university’s academic performance.   
 
The many problems of the TRST contract have not gone unnoticed among university 
governors. A large argumentative strand within policy and normative studies (Whitchurch, 
2016; AUT, 2005; Sikes, 2012; Chalmers, 2010; Elton, 2008; Locke, 2012; Macfarlane, 2011: 
2007) observes how the staff divisions of TONLY and RONLY are recent innovations in 
human resources management of universities arising largely out of the dissatisfaction with the 
TRST. Oxford (2008) suggests that universities under the pressures of staff rationalizations 
due to to dwindling resources have further resorted to single function contracts. The author 
highlights two other trends in UK HEI that may have fortified these tendencies namely the 
research assessment exercise and the rise of the student as a fee-paying consumer. Regardless 
of the source of these changes many scholars agree that this RONLY, TONLY divide only 
further polarised research and teaching roles among university staff. 
 
As a consequence, teaching was neglected and the regulators stepped in with a Teaching 
Excellence Framework (TEF). The TONLY contract emerged and several universities began 
creating many teaching-only roles (Blackmore, 2016; DFE, 2017). Locke (2014) shows 
evidence that over the years this contract has become a standard and popular arrangement in 
most UK universities with more than 30% of staff hired without research requirements in their 
job descriptions.   
 
Notwithstanding the growing popularity of single function academic contracts, the governance 
problems associated with them are numerous. Student stakeholders might not like to be taught 
by staff without proven research expertise (Neves & Hillman, 2016; Healey, 2005; Blackmore, 
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2016). Research grant providers might need to see a university give priority to research 
positions among its faculties before it accepts research proposals from it. Teaching grant 
providers might consider RONLY contracts as a poor indication that the university supports or 
facitates teaching (Fung & Gordon, 2016; Blackmore, 2016; Oxford, 2008; PREST, 2000). The 
lack of career progression in TONLY roles would surely dampen morale among these types of 
staff and thus reduce cohesion and integration in the university academic environment. 
 
H3a: There is a negative association between teaching and research staff and the research 
performance of a university. 
H3b: There is a negative association between teaching and research staff and the teaching 
performance of a university. 
 
Just as with TRST empirical work does not directly associate the single function contracts with 
university academic performance. Instead most scholars make anecdotal, argumentative and 
descriptive inferences about RONLY and TONLY contracts that are nevertheless insightful. 
For example, Vajoczki et al. (2011), Oxford (2008), Blackmore (2016), Locke & Bennion 
(2011), Nyampfene (2018), and  Harley (2002) suggest that TONLY roles are only a device to 
either rein in staff costs or re-classify underperforming researchers with a view to comply with 
regulatory requirements. From the perspective of the academics themselves TONLY remains 
a much despised and less sought-after contract. Dyer et al (2017) and Peters & Turner (2014; 
2327) here draw the link between such contracts and trends within UK HEI to casualize 
academic staff. After all, reduced Government support has meant that these institutions have 
to conserve their finances and what better way to do this than to employ larger numbers of 
fixed term teaching only staff who do not impose large future financial burdens.  
 
In other strands of the empirical work two key aspects of TONLY contracts are stressed. First 
is the fact that most UK universities populate such positions predominantly with women. 
Gender based discrimination is the theme here (Clegg, 2008; Marchant & Wallace, 2013; 
Thornton, 2013; santos & van Phu, 2019; Barrett el al., 2011; O’Brien & Hopgood, 2012). 
Second is the fact that these positions are generally considered to be “non-academic” in scope.  
Brew et al (2017) suggest that TONLY roles are academically untenable because research has 
to constitute an integral part of even the teaching function. This is why Oxford (2008) maintains 
that students themselves seek out academics that have a passion for their subject reflected in 
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active research credentials. The general narrative in UK HEI continues to be that a teaching 
only role is insufficient and not worthy enough (Bryson, 2013; Locke, 2014: 23).  
 
By contrast the research only contract remains a very important means used by universities to 
fortify their academic reputation as centres of research excellence. It is in this vein that 
Macfarlane (2011) argues that para academics who specialize in one academic function are 
relieved of the burdens of a heavy workload or having to swim against the tide of specialism 
and its rewards. Elsewhere many scholars (Probert, 2013; Shelton et al., 2001; Locke, 2012; 
Blackmore, 2016) show how this contract remains much sought after especially even among 
free lance researchers due to its lucrative nature and prestige. Others argue that research has 
often been seen to be the rich cousin of teaching with most academic processes privileging this 
function (Nyamapfene, 2018; DfES, 2003: 19; DBIS, 2015: 8). Academics are naturally drawn 
towards research due to its ability to cement their reputations as acholars allowing greater 
access to funds and grants.  
 
Overall, then although TONLY and RONLY contracts have become an increasing academic 
standard in UK HEI there are widespread academic disapprovals of the use of such contractual 
forms especially the former. Scholarly evidence and arguments seem to be suggesting that such 
single function contracts while supporting one academic function may harm the other while 
also interfering with the systemic integrity of the institution as a whole. At least two likely 
associations between these contracts and the university’s performances are discernible. The 
TONLY contract would likely fortify some aspects of teaching performance standards but 
might reduce the research and financial performances of the institution. On the other hand, the 
RONLY contract might improve some aspects of research while generating more finances but 
harm the teaching efficacy of the university. 
 
H3c: There is a negative association between research only staff and the teaching performance 
of a university. 
H3d: There is a positive association between research only staff and the financial performance 
of a university. 
 
H3e: There is a negative association between teaching only staff and the research performance 
of a university. 
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H3f: There is a negative association between teaching only staff and the financial performance 
of a university. 
 
3.2.1.3.2. Part-Time Staff 
 
Another key division within university staff contracts is the part-time/full-time distinction. 
Public calls for higher student coverage in the UK have grown in recent times. There has been 
strident criticism of the elite nature of universities and repeated calls to throw open the portals 
of these institutions and expand student coverage (Kim, 2008; Dearlove, 2002; Williams, 1997; 
Hamsley-Brown, 2012). At the same time the introduction of a quasi-market in UK HEI with 
reduced government budgetary support has placed enormous financial burdens on university 
finances (Taylor, 2013a,b; Rowland, 2013; Horden, 2013; Parker, 2013). So, on the one hand 
student populations have more than doubled but faculty sizes have remained stagnant (Rosen, 
2003:82; Bryson, 2004; Burgess et al., 2006). Universities have been left with no choice but to 
embrace more and more adhoc staffing arrangements to meet growing academic/administrative 
workloads (Bryson & Blackwell, 2001; Locke, 2012; Whitchurch & Gordon, 2013; Husbands 
and Davies, 2000). Yet public policy scholars have continued to demand resource thriftiness 
and value for money from an already strained university (Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013; 
Rowlands, 2013; Taylor, 2013a). Other theorists have continued to maintain that it was only 
legitimate for a university to meet the needs of societal constituents fully irrespective of the 
strains on its finances. All of this has meant further adhocism in the university staff contracts. 
 
But there has been growing concern among the Cultural/quality assurance literature (Brown & 
Carasso, 2013; Eurydice, 2010:24; Attwood, 2008b; Yorke, 2009a, b; Allen, 2011; Palfreyman, 
2010) that the overall quality of the academic work is being seriously harmed by such 
adhocism. These scholars suggest that too many part timers would ultimately denigrate the 
university’s academic performance. Whether in the idea generation and refinement of research 
or repeated engagement and empathetic learning of teaching part time staff do not have the 
continuity to contribute to the academic functions of a university. Further, there is undoubtedly 
significant merit in scholarly contentions that ad-hoc contractual arrangements destroy the 
quality of academic work. Good research depends on repeated and continuous engagement 
with ideas and their refinement (Holliman, 2017; Saunders et al., 2009). This would surely 
suffer in an academic environment where there are too many staff with short limited 
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engagements with the institution. Continuity in thought processes would not prevail and this 
would impact upon the quality of research done. 
 
Optimal contracting and resource dependence theorists (Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & 
Buck, 2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Marginson, 
2006) suggest a different angle. They argue that like with all other staff decisions, much 
depends on how a university chooses its part time staff. For example, a university that is unable 
to afford faculty with “high academic reputation” might achieve a beneficial compromise 
through employing them on part time basis. This would not only save it resources but also 
prove optimal in terms of its long-term academic sustainability. Such a strategy would also 
undoubtedly be invaluable in a highly competitive higher education market like the UK with 
limited Government funding (Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; ; Jacobson & 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996).   
 
Scholarly work in university governance seems to echo many of these theoretical narratives 
yet extend them richly in different directions. The insecurities generated by the contract and its 
deeply demotivating nature is a major cause of concern for large strands of the literatutre 
(Collinson, 2004; Purcell et al., 1999; Bryson & Blackwell, 2006; Ackers & Oliver, 2007; 
Rowley; 1996). For example, Collinson (2004) finds that although UK universities have been 
employing larger numbers of part time staff to cope with the increased student intake such staff 
have continued to be treated as marginal. Similarly, Thewlis (2003) finds that part time 
contracts reduce researchers’ productivity, and that staff on such contracts are constantly 
concerned about job insecurity which distracts from focusing on their current job. Elsewhere 
Ackers & Oliver (2007) corroborates this finding of part-time staff being treated as marginal 
and “second class citizens”, and extends this argument further by showing how universities are 
often reluctant to invest in the training and development needs of such staff, constraining them 
to perform at a far lower level of competence than their full-time peers. At another level the 
authors find evidence supported by Purcell et al. (1999) and Allen-Collinson (2004) that part 
time employees face isolation from the wider academic community and also lower access to 
librarires, experience, useful information and other knowledge infrastructure thus reducing 
their productivity  
 
The part time contract is seen from the perspective of the gender question by several empirical 
papers. At least three studies (Blake & La Valle, 2000; Metcalf et al., 2005; Thornton, 2013) 
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highlight how an unusally large proportion of part time employees at universities are female. 
This fits within the unconscious gender bias narrative that is ubiquitous in higher education.   
 
In other literature the student angle is stressed. Locke et al. (2016) find that part time staff are 
rarely if ever available to students for interaction and instruction. Out of class interaction, 
mentoring and informal advice is thus significantly reduced and the author points to the 
disastrous impact this has had on teaching and learning at the institution. The inference is 
unmistakeable that growing part-time staff are denigrating the academic experience of 
university students which shows up in NSS scores (Gunn, 2018; Yorke, 2009a). The Author 
also highlights the demanding workload that part-time staff face, and how often they often need 
to work over hours or risk underperformning. Therefore, Bryson & Blackwell (2006) raises the 
topical question of why so many academic staff continue to be employed via the part time 
contract despite its well-known inadequacies. The author makes the valid empirical observation 
that such employees, who constitute a much smaller fraction of other sectors of the economy 
nevertheless constitute a very large and growing proportion 49.9% of higher education. 
(HESA, 2018). According to him this is a travesty in a sector that aims to be a knowledge 
creating and disseminating hub.  
  
On the whole the above discussion seems to suggest two important likely associations. The use 
of part time contracts by a university on the one hand should lead to conservation of resources 
thus improving its financial performance. But on the other hand, this contract should reduce 
the academic ambience of the institution leading to lowered academic performance.   
 
H3g: There is a negative association between part-time to full-time staff and the research 
performance of a university. 
H3h: There is a negative association between part-time to full-time staff and the teaching 
performance of a university. 
H3i: There is a positive association between part-time to full-time staff and the financial 






3.2.1.3.3 Female Staff Diversity  
 
Of the core theories of university governance at least two namely Stakeholder and Public 
Accountability have straightforward arguments about the benefits of gender balance in both 
research and teaching functions of a university. The former highlights that higher levels of 
diversity in staff will guarantee different ideas, unique insights and alternative perspective in 
both academic functions (Roberts, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997; Ullman, 1985; Roberts, 1992). 
While the latter suggests that a fair balance between males and females in academic staff is a 
public necessity driven by societal cohesion considerations. Both genders can and should 
contribute to the idea generation/refinement in research as well as the debate/dialogue of 
teaching. This is what any civilized society composed of gendered stakeholders would expect. 
But other theories have more nuanced arguments about the gender impacts on research and 
teaching.  Resource dependence suggests that universities can gain access to a wider talent pool 
by having a gender diverse staff population. This would ensure access to a workforce with 
varied skillsets, experience and networks (Pfeffer, 1987; Verbruggen et al., 2011). But the 
theory does not necessarily suggest that having more female staff will enhance teaching or 
research. Similarly Legitimacy scholars argue that universities with a well-represented female 
staff population would gain a reputation for gender equality that would give them an advantage 
in obtaining diversity related research grants (Metcalf et al. 2005). The theory does not have a 
normative prediction on gender diversity and research/teaching performances. Culture & 
Quality Assurance seems to underline that female staff have a natural proclivity for teaching 
due to their higher empathy factor (Ferber & Huber, 1975; Mestre et al., 2009; Kaschak, 1978; 
Ackers, 1994; Mackie, 1976). The theory seems to imply that teaching performance at 
institutions with higher fractions of female staff should improve. Yet there is no such normative 
prediction with regard to research. 
 
Within the context of this complicated and mixed theoretical picture it is unsurprising to see 
empirical and policy scholars highlighting a range of tangential but important aspects in 
relation to staff level gender diversity. Santos & Van Phu (2019) argue that despite several UK 
universities largely adhering to CUC regulations (2009) and employing larger numbers of 
female staff this is only superficial. In their surveys of more than 3000 academic staff employed 
in the 24 Russell Group universities the authors find that such staff are employed in roles that 
do not allow them to contribute fully. In particular, the authors suggest that women are 
generally employed in teaching-based roles and are rarely allowed to contribute to the research 
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function. Elsewhere a set of scholars such as Huang et al. (2019) and Metcalf et al. (2005) and 
find that women are generally employed in part time roles which are twice as common among 
them as in their male counterparts. Similar findings of female staff being largely employed in 
single function, teaching only roles with very low opportunities for career advancement are 
supported in Metcalf et al. (2005), Nyamapfene (2019), Clegg (2008), Moss-Racusin et al. 
(2012)and Barrett et al. (2011). The authors suggest that this is indicative of a deep-seated 
unconscious gender bias in UK HEI which privileges men over women. Another study by 
(Bornmann et al., 2007) shows that, even if women and men were generally equally successful 
at all career stages, still men with previous experience would obtain higher application and 
funding rates than women at similar career points. The studies conclude that there is an 
unconscious bias in review or selection, especially as men with enhanced social networks tend 
to receive more favourable treatment from reviewers who are part of their network. (Pohlhaus 
et al., 2011; Perna, 2005; Mason et al., 2013). 
 
Elsewhere Dearden et al. (2012), Blackaby & Frank (2000), Duflo (2012), and Moss-Racusin 
et al. (2012) show that women face severe challenges in promotions and remain significantly 
underrepresented in higher levels of academia. Many such scholars including Marsh et al. 
(2009) Mutz et al. (2012) echo the arguments of the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee (2002) that suggest that a key reason behind the lower promotion rates 
of women have to do with the singular lack of research content in their job descriptions. The 
narrative among most of these scholars seem to hint at strong evidence of systemic and circular 
bias against women in the sector. In other words, women do not get academic positions that 
involve research due to their unsuitability but then this lack of research credentials once again 
denies them promotion in the next round.  
 
Undervaluation of the women’s work in academia is another theme that finds robust support 
across the literature. Barabasi et al. (2019) conduct a longitudinal survey of gender differences 
in more than 1.5 million higher education research publications in 83 countries between 1955 
and 2010. The authors find rising participation rates but much lower research impacts among 
women when compared to their male counterparts. Interestingly men received 30% more 
citations than women. This theme is extended by Astegiano et al’s (2019) meta-analysis, Dion 
et al. (2018) study of several journals from 2007 to 2016, Helmer et al., (2017) 
 and Gewin (2017).  
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Wenneras (1997) and Witteman (2019) found some evidence of bias in awarding research 
grants to females stemming from their work being evaluated less favourably than their male 
peers. The author cites a study by Budden et al. (2008) of gender-blind testing of research grant 
applications and highlight how a large majority of applications accepted were those of women.  
Yet the two largest studies from the UK Blake & La Valle (2000) Santos & Van Phu (2019) 
also coalesce findings about research grant applications in UK HEI. The Authors show how 
despite largely proven gender neutrality in research grant processes women remain 
significantly less likely to even apply for such grants. It does seem that such surveys and studies 
underline a deep-seated reluctance among women to even engage with the research grant 
process assuming that they will fail anyway. This aligns with normative and policy-based 
voices like Hewitt (2020), Booth et al. (2000), and Carter et al. (1999) that have oft argued that 
women face a growing and systematic academic gap in higher education. The deep-seated fear 
of research grant rejection is suggestive of an underlying confidence problem stemming from 
years of neglect and bias. 
 
Elsewhere even historically there have been indications of gender divides in higher education 
learning with women preferring female instructors (Ferber & Huber, 1975). In a slightly 
different vein, Bozeman & Gaughan (2011) and Abramo et al. (2014) show that women 
generally spend much higher proportions of their working day on teaching related activities 
than their male counterparts. This seems to suggest a natural inclination towards teaching a fact 
that is often stressed in the behavioral literature. This has also to do with the higher empathy 
that women naturally have to facilitate, foster and nurture learning. There is thus the normative 
expectation that women will be better teachers than their male peers.   
 
It should be noted that although there is no empirical work directly associating female staff 
levels with university academic performances the empirical indications seem to imply that it 
would not be wrong to infer a likely negative association with university research performance 
and a positive one with university teaching performance.  
 
 On the whole then the many strands of discussions on the five separate categories of staff 
contracts makes clear how important this dimension of university governance is. Universities 
face a unique challenge in calibrating these contracts to meet their differing mission based, 
academic and student market-based imperatives. Therefore, a third principal hypothesis must 
be formulated here as shown below. 
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H3j: There is a positive association between female staff diversity and the research 
performance of a university. 
H3k: There is a positive association between female staff diversity and the teaching 
performance of a university. 
 
3.2.1.4 Pedagogical orientations in student population  
 
The UK student market for higher education is rich and diverse. Students seek different types 
of courses and academic ambience from institutions and these portals of higher learning also 
target different parts of the student population to establish their academic niches (House, 2010; 
Pittaway et al., 1998; Polat et al., 2019). 
 
The public role of a university as a higher education portal generates the expectation that it 
should be active in all different levels of academic attainment i.e. undergraduate, postgraduate 
and doctoral levels. The Public Accountability narrative therefore seems to suggest that a 
diverse student body accommodative of all of society’s public goals in education is an 
important objective for a university (Spencer-Rodgers &McGovern, 2002; Volet & Ang, 
1998:21). Similarly, Student and staff stakeholders in a university demand a meaningful and 
complete pedagogical environment that includes all levels and types of students who can 
contribute to a richer learning (Trice, 2003; Taylor, 2005).   
 
On the other hand, Resource Dependence narratives are more nuanced underlining the 
university’s need to tailor its student body to match its academic resources and competencies. 
The theory also points to the dangers of resource stretching that might be inevitable if a 
university expands its academic repertoire or expands its student bodies to include international 
students (Coate, 2008; Hartnett et al., 2004; Iannelli & Huang, 2014). Legitimacy in its 
pragmatic version makes the important argument that a university should target a student body 
that fits the general perceptions of its academic specializations otherwise it risks a serious 
delegitimization of its knowledge contribution (Stensaker, 2018; Sawir, 2013; Bright, 2004; 
Suchman, 1995). Cultural considerations stress how student body compositions are an 
important governance discretion that could differentiate the academic ambience of a university 
(Trowler, 2008: 2001; Sawir, 2013). As a domestic institution these universities face an 
important choice in terms of international student entry. Quality assurance connects student 
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body choices with the overall ability of universities to effectively meet academic quality goals 
especially at higher levels of academic attainment (Mazzarol & Soutar, 2002; Furedi, 2004; 
Bright, 2004).  
 
In sum then these theories of university governance throw the spotlight on student body 
compositions in universities as an important governance discretion facing them. On the one 
hand these knowledge institutions face a unique challenge in crafting their student recruitment 
policies to achieve the best balance between diversity in academic levels and academic 
specialisations. On the other hand, they also need to bridge the divide between the domestic 
and the global in their student bodies. Large swathes of policy-based narratives highlight the 
unique trade-offs facing universities in crafting their student recruitment policies (Dearing, 
1997; Harris, 1996; Nicholls et al., 1995; Smith et al., 2010; House, 2010; Bolsmann & Miller, 
2008). While there are several indications of likely governance issues and challenges in many 
of these narratives, scholars do not coalesce these discussions to frame a specific governance 
construct.  
 
Therefore, departing from existing university governance trajectories this thesis frames a 
singular missing dimension here namely pedagogical orientations in student body diversities. 
It uses two relatively simple ratios i.e. the proportion of post graduate students (PGINT) and 
the proportion of international students (INTS) to map this dimension of university governance 
and its impacts on university performances. 
 
H4: The pedagogical orientations of a university should significantly associate with its 










3.2.1.4.1 Fraction of International Students 
 
Theories of university governance have mixed and often ambiguous predictions about how 
international students at a university might affect its performance. Legitimacy theorist 
(Suchman, 1995; Coy & Pratt, 1998; Maingot & Zeghal, 2008) note how how higher fraction 
of these students raise the reputation of the institution. This should if taken on board draw 
excellent research and teaching faculty to the university and improve its performance. As 
salient stakeholders, international students bring much needed intellectual diversity to a 
university’s academic environment and this should further enrich its academic performance. 
Knowledge and skillsets would be shared across this diverse academic student pool and his 
would lead to aAttracting international students is also congruous with the economy’s need for 
diverse talented and experienced global work force. This is why public policy commentators 
(Parker, 2011; Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013; Rowlands, 2013; Collini, 2005; Suchman, 
1995; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006) stress that a university would improve its academic and 
financial performance by recruiting more international students.  
 
Other theories have rather mixed predictions. While resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1987; 
Callen et al., 2010; Hartnett et al., 2004) recognizes that international students will bring higher 
fees and thus improve the institution’s financial viability, the theory simultaneously flags the 
academic resource burdens that such students might impose on the university. Similarly, 
optimal contracting (Verschuere & De Corte, 2014; Mitchell et al., 1997) makes it clear that 
international students might bring higher fees but may also expect higher levels of facilities 
and academic services to compensate them for this. Cultural considerations welcome the 
diversity of international students but caution against loss of the domestic academic culture 
(Trice, 2003; Volet & Ang, 1998; Ward, 2001; Barron, 2006). Quality concerns abound 
whether international students might reduce service levels for domestic peers(Anyanwu, 2004; 
Delaney, 2002). 
 
Within this ambiguous theoretical context it is unsurprising to find that there has been limited 
empirical work studying the relationship between the number of international students a 
university takes and its performance. Some studies highlight the academic burdens of 
international students while others document such students’ academic outperformance. For 
example, (Anyanwu 2004; Barron 2006; Furedi 2004; Bright, 2004; Delaney, 2002) find that 
some UK institutions have had to lower academic pass marks just in order to accommodate 
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intenational students. Others like Pauley (1988) and Williams (1989) in their Australian 
samples show that international students academically outperformed their domestic peers and 
improved the university’s performance. Elsewhere Marshall & Chilton (1995) in their UK 
study document the positive relationship between numbers of international students and 
university good honours degree awards. Wright and Cochrane’s (2000) In their cross-sectional 
study find a positive link between the ratio of research international students at a university 
and university research performance (research degree completion).  On the other hand, 
Makepeace & Baxter (1990) and De Vita (2002) find that first year international students 
underperform academically when compared to their domestic UK peers, but this assessment 
offers a limited and narrow view of the international student’s full output and potential 
contribution to the university’s performance, as some international students need time to adopt 
as pointed out by Russell et al. (2010), Lebcir et al. 2008 and Wu et al. (2015).  
 
In a more recent study Sawir (2013) finds that teaching techniques has improved for the better 
in universities with more international students, it has also showed that it has contributed to the 
development of domestic students learning. The study suggests that if well utilized, 
international students in universities can contribute to the overall performance of a university.  
Morrison et al. (2005) UK study from 1995 to 2000 show that some international students, 
specifically from north and south America did improve the academic performance of the 
university, while international students from other parts of the world performed the same or 
sometimes less than their domestic peers. This here provides further indication of the optimal 
contracting discussion, that universities which carefully choose their international student 
population can ultimately improve their performance.   
 
it is quite apposite that policy-based narratives and normative discussions in the literature too 
are divided. With the reduction of government support there has been increased competition in 
recruiting international students among UK universities. Policy commentators (Brown, 2011a; 
Foskett, 2010; Hemsley-Brown, 2011; Lomer et al., 2018) suggest that universities have been 
viewing this as an opportunity to counterbalance the cuts in government funding and boost 
their revenue streams. In fact, the UK Government itself in its much publicized campaign to 
rebrand UK universities in 1999 framed extensive guidelines called exhorting universities to 
seek international students from across the globe to foster and maintain their brand superiority 
(Taylor, 2005; Li et al., 2010). Recent observations of external multilateral institutions such as 
the OECD (2004) confirm this. In its policy paper the institution underlines how the UK has 
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indeed been encouraging universities to adopt a revenue generation policy by attracting larger 
numbers of non-EU students.  
 
Elsewhere there are arguments that if UK universities choose their international students 
wisely, they can simultaneously achieve university academic performance and financial 
vibility (Rogers & McGovern, 2002; Soo & Elliot, 2010; Pauley,1988; Williams, 1989). 
Undoubtedly this puts pressure on govenors to ensure that universities continue to academically 
perform and meet or exceed the expectations of international students as salient stakeholders 
or risk failure to attract them (Collini, 2005; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Yet this burden is 
worth shouldering. At another level the very fact that international students court a particular 
university in itself creates a reputational halo that helps it further in the next recruitment season 
especially through word of mouth referrals (Marginson et al., 2010; Gabaix & Landler, 2008; 
Mazzarol & Soutar; 2002).  
 
On the whole there is enough evidence to infer that larger fractions of international students as 
a governance policy should positively impact a university’s financial performance. But with 
academic performance the inference is relatively harder to make. Yet on the weight of overall 
evidence this thesis posits a likely positive impact on it. 
 
H4a: There is a positive association between the ratio of International students and the 
research performance of a university. 
H4b: There is a positive association between the ratio of International students and the 
financial performance of a university. 
 
3.2.1.4.2 Postgraduate Intensity 
 
In general, most theories of university governance predict a positive association between the 
number of post graduate students at a university and its academic performance. Culture/quality 
assurance scholars (Kim, 2008; Trowler, 2008; Brown, 2004; Salter & Tapper, 2000; Vidovich, 
2002) aver that institutions with higher levels of postgraduates have an academic ethos 
stemming from their mission of being more than just a finishing school. This improves their 
academic ambience and should result in better research (Melville Ross, 2010; Hordern, 2013: 
Stanton et al., 2009). The theory also suggests that such focused institutions possibly mobilize 
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a range of specialized research related resources that further aids their research orientation. The 
public role and mission of a university to increase student coverage implies higher numbers of 
student places. But different universities have internalized this role in different ways (Coy et 
al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2002: Tarbert et al., 2008). Some have increased undergraduate places 
as this is easiest to do and imposes lower academic resource burdens while others have 
increased postgraduate coverage. Yet universities as institutions of higher learning have a 
public duty to make advanced learning as accessible as possible and this positive externality 
should improve them academically (House, 2010; Neves, 2018; Leitch, 2006).  
 
Resource intensity of postgraduate institutions is definitely higher and this might lead to a 
higher financial burden on them (House, 2010; Priporas & Kamenidou, 2011). But network 
externalities of higher qualified staff at such institutions might encourage higher funding as 
well as better pedogogy. Postgraduate places might also raise the reputational legitimacy of a 
given university and this could help it attract a range of fee-paying students including 
international ones (Angell et al., 2008). New post-1992 universities quickly recognized the 
potential financial and reputational benifits stemming from carefully considering their 
postgraduate population, and started investing more resources towards recruitment and 
improving research facilities in order to improve their university research and financial 
performance (Callen et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Iannelli & Huang, 2014). 
 
Empirical work on post graduate students and their impacts upon university academic and 
financial performances have largely been tangential. At least two studies conflate post graduate 
intensities of universities as indicators of academic and/or research performance. Using a UK 
sample Tarbert et al. (2008) uncover evidence that Vice Chancellors are financially rewarded 
for recruiting higher numbers of postgraduates. The author seems to infer that such rewards are 
driven out of an internal governance pereception that higher post graduates improve research 
reputation, expertise and performance. More recently Boliver (2015) uses postgraduate student 
population as a research activity/research quality measure. He uncovers distinct links between 
the higher levels of post graduate students and research activities/ financial resources in most 
Pre-1992 and Russell Group universities when compared to peers. The author consequently 
infers that the proportion of postgraduate students enrolled at a given institution reflects its 
internal governance priorities towards research and academic excellence.  
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Elsewhere narratives within the literature highlight the many benefits that students derive from 
universities that have larger numbers of post graduates. In these too the undercurrent is 
definitely one that recognises how students and staff themselves perceive the post graduate 
intensity of an institution as a reflector of its research reputation excellence and expertise. For 
example, Angell et al. (2008) document how students are drawn to institutions with large 
postgraduate populations because they believe that these institutions will enable them to 
participate in rich business networks and find effective footholds in the industries where they 
intend to seek employment after the course. Similarly, Balmer & Liao (2007) show how 
postgraduate students often seek the benefits of brand reputation that universities with large 
numbers of post graduate students and courses embody. The implication is that such 
universities have a combined academic and professional ambience that helps the student build 
an effective industry-based community and network which will ultimately help him/her in 
career progression. Extending these results, one is able to infer that the paper suggests that 
these better graduate prospects should in turn improve the academic performance of the 
institution too. 
 
There is evidence that students themselves use postgraduate intensities as a filter mechanism 
in their university selection criteria. Igraduate (2013), Staurt et al. (2008) and Donaldson & 
McNicholas (2004) underline in their different student samples that when ranking the 
institutions of their choice students use the number of postgraduates as a short hand for good 
academic ambience and research expertise and reputation. It is not hard therefore to understand 
why some scholars above have used this variable as a university performance indicator. At 
another level these findings may be seen as an indication of the complex governance processes 
that may be at play here. Choosing higher levels of postgraduate places may have to go hand 
in hand with large levels of investment in educational and research facilities if it is to yield a 
positive impact on academic performance. Students might be inferring a research reputation in 
postgraduate places but unless the university supports such places with world class facilities it 
might not follow through on this promise of academic performance (Barnes, 2007; Adee, 
1997). 
 
This argument is stretched in other ways by other scholars. For example, Smith et al. (2010) 
points to the important educational benefits that post graduate courses bring to UK universities. 
The author highlights how according to him UK’s significant 8% contribution to the research 
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output of the world is a direct consequence of the post graduate orientation of most universities 
in the country. Yet the author also admits that such higher post graduate places are not free. 
Universities need to spend much larger amounts on services and facilities in order to be able to 
support higher post graduate intensities. Such a resource burden may not be plausible or even 
appropriate for all universities. Others like House (2010) maintain that for at least some 
universities the higher levels of facilities spend due to post graduates may be worth the 
increased research output and academic credentials. In fact, this is why a host of policy critics 
led by Callen et al. (2010), Leitch (2006) and Verbruggen et al. (2011) uphold the notion that 
universities calibrating their post graduate places upward and supporting them with higher 
infrastructural spending would surely reap the benefits in terms of higher academic and 
financial performances. 
 
To close the empirical discussion there seems enough tangential evidence in UK HEI that 
higher levels of postgraduates at a university should positively associate with both its research 
and financial performances. On the whole then reading across the two new variables of INTS 
and PGINT one can formulate the following key hypothesis. 
 
H4c: There is a positive association between the ratio of postgraduate student and the research 
performance of a university. 
H4d: There is a positive association between the ratio of postgraduate students and the 
financial performance of a university. 
 
3.2.1.5 Strategic Financial Choices in Asset/Revenue Structures 
 
Universities are financial entities too. But their asset and revenue structures are much richer 
than their corporate counterparts. This is why all theories of university governance invariably 
highlight governance discretions and challenges in these structural choices. For example, a 
university’s prioritization of certain revenue streams or assets could have far reaching 
implications for its resource dependencies (Flowes, 2014; Taylor, 2013a; Hamsley-Brown & 
Oplatka, 2006). These decisions once made would not only be very difficult to reverse but also 
might burden the institution for several decades and constrain its performance. Similarly, as 
good stewards the governors of a higher education institution have to play a checks and 
balances role with respect to to the executive profligacy of the Vice Chancellor and his/her 
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team. This profligacy could centrally manifest in revenue stream and asset structure choices 
where vested interests could easily skew the decisions and thus lead to underperformance 
(Dolton & Ma, 2003, Cyert, 1975:9-11; Gounopoulos et al., 2019). The public manifesto of 
universities implies an integrity in earning and spending that must ensure above all the 
fulfilment of societal expectations. This implies a thrift and wisdom in financial choices that 
goes far beyond the narrow interests of one or the other societal constituent (CUC, 2017; CUC, 
2016; Brown et al., 2010: Tarbert et al., 2008). All stakeholder needs and legitimate concerns 
must be taken on board and carefully traded off. Otherwise the university risks just a focus on 
financial performance at the expense of its more important academic performance. From a 
separate perspective the quality of higher education does indeed have a financial basis that 
cannot and should not be ignored. In choosing revenues and assets the university must take 
account of the likely long-term ramifications on its ability to assure current and future students, 
staff and other interested parties of the overall quality of higher education delivered by it.  
 
It is surprising that despite these theoretical indications that there may be several important 
governance trade-offs embedded in the unique asset and revenue structure choices of 
universities, extant research does not engage with them. Consequently, the thesis aggrgates a 
set of six different revenue and asset structure-based variables into one composite construct 
and hypothesizes the existence of this fifth hidden dimension of university governace namely 
Strategic financial choices in Asset/Revenue Structures.  
 
H5: The Strategic Financial Choices in Asset/Revenue Structures of a university should 
significantly associate with its academic and financial performances. 
 
3.2.1.5.1 Tuition Fees 
 
At least two theories of university governance take a negative view of a fee based higher 
education system and Legintimacy stress the fact that as public institutions with a wider societal 
remit, universities must take active steps to increase access to higher education not limit it. 
Tuition fees at universities force students especially from economically disadvantaged 
backgrounds to rethink their higher education opportunities and thus disallow their effective 
participation in economic advancement (Fowles, 2014; Boliver, 2013; Mangan et al., 2010a, 
b; Sutton Trust, 2004; Chowdry et al., 2013 Dunnett et al., 2012). Yet universities just like their 
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corporate counterparts are resource-based institutions that derive a large fraction of their 
financial sustenance from such fees. Resource dependence argues therefore that these revenue 
sources cannot be neglected (Fowles, 2014; Taylor, 2013a,b; Marginson, 2018; OFA, 2019; 
Molesworth et al., 2009). Optimal contracting and quality assurance add other dimensions to 
the argument. Without a properly calibrated tuition structure an institution would be swamped 
with too many non serious students free riding and degrading the intellectual ambience 
(Baldwin & James, 2000; Naidoo & jamieson, 2005; Potts, 2005). The facilities and salaries 
that a higher education institution needs to fund would be put in jeopardy if tuition fees are not 
appropriately designed.   
 
Theory based divides notwithstanding, significant strands of policy-based narratives comtinue 
to stress the positives of tuition fees for universities. The introduction of the quasi-market and 
the freeing up of tuition fee caps for domestic students have been seen as salutary to the average 
institution (Nixon et al., 2016; Shattock, 2010: 2008; Parker, 2011: Middlehurst, 2013; 
Browne, 2010, Ntim et al., 2017). While demand for higher education has surged in past 
decades from 14% in 1980 to more than 40% in 2006 (Shattock, 2010) universities in the UK 
have been facing financial constraints due to reduced government funding. This is why 
Browne’s (2010) recommendations for increased tuition for domestic students was so well 
received. There have been ongoing discussion about how this has supported university efforts 
to become self-sustainable and counterbalance the reduced government funding (Fowles, 2014; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). There is the general perception that universities view this as an 
opportunity to raise more funds in order to improve their teaching/research facilities and invest 
more on skilled staff. The inference is obviously that this should consequently improve the 
institution’s academic performance. 
 
There is a lack of direct studies empirically associating tuition fees with university 
performance. Yet scholars have raised a rich range of concerns about their likely impact on 
students and universities alike. In particular, there is the finding that increased tuition fees have 
placed potential students from less advantages socioeconomical backgrounds in the UK at a 
disadvantageous position (Callender & Jackson, 2008; Boliver, 2013). Domestic students have 
been discouraged from going to the university of their choice due to the high fee implication 
and instead opting to join an institution closer to home (Fowles, 2014; Boliver, 2013; Mangan 
et al., 2010a, b; Sutton Trust, 2004). Other evidence Dunnett et al. (2012) shows how tuition 
fee has become the all-important factor while deciding which university to apply to. Elsewhere 
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Fortin (2004)’s inconclusive study associating higher tuition fees and enrolments seems to 
downplay this importance or argument.     
Other empirical work (Heller, 1997; 1999; Peter & Waterman, 1982; Handy, 1993; Gayle et 
al., 2003; Gunasekera & Reed, 2008; Gomes & Novaes, 2005) shows how an increased reliance 
on the fee paying student has meant that universities have increasingly started prioritizing 
student and parent concerns in a move described as the marketization of higher education 
(Molesworth et al., 2012) arguably at the expense of their other important academic objectives. 
Another key narrative uncovered in empirical work suggests a likely link between tuition fees, 
numbers of undergraduate students and an inordinate focus on improvement in teaching 
facilities at some (Fowles, 2014; Alderman, 2010; Colini, 2005; Rowlands, 2012). There seems 
to be an inference here that these universities will naturally focus on internal governances that 
facilitate student satisfaction in order to retain the all important fee paying student. 
Consequently this might have a negative impact on research, as such universities are more 
likely to overlook research activities and developments. When the tuition fee cap was 
introduced it was up to the discretion of the university to decide its tuition fee and how to invest 
the funds generated (Verschuere & De Corte, 2014). The relationship between tuition fee 
fraction and academic performance has not been explored, and based on the literature above it 
is expected that tuition fee fraction is negatively associated with research and positively 
associated with teaching. 
 
H5a: There is a negative association between tuition fees fraction and the research 
performance of a university. 
H5b: There is a positive association between tuition fees fraction and the teaching performance 
of a university. 
 
3.2.1.5.2 Service and Facility Spend per Student 
 
From a stewardship, resource dependence and optimal contracting (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; 
Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012; Middlehurst, 2004; 2013; Bennett, 2002; Knight, 2002)  
standpoint universities that strategically invests their money on improving their libraries and 
facilities are expected to have better teaching and research outcomes. Such investment will 
make the university more attractive to potential students thus increasing its student coverage 
and selectivity, and helps the university in recruiting talented staff persuaded by the academic 
environment and facilities (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Price et al., 2003; Mallin et al., 2015; 
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Murphy, 2012; Binsardi & Ekwulugo, 2003; Knight, 2002; Hamsley-Brown & Oplatka, 2006). 
As a good steward university boards that spend effectively on the knowledge facilities that 
matter are indeed husbanding resources of the institution well and this should lead to better 
research and teaching outcomes (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991: 82; Donaldson, 
1990). Public accountability stresses that universities should ensure that society as a whole is 
able to benefit from a well equipped and facility rich institution that helps all its constitutents 
(Farr, 2003; Coy, 2001; Mcgettigan, 2013).The argument runs that the improved facilities and 
resources should lead to better public research output and to an innovative teaching 
environment all of which should lead to better university performance.   
 
In the normative and policy-based literature many voices stress how a  university’s teaching 
and research performance is a direct function of its training efforts (Gayle et al., 2003; 
Trakman, 2008; Collini, 2005; Ritzer, 2002; Trowler, 2008). Elsewhere there are arguments 
that university governance mechanisms that prioritize time, money and resources on training 
lecturers and researchers are likely to generate improved student satisfaction scores, better 
student performances in the job market and higher quality published research (Shattock, 2010; 
2013; McGettigan, 2013). In fact, this explains why in the UK, training is one of the key 
indicators by which the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) assesses the quality of a university’s 
academic governance (QAA, 2005; 2009; 2011).   
 
Empirically Dao & Thorpe (2015), Migin et al. (2015) and Wiers-Jenssen et al. (2002)  find 
that the services and facilities provided in a university plays an integral part in the students 
decision to join. Metcalf et al. (2015) finds that state of art facilities and equipment is an 
incentive when universities are recruiting highly skilled academic staff.  Earthman (2002) and 
Ganyaupfu (2013) both found that such investments have a positive impact on the teachers, 
teaching and student’s academic achievements. Mushtaq and Khan (2012) and Kirmani & 
Siddiquah, (2008) both find that universities that have invested in student learning facilities 
have witnessed an increase in students achieving higher grades, and this finding is further 
coraborated by Karemera et al. (2003) and Young (1999) who found that a student’s 
performance is directly linked to the library and facilities provided in the university. Given that 
university performance is influenced by attracting the best students, highly skilled staff and 
providing a fertile environment for them to flourish, It makes sense therefore to associate 
higher spending by a university on training its staff with improved teaching and research 
outcomes. This should also improve student recruitment outcomes leading to better financial 
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performance. Therefore, a relevant hypothesis is that service and facility spend is positively 
associated with research, teaching and financial performance.  
 
H5c: There is a positive association between service and facility spend per student and the 
research performance of a university. 
H5d: There is a positive association between service and facility spend per student and the 
teaching performance of a university. 
H5e: There is a positive association between service and facility spend per student and the 
financial performance of a university. 
 
3.2.1.5.3 Endowment to Total Assets 
 
A unique asset structure within universities is the endowment which does not have an easily 
comparable counterpart in the corporate sector. To an extent the endowment is like a financial 
reserve that the university is able to draw upon sometimes to generate an additional income or 
to use to invest in selective research. Resource Dependence tenets (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Bouwman, 2011) aver that universities that are less dependent on 
funds/grants providers i.e. having a higher endowment to total assets ratios should arguably be 
able to forge an optimal governance direction that aids its performance. Such universities are  
more likely to innovate and implement independent teaching regimes and research  orientations 
as deemed fit internally. There may be less need to follow other fund provider guidance 
(Washburn, 2008; Carrington et al., 2018).  
 
Yet, higher levels of endowment are not an unmixed blessing. As endowment levels rise, 
endowment donors might begin exerting their own vested interests/power (bebchuk et al., 
2002; Van Essen et al., 2015). This is why public accountability raises concerns that 
universities may prioritize the research interests of endowment donors instead of establishing 
a robust public orientation in the research function (Butt, 2019; Squire, 2014; Parker, 2012). 
Similarly, legitimacy warns about how very high levels of endowments may make the 
academic institution opaque to student/parent concerns and subservient to corporate/donor 
vested interests (Ntim et al., 2017; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995).      
 
As mentioned earlier there are no counterparts to endowments in the corporate sector (Brown 
et al., 2012)Yet given the flexibility angle that is a predominant motivation for university 
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endowments it may be useful to examine corporate research into financial flexibilities of the 
firm. Hansmann (1990), Foskett (2010), and Acharya & Dimson (2007) document that the 
financial flexibilities afforded to a firm by the many reserve balances stored away from the 
good financial performances over the years are extremely useful. They allow the firm to 
establish an independent research and development trajectory and thus improve financial 
performance subsequently.  
 
In UK HEI, empirical studies flag Endowment levels differences across universities. Boliver 
(2015) highlights how older pre-1992 universities that are well-reputed for being research 
intensive have larger endowments than their post-1992 peers. Furthermore, the study notes that 
within the pre-1992 universities, Cambridge and Oxford have the largest endowments although 
their teaching performance quality assessed by student suggested similar scores. With regards 
to research activity, the study finds that universities that outperformed at research were the 
ones with higher endowments regardless of their Russell Group status a fact corroborated by 
Fazackerley (2013) and  Rogerson (2013).   
 
Although Asif & Searcy (2014) have used income from endowment as a university financial 
measure, and Olson (2000) identified endowments as a research performance measure and 
found a positive relationship with board size and board diversity. There are no previous 
empirical studies investigating the relationship between endowment levels with university 
research, teaching and financial performance. However interpreting the theoretical, normative 
and corporate sector evidence it seems reasonable to postulate that larger endowments to total 
assets would positively associate with research, teaching and financial performance of a 
university.  
H5f: There is a positive association between endowment to total assets and the research 
performance of a university. 
H5g: There is a positive association between endowment to total assets and the teaching 
performance of a university. 
H5h: There is a positive association between endowment to total assets and the financial 
performance of a university. 
 
3.2.1.5.4 Cash to Total Assets, Debt to Total Assets and Fixed to Total Assets  
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The core theories of university governance have some imperatives for the influences of 
liquidity, leverage and the regular asset structures of universities on their performances. The 
public role of universities suggests that these institutions should pay close attention to cash, 
debt and fixed asset levels (CUC, 2016; 2017; OFS, 2019a:b). Governors should ensure that 
universities do not become insolvent or illiquid as this will harm the public purpose 
(McGettigan, 2012; Hayes & Wynyard, 2002; CUC, 201; 2017; HEC, 2014). At the same time 
such an institution should ensure it has the fixed assets including facilities and equipment to 
serve society (Toutkoushian, 2001; Taylor, 2013a). Resource dependence warns against fiscal 
profligacy that might reduce its ability to attract resources (Flowes, 2014; Parker, 2012; 2013; 
Jabbar et al., 2018). A university that marshalls its assets suboptimally or borrows excessively 
might compromise its academic integrity and thus lose legitimacy among its constituents 
(Mcgettigin, 2013).  
 
Within the other ancillary theories, the checks and balances of the good steward principle 
demand that a university manage cash and debt levels prudently to ensure long term financial 
sustainability (Dalton & Kesner, 1987; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Kenser & Johnson, 1990). 
If it does not do so the institution will surely deteriorate its academic and financial 
performances. This theory also underlines the fact that lenders and university governors may 
play an unhealthy game of one-upmanship especially when debt levels are too high. Optimal 
contracting once again stresses the fact that an optimal balance is essential in these structures 
to ensure financial performance (Williamson, 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson 
& Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996). Quality assurance suggests the strong link between fiscal 
prudence embedded in these structures and the quality of the services delivered (Salter & 
Tapper, 2000; Yoke, 2000). Finally, managerial power stresses how internal governors may 
face huge problems in establishing an independent policy direction when the institution has 
over borrowed (Dixon & Coy, 2007; Marginson & Considine, 2002; Capano, 2013; 
McGettigan, 2013). On the whole, then all theories of governance stress the correct calibration 
of these asset structures for the university’s performances. 
 
The debt problems of universities have been strongly underlined in the university policy and 
normative literature. Universities enthusiastically started borrowing funds in order to invest in 
expansion plans and resources to ensure a higher ability to accommodate a targeted growth in 
student populations (Ferry & Eckersley, 2012). But this borrowing reached such unsustainable 
levels that there have been growing calls for a measure of sustainability in university debt 
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levels. In the last decade alone university debt in the UK tripled to £12 billion pounds. While 
1 in 5 universities were running a budget deficit funded by debt in 2011 in 2018 this had 
climbed to 1 in 4 universities (UK Universities, 2015; Grant Thornton; 2016; HESA, 2016; 
2019). This is why some universities have even had to sell off their assets to help ease the 
financial difficulties (University of Reading, 2018). As many as 4 universities had to be bailed 
out by the Office for Students (OfS) recently. Traditionally banks have been the biggest 
lenders, but due to new capital adequancy rules they have started to pull back and universities 
have turned to riskier private placement funds. This has resulted in the piquant situation where 
some low ranking universities who can least afford it continue to run big deficts on the funds 
obtained from private financiers at slightly higher rates further jeopardising themselves (IRF, 
2018). Policy commentators like McGettigan (2012) warn that such trends if they persist would 
seriously “risk killing the golden goose of UK HEI by loading it with debt”. 
 
Within this alarming context OFS has been forced to step in recently. The regulatory body 
mandated that it will not bail out universities in financial difficulties (Adam, 2018; Britain, 
2019; OFS, 2019a,b). The “too big to fail” banker mentality according to it should not be 
transferred in to the HEI sector (HEC, 2014). Therefore, it is imperative on universities to 
practice financial prudence and avoid fiscal profligacy. Such a tough stand has seen widespread 
support among both scholars and practioners who have lauded it (HEC, 2014) (OFS, 2019) 
(Adams, 2018) (Jack, 2018a,b). According to them this will avoid the triple problems of poor 
decision making, lack of financial discipline and lowered accountability of universities.  
 
Be that as it may there are indications that universities simply continue to flout fiscal prudence 
and borrow excessively in the hope that fee paying and international students will allow them 
to service their debts yet flourish (Iman, 2018; Turner, 2019; Watson, 2012). All the while 
however student numbers have been dropping and there are signs that they may continue to 
decline in the context of geo-political trends towards self sufficiency especially after the recent 
public health scares, the likelihood of a demographic dip and the impending Brexit (Turner, 
2019; Hillman, 2018; Jack, 2018b). UK universities borrowing in the hope of future income 
may find it to be a mirage and find it difficult to survive.  
 
 
At another level students themselves have started to get wind of these trends and seem rather 
worried. Student surveys such as (CUC, 2019; HEPI, 2019) find that a rising proportion feel 
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reluctant to even apply to universities that have financial difficulties. Credit rating agencies 
like Moody’s have generally rated the entire sector except the Oxbridge institutions negatively 
(Moody, 2019).  
 
Earlier empirical work in the university sector associating DTA with performance is non 
existent. But the earlier corporate literature is rich with many findings about the influence of 
debt on the firm’s value/ financial performance. One strand (Champion, 1999; Gosh et al., 
2000; Hadlock and James, 2002; Abor, 2005; Arbiyan & Safari, 2009; Taun, 1975; Nerlove, 
1968; Baker, 1973; Petersen & Rajan, 1994) documents positive associations, the second strand 
negative associations (Pathak 2011; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Haung & Song, 2006; 
Chakraborty, 2010; Salim & Yadav, 2012; Abor, 2007; Hammes, 2003; Mesquita & Lara, 
2003; Fama & French, 1998; Ramdan & Ramdan, 2015) while a third strand (Siddik et al., 
2017; Al-Taani, 2013; Ebaid, 2009; Jensen & Meckling, 1975) finds no significant associations 
here. On the whole, then, it does seem highly likely that higher debt on the balance sheet of a 
university is likely to deteriorate its financial performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is advanced. 
 
H5i: There is a negative association between debt to total assets and the financial performance 
of a university. 
 
Recent empirical work in the corporate sector on cash levels of firms document a growing trend 
towards holding higher levels of cash (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Kim et al., 1998; Opler et 
al., 1999). There are some indications that at least some firms benefit financially from such a 
stance.Yet there are also other studies that seem to infer that higher cash levels may be 
symptomatic of a deeper malaise in the firm. It could well be that the firm is holding this higher 
cash because of an uncertainty with future cash flows or to mitigate trade related concerns 
(Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2007; Gao et al., 2013). By contrast although cash levels have not 
been directly associated with university performance there are many empirical indications in 
the sector that the university cash problem may be distinctly different (Marginson, 2018; 
McGettigan, 2013; Jack, 2018b; UCU, 2019; Brackley, 2020; Universities UK, 202). The 
burgeoning debt crisis in UK universities is a well referenced fact here (Ferry & Eckersley, 
2012; UK Universities, 2015; Grant Thornton; 2016; HESA, 2016; 2019).  Such debt is often 
taken to meet investment projects that generally draw down across several years. In the 
meantime, the university holds large levels of cash on its balance sheet. Banks and other 
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financial institutions that lend may have conditionalities associated with their debt (IFR, 2019; 
Moody, 2019) that preclude universities from spending on discretionary payments such as 
research but allow contingent payments like teaching. Research payments can be postponed 
but teaching ones especially salaries cannot without a bankruptcy implication. A higher cash 
level may actually indicate that the university has borrowed excessively with a delayed 
drawdown time table for proposed facilities investments but is still restricted from spending on 
research. On the whole then it seems appropriate to surmise that university cash levels should 
negatively associate with all of its performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
advanced. 
 
Fixed asset proportions have been studied fairly extensively in the corporate literature. At least 
one study Kotsina & Hazak, (2012) finds that firm choices of fixed asset levels has no 
significant association with Asset Turnover (AT). Others find empirical evidence on both the 
positive (Al-Ani, 2014; Olatunji & Adegbite, 2014; Okwo et al., 2012; Reyhani, 2012; Azadi, 
2013; Iqbal & Mati, 2012; Inyiama et al., 2017) and negative sides (Li, 2004; Dong et al., 2012) 
of the debate. By contrast although there is no direct empirical work associating fixed asset 
levels with the financial performance of a university, it can be inferred that the higher levels of 
facilities and equipment that are after all the core of the fixed assets will attract students and 
staff and thus help the university generate higher tuition fees and revenues (Bachan, 2017; 
Bradley et al., 2008). Therefore, the following hypothesis 
 
H5j: There is a negative association between cash to total assets and the research performance 
of a university. 
H5k: There is a negative association between cash to total assets and the teaching performance 
of a university. 
H5l: There is a negative association between cash to total assets and the financial  
performance of a university. 
H5m: There is a negative association between fixed to total assets and the financial 
performance of a university. 
 
In totality this section has demonstrated how there are theoretical and empirical indications of 
the vital importance of six different strategic asset and revenue structure choices that have been 
neglected in university governance studies. As shown here most of these strategic variables 
have been often the subject matter of regulatory prescriptions of institutions like the OFS and 
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the CUC and so it is indeed surprising to find a lack of focus in debating this construct in the 
extant body of empirical work (CUC, 2017; 2016; ref – see folder). Therefore, the following 
key hypothesis advanced here. 
 
3.2.2 University Board and Audit Related Governance 
 
The previous section developed a set of key hypotheses linking a set of carefully identified 
missing dimensions of university governance with this institution’s performance. Yet as 
mentioned before this thesis does not ignore the usual sets of board level and audit related 
governance dimensions widely studied both in the extant university governance literature as 
well as the corporate governance literature (Ntim et al., 2017; Harris, 2014; Olson, 2000; 
Lokuwaduge, 2011; Low et al., 2015; Guest, 2014; Walker et al., 2019). Such literature has 
already identified how each of the seven theories chosen to explain university governance have 
normative implications for these governance dimensions. For example, board compositions 
need to take account of public needs, stakeholder competing claims, legitimacy debates among 
constitutents, resource needs and utilizations, academic/non-academic quality assurance 
aspects, balancing managerial power and maintaining an optimal balance in all external 
contracting (Coy et al., 2001; Donaldson & Preston , 1995; Freeman, 2015; Suchman, 1995; 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Bebchuck et al., 2002; Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; Fowles, 2014; Deem 
et al., 2007; Brown, 2004). Similarly, these theories predict a range of governance performance 
effects embedded in the external and internal audit structures of the university. Therefore, on 
the whole, there is little doubt that board and audit related governances are an important 
influence on the performance of the university and a key hypothesis must be framed here. 
 
H6: The Board and Audit Related Governance of a university should significantly 
associate with its academic and financial performances. 
 
In what follows the thesis critically identifies the theoretical underpinnings of each of the usual 
set of board level and audit related governance mechanisms. 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Board Size 
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Stakeholder, Resource Dependence, Legitimacy and Stewardship theories aver that larger 
boards are likely to improve organizational performance (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Freeman, 
1984; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Smallman 2004; Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson, 1997). Stakeholder theory points out how in larger boards there is greater scope to 
include all the diverse stakeholders in universities ensuring their voice is incorporated in 
governance policies (Davis et al., 1997; Fama, 1980; Freeman, 1984). This would improve 
performance. Legitimacy (Hyples, 1995; Tilling, 2004; Deegan, 2004) argues that larger 
boards will have greater scope to include all the important constituencies of a university in its 
top tier governance. This would generate greater reputational legitimacy and thus enhance 
performance. Resource Dependence (Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006) aver that 
larger boards are more likely to consist of members with a wealth of experience and networks. 
This would help the university improve its research, teaching and financial performance. 
Finally Stewardship (Saltman et al., 2000; Swansson, Mow & Bartos, 2004) posit that larger 
boards are likely to possess the right balance to ensure a good stewardship of university 
achieving better performance. 
 
By Contrast Public Accountability, Quality Assurance and Optimal Contracting adopt a 
nuanced view. All three theories concur that it is right sizing of boards that help achieve 
coherence in governance policy and thus leads to enhanced performance (Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 1996; Trowler, 2008; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mallin et al., 
2015). In other words these theories suggest that neither too large nor too small boards would 
work. Quality assurance advocates carefully choosing board members who correctly identified 
quality deficits in research, teaching and financial governances (Brown, 2004; Leiyste & 
Westerheijden, 2014; Salter & Tapper, 2000; Kim, 2008; Stensaker, 2018; Nelson, 2002). 
Similarly, Optimal Contracting (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Nelson, 2002a:b; 
Murphy, 2012) suggests that too large a board would dissipate focus and might result in 
analysis paralysis while too small a board would lack ability to oversee contracts and 
performances efficiently. Finally Public Accountability (Coy ey al., 2001; Nelson et al., 2013; 
mKreysing, 2002; Banks et al., 1997) maintains that boards would be more accountable to 
general public interests if they included the right number of outside neutral and independent 
members. Clearly the two sets of theories pull in different directions and there is no consensus 
on the direction of association between university board size and its performance.  
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Corporate governance empirical research predominantly finds that larger board sizes correlate 
negatively with firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Conyon & Peck, 
1998; Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Tomasic et al., 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Pathan et 
al., 2007). This scholarship concurs that large boards give rise to the free rider problem with 
most board members taking on a passive role. Some corporate studies do find that larger boards 
are associated with better firm performance such as Belkhir (2009), Adam & Mehran (2005) 
and Kiel & Nicholson (2003). These authors in general trace this better performance to the 
superior monitoring ability of larger boards. Elsewhere at least two empirical studies namely 
Adams & Mehran (2005) and Cobham & Subramaniam (1998) uncover evidence of a U shaped 
relationship between board size and firm performance suggesting that neither too small nor too 
large a board size is efficient.  
 
Surprisingly and by way of contrast the only extant research findings in university governance 
and performance i.e. Lokuwaduge (2011) and Lokuwaduge & Atmstrong (2015) find that 
board size is uncorrelated with teaching or research performance. In their sample of Australian 
public universities the authors find that it is only asset turnover i.e. financial performance of 
universities that correlate positively with university council sizes. However the fact that this 
study is cross-sectional detracts from the robustness of their findings. Elsewhere Olson (2000) 
in their single year sample found a significant positive relationship between board size and an 
increase of endowment levels and total number of gift income.  
 
Given the above ambiguity in direction of association between university governance and 
performance the following main hypothesis is formulated with regard to the UK university 
sector. 
 
H6a: There is a positive association between board size and research performances of a 
university.  






3.2.2.2 Board Diversity 
 
The main theories underpinning university governance i.e. public accountability, stakeholder, 
resource dependence and legitimacy invariably find merit in greater board diversities. Public 
accountability suggests that diverse boards are likely to meet the general public’s concern with 
the neutrality, fairness and independence of university governance (Coy et al., 2011). 
Legitimacy adds that diverse boards will necessarily be drawn from different constituencies in 
society and therefore the university will be perceived to be more credible and trustworthy 
(Suchman, 1995; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006). Stakeholder perspectives underline how 
ensuring that the governing board is drawn from each set of stakeholder groups will ensure that 
board members take clear account of the differing concerns of each group (Roberts, 1992; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). Resource dependence posits that a diverse university board can be 
assured of experienced academics and professionals who bring varied expertise and network 
resources to the institution (Pfeffer, 1987; Verbruggen et al., 2011). Yet it must be noted that 
each of the four theories welcome certain types of diversity but not others. For example, Public 
Accountability and Legitimacy lay emphasis on independence and neutrality of directors while 
resource dependence and stakeholder focus on the expertise and resource richness among them.  
 
Between the seven theories only managerial power and optimal contracting strike a dissenting 
note.  These scholars draw attention to the fact that diversity in boards could interfere with 
cohesion in policy formulation leading to policy logjam (Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & 
Buck, 2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996). Diverse board members will 
necessarily pull in different directions and this will result in policy disagreements. Decision-
making will become slow and ponderous and the university will find itself unable to respond 
to changing conditions in higher education. In totality five of the seven theories suggest 
diversity will have a positive influence on performance while the other two posit a negative 
one.  
 
Board diversity including gender, ethnic and experience diverstities among corporate firms has 
been extensively studied (Carter et al., 2003; Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Ntim, 2015). Most authors seem to find that both types of diversity positively affects 
firm performance.  
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Erhardt et al. (2003) report positive associations between board and ethnic diversities and the 
performances of 127 large US listed firms between 1993 and 1998. Similarly, Lückerath-
Rovers (2013) in their sample of 99 Dutch listed companies throughout years 2005-2007 find 
that gender-diverse boards may provide better monitoring over management and improve 
firms’ financial performance. Ntim (2015) documents that board diversities are significantly 
and positively associated with market valuation of all 169 firms listed on Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange.  
 
Within the UK corporate context, Singh et al. (2008) find that new women directors tend to be 
more reputed with greater board and career experience, and education than their male 
counterparts. This suggests that board diversity can bring diverse ideas, experience, knowledge 
and business contracts, all of which may enhance a firm’s financial performance. Similarly, 
Arun et al. (2015) report that greater gender diversity can promote the implementation of 
restrained earning management practices among FTSE 350 UK listed firms. Elsewhere, 
Gregory-Smith et al. (2014b) find no relationship between board gender diversity and financial 
performance for all FTSE 350 firms. Ntim (2015b) in his South African sample finds evidence 
that ethnicity and gender both have a positive influence on voluntary disclosure.  
 
In the university performance empirical literature board diversity is studied in different ways.  
Lokuwaduge (2011) does not directly measure board diversity at all in her Australian sample 
preferring to document only the number of Government appointed board members at each 
university. In other words, the author only measures one type of diversity among board 
members i.e. whether the government nominates them or not. She finds no impact of these 
government appointees on teaching research or financial performance. Elsewhere Harris 
(2014) does find among US universities that higher numbers of female board directors impact 
positively on financial/administrative performances such as new student recruitments and 
retentions. Olson (2000) in his study of independent not-for-profit colleges finds that board 
members with business executive backgrounds and experience contribute positively to gift 
incomes at these institutions.  Ntim et al. (2017) distinguish clearly between gender and ethnic 
diversities in UK university boards and underline an important association between these and 
voluntary disclosure levels at these institutions.  
 
In addition, there is policy-based evidence in the UK that regulators feel that both gender and 
ethnic diversity on boards should positively impact university performance. The CUC (2009), 
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UUK (2011), (Davies-Report, 2011) and FSSG (2011) have been emphasizing that university 
boards take active steps to diversify their memberships to reflect the right balance of genders, 
ethnicities, age groups and experience. It must be noted that diversity at the board level can 
and should lead to diversity lower down in the university (Collini, 2005; 2008;Trowler, 2008; 
Ritzer, 2002; Ntim et al., 2017). For instance, ethnically diverse university boards would both 
attract new students from similar ethnic backgrounds and also generate more ethnically 
orientated research funds and bursaries.  Similarly, women board members would encourage 
policies and programs that target more female students and staff. After all Stakeholder Theory 
(Ullman, 1985; Roberts, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997) posits that ethnic and gender diversities 
would necessarily play such an instrumental role and hence must be encouraged. From another 
angle diverse board members would be seen as more legitimate by university grant providers 
(Suchman, 1995; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006) and also attract resources from institutions 
focused on ethnicity or gender based research (Vebruggen et al., 2011; Callen et al., 2010).  
Earlier empirical research in university governance such as Ntim et al. (2017) and Harris (2014) 
within their differing contexts does find evidence for such arguments.  
 
Diverse university boards should encourage dissent, prevent “group-think” and check 
unfettered executive power at the top of the organizational pyramid (Parker, 2011; Trackman, 
2008; Parry, 2011; Trowler, 2008; Collini, 2005; Melville-Ross, 2011). For instance, the Vice 
Chancellor and his executive team might be driven to generate more resources for research 
through narrowly seeking such resources in private sector corporate sponsorships (Perez & 
Ode, 2013; Ferreira, 2015, p. 108; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Jurkus et al., 2011; Walt & Ingley, 
2003 ). In fact Nagy & Robb (2008) and Parker (2013) caution against such growing corporatist 
tendencies within university boards A diverse board might rightly be expected to raise 
objections to such moves and lower these corporatist tendencies. This is what Ntim et al. (2017) 
in their empirical research in university governance and voluntary disclosure find. Diverse 
boards do encourage better disclosure particularly with regard to research sponsorship. Such 
transparency would surely improve the academic integrity of the institution and generate 
greater trust and credibility in the research produced by it. 
 
Such diverse university boards may be expected to provide much needed balance within 
university spending budgets. For example, it is likely that Vice Chancellors recruited from the 
corporate sector at some universities might focus more on student recruitment, marketing and 
revenue generation at the expense of academic items such as services/facilities spend or teacher 
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training budgets. Parry (2013), Parker (2011), Melville-Ross (2010), Kim (2008), Trakman 
(2008) and Hordern (2013) highlight how the current trend towards making university boards 
and executive structures more managerial might inadvertently do exactly this. Academic 
spending on teaching/research infrastructure or teacher training may be given lower priority by 
a managerial Vice Chancellor more interested in the commercial and business aspects of the 
university. Diversity in the university board might check this trend. The argument is that female 
board members might easily spotlight such neglect and restore teaching related spending. 
Earlier empirical research by Ntim et al. (2017) supports such a view. The authors show that a 
gender and ethnicity rich board in UK at the very least improves voluntary disclosures in the 
institution about its financial spending. It is not difficult to make the inference that such 
financial transparency should lead to a rebalancing of budget priorities towards academic goals. 
 
A diverse university board would generate greater legitimacy for the institution at least among 
the different board member constituencies. This is exactly what legitimacy theory predicts 
(Suchman, 1995; Coy & Pratt, 1998; Maingot & Zeghal, 2008). Thus specifically the presence 
of larger numbers of female board members should attract female staff and students. Similarly, 
minority board members should generate legitimacy for the institution among minority 
community staff and students. Such trends should lead to better quality gender/ethnicity 
research in the institution and raise its academic reputation with 148onsequent greater levels 
of on-campus-placements and better graduate-prospects (Shattock, 2013a, b; Lambert, 2007). 
In totality, there is ample evidence that board gender and ethnic diversities will positively 
correlate with the academic performances of a higher education institution. Therefore, the 
following key hypothesis is advanced here.  
 
H6c: There is a positive association between ethnic diversity and the research  performance of 
a university. 
H6d: There is a positive association between ethnic diversity and the teaching  performance of 
a university. 
 
H6e: There is a positive association between board gender diversity and the research  
performance of a university. 
H6f: There is a positive association between board gender diversity and the teaching  
performance of a university. 
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3.2.2.3 Board independence 
 
Among the core theories of university governance only legitimacy and public accountability 
have a direct normative for board independence. Public accountability stresses that neutral 
public interest in universities is best operationalized when outside experts with no obvious 
stake in it are coopted at the highest governance levels (Coy et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2003). 
These neutral outsiders will not hesitate to articulate the broader public interests and question 
the legitimacy of the university’s governance. This would surely provide balance within a 
university’s governance and enhance its subsequent multi-dimensional performance 
(Jongbloed et al., 2018; Pollitt, 1990; Nuemann & Guthrie, 2006). Legitimacy theory further 
argues that important stakeholders without direct stake in an institution accept that it is 
legitimate only when persons whose integrity and impartiality are assured govern it at the 
highest levels (Nagy & Robb, 2008; Parker, 2013; Suchman, 1995). When a university 
incorporates higher proportions of lay and independent board members it is seen as more 
legitimate and this enhances its performance in the long run. The other two core theories of 
university governance have no direct normative implication. As long as board members of a 
university are chosen for their rich resourcefulness and networks, Resource Dependence theory 
is satisfied (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Osborne M & Bell, 2009). 
Similarly, Stakeholder theory does require wider representation of all salient stakeholder 
groups in the university board but once again there is no extra requirement of independence 
(Freeman et al., 2004; Davis Schoorman & Donaldson, 1995).  
 
Stewardship, managerial power and optimal contracting theories tend to support independent 
boards as a device both to rein in powerful interest groups as well as bring fresh ideas and 
concepts into organisations (Donaldson I & Davis, 1991; Donaldson T & Preston, 1995; 
Donaldson, L, 1990). As institutions age, they tend to close themselves to new ideas from the 
outside world. This could prove disastrous. Bringing in fresh perspective from independently 
minded experts would refresh policy thinking at the highest level and avoid “group think” 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mallin et al., 2015; Yermack, 1996).  These theories therefore suggest 
that outside influence at the highest levels could prove salutary for a firm. Fresh governances 
would be introduced old styles of governances would be questioned and weeded out by the 
independent board members. Consequently, this would improve performance. Such arguments 
are particularly appropriate to universities, which as knowledge institutions are more at risk of 
intellectual stagnation (Parker, 2011; Collini, 2005) 
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Empirical research in corporate governance largely confirms the expectations of Legitimacy, 
Public Accountability and the three other non-core theories. For example Cobham & 
Subramaniam (1998), Mishra & Nielson (2000) and Pathan, Skully & Wickramanayake (2007) 
document that board independence has a positive relationship with service sector firm 
performance. Similarly Pathan et al (2007) show how independent board directors of firms 
prove to be better monitors for its performance simply because they have their own reputations 
to maintain. This explains why corporate governance best practice codes in several countries 
have mandated a majority of executive directors on corporate boards (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003; Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 1998). It is also at the base of the 
university governance mandates in the UK that have stipulated 50% lay members on boards. 
 
In university governance studies Harris (2014) samples US non-profit sector higher education 
institutions to discover that independent directors are indeed a significant positive influence on 
student retention rates and financial resource generation. Yet his findings indicate that only 
some types of independent directors, those with experience and expertise in fund raising, help 
generate additional resources for universities. Elsewhere agency and stewardship theory-based 
scholars (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Weisbach, 1988; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) find evidence 
that independent boards do improve decision-making and consequent performance in 
universities. Lokuwaduge (2011) and Lokuwaduge & Armstrong (2015) in her Australian 
sample finds different directions of association between council independence and the 
university’s teaching, research and financial performance. On the one hand lay members on a 
university’s board increased teaching performance but decreased both research and financial 
performance in the author’s investigation. Such a mixed result is hard to explain and does not 
seem to fit any neat theoretical logic. Ntim et al. (2017) underline significant positive 
relationships between board independence and university voluntary disclosure levels in their 
UK university sample. In related findings the authors document that the average proportions 
of lay members on university boards in UK in 2012 exceeded 50%. This fits with CUC 
recommendations and suggests that these institutions seem to be aware of the advantages they 
derive from such independent members.  
 
At another level lay members can be expected to encourage quality directed changes in 
university teaching and research governance (Schofield, 2009; Greatbtch, 2014; Shattock, 
2013a; Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006a; Bozec & Bozec, 2012). They are outsiders 
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who are more interested in their own long-term reputation rather than pursuing any narrow 
vested interests in the institution. In fact, this is why corporate governance scholarship 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006a; 2006b; Bozec & Bozec, 2012) has found important 
links between the quality of firm performances and the number of laypersons on its boards.  
 
Among universities Ntim et al. (2017) document that UK institutions with higher levels of 
board independence are more accountable and voluntarily disclose more financial and non-
financial information. The implication clearly is that these directors from outside are more 
interested in long term performance, quality and reputational concerns than their internal 
counterparts with vested interests in the institution. In recent research Bachan (2017) and 
Johnes & Soo (2013) find clear evidence of grade inflation among UK universities. One would 
therefore expect that boards with more lay members would encourage crackdowns on cases of 
plagiarism and grade inflation (Trowler, 2008; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Barako et al., 2006a, b). 
They would thus bring a much-needed quality imperative to all of the university’s functions. 
 
Other culture and learning narratives in university governance stress how independent and 
fresh voices at the board level might be essential to support evolution of appropriate teaching 
and learning regimes. Teaching infrastructure and budgets will tend to be neglected in 
universities because unlike research, teaching does not draw in resources or raise academic 
reputations. Due to their status and focus on the long term independent lay board members 
would act as an effective check on such tendencies to neglect teaching infrastructures and 
budgets (Trowler, 2008; Tennat & Duggan, 2008; Jack, 2008).  
 
Finally, studies (Xiao et al., 2004: Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Chan & Gray, 
2010; Gisbert & Navallas, 2013; Ntim et al., 2017) also suggest that lay board members might 
have salutary influences on the audit function of any institution. Such members would surely 
question existing managerial audit and related governance practices, improve them and 
encourage voluntary disclosure. The argument is that such external members are rank outsiders 
and so relatively unaffected by vested interests in the institution. They would not hesitate to 
question internal audit mechanisms and/or call for forensic external audits of the institution by 
BIG4 audit firms. It is in this vein that Ntim et al. (2017) document in their UK based study 
that lay member fractions on UK University boards positively correlate with appointment of 
BIG4 audit firms as well as strong internal audits at these institutions. They also show how 
universities with lower levels of independent members in their sample continue to adopt lower 
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levels of audit compliance despite regulatory guidelines to the contrary in the country. Overall 
there seems to be enough empirical indication to infer and formulate the following key 
hypothesis.  
 
H6g: There is a positive association between board independence and the research 
performance of a university.  
H6h: There is a positive association between board independence and the teaching 
performance of a university. 
 
3.2.2.4 Board Meeting Frequency 
 
Core theories of governance and performance are invariably positive on the impact of board 
meeting frequencies on institutional performance. Public accountability scholarship (Vefeas, 
1999; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Carcello et al., 2002; Karamanou & Vefeas, 2005) suggests that 
effective boards are generally evidenced by their meeting frequency. After all it is only in 
frequent meetings that such boards can monitor and modify institutional governances bringing 
them in line with public purpose. It is this that will vocalize public purpose and accountability 
leading to higher performance. In a similar vein resource dependence (Reverte, 2009; 
Schofield, 2009) argues that periods of financial uncertainty competition and reform require 
boards to meet regularly to strategize, discuss, plan and assess executive performance. It is also 
in these frequent meetings that resource rich board members can exchange valuable strategic 
information about their network contacts. These are what will then improve the board’s access 
to resources leading to better performance. Stakeholder theorists such as Freeman & Reed 
(1983) opine that frequent board meetings also help diverse stakeholders voice and debate their 
different opinions. The regular debates balance and enrich governance policy leading to better 
overall performance in the institution. Meeting more frequently can also help keep governors 
informed and updated about developments in the institution. This enables them to address 
critical problems in a timely manner and thus increases the legitimacy of the institution 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995).   
 
By contrast ancillary theories of governance are generally mixed in their analysis of how board-
meeting frequencies impact upon performance. For example, Jensen (1993) and Vefeas (1999) 
argue that too many board meetings generally reduce performance in terms of executive time, 
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travel arrangements and potential conflict of opinions. The authors suggest that an effective 
board must sometimes do nothing and allow the executive to get on with the job. Others here 
suggest that it might make sense for a board to vary its meeting frequency based on external 
and internal environment pressures. For example, stewardship and agency scholarship (Kohli 
& Saha, 2008; Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004; Bebchuk, Cohen & Farrell, 2004) argue that a board 
can recover faster from poor performance if it meets more frequently. Taken together therefore 
the multi-theoretical framework seems to suggest that governing board meetings might either 
have a positive or negative impact on institutional performance. 
 
Empirical corporate literature documents a clear negative link between the frequency of board 
meetings and firm performance (Vefeas, 1999; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). By contrast in the 
university literature, Lokuwaduge (2011) and Lokuwaduge & Armstrong (2015) find in their 
Australian sample that overall performance is weakly (i.e. only at 90% level of confidence) 
positively impacted by council meetings. But when she breaks down performance she finds a 
positive significant impact only on research but no significant impacts on teaching or financial 
performances. Ntim et al. (2017) discover in their UK sample that board-meeting frequency 
does not have any significant influence on levels of voluntary disclosure. Despite these contra 
and mixed theoretical and empirical indications the thesis posits a positive association here. 
The following key hypothesis is advanced. 
 
H6i: There is a positive association between board meeting frequency and the research 
performance of a university. 
H6j: There is a positive association between board meeting frequency and the financial 
performance of a university. 
 
3.2.2.5 Executive Team Meeting Frequency 
 
High performing universities share academic and financial decision-making at many levels and 
in different bodies. Several authors including Knight (2002), Salter & Tapper (2002), Dearlove 
(2002), Taylor (2013b) and Melville Ross (2010) concur that UK university governance is 
mostly a model of shared governance divided between at least three different bodies namely 
the Governing Board, and the Vice Chancellor’s executive team. This is particularly true in 
development of teaching assessments, protocols and regimes. For example, influential and 
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experienced professors on the board often make the important policy decisions on academic 
syllabi, teaching and assessment protocols. Similarly, deans and pro-vice chancellors sit with 
the Vice Chancellor on his executive team to decide on important governance protocols 
affecting exam standards, administration, learning outcomes and so on of the university. In fact 
this is the very essence of the collegial arrangements lauded by a range of university 
governance scholars (Middlehurst, 2013; Lambert, 2005; Parker, 2011; Shattock, 2013a, b). 
Larger size of these bodies might on the one hand ensure greater balance and seamless 
incorporation of plurality in teaching governances. On the other hand, too many members on 
either body may bring a dysfunctional influence on it. However, it is to be expected that greater 
monitering and frequent calibration of teaching performance by the executive team ought to 
improve such performance. Ntim et al. (2017) document the important moderating influence 
of executive teams in the university governance voluntary disclosure relation. But the authors’ 
study does not investigate this link with university performance. Therefore, the direction of the 
relationship between executive team meeting and academic performance although difficult to 
determine a-priori due to the lack of direct empirical work here can be largely posited to be 
positive. Therefore, the following hypothesis is advanced.  
 
H6k: There is a positive association between Vice-Chancellor’s executive team meeting 
frequency and teaching performance of a university. 
 
3.2.2.6 Presence of a Unique Governance Committee  
 
The clutch of four core theories underpinning governance highlights the need for special 
internal governance structures and committees to regularly monitor and calibrate compliance 
with best practice governance and thus improve institutional performance. Public 
accountability argues that by giving special status to a governance committee the board 
establishes the priority it accords to internal governance processes and mechanisms. This 
should imbue the institution with a public environment that actively encourages governance 
debate. In the process there will be changes to governance protocols that should improve the 
institution’s public performance (Coy et al., 2001; Bedard & Gendorn, 2006; Jetty & Bertie, 
2012). Resource dependence suggests that the special committees on internal governance 
instituted by a board would help it focus on discovering existing deficiencies in internal 
resources within the institution. This may then be easily corrected using the rich resource 
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networks of the board (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006). Legitimacy traces the 
positive links between instituting a special committee on governance and transparency 
perceptions among societal constituents (Gibbs, 2001; Bradley et al., 2009; Osborne M & Bell, 
2009; Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002). Finally, stakeholder scholars point to how a special 
governance committee could be the most suitable portal to flag the concerns of minority and 
less salient stakeholders of an organization. Within these specialized debating platforms in the 
organization a truly inclusive approach that balances all competing interests may be trashed 
out and forged (Donaldson L & Davis, 1991; Wicks & Parmar, 2004; Donaldson T & Preston, 
1995; Freeman, 2010) 
 
Unique Governance committees could arguably provide another channel for the board in its 
role as a good steward to check on executive excess. Yet stewardship as a theory admits that 
whether such a committee actually becomes effective or not in its channelling is an empirical 
question that is not necessarily proven (Marginson & Considine, 2000; Mow & Bartos, 2004). 
Optimal contracting (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012) also takes a 
more rational view of institution of special committees on governance. The theory suggests 
that special committees may or may not work in an optimal way. There is the ever-present 
danger that such mechanisms do not really help and become another layer of red tape within 
the institution. Managerial power agrees and suggests that although governance committees 
might help check inordinate increases in managerial influence within internal decision-making, 
there is no guarantee that they will indeed (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van essen et al., 2015; Kalyta 
& Magnan, 2008; Byrd et al., 2010). Thus, there is a neat division between the seven theories 
about the utility of special governance committees with the core set arguing for them but the 
ancillary set questioning their efficacy.   
 
Another key aspect of the theoretical indications in respect of this variable is worth noting. 
Specialized Governance committees could have a special reputational effect due to their very 
nature (Ntim et al., 2017). A university that sets up such a committee is signalling the public, 
salient stakeholders and other constitutents that it adheres to the highest academic standards 
(Core, 2001). Theoretically such a signal might have a more direct association with research.  
 
Empirical research in the performance impacts of unique governance committees within 
university governance literature is mostly indirect and so it may be useful first to highlight 
some notable findings from the corporate literature. For example, Datar et al. (1991) and Wang 
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et al. (2008) suggest firms ought to ensure that there are adequate numbers of internal 
committees so that there is effective oversight of executive spending decisions. This would not 
only make fraud difficult but also ensure appropriate balance in spending across the firm’s 
strategic priorities. Naturally the institution will thus be able to demonstrate its public 
accountability, stakeholder focus and legitimacy. This is exactly what Ntim et al. (2012) find 
within their sample of South African firms between 2002 and 2006. Firms that set up different 
committees and in particular those that set up a separate governance committee disclose more 
governance related information and in general improve their reputation in the market. In a 
related vein Gietzmann & Ireland (2005) Gray et al. (1996), Braadbart (2007) and Bushman & 
Smith (2003) show how strategic and timely information disclosures play an important role in 
performance and lead to better accountability.  
 
Within university governance the CUC (2009) mandates the need for at least three separate 
committees to oversee accounting, internal control, risk, appointment and remuneration. 
Although this regulatory body does not require universities to set up a separate governance 
committee, Ntim et al. (2017) find in their UK university sample that those that did voluntarily 
disclosed more governance and performance information than their peers. Lokuwaduge (2011) 
determine in their Australian sample that universities with larger numbers of committees 
perform worse in teaching but better in research and financial performances than their peers. 
She further finds that the transparency level of a given university in her sample has no 
significant impact on any of its performances. To date however no study in university 
governance has examined explicitly whether the presence of a separate governance committee 
at a university improved its research performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
advanced. 
 
H6l: There is a positive association between the presence of a unique governance committee 
and university research performance. 
H6m: There is a positive association between the presence of a unique governance committee 





3.2.2.7Audit Committee Size  
 
Internal audits are recommended by five of the seven theories of university governance as an 
important device to improve transparency and performance of universities. At one level while 
such audits demonstrate the commitment of the institution to public purpose at another, they 
also improve legitimacy due to the presence of effective internal audit and governance 
mechanisms which increases the effiency of internal processes in the organization, which 
subsequently leads to improved perception amongst stakeholders (Gibbs, 2001; Bradley et al., 
2009; Osborne M & Bell, 2009; Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002). This ultimately leads to 
improved internal mechanisms for stakeholder inclusion and create another channel for the 
checks and balances of a good steward (Donaldson L & Davis, 1991; Wicks & Parmar, 2004; 
Donaldson T & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 2010).  
 
 In addition, the quality and optimality of a university’s academic and financial services will 
surely improve due to a stronger internal audit function (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Marginson, 
2006). Thus, the overall theoretical indications seem to stress the importance of the audit 
function in a university (Coy et al., 2001; Bedard & Gendorn, 2006; Jetty & Bertie, 2012). 
 
A direct inference can be made that the size of such committees would allow for greater 
diversity and independence to exert itself in the fulfilment of all these objectives. This justifies 
why audit committee size is an important likely antecedent of university performance. 
Important empirical work has been conducted in corporate sector on internal audit. Some 
studies suggest that when correctly composed with financial experts’ internal audits actually 
improve the institution’s functioning (Bedard et al., 2004; Krishnan, 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 
2006). Other studies (DeFond et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2004) find that the market positively 
values the appointment of expert auditors. In fact, Agyemang- Mintah & Schadewitz in their 
UK sample of 63 financial institiutions over 12 years found that the adoption of an AC by 
financial institutions has a positive and statistically significant impact on firm value. By 
contrast work on this variable in the university sector has been scant as observed by Ntim et al. 
(2017). There have been some calls in the empirical literature for more financial experts on 
university audit committes (CUC, 2006a, b; 2008; Dewing & Williams, 1995; Pearson, 2009); 
university funding councils have been stressing the need for more robust internal audit 
interventions to improve the quality assurance in universities and scholars have been underling 
the importance of this function to improve transparency and accountability. The only set of 
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studies actually measuring audit committee functioning (Dewing & Williams, 1995; Pearson, 
2009) conclude that the function is yet to become robust and is need of much reorientation and 
reframing. On the whole then there seem to be enough indications for a likely positive 
association between this variable and the university’s financial perfromance. Hence the 
following hypothesis is advanced. 
 
H6n: There is a positive association between audit committee size and the financial 
performance of a university. 
 
3.2.2.8 Use of BIG-4 Audit Firm for External Audit 
 
All theories of governance welcome the use of reputed external audit as an internal governance 
mechanism. Public accountability stresses that employing a reputed external auditor 
demonstrate an institution’s higher desire to remain accountable (Coy et al., 1997; 2001). This 
ensures that the institution is seen to be fulfilling its public remit without resorting to fraud, 
maladministration or poor governance. Stewardship contends that reputed external auditors 
have the power to self-select their clients and protect their reputation and thus mitigate agency 
problems (Davis et al., 1997; Saltman et al., 2000; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Swansson, 
Mow & Bartos, 2004; DeAngelo, 1981a, b). In other words, by simply ensuring BIG4 audit an 
organization sends a clear signal that its stewards are indeed acting in the best interest of all 
stakeholders and are not frightened of stricter external scrutiny. Legitimacy and resource 
dependence (Deegan, 2004; Suchman, 1995; Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004; Kesner & Johnson, 
1990; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) support such stricter external audits 
on the grounds that it lends the institution a halo of transparency and accountability, which 
enhance both its legitimacy and access to resources. When an institution demonstrates that it 
employs the best external audit teams to certify its internal governance practices then resource 
rich board members are attracted to it.  
 
These board members then provide expanded channels of resources access to it. This would 
help it outperform. Similarly, employment of BIG4 audit teams generates a halo of legitimacy 
in itself. This gains its legitimacy and that helps it outperform. Stakeholder theorists suggest 
that effective representation of all stakeholder groups in internal decision-making is ensured 
when BIG4 auditors critically comment on these (DeAngelo, 1981a, b; Lennox, 1999). In 
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particular when these large reputed audit agencies point out internal deficiencies then the board 
takes it seriously and acts improving several performance metrics consequently (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991; Freeman, 1999) Optimal Contracting and Managerial power (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991; Freeman, 1999; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; Williamson, 2005; Bebchuk 
et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2015; Kalyta & Magnan, 2008) each separately underline the 
ability of such external audits to maintain the effective and optimal balance among competing 
interests in the institution. For example, BIG4 audits often specifically comment on deleterious 
relationships or practices, which often lead to corrective governance reforms. This 
subsequently balances power structures in the organization and improves performance.   
 
All seven theories of university governance in general seem to be in favour of better external 
scrutiny as a means to improve institutional performance. However, it can be inferred as with 
the previous variable that the decision to employ a BIG4 auditor is more directly linked to 
research rather than teaching performances at a university. Research as an academic function 
is largely external in its orientation unlike teaching. Skilled research staff are generally likely 
to be attracted to universities that are forensic and transparent in their functioning. Such staff 
unsurprisingly would go on to produce higher quality research at such a university. Therefore, 
there is an expectation that BIG 4 audits will have a direct and positive impact on university 
research (Xue & O’Sullivan, 2013; DeAngelo, 1981a, b; Lennox, 1999). After all external 
independent scrutiny would surely impact academic reputation in terms of research more than 
teaching. 
 
As in the case of other audit related governance dimensions, here too university literature is 
largely indirect in scope. It may be useful to note a few important findings from corporate 
work. Camfferman & Cooke (2002), Adelope (2011), Jetty & Beattie (2012), and DeFond 
(1992) demonstrates how the quality, status and size of the external audit firm is a core factor 
in improving both governance and performance within the company. In particular, these studies 
highlight the higher credibility signals sent by the corporate firm in employing a BIG 6 audit 
firm. DeFond (1992) finds that employing a large and well reputed auditor would enable better 
monitering and help mitigate agency conflicts. While elsewhere, Chen et al. (2013) report 
empirical evidence that firm performance is positively infunced by the size of the auditing firm. 
They all also show how these signals have tangible positive effects on the firm’s consequent 
performance. Within the university sector many researchers (Xue & O’Sullivan, 2013; Gordon 
et al., 2002; Ntim et al., 2017) underline the propensity of UK universities especially the 
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traditional i.e. pre-1992 ones to employ large external audit firms. Of these Gordon et al. (2002) 
and Ntim et al. (2017) verify that employing such BIG 4 audit firms do indeed have a positive 
impact on voluntary disclosure levels at these universities. Yet the question of its impact on 
university teaching research or financial performance is hardly explored in these investigations. 
Even Lokuwaduge (2011) in her governance-performance study using a fairly large sample of 
Australian universities does not even consider such a variable thus losing a potentially rich 
source of explanation. A valuable opportunity is thus available to this thesis to investigate the 
questions. Hence the following hypothesis is proposed.  
 
H6o: There is a positive association between use of big four audit firm and research 
performance of a university. 
 
3.2.2.9 Vice-Chancellor Pay 
 
The tricky question of the remuneration of the CEO has occupied a significant part of Corporate 
Governance theory and literature (Andreas et al., 2012; Cambini et al., 2015; Conyon, 2014). 
Scholars have and continue to question the excessive nature of such pay and its link with firm 
performance. They ask what safeguards are available to shareholders in the event of subsequent 
underperformance. Public accountability and Legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Tilling, 
2004; Judge et al., 2008; Donaldson & Davis, 1994) naturally stress that the chief executive 
must be held accountable and his/her pay must be legitimately earned. This argument is 
obviously appropriate to VC pay given the university’s public role and its higher need to remain 
legitimate to both students and taxpayers.Stakeholder perspectives (Ogden & Watson, 1999; 
Berman et al., 1999; Wicks, Berman & Jones, 1999; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) stress a measure 
of balance in the remuneration of all internal governors and executives in the firm. The theory 
also encourages coopting CEOs as partial shareholders to align their interests with the firm. 
While this shareholder alignment argument may not be wholly appropriate in higher education 
still there are indications that student/staff interests in universities may question very high 
levels of VC pay. Resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006) 
recognizes that CEOs might have to be paid for their rich resource, networks and strategic 
insights but emphasizes “value-for-money” here. Such an argument is even more topical to 
universities. Stewardship (Daily et al., 2003; Christopher, 2010; Dedman, 2000) claims that 
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CEOs/VCs will act in the best interests of the firm/university when they are empowered 
appropriately. So executive pay ought to be seen in that light. 
 
Managerial power theory is the first to strike a discordant note. Bebchuk & Fried (2003) and 
Finkelstein (1992) draw attention to the problems of executive pay and its impact on power 
balance between the different governing bodies of the firm and the CEO. Theorists also argue 
that executives at the top of the organizational pyramid often have too much power to influence 
the level and structure of their own pay (Byrd et al., 2010; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Kalyta 
& Magnan, 2008; Hill & Phan, 1991). Therefore, excessive pay generates conflicts of interest 
and makes internal governance less democratic. This reduces firm performance. If this is the 
case with corporate firms then it is truer within universities. After all these institutions are 
difficult to control and govern and impose greater burdens on the chief executive (Johnes & 
virmani, 2019; Simon, 1957; Shackleton, 2017). By contrast Optimal Contracting theory 
suggests that executive pay may be structured well in firms where the governing board is active, 
independent and acting at arms-length to the institution (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et 
al., 2015; Murphy, 2012). In such firms the correct trade-off is achieved between hiring the 
best-fit talent at the top of the organization while right-sizing pay levels and structures 
(Custodio et al., 2013; Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Cordeiro et al., 2016). Such right sizing of pay 
would naturally enhance both governance and performance. All in all, most of the theoretical 
framework agrees that CEO/Vice Chancellor pay is an important governance variable with 
likely influences on both other internal governances and performances of the institution.  
 
There has been growing concern in recent times about growing levels of VC remuneration in 
UK HEI. There has been a perception that with the increasing marketization of the university 
sector there have been pressures on university boards to increase remunerations for their chief 
executives. Many policy experts have criticised such tendencies arguing that the public nature 
and role of universities does not justify such excessive pay increases (CUC, 2018; Morgan, 
2017; Grove, 2018; OFS, 2018a; Baker, 2017, Adams, 2017, Department of Education, 2017). 
In the face of this regulators such as the OFS have mandated strict checks on such profligacy 
stipulating that institutions that are unable to justify remuneration levels in excess of 150K for 
their VCs will be penalized. However, some policy debates raise the issue of talent, job scope 
and complexity in the context of VC pay (Whitchurch, 2006; Bosetti & Walker, 2010; Johnes 
& Virmani, 2019) These scholars suggest that it may actually be more than appropriate to pay 
higher salaries to VCs given the complexity of their jobs (Shackelton, 2017; Simon, 1957). 
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Evidence is advanced from the US and elsewhere to show how globally universities pay much 
more than the UK in order to retain their talented VCs (Blanchflower, 2017; Ross, 2018b; 
Grove, 2018b, Bennet, 2019). There is also the argument that universities are generally 
monopsonies in the VC recruitment market (Bachan & Reilly, 2016). By virtue of this, the 
institution has undue advantage anyway in pushing down VC pay levels. After all VCs with 
their university specific skill. Cannot easily find other comparable jobs in the market. This is 
exactly why Soh (2007) in their simple of 37 Australian universities covering the 8-year period 
from 1995 to 2002 documents highly significant differences between the remunerations of VCs 
and CEOs. A university institution that is 10% larger according to the author’s study  pays its 
VC only 2.7% more while its corporate peer of similar size pays its CEO 3.7% more. The 
economies of scale accruing to the institution in the remuneration of the highest executive are 
much greater in the university sector than in the corporate sector.  Finally, some normative 
scholars advance the idea that lower salaries in higher education might drain the sector of its 
talent as really capable VCs might seek employment elsewhere (Shackelton, 2019; pg. 177; 
Richardson, 2017, Oxford University, 2018). 
 
The policy debates notwithstanding, VC pay has been less studied than the pay of CEOs of 
firms. However, CEO pay has more often been directly correlated with governance and 
disclosure but only indirectly with performance. A transitive relationship with the firm 
performance often has to be inferred in many of these papers. For example, Brown & Lee 
(2010), Fahlenbrach (2009) and Jouber & Fakhfakh (2012) document a negative association 
between the quality of corporate governance within a firm and the levels of executive pay. 
Obviously, this fits within the idea that well governed firms perform better than peers and 
therefore ought to implement a rigorous “value for money” yardstick while deciding executive 
pay (Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2008; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). By contrast Al-Najjar et al 
(2016) report a positive association here suggesting that it is the poorly performing firm that 
constrains its executives pay.  
 
In university governance and performance there is some evidence of earlier quantitative 
scholarly work linking Vice Chancellor (VC) pay with some internal governances and 
university performance. Baimbridge & Simpson (1996) use a cross-section of 64 VCs for the 
academic year 1993-94 to discover that pay is influenced by university income derived from 
research grants and fees.  Ehrenberg et al. (2001) find a weak link between president pay and 
performance in their US college sample. Although the authors do find some evidence linking 
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a president’s pay to tenure, past experience, governance type, size and income, their results are 
not robust across the specifications reported. Dolton & Ma (2003) estimate the earnings 
relationships for UK HEIs in panel data for the nine-year period 1993-94 to 2001-02 and find 
evidence for positive significant impacts from institutional characteristics such as governance-
type, size, internal pay structures and income/research performances.  
 
A fairly recent study by Tarbert et al. (2008) investigates the relationship between VC pay and 
university performance in UK for the period 1997 to 2002 using dynamic first-difference pay 
change models. The authors find at least two very interesting results.First VC pay changes 
seem to derive very little traction from changes in income, research grants or other such 
performance indicators in the overall sample that includes both the research-intensive pre-1992 
institutions and post-1992 ones. Instead they seem to be more explained by benchmarking 
indices with levels of corporate CEO pay and the changing pay structures of senior academic 
staff at any given university. Further the authors underline the fact that despite significant rises 
in VC pay in their sample there is still clear evidence of a negative drag on such pay arising 
out of legitimation concerns about university VC pay levels. Second and more importantly 
when they splice the sample into research-intensive high status pre-1992 universities and post 
1992 polytechnic ones they find a distinct pattern. Changes in university research income and 
numbers of postgraduate students positively affects changes in VC pay only in the former but 
not in the latter. Instead in the newer post 1992 institutions research income has no significant 
effect but the number of total students including undergraduate students has a positive effect 
while the number of postgraduate students has a negative effect on VC pay. In other words, it 
seems that universities reward VCs only if they further their distinct missions i.e. research and 
post graduate education in pre-1992 institutions and total numbers of students in the post 1992 
ones. The authors conclude that in their sample VCs seem to be rewarded for presiding over 
only mission relevant improvements in performance.  
 
Bachan & Reilly (2015) examine VC pay and its links with university performance from a 
distinctly different perspective. Their use a range of mission relevant, financial and non-
financial performance indicators just like Tarbert et al’s (2008), is noteworthy and in keeping 
with the multi-dimensionality of university performance. Further the fact that the authors 
acknowledge other putative measures of university performance in the UK such as Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) scores and Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA) scores despite 
not actually using them is nevertheless a useful confirmation of these variables as potential 
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performance metrics. Overall the study finds that higher levels of funding council grants and 
student recruitments from comprehensive schools/low participation geographies do positively 
increase VC pay. In other words, these two measures of non-financial performance drive 
universities to increase the remuneration for their highest executive. For example in their 
sample a 1% rise in highly paid staff earning in excess of GBP 70000 at a university increases 
VC pay by 0.43%. This is similar to Tarbert et al.’s (2008) results above.  Similarly, a 1% 
increase in external pay levels of comparable institutions in the previous year increases VC pay 
by 0.15%. The authors also corroborate their results by simultaneously implementing 
university fixed effects and showing consistent estimates. 
 
Both of the above studies document the fact that VCs seem to be underpaid relative to their 
corporate peers. This is corroborated in many other empirical studies in UK HEI. (Lucy et al., 
2019; Hubble & Bolton, 2019; Shackleton, 2017) compare VC pay levels with CEOs of firms 
who have similarly large job responsibilities and show how the former are indeed 
disadvantaged. The overall narrative that seems to emerge in these studies is that the HEI sector 
has legitimation concerns that do not allow fair pay scales for their senior executive.  
 
Gschwandtner & McManus (2018) is the another paper correlating Vice-Chancellor pay and 
University performance in the UK. The study uses established econometric models and ample 
empirical evidence from a dataset of 154 UK universities over a period of 10 years. The authors 
also use a comprehensive set of key performance indicators related to both student numbers 
and student evaluations of the university (league tables) as well as its research and funding 
performance. The authors conclude that it is benchmarking with peer group pay that explains 
much of the variation in VC pay amongst UK universities. 
 
Before outlining the main results of the paper it must be mentioned that the paper seminally 
classifies the theoretical literature on executive pay versus performance into three main strands 
and critically evaluates each. The first strand (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Murphy, 1990) models 
pay as a function of performance using agency and stewardship tenets that posit that principals 
necessarily incentivize agents by increasing their pay or performance-contingent bonus. The 
second strand based on optimal contracting and managerial power tenets (Raff & Summers, 
1987; Banker et al., 1996; MacLeod & Malcomson, 1998) instead argues that higher pay 
increases productivity of employees. Finally the last strand (DiPrete et al., 2010; Schmidt & 
Dworschak, 2006; Garvey & Milbourn, 2006; Nagel, 2007; Bizjak et al., 2008; Faulkender & 
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Yang, 2010; Laschever, 2013) argues on the basis of benchmarking theory that CEO pay is 
characterized by asymmetry and determined more by peer group pay levels and differential 
degrees of CEO power.  
 
Johnes & Virmani (2019) study VC pay and university performance between 2010-2017 in 149 
Higher education institutions in UK.  The authors find that VC pay is determined by neither 
the managerial effiency measure, nor by the financial security index by HESA. The only 
measure which is related to VC pay is the overall performance score produced by The 
University Guide The results cause the authors to speculate further that it is university 
reputation rather than performance driving VC Pay which is line with results and interpretation 
of Tang et al. (2000). Size of the HEI is positively associated to VC Pay. They also find that 
location is an important determinant of pay with universities in Wales exhibiting the lowest 
VC pay levels.  
 
On the whole there is ample evidence for the importance of VC pay as a likely important 
antecedent of university performance. In the growing context of financial sustainability, 
mission and academic quality there is little doubt that research, teaching and financial 
performances of this institution will display a strong association with this variable. Hence the 
following key hypothesis is advanced.  
 
H6p: There is a positive association between vice-chancellor pay and the research 
performance of a university. 
H6q: There is a positive association between vice-chancellor pay and the teaching 
performance of a university. 
6rc: There is a positive association between vice-chancellor pay and the financial performance 










The Chapter has collated a rich and diverse empirical literature on university governance and 
performance. In section 3.1 it classified the principal empirical gaps in the existing literature 
into three main categories i.e. the missing dimensions of university governance and 
performance, the missing culture and quality assurance aspects in the research and the missing 
longitudinal analysis. This classification helped establish the multiple contours of the overall 
research gap and show how existing scholarship has but scratched the surface of the 
considerable research problem characterising multi-dimensional university governance and 
performance.  
 
Using principles embedded in this formulation of the research gap, Section 3.2 developed a set 
of key hypotheses linking multi-dimensional university governance and performance. In the 
first sub-section here, the thesis uncovered a set of five missing dimensions of university 
governance namely, Selectivity in Entry Standards, Instruction Intensity in Student Staff 
Ratios, Research/Teaching/Gender Modalities in Staff Contracts, Pedagogical Orientations in 
Student Body Diversities and Strategic choices in Asset/Revenue Structures. Each of these five 
dimensions were separately identified and rooted in the seven-theory framework for university 
governance established in the previous chapter. Existent policy and empirical literatures were 
then carefully collated here to substantiate the lack of academic rigor. Nevertheless, the rich 
policy and empirical debates and insights were coagulated to formulate five key hypotheses 
and several related sub-hypotheses. In the second sub-section a broadly similar approach was 
followed with respect to the board and audit related university governances. The wider 
availability of empirical findings here allowed for an easier evaluation and calibration of 
several additional key hypotheses here.  
 
On the whole then the chapter achieved a formulation of  six key hypotheses and related sub-
hypotheses as a basis for the analytical work of the thesis. Armed with these, the next chapter 
takes the research forward by describing and justifying the methods of data analysis intended 




4. Chapter Four: Methodology 
The principal purpose of this chapter is to present the overall methodology of this research 
project. The detailed list of hypotheses developed and explained in the previous chapter need 
to be tested within the UK university sample data collated. For this there is the obvious need 
for a structured econometric approach to decipher the trends and associations between 
university governance and performance. The chapter details this methodological approach. It 
begins with 4.1 research methodology section that highlights the philosophy underlining the 
choice of the study, followed by a research population section 4.2, which briefly presents the 
sample chosen for the study and its geographical scope. Section 4.3 is the section where the 
the thesis explains how the sample was collected especially those parts where a laborious 
manual method was implemented. This is followed by section 4.4  where the use of panel data 
and its suitability for this research are elucidated. Section 4.5 is the section where the 
conceptuailsation and measurement of variables used is explained in brief.  The large list of  25 
university governance, 6 university performance and control variables are described and 
theoretically/empirically justified in the next section 4.6. Reference is made to extant studies 
that have used similar variables earlier while simultaneously attention is drawn to unique 
variables used for the first time by this thesis. The penultimate section 4.7 covers in detail the 
bivariate factor analyses intended here alongside the main regression models. In this section 
econometric issues connected with the thesis i.e The entire gamut of statistical procedures, 
tests, filters and models applied in the sample are fully delineated and justified. Finally, section 
4.8 concludes the chapter. 
4.1 Research Philospohy and Approach 
 
The research philosophy/approach choice and explanation for any study is an integral part of 
the applied social science research. It ultimately determines the approach in which the study 
will be conducted, what are the suited indicators to be gathered, and how to analyse the data 
and interpret the results (Veal & Ticehurst 2005; Smith, 2003; Bernard, 2013; Bryman, 2012). 
There are two different approaches in the social science, deductive and inductive, and two 
different paradigms, positivism and interpretivism, both have contrasting outlooks. Positivism 
assumes that the researcher should be objective and independent from what is being observed 
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whereas interpretivism assumes that the researcher should not be independent from the research 
they are conducting (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017).  
The process of the positivist approach is to saturate the literature establishing and identifying 
the relevant theories in order to develop a hypothesis. Statistical tests either accepts or rejects 
the hypothesis. In general quantitative methods are used in positivist approaches that are used 
to search for cause and effect relationships as well as using measurable components to 
statistically test and interrupt the results (Creswel, 2009; Howell, 2013). Using this approach 
will allow for the findings to be generalised to a large population. While in the interpretivist 
approach qualitative methods are preferred (Kaboub, 2001). The qualitative method can be 
deemed subjective and allows for further investigation into the subjects thinking and 
experience, this is criticised for not being as rigorous as the quantitative method and for the 
rise of potential bias (Veal & Ticehurst 2005). Data can either be primary data or secondary 
data. Primary data is original euthanistic data gathered by undertaking surveys, questioners, 
experiments, observations and interviews. Secondary data is data that is already available and 
can be obtained from financial/annual reports, agency websites, books and journals (Bernard, 
2013; Bryman, 2012).  
Given the nature of the research gap, question and objectives established in the previous 
chapters the thesis is fundamentally rooted in the positivist philosophy with a largely deductive 
orientation. Empirical data is used to test and assess the theoretical predictions of a complex 
seven theory framework of university governance and performance.  This is why the study 
adopts the positivist approach and quantitative techniques because the research starts with 
developing  theoretical structures and hypothesis, this is subsequently followed by empirical 
tests for association and causality, and then finally comparing the results to earlier empirical 
evidence. Also, this study relies heavily on secondary data from university financial/annual 
reports and published data from government agencies to observe the links between the multi-
dimensional features of university governance and performance. Such use of secondary data is 
common in the sector with several university governance studies (Lokuwaduge, 2011; 
Lokuwaduge and Armstrong; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Ntim et al., 2017; Harris, 2014; Olson, 




4.2 Research Population 
 
The sample used in this study examines the multi-dimensional links between university 
governance and university performance in 132 UK higher education institutions (HEIs). This 
sample has also taken into account different regional distributions within the UK (England, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), as well as university age represented as pre-1992 
university, and university affiliation/alliance such as Russell Group. The study aimed to include 
all UK universities with available data from 2005 to 2015. HEIs that were excluded from the 
final sample were dropped due to the lack of information or inability to obtain data for the 
research period of 2005 to 2015 (Ayoubi, &  Massoud, 2012; Lokawaduge, 2011; Lokawaduge 
& Armstrong, 2015 ). The final sample of 132 HEIs represents approximately 81% of the entire 
UK HEI population. The secondary data set was manually collected from university 
financial/annual statements, university websites and various government agencies such the 
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), National Student Survey (NSS) and Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) etc. A full sample of all 132 HEI are presented in Appendix 9.      
 
4.3 Types and Methods of Data collection 
This section discusses the two different data collection methods used in the study. In the first 
method data already available in many standardized databases of the HEI sector in the UK was 
collated. The method of secondary data collection used in this study consisted of annual 
observations of 132 UK universities over the period 2005 to 2015 i.e. the chosen time frame 
were identified and extracted from university websites, university financial/annual reports, 
publications from UK higher education agencies such as: the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA), publications of the National Student Survey (NSS), publication of The Times 
Good University Guide, the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) and the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 
previously known as the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). Teaching & research and 
financial related governance variables such as part-time to full time staff ratio, student staff 
ratio, teaching only staff, research only staff, teaching and research staff, postgraduate 
intensity, female staff fraction, service and facility spend per student, cash to total assets and 
debt to total assets were also obtained from published data collected by the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA), National Student Survey (NSS) and The Times Good University 
Guide. To measure the teaching performance of universities, data recording overall student 
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satisfaction, good honours, completion rate, graduate prospects and teaching grant fraction 
were obtained through the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), the National Student 
Survey (NSS), the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) and The Times Good University Guide 
for the years 2005 to 2015. Research performance data such as research quality, research 
income per academic, research grants were obtained through the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA), The Times Good University Guide, Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE), Office for Students (OFS) and the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 
previously known as the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). Size of the university 
characterised as total assets, total income and total staff has been obtained through university 
websites, financial/annual reports and the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). Age, 
region and the university’s affiliation/alliance has been obtained through university websites, 
association websites such as Russell Group, and the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
(HESA). Financial performance data for Asset turnover was collected from the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) from 2005-2015 (Arabzad et al., 2013). Previous 
researchers (Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Patrick & Stanley, 1998; Boliver, 2015; McDonald, 
2013; Asif & Searcy, 2013) have also collected performance data using the same methods and 
sources.   
In the second method, data regarding the internal board governance variables such as board 
size, board independence, board meetings frequency, board ethnic and gender diversity, 
executive team size, audit committee meeting frequency, vice-chancellor pay, presence of a 
governance committee and Big-4 auditor were obtained by using the 2005 to 2015 
financial/annual reports of all 132 UK universities and university websites. This was a 
laborious and time consuming process involving the actual manual recording of data in each 








4.4 Panel Data and its suitability for the research 
This thesis uses a panel data of 25 governance and 6 performance variables across 132 UK 
universities from 2005 to 2015. Five main reasons underlie the decision to conduct a panel data 
study in this thesis. 
First and foremost, the central narrative is that universities are unique institutions with 
embedded multi-dimensionalities in their governances and performances (Vukasovic et al., 
2018; Piattoni, 2009; Gohari et al., 2019). These multi-dimensionalities are also characterized 
by complex sets of trade-offs that cannot be captured easily by the limited board level and audit 
related governance variable sets generally used by extant scholarship such as Lokuwaduge 
(2011) or Ntim et al. (2017). There is a need to go beyond the conventional and make use of a 
wider set of governance and performance variables to capture these missing aspects. But even 
more importantly the complex governance performance associations and trade-offs need the 
simultaneous capture of both the entity of each university and its yearly variations. For 
example, each university would decide on its entry standards based on it’s own past history 
and experience as well as the past history and experience of peer universities across the sample. 
If the sample only consists of a cross-section of universities across one year or one university 
across several years this dynamic and peer comparison-based governance decision will not be 
fully revealed or explained. In other words, different university entities based on their time-
based assessments of internal governance-performance issues dynamically make and suffer 
consequences of their decisions across a given time horizon (Brown & Carasso, 2013; 
Buckland, 2004; Shattock, 2008: 2004; Middlehurst, 2004). Excluding either the entities or the 
timing would not replicate the real-life challenges facing university governors. 
Second university academic governances and performances are complex constructs that are 
inter-linked (Collis, 2004; Jongbloed et al., 2018; Aghion et al., 2010; Taylor, 2001). Revealing 
and evaluating such inter-linkages has to be done in a panel because it only in the heterogeneity 
of different universities across time that these will emerge. The sample must afford scope to 
go forward and backward in time and criss-cross through different universities to determine 
how and why certain staff structures or student body mixes were chosne and how these choices 
had interlinkages with other governance choices as well as performance implications. In fact 
(Greene, 2012; Gil-Garcia & Puron-Cid, 2014) document why in social studies complex 
interlinkages between behavioural and amorphous constructs like governance and performance 
can best be studied only through panels and that is why this is becoming essential in most social 
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science research.  A range of earlier empirical work has been calling for panel based 
longitudinal studies in university governance and performance for this very reason. (Ntim et 
al., 2017; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Olson, 2000; Asif & Searcy, 
2014).  
Third, Governance and performance are both outcomes as well as processes. This is especially 
true in Higher Education. Where governance ends and performance begins or vice-versa is 
difficult to pin down. Performance-governance endogeneity and continuum type aspects are an 
essential component of the analysis here. This is why time series comparisons are essential in 
all university governance and performance variables (Hsiao, 1986; Ntim et al., 2017). 
Endogeneity has often been traced as the missing aspect in most governance literature, with 
Ntim et al. (2017) being among the first set of studies actively addressing it, albeit only in the 
relation to university voluntary disclosure. Across time and universities there are reverse 
causalities embedded in how university governance variables impact performance and vice 
versa. For example, universities increase entry standards one year and may find a salutary 
impact the next year on research or financial  performance that emboldens them to further 
increase such standards in the year after. Such cyclical influences can only be traced robustly 
in panel based studies. Thus, taking just one observation for one year is simply unlikely to 
capture the complex interactive processes that underlie university research/teaching 
governances and performances. Panel data is therefore a very important prerequisite for this 
investigation.  
Fourth, culture and quality aspects permeate university governance and performance debate in 
a manner that is unique. The academic functions of research and teaching are rooted in what 
the normative and qualitative governance literature in HEI calls TLRs or Teaching and 
Learning Regimes (Trowler, 2008, 2019; Trowler & Cooper, 2002; Gayle et al., 2003). These 
TLRs are a complex series of fundamental beliefs about teaching and learning that feed back 
into each other and evolve in complex manner in every institution across time. For example, 
universities differ in their beliefs about how teaching/learning/research is best achieved. These 
beliefs form the basis of staff contractual structures, entry standards, student-staff ratios and 
various other governance constructs which ultimately go on to produce the research teaching 
and financial performance of these complex multi-dimensional institution. To discover how 
these heterogenous beliefs are in play across time and in different universities naturally requires 
robust comparisons across both time and entity. A panel data set is, thus, what will be able to 
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capture these important fundamental influences on the relationships between university 
governance and performance. 
Finally, there have been growing calls in the university governance literature for a longitudinal 
examination of governance performance relationships. Ntim et al. (2017), Shattock (2013), 
Christensen (2011) and Collini (2012) many others have been pointing to the many new 
regulatory changes intitiated in UK HEI in recent years including the introduction of tuition 
fees, reduction in budgetary support, focus on student services and so on. It is only recently i.e. 
2012 that many of these changes have been introduced. This is why having a panel data 
covering the decade commencing 2005 and ending 2015 is most appropriate here as it 
sandwiches many of these reforms and helps to assess their effectiveness empirically. After all 
many normative and policy-based governance studies (Watson, 2014; Middlehurst, 2014; 
Knight, 2002; Brown & Carasso, 2013Jarvis, 2013; Hemsley-Brown, 2011) have been calling 
for more empirically derived policy reforms in UK HEI. Panel based studies are essential to 
assess and thus correct the policy input within the sector.  This is why and uniquely,this 
investigation by its use of a panel data sample intends to richly contribute to the existing 
empirical body of knowledge in UK higher education.   
4.5 Conceptualization and Measurement Analyses of the Variables  
In this study, research quality, good honours, completion rate, graduate prospects, research 
grant fraction, overall student satisfaction, teaching grant fraction and asset turnover were 
expressed as fractions and percentages to keep the relationship in line with independent 
variables (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Consistent with existing literature (Lokuwaduge, 2011; 
Lokuwaduge and Armstrong, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017; Tarbert et al., 2008) variables such as 
board size and board meeting frequency, executive team size, audit committee meeting 
frequency, vice-chancellor pay and size were transformed into logarithms to overcome the 
problem on non-linearity and make the data more normally distributed  (Field, 2009). Other 
variables such as, teaching only staff, research only staff, teaching and research staff, part-time 
to full time staff, board gender diversity, board ethnic diversity, board independence, staff 
gender diversity, entry standard, tuition fees fraction, fraction of international student, 
postgraduate intensity, cash to total assets, debt to total assets, endowment to total assets, 
service and facility spend per student and student staff ratio were expressed as 
fractions/percentages. Presence of a unique governance committee and big four auditor are 
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dummy variables, thus not transformed. Missing values was not approximated for (Sterne et 
al. 2009; Kang, 2013). This study has used the same method used in previous studies.  
4.6 Selection of variables 
The study identifies 2 sets of variables, internal governance with its multi-dimensional 
characteristics/facets (board composition governance, research and teaching governance and 
financial governance) and performance (research, teaching and financial). As identified earlier 
in this study the dependent variable is performance and the independent variable is governance.  
4.6.1 University Governance Variables 
Internal governance mechanisms are concerned with the systems and practices adopted by the 
university to promote effective management of individual agents. Governance mechanisms 
compromise of missing dimensions i.e. Entry Standards, Staff Student Ratio, Staff Contractual 
Aarrangements: part-time to full time staff, teaching and research staff, teaching only staff, 
research only staff, and female staff diversity, Pedagogical Orientation: postgraduate intensity, 
fraction of international student, Strategic Choices in Asset and Revenue Structures: tuition fee 
fraction, endowment to total asset, service and facility spend per student, cash to total asset, 
debt to total asset, and fixed to total asset. Board and Audit Related governance variables: 
board size, board gender diversity, board ethnic diversity, board independence, board meeting 
frequency, executive team size, audit committee meeting frequency, vice-chancellor pay, 
presence of unique governance committee, big-4 auditor. Table 3 below shows the measures 
for each variable used to unpack the links between university governance and performance in 
this study. 
Table 3: Variables used to study governance of UK universities 
Variable Measure Acronym 
Governance    
Entry standard The percentage of the mean tariff point scores on entry. ES 
Student staff ratio The percentage of full-time equivalent (FTE) students at each 
institution to the number of FTE staff. 
SSR 
Staff Contractual Aarrangements 
Teaching and research staff The percentage staff are those whose contracts of employment state 
that they are employed to undertake both teaching and research to total 




Teaching only staff The percentage staff are those whose contracts of employment state 
that they are employed only to undertake teaching to total number of 
staff. 
TONLY 
Research only staff The percentage staff are those whose contracts of employment state 
that the primary academic employment function is research only to 
total number of staff (even though the contract may include a limited 
number of hours teaching up to 6 hours). 
RONLY 
Part-time to full time staff The percentage of part-time staff to full time staff . PTTSR 
Female staff diversity 
 




The percentage of postgraduate student to the total number of student.  PGINT 
Fraction of international 
students 
The percentage of international student to total number of students . INTS 
Strategic Choices in Asset and Revenue Structures 
Tuition fee fraction 
 
The percentage of tuition fee to total income. TFEE 
Endowment to total assets  
 
The percentage of endowment to total assets. ENDWTA 
Service and facility spend 
per student  
A two-year average of expenditure on academic services and staff and 
student facilities, divided by the total number of FTE students. 
SFSPEND 
Cash to total assets  
 
The percentage of cash to total assets. CTA 
Debt to total assets  
 
The percentage of debt to total assets. DTA 
Fixed to total assets  The percentage of fixed assets to total assets. FTA 
Board and Audit Related governance 
Board size  The total number of governing board members. BSIZE 
Board gender diversity  
 
Percentage of number of females to the total number of governing 
board members. 
BGDIV 
Board ethnic diversity  Percentage of number of ethnic minorities (black Asian and ethnic 
minorities) to the total number of governing board members. 
BEDIV 
Board independence  Percentage of independent/lay members to the total of governing 
board members.  
IGOV 
Board meeting frequency  The frequency of governing board meetings. BMFS 
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Executive team meeting 
frequency  
The frequency of executive team board meetings. ETMFS 
Audit committee size The total number of audit committee members. 
 
ADSIZE 
Vice-chancellor pay The amount of emolument/remuneration the vice-chancellor receives 
at the end of each year. 
VCPAY 
Presence of a unique 
governance committee  
1, if a HEI has set up a separate governance committee, 0 otherwise. UGCOM 
Big-4 auditor  1, if a HEI is audited by a big four audit firm 





Entry standard is calculated as the percentage of the mean tariff point scores on entry (Ayoubi 
& Massoud, 2012; Harris, 2014; Boliver, 2015; Boliver, 2013; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2007; 
Gorard et al., 2019). As an exclusivity measure such a variable neatly captures the governance 
challenge of the university’s public coverage role (Coy et al., 2001; Kim, 2008; Shore & 
Wright, 2004; Freemna, 2015) traded off against its quality assurance imperatives (Brown, 
2005: 2009; Sawir, 2013; Hoecht, 2006; Leisyte & Westerheijde, 2014; Salter & tapper, 2000; 
Gibbs, 2012).Student Staff Ratio 
In this study, this variable is calculated as the percentage of full-time equivalent (FTE) students 
at each institution to the number of FTE staff. This method was also used by (McDonald, 2013; 
Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Boliver, 2015; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge and Armstrong, 
2015; Abbott & Doucouliagos 2003; Kokkelenberg et al., 2008; Warning 2004; Warning 2007;  
Worthington & Lee 2005). The variable measures the instruction intensity of the university’s 
academic functions helping to encapsulate resource-based concerns (Fowles, 2014; Foskett, 
2010; Pfeffer, salancik, 2003) along with salient student stakeholder issues (Mitchell et al., 
1997; Roberts, 1992; Freeman, 1999; Wise et al., 2020). It also presents the challenging student 
population coverage angle (Marginson, 2018; Molesworth et al., 2010; Brown & Carasso, 
2013; McGettigan, 2013) along with the quality of higher education aspect (Sawir, 2013; 
bachan, 2017; Bright, 2004; Brown, 2004: 2009; Vidovich, 2002). 
Teaching and Research Staff 
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Teaching and research staff was calculated as the percentage of staff whose contracts of 
employment state that they are employed to undertake both teaching and research to the total 
number of staff. (Tytherleigh et al., 2005). This is the proportion of staff on standard tenure 
track contract and has the longest established theoretical imperatives in higher education 
(MacFarlane, 2011; Whitchurch, 2016; Oncea et al., 2010). 
Teaching Only Staff 
Teaching only staff was calculated as the percentage of staff whose contracts of employment 
state that they are employed only to undertake teaching the total number of staff 
(Nyamapfene, 2018; Tytherleigh et al., 2005). This is an indicator of the teaching governance 
priorities of the institution and captures quality based, instrumental and other legitimation 
concerns expressed in theory (Oxford, 2000; Locke & Bennion, 2011; Harley, 2002). 
Research Only Staff 
Research only staff was calculated as the percentage of staff whose contracts of employment 
state that the primary academic employment function is research only to the total number of 
staff. (Patrick & Stanley, 1998; Tytherleigh et al., 2005). This is an indicator of the research 
governance priorities of the institution and captures culture, quality based, instrumental and 
other legitimation concerns expressed in theory (Blackwell., 2006; Probert, 2013; locke, 2012; 
Blackmore, 2016; Shelton et al., 2001). 
Part-Time to Full Time Staff 
This part-time ratio is calculated as a percentage of the number of part-time staff to full time 
staff at a given university (Ackers & Oliver, 2007). The measure has a clear quality-based 
dimension (Bryson & Blackwell, 2001; Bryson & Barnes, 2000a, b) but it also captures the 
resource imperatives of a university in optimizing its staff usage (Raff & Summers, 1987; 
Williamson, 2005; Burgess et al., 2006). 
 
 
Female Staff Diversity  
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In this study, female staff diversity was calculated as the percentage of female staff members 
to the total number of staff. This is the same method used by (Santos & Van Phu, 2019). The 
variable measures gender diversity at the staff level. It captures a range of stakeholder, 
legitimacy and public accountability imperatives at the academic level in the university (Wise 
et al., 2020; Coy et al., 2001; Woodward et al., 1996). 
Postgraduate Intensity  
Postgraduate intensity was measured as the percentage of the number of postgraduate student 
to total number of students (Boliver, 2015; Tarbert et al., 2008). As a student body composition 
indicator of the university the variable has been underlined as a proxy for the academic ethos 
and reputation both in culture & quality assurance as well as legitimacy theories (Suchman, 
1995; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Cremonini et al., 2015; stensaker, 2018). It has also been 
emphasized as a likely resource burden (House, 2010; Neves, 2018).   
Fraction of International Student  
In this study, fraction of international students was calculated as the percentage of international 
students to the total number of students at a given university (Dolton & Ma, 2003). Governance 
theory especially in stakeholder, legitimacy and culture & Quality Assurance perspectives 
argues that this variable is a good measure of the effects of salient international fee-paying 
students, the academic reputation and quality burden on the university (Freeman, 2010; 
Suchman, 1995; Leisyte & westerheijden, 2014; Stensaker, 2018). 
Tuition Fee Fraction 
This variable was calculated as a percentage of the total income from tuition fees to total 
income for each university. (Dolton & Ma, 2003; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2007). Resource 
dependence, legitimacy and public accountability concerns (Coy et al., 2001; Pfeffer, 1987; 
Fowles, 2014; Suchman, 1995) are primarily reflected and traded off in this variable.  
 
 
Service and Facility Spend per Student 
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This study has used the same method to calculate the measurement for service and facility 
spend per student as Ayoubi & Massoud (2012) study of 100 UK universities, Boliver (2015) 
and The Times Good University Guide. Optimal contracting, stewardship and resource 
dependence (Williamson, 2000: 2005; Davis et al., 1997; Perez & Ode, 2013; Pfeffer, 1987; 
Fowles, 2014; Foskett, 2010) imperatives are mirrored and balanced in this variable.  
Endowments to Total Assets 
Endowment to total assets has been calculated as the percentage of endowment to total assets. 
This method is line with previous university governance studies (Olson, 2000; Bown et al., 
2010; Boliver, 2015). Public accountability and legitimacy stress the importance of such an 
indicator of likely corporate donor interests and research priorities and proclivities (Suchman, 
1995; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Coy et al., 2001; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; ; Stensaker, 2018; 
Scherer et al., 2013; Kim, 2008).  
Cash to Total Assets 
This variable was calculated as the amount of cash held within a university to total assets. The 
liquidity of the institution has been used in both the corporate and university governance 
literature (Zahra & Prearce, 1989; Lokuwaduge and Armstrong, 2015; Lokuwaduge, 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2017; Guthrie, J. & Neumann 2007; Rashid, Islam & Anderson 2008). Stewardship, 
Managerial Power and optimal contracting (Perez & Odo, 2013; Davis et al., 1997; Van Essen 
et al., 2015; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Williamson, 2005 ; Raff & Summers, 1987) highlight this 
variable as an important proxy for financial consraints and challenges facing the university. 
Debt to Total Assets 
This study has calculated debt to total assets as a percentage of  the debt of a university to total 
assets. (Calabrese, 2011; Rosen & Sappington, 2016; Sheikh & Wang, 2012; Jensen, 1986; 
Grossman and Hart; 1982; Jiraporn et al., 2012; ). Legitimacy Public Accountability and 
stewardship (Perez & Odo, 2013; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) highlight the 
importance of sensible and appropriate leverage policies in universities. 
 
Fixed to Total Assets  
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This study has calculated fixed to total assets as a percentage of  the fixed assets of a university 
to total assets. (Calabrese, 2011; Rosen & Sappington, 2016; Sheikh & Wang, 2012; Jensen, 
1986; Grossman and Hart; 1982; Jiraporn et al., 2012; ). Theories of stewardship and optimal 
contracting underline how university choices of fixed assets reflect its pedagogical priorities 
and burdens (Perez & Odo, 2013; Davis et al., 1997; Van Essen et al., 2015; Bebchuk et al., 
2002; Williamson, 2005 ; Raff & Summers, 1987).  
Board Size 
Board size (Guest, 2009) was computed as the natural log of the number of members on the 
university governing board. The variable has been used extensively in the corporate 
governance and firm performance literature (Guest, 2009; Kalsie, A., & Shrivastav, S. M., 
2016; Khanchel, 2007; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Adams & Mehran, 2005; 
Chaganti, Mahajan & Sharma 1985). In the university governance scholarship, previous studies 
such as (Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Olson, 2000; Ntim et al., 2017) 
have used the same method to construct this variable.  
Board Gender and Ethnic Diversity 
Board gender and ethnic diversity was calculated as a percentage of the number of female 
members and the percentage of ethnic minorities (black, Asians and ethnic minorities) to the 
total number of university governing board members respectively. In line with previous studies 
in the corporate governance literature (Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2000; Ntim, 2015; 
Barako & Brown, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Fields and Keys 2003; Ostrower 2007) and 
in the university governance literature (Olson, 2000; Harris, 2014; Ntim et al., 2017) this study 
will further investigate ethnic and gender diversity characteristics.   
Board Independence 
Board independence was calculated as a percentage of the number of independent/lay members 
to the total number of university governing board members. Previous corporate governance 
studies (Bhagat & Jefferis 2002; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir 
et al.; 2002; Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) and university 
governance studies (Harris, 2014; Ntim et al., 2017; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & 
Armstrong, 2015) have used the same method to construct this measurement.   
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Board Meeting Frequency 
Board meeting frequency was computed as the natural log of the number of meetings a 
governing board held during the year. This is line with previous corporate governance studies 
(Rodriguez-Fernandez et al.,2014; Chen & Chen, 2012; Christensen et al., 2015; Hu et al., 
2010; Vafeas, 1999; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). In the university governance studies (Ntim 
et al., 2017; Lokuwaduge, 2011) have also used this method to determine this variable.  
Executive Team Meeting Frequency  
In this study, we calculate executive team meeting frequency as the natural log of the number 
of meetings an executive team held during the year. Earlier university governance study Ntim 
et al. (2017) have conducted the same method to construct this variable.   
Audit Committee Size 
Audit committee size was calculated as the natural log of the number of members on the 
university audit committee. (Ntim et at., 2017; De Silva & Armstrong, 2012; Vermeer, and 
Raghunandan, 2006; Harris, 2014) 
Vice-Chancellor Pay 
Vice-chancellor pay was calculated as the natural log of  the amount of remuneration the vice-
chancellor receives each year. This variable has been used in previous studies in the university 
governance literature by (Bachan and Reilly, 2015; Tarbert et al. 2008; Dolton and Ma, 2003)  
Presence of Unique Governance Committee 
The existence of a unique governance committee within a university was given a 1, 0 otherwise. 
The same method was used in previous university governance studies (Lokuwaduge, 2011; 




Whether a university is audited by one of the big four audit firms which are 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst and Young, and KPMG. If yes  it was given a 1, 0 
otherwise. The same method was used in previous corporate governance literature (Beiner et 
al., 2006; Elmagrhi et al., 2018; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015; Huang and Kung, 2010) and  
in university governance scholarship (Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2017).  
4.6.2 University Performance Variables 
The dependent variable performance consists of three variables: research performance, 
teaching performance and financial performance. Table 4 below shows the measures for each 
variable used to unpack the links between university governance and performance in this study.  
Table 4: Variables used to study the performance of UK universities 
Variable Measure Acronym 
Performance    
Research Performance  
Research performance 
index  
An index consisting of research quality, research grant fraction, 
completion rate, graduate prospects, good honours. Research income 
per academic has been used as an ancillary variable independent from 
the index     
RPI 
Research quality  Overall quality of research based on the Research Exercise 
Framework (REF). The output of the REF gave each institution a 
profile in the following categories: 4* world-leading; 3* 
internationally excellent; 2* internationally recognised; 1* nationally 
recognised and unclassified 
RQ 
Research grant fraction  The percentage of all income in respect of externally sponsored 
research carried out by the university to total assets 
RGF 
Teaching performance  
Teaching performance 
index  
An index consisting of overall student satisfaction, completion rate, 
good honours, graduate prospects. Teaching grant fraction has been 
used independently from index.  
TPI 
Teaching grant fraction  The percentage of total grant for teaching to total income 
 
TGF 
Overall student satisfaction is split into two components that give students’ views of the quality of 
their courses: i) Teaching quality: Is a measure that reflects the 
average NSS scores of the teaching, learning opportunities, 
assessment and feedback, and academic support sections. Ii) Student 
experience: is a measure that is drawn from the average NSS scores in 
the organisation and management, learning resources, learning 




Percentage of students that complete their degree CPRATE 
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Good honours  The number of students who graduated with a first-class distinction or 
upper second-class degree as a proportion of the total number of 
graduates with classified degrees.  
GHONR 
Graduate prospects  Destinations of leavers. It is based on the activity of leavers six months 
after graduation and whether they entered professional or non-
professional employment.  
GPRO 
Financial performance   
Asset turnover 
 
Total income to total assets  AT 
 
Research Performance Index 
The research performance index consists of 5 variables, namely, research quality, research 
grant fraction, degree completion rate, good honours, graduate prospects. Research income per 
academic has been dropped from the research performance index and has only been used as an 
ancillary variable in some cases if it provided further insight. Previous studies (Boliver, 2015; 
Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge and Armstrong, 2015; Harris, 
2014; Linke 1995; Valadkhani & Worthington 2006; Warning 2007) have used the same 
variables to measure research performance specifically and non-financial performance in 
general. In this study, all 5 variables were used to calculate the research performance index.  
 
Research Quality 
Research quality is part of the Research Performance Index (RPI). This variable is measured 
as a percentage score awarded to each university based on its research output. This is published 
by the Research Excellence Framework (REF) previously known as the Research Excellence 
Framework (RAE) and The Times Good University Guide. This indicator is objective and has 
been used by several university performance literature (Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge and 
Armstrong; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Boliver, 2015; Patrick & Stanley, 1998).  
 
Research Grant Fraction  
Research grant fraction is part of the Research Performance Index (RPI). This variable is 
calculated as research grant divided by total income. This variable offers an additional 
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dimension to research performance by having an independent grant provider 
offering/rewarding research grants based on the merits of that institutions research output and 
capabilities (Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Asif & Searcy, 2013).  
Teaching Performance Index 
The teaching performance index was generated using 4 variables, that are, student satisfaction 
as a teaching quality and student experience measure, completion rate as the success rate 
measure, good honours, graduate prospects as the graduate and employability measure 
(Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge and Armstrong; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Boliver, 2015; 
Guthrie, J & Neumann 2006; Guthrie, J. & Neumann 2007; Warning 2007; Patrick & Stanley, 
1998). In addition to the above Teaching grant fraction was used as separate but important 
measure of teaching performance but is not part of the teaching performance index (Santos & 
Van Phu, 2019). This study uses data published by the National Student Survey (NSS), The 
Times Good University Guide and the Office for Students (OfS) from 2005 to 2015.  
Asset Turnover 
Asset turnover has been calculated as the net income divided by total assets. This variable has 
been widely used as indicator to measure financial performance in previous literature (Beiner 
& Schmid 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe 2005; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge and 










The control variables are university size, region, age of the institution and university 
affiliation/alliance. Table 5 below shows the measures for each of the control variables used.  
Table 5: Control variables used to study the governance and performance of UK universities 
Variable Measure Acronym 
Controls   
Size This is captured in three different ways. It is measured as the log of 
total assets or log total income or total staff. All three represent size 
of the institution. 
TA; TINC; 
TST 
Region The regional distribution of universities was measured as 1 for 
England, 2 for Wales, 3 for Scotland and 4 for Northern Ireland.  
REGION 
Age  The age of the university was measured as 1, if the university is an old 




1, if the university is a member of the Russell Group, 0 otherwise. RGROUP 
 
Size of the University  
The size of the university has been calculated as the natural log of total assets, total income and 
total staff respectively. Both corporate and university governance literature supports this 
(Harris 2014; Ntim et al., 2017; Tarbert et al., 2008; Boliver, 2015; Oi and Idson, 1999).  
Region 
Region was measured as the location of the university within the UK. England, Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland, each were given 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively (Bachan, 2017; Ntim et al. 
2017).  
Age and Affiliation of the University  
Whether or not the university is an established pre-1992 university. If yes it was given a 1, 0 
otherwise. The university’s alliance and affiliation such as Russell group, Million+, Red Brick, 
University Alliance and unaffiliated universities. 1 if a university is a Russell Group member, 
0 otherwise. (Boliver, 2015; Boliver, 2013; Ntim et al., 2017; Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Santos 
& Van Phu, 2019; Patrick & Stanley, 1998). 
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4.7 Analysis of the Data  
 
In order to decipher the complex links between university governance and performance this 
study uses regression analysis to uncover the complex and multi-dimensional relationship 
between university governance instruments, the dependent variable (university performance) 
and control variables.   
 
Relationships between dependent and independent variables are generally done using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) based estimations that do not distinguish between time and entity. All 
observations irrespective of years or entities are simply stacked above each other and an overall 
average relationship between the variables is estimated (Gujarati, 2003; Gil-Garcia & Puron-
Cid, 2014). This results in an inaccurate assessment of the true relationship between the 
variables since the time effects and entity effects are blurred and combined. Despite high R-
squares and significances of coefficients there may be significant autocorrelation, 
misspecification and biased coefficients in such a model due to this (Baltagi, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2010; Gil-Garcia & Puron-Cid, 2014). This is why regression models that account 
for both time and entity fixed effects are the standard in most panel studies. The main regression 
model used in this thesis is based on GLS (FE) estimation accounting for both entity and time 
effects. This choice of the GLS (FE) is highly appropriate in this thesis for the following main 
reasons. 
 
First and foremost, the sample used in this data set is a panel. Every governance and 
performance variable varies across universities and years. Each university has to be separately 
accounted for and its governance performance equation contrasted with every one of its peers 
across the ten years of the sample. If entity and time fixed effects are not included in the 
regression only an average and misspecified relationship between such governance and 
performance will emerge here (Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Hence to 
capture the rich heterogeneity in the governance performance relationships of every university 
and year in the sample a fixed time and entity effects regression is essential. Fixed effects 
regressions have been widely used in the extant empirical literature of both corporate and 
university governance and therefore its choice here is well substantiated. A few classic 
examples here include (Lucey et al., 2019; Dolton & Ma, 2003; Bachan & Rielly, 2015; Yekini 
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et al., 2017; Gschwandtner & McManus, 2018; Gounopoulos et al., 2019; Chowdry et al., 2008; 
Kokkelenber et al., 2008) 
 
Second, every university performance dependent variable used in the models of the thesis may 
have time invariant heterogenous influences on it that are unobservable. For example, research 
performance of a given university may be a function of many time varying governance 
variables like entry standards, student staff ratios and so on but may also be a function of some 
time invariant variables such as its research mission which generally do not change much 
during even a decade. To ensure that only time variant factors account for the changes in the 
dependent variable once again a fixed effects (FE) estimation is most suitable as suggested by 
Greene (2008). After all factors that influence performance but do not change over time imply 
that they are stable across time and so there is no governance change associated with them. A 
university will not change its research mission in one year or even in several years and so any 
influence on performance remains the same across all the ten years of the results (Greene, 
2008). It must not therefore enter the regression and to ensure this a fixed effects regression is 
essential.  
 
Third, the choice of GLS FE instead of OLS as the base level regression is to control for 
econometric problems that in most economic samples like this one make assumptions of 
classical OLS untenable. For example, homescedasticty in the residuals of the regressiom is 
not generally held in panel data of this kind and this is likely in my sample too. Similarly, most 
panel data suffer from autocorrelation, multicollinearity and endogeneity and as stressed earlier 
this is very true in my sample. In addition, my univariate statistics show how all my variables 
are not strictly normally distributed. Thus, most of the assumptions of classical OLS are not 
met in the sample. It is widely agreed (Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010; Hsiao, 
2006: 1986) that the GLS method is more robust to the presence of such econometric problems 
in any data set. Therefore, it is used as the main model here. Notwithstanding this, the 
sensitivity analysis section below explains and justifies how this thesis further double checks, 
verifies and controls for each of these problems through a suite of other regressions.  
 
Finally, the use of GLS FE in this thesis has been further corroborated by cross checking all 
models with OLS results. Everywhere the results (interpreted in chapter 6) show the many 
sensitivities associated with the OLS and thus justify the use of GLS FE as the main basis for 
interpretations here. However to robustly substantiate this, post-estimation Hausman 
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specification tests have also been  carried out that rejected (p-value < 0.05) the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between the explanatory variables and the random effect model in each case.  
 
The Fixed-Effects (FE) method is applied in this study as a powerful and widely used  method 
to estimate the parameter of a regression model (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The FE method 
allows the intercept to differ across time and institutions, but not over time, while assuming the 
slope coefficient are constant as the intercept varies across cros-sectional units, thus taking into 
account indivuality. A representation the generic version of the econometric model chosen in 
this thesis is shown in the equation below:  
 
            Yit = 1i + 1 Xit + 2 Xit + it                                                                                          (1) 
 
Y = The dependent variable (university performance) 
 = The constant  
n = The slope of independent variable and controls 
Xit = The independent variable (university governance and controls) 
it  = error term                                                                               
t = Time 
I = Institution 
 
Six governance-performance models fall within this generic formulation as shown below: 
 
 
Model 1:  
 
RPI it = it + 1 ES it + 2 INTS it + 3 BSIZE it + 4 TRST it + 5 GCOM it + 6 SSR it + 7 
IGOV it + 8 FSF it + 9 CTA it + 10 TST it + 11 PRE1992 it + 12 REGION it + 13 CODE it 
+ 14 YEAR it + it                                                                                                                                                                         (1.1) 
Where: RPI denotes research performance index; ES denotes entry standards; INTS denotes 
fraction international students; GBSIZE denotes governing board size; TRST denotes teaching 
and research staff; GCOM denotes the existence of a separate governance committee; SSR 
student to staff ratio; IGOV denotes independent governors; FSF denotes female staff fraction; 
CTA denotes cash to total assets; CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TST), 





RQ it = it + 1 ES it + 2 BIG4Ait + 3 BSIZE it + 4 FSF it + 5 BGDIV it + 6 VCPAY it + 7 
ENDWTA it + 7 PGINT it + 8 PGINT2it + 9 PTTR it + 10 TFEE it + 11 SFSPEND it + 12 
TI it + 13 PRE1992it + 14 REGION it + 15 YEAR it + 16 CODE it + it                           (1.2) 
 
Where: RQ denotes research quality; ES denotes entry standards; BIG4A denotes if HEI is 
audited by a big 4 auditor; BSIZE denotes governing board size; FSF denotes female staff 
fraction;  BGDIV denotes governing board gender diversity; VCPAY denotes vice-chancellor 
emolument; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; PGINT denotes postgraduate 
intensity; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per 
student; CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TI), university herageitage 
(PRE1992), university region (REGION), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
 
Model 3:  
 
RGF it = it + 1 BMFS it + 2 BEDIVit + 3 TRST it + 4 PTTSR it + 5 TONLY it + 6 
ENDWTA it + 7 FSF it + 8 TST it + 9 RGROUP it + 10 YEAR it + 11 CODE it + it       (1.3) 
 
Where: RGF denotes research grant fraction; BMFS denotes governing board meeting 
frequency; BEDIV denotes governing board ethnic diversity; TRST denotes teaching and 
research staff; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio;  TONLY denotes teaching only staff; 
ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CONTS 
denotes control variables for university size (TST), university mission (RGROUP), university 




TPI it = it + 1 ES it + 2 SSR it + 3 TFEE it + 4 FSF it + 5 CTA it + 6 BEDIV it + 7 
BGDIV it + 8 SFSPEND it + 9 TA it + 10 PRE1992 it + 11 REGION it +  12 YEAR it + 13 
CODE it + it                                                                                                                         (1.4) 
 
Where: TPI denotes teaching performance index; ES denotes entry standards; SSR student to 
staff ratio; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CTA denotes 
cash to total assets; BEDIV denotes governing board ethnic diversity; BGDIV denotes 
governing board gender diversity; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per student; 
CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TA), university age (PRE1992), 







Model 5:  
 
TGF it = it + 1 TFEE it + 2 FSF it + 3 PTTSR it + 4 RONLY it + 5 ENDWTA it + 6 TRST 
it + 7 ETFS it + 8 BSIZE it + 9 VCPAY it + 10 IGOV it + 11 RGROUP it + 12 PRE1992 it 
+ 13 REGION it +  14 YEAR it + 15 CODE it + it                                                              (1.5) 
 
Where: TGF denotes teaching grant fraction; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; FSF denotes 
female staff fraction; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio; RONLY denotes research 
only staff; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; TRST denotes teaching and research 
staff; ETFS denotes executive team meeting frequency; BSIZE denotes governing board size; 
VCPAY denotes vice-chancellor emolument; IGOV denotes independent governors; CONTS 
denotes control variables for university mission (RGROUP), university age (PRE1992), 
university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
Model 6:  
 
AT it = it + 1 FTA it + 2 DTA it + 3 CTA it + 4 SFSPEND it + 5 RONLY it + 6 TONLY it 
+ 7 UGCOM it + 8 PTTSR it + 9 GBMFS it + 10 VCPAY it + 11 INTS it + 12 PGINT it + 
13 ADSIZE it + 14 TA it + 15 RGROUP it + 16 PRE92 it + 17 REGION it + 18 YEAR it + 
19 CODE it + it                                                                                                  (1.6) 
 
Where: AT denotes asset turnover; FTA denotes fixed to total assets; DTA denotes debt to total 
assets; CTA denotes cash to total assets; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per 
student; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; RONLY denotes research only staff; 
TONLY denotes teaching only staff; UGCOM denotes presence unique governance 
committee; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio; GBMFS denotes governing board 
meeting frequency; VCPAY denotes vice-chancellor pay; INTS denotes fraction of international 
students; PGINT denotes postgraduate intensity; ADSIZE denotes audit committee size; 
CONTS denotes control variables for  university size (TA); university mission (RGROUP), 
university age (PRE1992); university region (REGION); code (CODE) and year (YEAR).  
 
Models 1 to 6 examine the relationship between the multi-dimensional characteristics of 
university governance and a university’s research, teaching and financial performance 
respectively. The   is expected show a positive result when the relationship between university 





4.7.1 Sensitivity Tests 
 
In each of the six models specified above a battery of tests are combined with an appropriate 
suite of 5 different regressions in order to verify the main GLS FE estimation. The first 
sensitivity regression implemented here is the GLS MLE (Maximum Likelihood Estimation). 
The overall idea is to maximize the likelihood function by estimating the parameter with a 
statistical approach that is distinct from the least squares approach (Ender, 2005; Field, 2009). 
This helps to robustly corroborate the GLS FE result. The maximum likelihood regressions 
unlike classical regression methods allow the dependent and independent variables to be drawn 
from distributions that are not strictly normal. Therefore, they provide an alternative estimation 
to check and verify the GLS FE result. Thus, accommodating a much wider range of variable 
distributions than the least squares as well as accounting for the presence of likely outliers in 
the sample data set. Earlier governance studies have indeed used the maximum likelihood 
estimation in other contexts (Kokkelenberga et al., 2008; Blank & Van Hulst, 2011; Renders 
& Gaeremynck, 2006).     
 
The second sensitivity regression Autoregression (AR) is used to in order to implement a 
Koyck transformation (Koyck, 1954: Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 624-630) but through a 
generalized rather than an ordinary least squares regression. Here the dependent performance 
variable in the model is lagged one period and used as an additional regressor in the model. 
This is the autoregression (AR). The reasoning behind this is part theoretical and part empirical. 
Given that governance calibration takes time to implement it is reasonable to assume that the 
effect on university performance will be with a lag and as shown by Koyck (1954) this is most 
easily accounted for by the lagged performance dependent variable. Empirically this data set 
has just 10 years of data i.e, T is small with significant numbers of missing values. Lagging the 
independent variables i.e. distributed lag model will result in further loss of degrees of freedom 
reducing the representativeness (i.e. N) and robustness (Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 598) of the 
model. The use of GLS AR is an added validation here as the lagged dependent variable is a 
potential source of collinearity as well as serial correlation (Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 626). 
 
This study also uses two additional Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) and Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) to control for endogeneity concerns that arise from having one or more 
variables associated with the error term i.e. reserve causality. Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) 
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test was used to check for the presence of endogenous variables in all 7 models. The 
independent variables in all models were assumed to be endogenous and are regressed, the 
residuals were then saved and regressed against the dependent (Field, 2012). The results are 
found in appendix table 6. The DWH was unable to accept the null hypothesis and therefore 
IV instruments has been used to account for endogeneity. The Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
method which address concerns associated with the omitted variables, and the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) method which relaxes the assumption have been applied in this 
study (Baum et al., 2003). Earlier studies that account for endogeneity have used this method 
(Antonakis et al., 2014; Soo & Elliot, 2010). For each of these a set of over-identification tests 
(i.e. Sargan, Basman and Hansen’s J) are also conducted to confirm a robust lack of over-
identification in these regressions. 
 
4.7.3 Diagnostic Statistics  
 
Variables board size, board meeting frequency, cash to total assets, executive team meeting 
frequency, vice-chancellor pay, audit committee size unique governance committee, total 
assets, total income, total staff were transformed into logarithms to remove any abnormalities 
this has been done in previous studies (Lokuwaduge, 2011; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; 
Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017; Tarbert et al., 2008) . While board gender 
diversity, board ethnic diversity, board independent members, teaching and research staff, 
teaching only staff, research only staff, female staff diversity, part-time staff ratio,  number of 
international students, tuition fees ratio,  cash to total assets, debt to total assets, fixed to total 
assets were transformed into fractions/percentages.  
4.7.4 R-squared 
 
The R-squared value is a statistical measure which indicates how much of the variance in the 
dependant variable is explained by the independent variables. It is measured between 0 and 1, 
the closer the value is to 1 the better the fit/relationship between the university governance 
variables and university performance (Frost, 2013; Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The formula for 
R- squared is: 
 
R2 = 1 − 
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?)
2
𝑖
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)2𝑖
 





Multicollinearity happens when there is high levels of correlation between two or more 
independent variables in the regression model (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). High levels of 
collinearity makes it less reliable and more complicated to assess the validity of results and this 
can lead to high standard deviation and limited R2. High multicollinearity can be detected by 
using the Pearson & Spearmen correlations shown in Table 15, any correlation between two 
variables that are higher than 0.80 or 0.90 indicates severe multicollinearity problems in the 
model (Field, 2013; Gujarati & Porter, 2010). The results from the correlation table shown in 
Table 15 indicate no serious multicollinearity levels. Due to the nature of the longitudinal data 
set some degree of multicollinearity are unescapable. To further detect whether the 
multicollinearity between the variables are at the acceptable levels, Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and Tolerance test has also been used.  
 











The Tolerance formula:  
 
                                                                                                             
𝑇𝐹 = 1 −  𝑅2 
                                                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
Results showing VIF values that are above 10 and tolerance values below 0.10 means that 
multicollinearity could be a problem (Field, 2013). Appendix 4 shows the VIF and tolerance 
test results for all the models. The test results shows that the mean levels of VIF across all 
models do not exceed 5 but variables of Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT), Teaching Only Staff 








This refers to the event where the variability of a variable is unequal across the range 
of values of the predictor variable. We have heteroscedasticity and homoscedasticity 
which shows the dependent variable’s variability is equal across values of the 
independent variable. This study has used two tests The Breusch-Pagan Test  and White 
Test. The Breusch-Pagan test is designed to detect any linear form of heteroscedasticity. The 
null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus the alternative that the error 
variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables. A large chi-square would 
indicate that heteroskedasticity was present. If the p-value is > 0.05 the test suggests 
Homoscedasticity, If value is <0.05 it suggests Heteroskedasticity (See Appendix table 5 for 
results).  
 
4.7.7 Endogeneity  
 
Endogeneity emerges when one or more of the independent variables in the model are 
correlated with the error term in the model simultaneous causality , omission of variables is 
attributed to unavailable data  and the variables can be influenced by omitted variable, and 
error in variables is when variables are measured incorrectly (Zaefarian et al., 2017). 
Accounting for endogeneity is an important element  in a regression model that ultimately 
improves the validity of the results. Still, often time endogeneity problems are overlooked by 
researchers (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Antonakis, et al., 2010; 2014; Ntim et al., 2017; Beiner et 
al., 2006). Several university governance studies (Harris, 2014; Ntim et al., 2017; Lokuwaduge, 
2011; Soo & Elliot, 2010) have alerted of the plagued endogeneity issues that are unaccounted 
for in most studies of this nature. The multi-dimensional features of university governance and 
performance and its complex process like characteristics has to be observed with a fine-tooth 
comb to truly unpack and detect its true influence and associations, this is particularly relevant 
in panel longitudinal data (Antonakis et al., 2010, 2014).   
 
To avoid spurious results, this study employs the same different methods used by (Beiner et 




4.7.8 Factor Analysis 
 
The study uses a factor analysis to find the correlation variables to construct and determine the 
weights for the factor loading. For this study the factor loading was used to construct two 
dependant variables which are, research performance index consisting of, research quality, 
research grant fraction, degree completion rate, graduate prospects and good honours. Research 
income per academic was dropped from the index as it showed the lowest factor loading (below 
0.70). And teaching performance index compromised of, overall student satisfaction, good 
honours, completion rate and graduate prospects. Teaching grant fraction was dropped from 
the index due to its inconsistency with the other factor loading variables with regard to the sign, 
and for having a factor loading below 0.70. This is the same method suggested and used by 
(Lokuwaduge, 2011; Field, 2009). The academic performances of research and teaching both 
have overlapping variables that are used to construct the indices (Kline, 2014). These 
overlapping variable have common characteristics and associations for each of them as 
explained in the variable definitions section above. To help with the with interpretation of the 
factors, factor rotation and varimax rotation were used to help reduce the variables that have 
high loading in each factor, and reduces the sum of variance in the squared loading (Kline, 
2014; Field, 2009). Variables with factors loading below 0.7 were considered were carefully 
considered or dropped, while factor loading above 0.7 was shown to extracts sufficient variance 
from the variable.  
 
4.7.9 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics was used to analyse each of the independent (university governance), 
dependant (university performance: research, teaching and financial) and controls variables in 
this study of 132 UK HEI from 2005 to 2015. It shows the mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum for each variable. This allows for a greater understanding of the 
variables and offers a useful insight to the longitudinal changes from 2005 to 2015 to be 
observed. Similar to prior variables were spliced to show the difference between pre-1992 and 
post-1992 universities and Russell Group and non-Russell Group universities (Bachan & Riley, 
2015; Boliver, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017; Iannelli & Huang, 2014).  
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4.7.10 Programs Used in this Study 
 
STATA and Microsoft Excel has been used in this study to obtain the results. The gathering of 
the data and the preparation of the data file was done in Microsoft Excel. STATA was used to 
transform variables and calculate descriptive statistics, correlations, factor analysis, 
assumption tests, multivariate analysis.  
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented and justified the entire gamut of research philosophies, approaches, 
methods, data and sample used in the thesis. In section 4.1 the thesis showed that a positivist 
philosophy and a consequent quantitative approach is most appropriate within the research 
context. The full geographical scope of the sample i.e the 132 UK universities and their salient 
features were described in the next section 4.2. The wide and extensive data sources in UK 
HEI from where the sample of thesis had been collected were detailed in section 4.3 which also 
described the different collection approaches and their difficulties. Panel data and its 
appropriateness for the research were highlighted next. Section 4.4 listed and explained five 
separate reasons for the use of panel data and justified this within the context of the research 
question and related objectives. In the next section 4.5the techniques used to conceptualize the 
variables were made explicit. The large list of 25 governance and 6 university performance 
variables, two of them composite indices were formalised in the next section 4.6. How each 
variable is measured, the previous studies using the same variable and its theoretical 
importance were briefly enumerated. Section 4.7 was the data analyses section which described 
and justified the entire range of models, tests, filters and techniques intended in the thesis. Here 
the choice of the GLS fixed effects regression as the base model and the use of five other 
multivariate sensitivity regressions were presented and defended. Having established the 
methodological basis for the empirical analyses of the thesis the next Chapter 5 begins with a 
univariate and bivariate analysis of the research sample.  
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5. Chapter Five: Descriptive statistics and Correlations  
  
This Chapter begins analysesing the large longitudinal dataset of UK University Governance 
and performance variables collated from different data sources. The principal objective here is 
to decipher and interpret how each variable behaves across both the entire sample period 
between 2005 and 2015 as well as among the entire collated set of UK universities. Through 
such a multi-layered interpretation it is anticipated that the multi-dimensionality, process-like 
characteristics and culture/quality assurance elements embedded in university governance and 
performance will come to the fore thus providing a first confirmation of the research gap 
identified by this thesis. This will then provide a foundation for the more complex multivariate 
analyses to follow in Chapter 6.  
 
In consonance with this aim the chapter divides into three main sections. Section 5.2 
descriptively analyses each of the 25 university governance, 6 university performance variables 
and 4 controls in turn in three sub-sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 respectively.  
 
Section 5.3 then conducts an elaborate longitudinal cross-correlation analysis on the full 
sample. Through this section each of the several hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 are 
quantitatively evaluated. This section also identifies the strongest associations between all pairs 
of variables as well as their likely combinations. Finally Section 5.3 concludes the main 
insights developed through the entire descriptive analyses.  
 
5.2 Univariate Descriptive statistics 
 
This section has three parts. Each independent  governance variable is discussed in sub section 
5.2.1, while each dependent performance ones is discussed in sub section 5.2.2 and finally 
controls are discussed in sub section 5.2.3. These variables attempts to shed light on hitherto 
unexplored dimensions of university governance/performance. It should be noted that almost 
every governance and performance variable is interpreted in terms of its university 
performance/governance implications respectively. This is entirely consistent with the primary 
empirical research gaps already identified in chapter 3 namely the explication of multi-
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dimensionality and process-like characteristics of both these university constructs. In what 
follows a rich Interpretations that flag and explain these ambiguities form an important part.  
 
5.2.1 University Governance Variables 
 
The section analyses the independent variables that are interpreted as internal governances of 
a university. It begins with the standard variables used earlier in the governance literature 
before moving on to new ones that provide further rich explanation. Table 6 below shows the 
descriptive statistics for the independent governance variables from 2005 to 2015.  
 
5.2.1.1. Board Size 
 
University board size has been the most important governance variable of interest in the extant 
literature. However no empirical analysis explores this variable in more than a cross-section. 
For the first time this thesis evaluates this variable across 132 universities for a decade. The 
table 6 shows how UK university boards have been populated on average across the decade 
2005 to 2015. Mean and median board sizes have been on the decline (from just above 26 to 
around 23) under regulatory pressures (CUC, 2009: 2014) as noted by extant scholarship (Ntim 
et al., 2017). This is well above the mean board size of 19 found by Lokawaduge (2011) in 
Australian universities. Worryingly, universities with the largest board sizes have persisted 
with them through the decade with at least one  increasing board membership as recently as  
2015 to 38 (see maximum in Table 6). This tendency among UK universities to persist with 
larger boards seems to concur with the recommendations of Stakeholder, Legitimacy, Resource 
Dependence and Stewardship (Davies et al., 1997; Tilling, 2004; Marginson, 2006; Saltman et 
al., 2000) while militating against Public Accountability, Quality Assurance and Optimal 
Contracting theories (Yermack, 1996; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mallin et al., 2015). 
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Table 6: Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Governance 
Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Governance 
Variable: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
BSIZE: Board Size 
Mean 24.248 26.225 25.738 25.369 24.796 24.370 24.539 24.084 23.565 23.2439 22.869 23.443 
Median 24 25 25 25 25 24 24 24 23 23 23 23.5 
STD 4.757 6.386 5.198 5.536 4.804 4.506 4.476 4.391 4.354 4.097 4.046 4.142 
CV .196 .243 .201 .218 .193 .184 .182 .182 .184 .176 .176 .176 
Minimum 11 15 16 17 16 16 15 15 14 13 11 12 
Maximum 43 43 39 42 40 37 36 36 40 34 34 38 
BGDIV: Board Gender Diversity (%) 
Mean .2911 .2483 .2607 .2728 .2658 .2737 .2848 .2947 .2989 .3098 .3167 .3330 
Median .2857 .2631 .2608 .2594 .2582 .2752 .2768 .2916 .2857 .3076 .3076 .3214 
STD .0945 .1001 .0924 .0941 .0938 .0886 .0949 .1040 .0918 .0882 .0833 .0808 
CV .3246 .4033 .3546 .3450 .3529 .3238 .3335 .3528 .3071 .2849 .2631 .2426 
Minimum 0.4479 0.0412 0.0367 .0487 .05 .0333 .0740 .0882 .1111 .1333 .1333 .1333 
Maximum .5789 .5 .4761 .5714 .5238 .5454 .5333 .5789 .5263 .5263 .5555 .5 
BEDIV: Board Ethnic Diversity (%) 
Mean .06915 .0649 .0674 .0672 .0652 .0668 .0642 .0693 .0696 .0679 .0711 .0809 
Median .0513 .0533 .0625 .0513 .0476 .0488 .0434 .0526 .0526 .05 .0526 .0715 
STD .0678 .0600 .0571 .0597 .0617 .0699 .0716 .0706 .0646 .0694 .0687 .0790 
CV .9806 .9253 .8471 .8882 .9470 1.0475 1.1137 1.0192 .9284 1.0215 .9659 .9764 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum .36 .36 .32 .32 .32 .3333 .3529 .36 .3076 .3125 .3157 .32 
IGOV: Board Independent (%) 
Mean .5857 .5833 .5750 .5905 .5739 .5821 .5896 .5884 .5830 .5950 .5909 .5856 
Median .5769 .5517 .56 .5789 .56 .5659 .5882 .56 .5714 .5862 .5909 .5833 
STD .1289 .1443 .1458 .1274 .1419 .1293 .1283 .1231 .1177 .1224 .1244 .1272 
CV .2202 .2475 .2536 .2158 .2473 .2221 .2177 .2092 .2019 .2056 .2106 .2172 
Minimum .0434 .1111 .1111 .1 .0434 .1428 .1428 .1428 .16 .125 .16 .1538 
Maximum .8888 .8636 .8888 .8095 .8095 .8333 .875 .8695 .8095 .8888 .7894 .84 
GBMFS: Governing Board Meeting Frequency   
Mean 4.9009 4.5777 4.7065 4.7551 4.6698 4.8962 4.8888 4.9166 5.0247 5.0588 5.0333 5.1967 
Median 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 
STD 1.4664 1.3152 1.4641 1.4647 1.2552 1.4069 1.4370 1.4528 1.5245 1.5853 1.4720 1.5987 
CV .299222 .2873 .3110 .3080 .2688 .2873 .2939 .2954 .3034 .3133 .2924 .3076 
Minimum 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Maximum 13 10 13 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 
ETMFS: Executive Team Meeting Frequency 
Mean 26.3012 24.4285 25.5909 25.3636 26.4583 23.3928 25.9393 26.3611 27 26.8421 27.4594 28.4285 
Median 24 21 23 22.5   23.5 19.5 24 24 24 24 24 26 
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Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Governance 
Variable: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
STD 15.6747 16.9869 16.0316 16.2965 16.4369 17.5864 16.4809 15.1735 14.9073 15.2643 15.5520 14.9278 
CV .5959 .6953 .6264 .6425 .6212 .7517 .6353 .5756 .5521 .5686 .5663 .5250 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
SSR: Student Staff Ratio 
Mean 17.5229 16.7818 17.294 18.2851 - 17.2911 17.0745 17.2380 17.7843 17.6739 18.2116 17.4686 
Median 17.65 16.9 17.15 18 - 17.4 17.1 17.7 18.1 17.9 18.5 17.7 
STD 3.4383 3.4052 3.4248 3.7937 - 3.2123 3.3345 3.3054 3.3522 3.2005 3.6645 3.4837 
CV .1962 .2029 .1980 .2074 - .1857 .1952 .1917 .1884 .1810 .2012 .1994 
Minimum 7.1 7.1 7.6 8.4 - 9.1 8.9 8.9 8.9 10.1 10.2 10.2 
Maximum 32.9 27.5 25.4 30.2 - 25.2 25.8 25.1 23.8 25.2 32.9 30.2 
ES: Entry Standard 
Mean 58.5447 63.3316 57.5961 57.4268 - 59.9258 58.0493 57.8578 57.9575 57.0297 58.1113 58.6943 
Median 54.1396 61.3559 54.7591 53.2850 - 55.4054 53.4322 52.4680 52.8622 51.1745 53.6065 54.7889 
STD 14.7161 16.4021 15.2081 15.2471 - 14.4029 15.0839 14.6017 14.8942 14.5754 13.7613 12.8641 
CV .2513 .2589 .2640 .2655 - .2403 .2598 .2523 .2569 .2555 .2368 .2191 
Minimum 28.9463 38.9830 28.9463 32.3747 - 36.1003 33.2096 33.6380 33.4525 34.3959 35.0819 36.5259 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 - 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
PTTSR: Part-time to Full-time Staff (%) 
Mean .3338 .3031 .3175 .3228 .3302 .3393 .3492 .3420 .3482 .3409 .34316 .3345 
Median .3261 .2764 .2963 .2959 .3333 .3237 .3489 .3455 .3532 .3413 .3429 .3092 
STD .1612 .1668 .1671 .1605 .1551 .1642 .1662 .1630 .1624 .1561 .1544 .1575 
CV .4830 .5504 .5263 .4973 .4696 .4839 .4762 .4768 .4663 .4581 .4499 .4710 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 .0634 .0672 .0690 .0608 .0648 .0720 .075 .0377 
Maximum .8639 .7614 .7105 .8068 .7813 .8316 .8639 .8257 .8419 .8080 .8204 .7393 
FSF: Female Staff Fraction (%) 
Mean .4471 .4234 .4310 .4375 .4393 .4453 .4517 .4534 .4567 .4565 .4586 .4640 
Median .4444 .4175 .4321 .4343 .4392 .4418 .4483 .4461 .4482 .4459 .4527 .4583 
STD .0704 .0694 .0704 .0720 .0725 .0725 .0709 .0698 .0675 .0660 .0667 .0672 
CV .1575 .1640 .1635 .1647 .1651 .1629 .1570 .1539 .1479 .1447 .1454 .1450 
Minimum .2164 .2222 .2301 .2255 .2164 .2248 .2283 .2615 .2794 .2837 .2848 .2974 
Maximum .7 .6486 .6554 .675 .6666 .6595 .6590 .6590 .6829 .6818 .6938 .7 
TRST: Teaching and Research Staff (%) 
Mean .5810 .5699 .5512 .5577 .5806 .5770 .5861 .6030 .6010 .5936 .5827 .5875 
Median .5487 .5545 .5420 .5434 .5666 .5444 .5456 .5585 .5531 .5447 .5357 .555 
STD .2208 .2229 .2192 .2263 .2237 .2308 .2392 .2258 .2236 .2104 .2053 .2006 
CV .3800 .3911 .3977 .4057 .3853 .4000 .4081 .3745 .3721 .3545 .3523 .3414 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1489 .0962 .1875 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TONLY: Teaching Only Staff (%) 
Mean .2566 .2580 .2694 .2697 .2527 .2607 .2572 .2415 .2476 .2480 .2622 .2557 
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Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Governance 
Variable: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Median .2174 .2055 .2171 .2081 .2101 .2136 .2076 .2051 .2013 .2359 .2508 .2393 
STD .2132 .2399 .2338 .2355 .2196 .2238 .2270 .2092 .2083 .1861 .1850 .1723 
CV .8310 .9298 .8681 .8733 .8692 .8585 .8824 .8663 .8412 .7503 .7056 .6737 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .9615 1 .8457 .8930 .7596 
RONLY: Research Only Staff (%) 
Mean .1482 .1574 .1548 .1524 .1507 .1491 .1474 .1469 .1428 .1426 .1421 .1445 
Median .0793 .1031 .1054 .0987 .0821 .0772 .0789 .0796 .0721 .0665 .0689 .0695 
STD .1590 .1556 .1530 .1558 .1585 .1640 .1665 .1591 .1584 .1604 .1605 .1622 
CV 1.072 .9883 .9883 1.022 1.051 1.099 1.129 1.083 1.109 1.125 1.129 1.122 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum .8 .6316 .6332 .6405 .6666 .75 .8 .6866 .6954 .6985 .7055 .728 
PGINT: Postgraduate Intensity (%) 
Mean .2333 .2341 .2355 .2375 .2187 .2272 .2395 .2418 .2314 .2316 .2338 .2356 
Median .2202 .2173 .2265 .2255 .2115 .2192 .2338 .2316 .2128 .2157 .2207 .2201 
STD .0951 .0947 .0961 .0970 .0924 .0922 .0968 .0981 .0959 .0929 .0950 .0965 
CV .4076 .4048 .4081 .4085 .4225 .4058 .4041 .4056 .4145 .4013 .4064 .4096 
Minimum .0060 .0167 .0144 .0216 .01 .0087 .0060 .0150 .0191 .0244 .0255 .0253 
Maximum .6027 .5439 .5618 .5764 .5694 .5561 .5815 .5826 .5905 .6013 .6027 .5834 
TFEE: Tuition Fee Fraction (%) 
Mean .3778 .2610 .2633 .2830 .3028 .3304 .3536 .3710 .3977 .4769 .5358 .5772 
Median .3506 .2561 .2513 .2687 .2987 .3341 .3581 .3739 .4042 .5232 .5949 .6334 
STD .1579 .0845 .0917 .0967 .0941 .0996 .1028 .1048 .1097 .1363 .1633 .1857 
CV .4180 .3239 .3484 .3416 .3109 .3014 .2908 .2825 .2758 .2857 .3048 .3217 
Minimum .0215 .0805 .0662 .0215 .0719 .0804 .0858 .1017 .1128 .1270 .1379 .0981 
Maximum .8229 .5819 .6622 .6862 .6619 .7109 .6969 .7161 .7297 .7753 .7720 .8229 
INTS: Fraction of International Students (%) 
Mean .1757 .1542 .1570 .1613 .1602 .1672 .1778 .1865 .1875 .1907 .1950 .1937 
Median .1605 .1390 .1481 .1516 .1547 .1645 .1689 .1756 .1750 .1737 .1717 .1801 
STD .1119 .1093 .1059 .1057 .1037 .1067 .1094 .1105 .1138 .1175 .1209 .1194 
CV .6371 .7088 .6743 .6552 .6472 .6380 .6151 .5927 .6070  .6161 .6202 .6165 
Minimum 0 0 0 .0027 .0089 .0088 .0116 .0130 .0110 0 .0020 .0021 
Maximum .7536 .7536 .7133 .6616 .6776 .6845 .6542 .6614 .6675 .6706 .6692 .6650 
ENDWTA: Endowment to Total Assets (%)  
Mean .0468 .0633 .0615 .0563 .0469 .0401 .0412 .0432 .0413 .0414 .0408 .0401 
Median .0074 .0087 .0084 .0075 .0060 .0058 .0057 .0071 .0076 .0073 .0069 .0072 
STD .0890 .1169 .1133 .1073 .0893 .0772 .0778 .0829 .0793 .0742 .0740 .0724 
CV 1.900 1.8459 1.842 1.9060 1.9016 1.9256 1.886 1.917 1.920 1.793 1.814 1.803 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum .6325 .6325 .6289 .5901 .5359 .4202 .4108 .5261 .4866 .3977 .3961 .4010 
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Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Governance 
Variable: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
VCPAY: Vice-Chancellor Pay  
Mean 242197.2 183014.9 198733.8 208665.3 226062.7 248588.8 247904.3 251213.5 254779.6 263378.6 269055.5 277567.1 
Median 238862 182807.5 195098 203500 219000 241000 244000 245000 245795.5 253528.5 263000 271000 
STD 58467.62 38797.8 45843.55 43271.72 45494.62 50117.17 48634.44 52210.88 53945.55 57838.03 58949.7 60528.68 
CV .2414051 .2119925 .2306782 .2073738 .2012478 .201606 .1961823 .2078347 .2117342 .2196003 .2190987 .2180687 
Minimum 86000 86000 117337 127666 135032 148000 143000 105000 121000 119000 125000 103917 
Maximum 466000 323000 376000 355000 432000 415129 406000 424000 424000 466000 453000 462000 
BIG4: Audited by BIG-4 Auditor  
Mean .773539 .7849462 .78125   .7979798 .7596154 .745283 .7327586 .7642276 .7804878 .7642276 .7903226 .808 
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
STD .4187108 .4130865 .4155687 .4035505 .4293864 .4377719 .4444392 .4262167 .4156091 .4262167 .4087298 .3954581 
CV .5412 .5262 .5319 .5057 .5652 .5873 .6065 .5577 .5324 .5577 .5171 .4894 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UGCOM: Presence Unique Governance Committee  
Mean .2232 .0632 .1058 .1648 .2020 .22 .2363 .2666 .275 .2601 .2704 .2833 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
STD .4166 .2450 .3095 .3730 .4035 .4163 .4267 .4440 .4483 .4405 .4460 .4525 
CV 1.865 3.871 2.923 2.263 1.9975 1.8924 1.805 1.6652 1.630 1.6932 1.649 1.597 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SFSPEND: Service and Facility Spend per Student 
Mean 1157.148 575.6183 606.9924 685.4538 - 1117.929 1203.728 1425.798 1462.845 1499.316 1524.893 1633.172 
Median 1127 624 660 713.5 - 1014 1119.5 1312.5 1354.5 1372 1393 1520.5 
STD 599.080 393.043 404.250 392.952 - 399.384 436.874 481.820 490.373 487.079 496.337 512.884 
CV .517721 .6828 .6659 .5732 - .3572 .3629 .3379 .3352 .3248 .3254 .3140 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 - 480 482   653 625 630 369 446 
Maximum 4090 1921 1935 2020 - 3218 3518 4090 3971 3588 3490 3506 
CTA: Cash to Total Assets (%) 
Mean .0782 .0576 .0564 .0590 .0645 .0699 .0827 .0846 .0870 .1002 .0993 .0988 
Median .0486 .0264 .0296 .0322 .0310 .0385 .0513 .0607 .0634 .0814 .0890 .0812 
STD .0828 .0733 .0684 .0732 .0743 .0767 .0871 .0834 .0851 .0926 .0887 .0888 
CV 1.0585 1.2722 1.212 1.240 1.151 1.096 1.053 .9863 .9780 .9247 .8935 .8996 
Minimum -.0013 0 0 .00009 0 0 0 0 .0010 -.0013 .0017 .0023 
Maximum .6049 .4305 .3446 .3544 .2799 .3337 .3653 .3733 .3404 .5168 .6049 .5604 
DTA: Debt to Total Assets (%) 
Mean .1563 .1530 .1452 .1438 .1530 .1578 .1584 .1562 .1588 .1592 .1608 .1728 
Median .1470 .1396 .136 .1321 .1464 .1521 .1438 .1449 .1577 .1564 .1651 .1728 
STD .1092 .1028 .0956 .1042 .1117 .1156 .1168 .1112 .1068 .1076 .1067 .1209 
CV .6986 .6719 .6584 .7250 .7299 .7324 .7374 .7122 .6722 .6761 .6633 .6995 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Governance 
Variable: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Maximum .6772 .4601 .4217 .4595 .5581 .5877 .5869 .5061 .4428 .4559 .4385 .6772 
FTA: Fixed to Total Assets (%) 
Mean .7661 .7940 .7927 .7847 .7741 .7688 .7560 .7538 .7527 .7474 .7537 .7508 
Median .7752 .8142 .8159 .8050 .7824 .7802 .7640 .7574 .7570 .7535 .7538 .7645 
STD .1063 .0975 .1021 .1219 .1068 .1038 .1113 .1072 .1060 .0992 .0949 .1056 
CV .1388 .1228 .1288 .1554 .1380 .1350 .1472 .1423 .1408 .1327 .1259 .1406 
Minimum .0596 .5000 .4164 .0596 .2895 .3183 .2878 .2541 .2868 .3045 .2492 .3048 
Maximum .9882 .9704 .9611 .988 .9551 .9584 .9510 .9313 .9214 .9330 .9237 .9259 
ADSIZE: Audit Committee Size  
Mean 5.33741 5.09615 5 5.33898 5.20312 5.20312 5.5797 5.42253 5.30137 5.36363 5.45454 5.55263 
Median 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
STD 1.77797 1.34688 1.59325 1.82520 1.67312 1.41622 1.94335 1.90234 1.83094 1.93247 1.97714 1.81398 
CV .333115 .264294 .31865 .341864 .32156 .272188 .348290 .350821 .34537 .360291 .362476 .326688 
Minimum 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 






Differentiating the sample between old pre-1992 institutions and newer post 1992 ones does 
shows that older established universities exhibit less pressures to conform to regulations to 
limit board sizes and seem to persist in larger sizes when compared with their newer rivals a 
fact echoed by Ntim et al. (2017) see Appendix Table 1.  
 
5.2.1.2. Ethnicity Diversity 
 
The average UK University exhibits minimal compliance to statutes encouraging diversity on 
boards (CUC, 2001; 2003; 2006: 2009) employing just 1 or 2 members from ethnic minorities. 
This constitutes a low fraction of board size not exceeding 8.5% on average across the decade 
and these figures conform to earlier studies (Ntim et al., 2017; Schofield, 2009). It is gratifying 
to note the increase albeit very slow in these fractions especially in 2014/2015. What is 
extremely revealing is that at least half of the data sample of university years never exhibit 
fractions more than 5% from among minority groups. This diversity never exceeds 40% in any 
year for any university. Clearly exhortations of Public Accountability, Resource Dependence, 
Stakeholder and Legitimacy (Coy et al., 2011; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006; Mitchell et al., 
1997; Verbruggen et al., 2011) to increase ethnic diversity of boards are not heeded by UK 
universities. On the other hand it seems that these institutions would further lower ethnic 
diversity but for regulatory mandates (CUC, 2009; UUK, 2011; FSSG, 2011) forcing them not 
to. The elite russel group tend to exhibit significantly lower ethnic fractions in boards when 
compared to their peers. A bias against minority groups in board member recruitment cannot 
be ruled out in the former, a fact stressed in the extant literature (Ntim et al., 2017; Goodall & 
Osterloh, 2015; Santos & Van Phu, 2017). The finding is even more strongly corroborated 
among the older pre-92 institutions which display a strong aversion to ethnic minorities in 
Board compositions right up until 2015.  
 
5.2.1.2.3 Gender Diversity 
 
Women on average seem to be better represented (Anywhere between 6 and 7) than their ethnic 
minority counterparts on UK university boards across 2005 to 2015 (see Table 6). This makes 
for at least 25% of the total board sizes on average in almost all years reaching beyond 3 in 
every 10 by 2015. These results are in line with earlier estimates in the literature including 
Ntim et al.’s (2017) 26.28% for 2012. What is gratifying is that this proportion has been 
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increasing consistently. Yet there is a wide spread among the universities with many 
observations at both ends of the range. Fairly large percentage of university year observations 
fall between 20 and 40 percent with at least one university choosing to employ just 3 women 
as against a peer choosing as high as 14. UK Universities seem to be less reluctant to implement 
the exhortations of the four core theories of governance to increase board gender diversity (Coy 
et al., 2011; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006; Mitchell et al., 1997; Verbruggen et al., 2011). 
Yet in the sample findings there is still some evidence of resistance to include women on the 
board arguably to reduce potential policy logjams on boards as suggested by Managerial Power 
and Optimal Contracting theorists (Williamson, 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson 
& Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996). Older pre-92 institutions remain relatively rigid clearly 
resisting gender balance with the lowest average fractions across the decade. The newer 
universities (post-92) and those unaffiliated to either group exhibit some of the highest 
fractions of women members across the sample years (see Appendix 1).  
 
5.2.1.4 Board Independence 
 
UK universities have prioritized CUC guidelines (2009) regarding board independence. 
Average numbers of board members sourced from outside the university remain above majority 
i.e. 50% levels across the sample decade (see appendix). This conforms to extant findings 
within UK data by Ntim et al. (2012: levels of 54.5%) and is somewhat lower than the levels 
found in Australian Universities (60%) by Lokuwaduge (2011). However there is a wider 
variation in these levels across institutions in the UK ranging from as low as 4.3% to as high 
as 88.8% of board sizes. It is worthwhile to note how minimum levels have nevertheless been 
increasing across years. It seems that a large bulk of UK universities have taken on board the 
recommendations of Neo-classical stewardship, Managerial power and Optimal Contracting 
theories (Donaldson, 1990; Mallin et al., 2015; Yermack, 1996) by ensuring higher proportions 
of lay members. The elite Russell group universities in this data sample consistently on average 
prefer internal rather than lay board members (lay member mean fractions below or around  
50%) when compared to their peers (lay member mean fractions above 60%) across the decade 
(see Appendix 1). From a resource dependence standpoint it could be that non-Russel 
institutions are gathering higher numbers of lay members in the hope to access richer resource 
networks or from a regulatory angle lack of dependence on Government funds in Russel 
universities when compared to non-Russel institutions makes the former seem less bound by 
board independence regulatory directives than the latter.  
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5.2.1.5 Board Meeting Frequency 
 
University boards across the UK met 4-5 times a year on average across the decade (see Tables 
6). This seems less than the Australian average of around 7 times discovered by Lokuwaduge 
(2011) but in line with Ntim et al.’s (2017) UK figure of about 5 times in 2012. The spread 
around these mean figures (from 3 to 12/13) is also similar to comparable findings reported 
elsewhere. It is interesting to note how the recent trend has clearly been towards higher 
numbers of meetings each year (see Table 6). This seems to align with the recommendations 
of Public Accountability, Resource Dependence, Stakeholder and legitimacy (Karamanou & 
Vefeas, 2005; Reverte, 2009; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990) all of which 
stress the importance of frequent board level meetings. It seems that the elite Russel Group of 
UK universities in this sample endorse such a theoretical view and ensure their boards meet a 
significantly higher number of times than their peers (see Appendix 1). Yet there is an overall 
impression that UK universities seem to heterogeneously vary board meeting frequencies 
arguably to suit their individual emerging exigencies from year to year. This is what scholars 
like Kohli & Saha (2008) and Bebchuk, Cohen & Farrell (2004) have recommend.  
 
5.2.1.6 Student Staff Ratio 
 
The average UK University (both mean & median) has been remarkably consistent in choosing 
a relatively low student to staff ratio (between 16.5 and 18.5). This compares 206ndogeneit 
with the higher ratios (between 38 and 40) found by Lokuwaduge (2011) in her Australian 
university sample and Kokkelenberg et al. (2008). But such consistency belies a large variation 
across universities. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) in any given year is 
never below 18%. Universities spread out close to 20% around yearly mean values. This is 
preliminary evidence of how differently each university chooses to implement this academic 
governance. This ratio has been growing across the decade due to the public accountability 
pressure on universities to cover a larger proportion of the student population combined with 
the steady reduction in budgetary support (Shattock, 2013a, b; 2004a; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 
2008; FSSG, 2011; UUK, 2011; CUC, 2006a, b; Prondzynski, 2012; Havergal, 2015a; 2015b). 
Reducing faculty recruitment  seem to be at work here. Whether this lack of quality assurance 
in academic function of many universities is a consequence of resource provider vested 
interests or stakeholder (teacher unions)/managerial power exertions cannot be directly inferred 
but surely such forces must be at work in at least the low performing institutions.  
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Russell Group universities consistently out perform on this metric and exhibit low ratios in the 
overall sample (see Appendix 1). Here then is preliminary proof that a university’s mission i.e. 
whether greater student coverage (post-1992) or higher quality teaching or research (pre-1992) 
is its main goal; has a significant influence on internal governance priorities a fact previously 
discovered and underlined by Tarbert et al. (2008).  
5.2.1.7 Entry Standards 
 
The entry standards in UK universities have varied widely across the decade as shown in the 
percent histogram for all university years in the sample (see Table 6). There is significant 
anecdotal evidence confirming the general rise in student recruitment standards across the UK 
partly from competitive dynamics, partly from regulatory pressures and partly from oft-cited 
dumbing down of standards in A-level results  (FSSG, 2011: UUK, 2011; Havergal, 2015a; 
2015b; Hordern, 2013; Parry, 2013; Woodford & Earl-Novell, 2006; Barrow Reilly & 
Woodfield, 2009; Bachan, 2017). Yet from a theoretical angle there is an important trade-off 
that characterize this variable. Public accountability avers that a university must not be too 
selective in its recruitment else it would risk excluding deserving students from higher 
education (Nelson et al., 2002; Parker, 2011). Stakeholder perspectives raise an opposite 
concern that university entry standards must not be dumbed down too far and thus risk the 
classroom environment and compromise important pedagogical objectives and future job 
market requirements (Ntim et al., 2017: Kim, 2008: Burrows, 2012). Russell group universities 
consistently display higher entry standards as anticipated (see Appendix 1). Clearly given their 
higher credibility these superior university brands have the luxury to choose their student intake 
unlike their lower ranked peers a clear case of an adverse-selection problem in the UK 
university student market. This confirms the academic selectivity of this group which has the 
status to attract students with the best A-level scores a fact repeatedly stressed by several 
university performance scholars (Raffe & Croxford, 2013;2014; Boliver, 2015). Also entry 
standards seem to be strongly influenced by the core mission of any given university for 
example higher student coverage or higher teaching/research performance. The new post-1992 
institutions exhibit significantly lower entry standards when compared to their older well 




5.2.1.8 Fractions of Tuition Fee 
 
Summary statistics in the sample show that tuition fee is a very important source of funds for 
UK universities on average (both mean and median) and this dependence has been rising 
especially after the 2012 tuition fee cap increase, moving well above 50% of total incomes (see 
Table 6). Yet there is significant intra-university variation (from as low as 2% to as high as 
82%) in this reliance on tuition fee confirming that UK universities should differ markedly in 
how they prioritize teaching related governances and outcomes. Instrumental versions of 
stakeholder theories should clearly apply here as universities dependent on these incomes 
prioritize parent-student concerns over others in ways different from peers relatively immune 
to such dependence (Ntim et al., 2017; Peter & Waterman, 1982; Handy, 1993; Gayle et al., 
2003; Gunasekera & Reed, 2008; Gomes & Novaes, 2005). The summary table suggests that 
a very significant proportions of universities depended on tuition fee for between 40 and 70% 
of their incomes. The coefficient of variation corroborates this lower yet unique deviation from 
the mean by never exceeding 41% of the mean.  
 
Russel Group universities are half as dependent on tuition fees whereas they earn anywhere 
between 3 to 5 times as much on average from research when compared to their non-elite peers 
(see Appendix 1). Here is also further indication of both the severe financial dependence on 
tuition fees (UUK, 2011; FSSG, 2011: Ntim et al., 2017) and pedestrian nature of research in 
the rest of the higher education sector in the country (RAE results. 1996-2008; League tables 
cited by Shattock, 2013a, b).  
 
5.2.1.8. Postgraduate Intensity  
 
The mean and median remain relatively the same throughout the decade at around 22-23%. 
But what is noteworthy is the vast contrast between the maximum and minimum values show 
in Table 6, some university are clearly more research intensive with as much as 60% higher 
degree students whereas at the other end of the spectrum a university could have a ratio as low 
as 1%. The priorities of universities between research and teaching governance is ostensibly to 
compare the number of higher degree students with those of lower degree students at a given 
institution. The larger numbers of postgraduate students at a given institution should flag its 
research orientation. Such widespread variation in postgraduate intensity in UK universities 
suggests how at least some mission led institutions have internalized Public Accountability 
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pressures of increasing coverage (Coy et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2002: Tarbert et al., 2008), 
ostensibly by increasing undergraduate places. Conversely others have been brand/reputation 
and legitimacy driven (Melville Ross, 2010; Hordern, 2013: Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013) and 
thus solely increased postgraduate enrollments.   
 
Russell Group universities demonstrates significantly higher post graduate students when 
compared to their non-elite counterparts. Across the decade Just below 50% of the student 
population at a Russell Group university has been postgraduate unlike the under 30% at peer 
institutions (see Appendix 1). Contrasting the pre-1992 and post-1992 universities reveals a 
similar picture with the former group consistently reporting higher postgraduate student 
fractions than the latter. 
 
5.2.1.7.9 Fraction of International Students 
 
The multi-dimensional nature of UK universities is in part derived from their international 
status. One could infer consequently that the numbers of international students enrolled at a 
given institution would change its inter-se priorities with respect to teaching and research.  In 
particular to enhance the credibility of an institution in the global higher education marketplace 
it may be argued that universities might need to calibrate research and teaching modalities. 
Therefore a variable measuring the fraction of international students at a given university 
would help unpack research and teaching governance priorities from yet another unique 
dimension.  
 
The slow and steady growth in the fraction of international students across the decade in UK 
universities is evidenced in the summary statistics of this variable (see Table 6). From levels 
as low as 3 international students in every 20 students in 2005 they have reached levels of 1 in 
every 5 by 2015. What is noteworthy is that at almost all segments of the spectrum in the data 
sample and importantly in the lower levels UK universities have been largely increasing 
fractions of international students. One could infer that these institutions particularly at the 
bottom end have been exploiting the status and credibility (Bonroy & Constantatos, 2008; 
Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; van Vught et al., 2012) that their top UK peers in general enjoy 
across the globe.  
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5.2.1.7.10 Ratio of  Research and Teaching staff  to total staff 
 
In Universities that prioritize research it can be expected that larger numbers of research staff 
would be employed. Measuring the ratios of research or teaching staff to total staff across 
universities would reveal inter-se differences in their research/teaching governance priorities. 
Therefore these ratios are constructed as a final proxy in this sample.  
 
As anticipated universities in the sample (see Table 6) on average (mean) report a combined 
research only and research/teaching staff of anywhere between 70 and 75% across the ten years. 
But interestingly there is at least one university that reports 0 staff involved in research (see 
minimum in table 1) and one that reports 0 pure teaching staff (see maximum in table 1). 
Examining the ratio of teaching only staff to total staff sheds further light. Mean pure teaching 
staff levels do not ever exceed 27% in any year. But there is wide dispersion here unlike in the 
research staff variable with a coefficient of variation anywhere between 0.67 and 0.92. This is 
3 to 4 times as high as the latter.  
 
The histograms (in Appendix table 2) make this difference even starker. Notice the long right 
tail in teaching only staff with fairly substantial university year observations exhibiting 35-
40% teaching only staff. Percentile tables (Appendix 2) confirm that there seem to be 
significant numbers of universities with very high fractions of teaching only staff. The finding 
accords with extant normative scholarship (Foskett, 2010; Gayle et al., 2003; Shattock, 2013a, 
b) that questions whether some UK universities actually generate any new knowledge at all or 
are simply teaching institutions properly classifiable as colleges.  
 
A credibility issue (Bonroy & Constantatos, 2008; Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; van Vught 
et al., 2012) is certainly highlighted in the sample where at least a significant number of 
universities neglect research almost entirely. Worryingly this number has remained rather 
stable with more than a score of such universities persisting across the decade with half or more 
of pure teaching faculty. From a legitimacy angle (Lindblom, 1994; De Villers & Van Staden, 
2006) UK university users are arguably right to be concerned whether some institutions are 
indeed failing in the knowledge generation dimension.  
 
Splicing by Russell Group once again differentiates this elite group from peers (see Appendix 
1). On average teaching only staff in the non-Russell are twice as high (28.43%) as the Russell 
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group (13.94%). A simple comparison of the maximum values in either sub-group highlights 
how the non-elite group has some universities in all years that choose (100%) teaching staff 
whereas no Russel Group University ever employs more than (44%) of pure teaching only staff 
in any year. Clearly then Russell universities maintain a tight governance regime unlike their 
rivals that ensures no undue priority to either teaching or research. 
 
5.2.1.7.11 Part-time to Full-time Staff 
 
The median average for part-time staff has increased from (27%) in 2006 to (34%) in 2014. 
This increase of ominous non-permeant contacts is a response by universities from the external 
public pressures to increase student coverage population (Brown & Carasso, 2013; McDonald, 
2013; Davern et al., 2006; Bachan & Reilly, 2015). Universities should carefully choose their 
part-time to full-time ratio. The maximum of (86% )and minimum of (3%) are showing a very 
contrasting picture that might have significant implications on their performance. Therefore, 
this important university governance policy needs delicate calibration.  
 
5.2.1.13 Female Staff Diversity 
 
Diversity has been studied in the board level but not in the staff level, therefore this is one 
additional facet of the multi-dimensional university governance concept. Female staff diversity 
has been on the rise in the past decade from a mean of as low as (42%) in 2005 to (46.4%) in 
2015. This  improvement in gender diversity levels is in line with Botella et al. (2019) calls for 
reducing the gender gap in academia and staff employment.  Stakeholder theorist (Suchman, 
1995; Coy & Pratt, 1998; Maingot & Zeghal, 2008) also suggest that employing more female 
staff will improve a university’s performance and that it should create further legitimacy to the 
institution (Carter et al., 2003). 
 
5.2.1.14 Vice-Chancellor Pay 
 
The descriptive summary shows a clear steady increase in vice-chancellor’s pay from a mean 
of £242,000 in 2005 to £277,500 in 2015. The pay gap between the maximum and the minimum 
is starkening with the highest earning vice-chancellor earning more than 4 times than  his/her 
counterparts (see Table 6). This finding is in line with earlier studies (Bachan & Reilly, 2015; 
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Tarbert et al., 2008). The increase in vice-chancellors pay has not been without its back clash. 
Remuneration of top executives has increased in both the public and private sector (Bachan & 
Reilly, 2015), but university vice-chancellors seem to receive higher criticism. As universities 
move towards a quasi-market it has been assed as such entities and have become rewarded 
based on its merit by fund providers (Dolton & Ma, 2003). Therefore, vice-chancellors that 
outperform for their institutions are rewarded likewise.   
 
5.2.1.15 Cash to Total Assets, Debt to Total Assets and Fixed to Total Assets  
 
Cash to total assets median has  more than doubled over the past decade from as low as 2.5%  
in 2006 to 8% in 2015. This result is similar to Bates et al. (2008) US finding in the corporate 
sector where between 1980 to 2006 the cash ratio has more than doubles from 10.5% to 23%. 
In the higher end of the spectrum some universities cash ratio is higher than 50%. Perhaps with 
universities becoming less reliant on government funding these universities are withholding 
cash as a precautionary as they working under financial limits (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2007).  
Debt to total assets also shows alarming pattern with some universities acquiring debt above 
65% and the mean keeps increasing year on year from 15% in 2005 to 17% in 2015. Optimal 
contracting, managerial power and stewardship all warn against high levels of debt (Pathak 
2011; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Haung & Song, 2006; Chakraborty, 2010). This would 
impinge on a university’s independence. As recent as 2018 the Office for Student (OfS) has 
offered bail out for 3 universities that were on the verge of bankruptcy (OFS, 2018b, c; 2019b; 
Adam, 2018) . This a clear indication that UK HEIs need to improve their financial governance 
policies.  
 
Fixed to total assets seems to show a steady pattern across the decade with little change. The 
mean does not fluctuate and remains within 75% to 77% levels. But the gap between the 
maximum and minimum seems to reflect the differences in policies applied by each university.   
 
5.2.1.16 Endowment to Total Assets 
 
The mean throughout the 10 year remains relatively the same at around (4.5%-5.5%). Some 
universities exhibit 0 endowments, whereas the maximum university has an endowment level 
higher than 50% across the decade. Resource dependence theorists (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
 213 
Bouwman, 2011) have suggested that universities that are financially independent are able to 
forge the governance direction that aids its objectives, therefore, leading to better performance. 
But there is a trade-off associated with large endowments, the donors might impose their 
influence on the institutions which might hinders the process of knowledge creation (Bebchuck 
et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2015).  
 
5.2.2 University Performance Variables 
 
This section 213ndogene the 3 dependent variables that of research, teaching and financial 
performance of a university. The order of discussion here is driven by the theoretical and 
methodological imperatives of the thesis.  
 
5.2.2.1 Research Performance Index 
 
The research performance index was constructed using five measures, research quality, 
research grant fraction, degree completion rate, graduate prospects and good honors.  
 
5.2.2.1 Research Quality 
 
It is quite revealing to see the rapid decline in research quality of the average UK University 
during the decade 2005 to 2015. This decline is particularly severe between 2007 and 2010 
possibly due to the increased quality based regulation and rating systems initiated by the 
Research Assessment Exercise in the UK (Ntim et al., 2017; Foskett, 2010). This is preliminary 
quantitative confirmation of “the decline in research quality” argument repeatedly stressed in 
UK governance normative literature (Brown, 2011a; Foskett, 2010; Hemsley-Brown, 2011).  
The diversity among universities is also obvious here. The ratio of the standard deviation to 
the mean in this sample (i.e. the coefficient of variation) has been growing and is between 80 
and 94% especially in recent years 2012-2015 suggesting the growing disparity in research 
quality among universities. The 95th percentile of the data comprises universities with RQ 
ratings above just 66 and 69 when compared to a maximum possible rating of 100.  95% of the 
universities lie below this RQ rating. Only about 5% of the sample is in the very high research 
quality bracket of 70% or above. Clearly then UK universities can be divided into two different 
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segments of research quality (Boliver, 2015; RAE results. 1996-2008; League tables cited by 
Shattock, 2013a: 13-15).  
 
Therefore preliminary evidence emerges that research quality is a core concern in UK 
university governance and performance. It also seems to confirm why  recent theoretical and 
empirical scholarship (Jongbloed et al., 2018; Bonroy & Constantatos, 2008; Dulleck & 
Kerschbamer, 2006; van Vught et al., 2012) has repeatedly stressed internal governances that 
foster the ‘credence/experience good’ nature of university education. The average UK 
University has its work cut out to assure potential students about its research credentials.  
 
Splicing the sample by Russel group further accentuates this argument. Across the decade the 
24 universities comprising this elite group consistently outperform peers on this metric (see 
Appendix 1). Undoubtedly this group fully earns its epithet “research intensive” given by 
several scholars (Tarbert et al., 2008; Bachan, 2015). Such distinct differences are visible 
across another sample splicing between the old pre-1992 universities and their post-92 peers. 
Traditional UK universities i.e. pre-1992 ones outperform and stand out as comprising another 
part of the high research quality segment. Their post-92 peers are clear laggards. 
 
5.2.2.3 Research Grant Fraction  
 
The mean average for research grants fractions remain relatively the same throughout the 
decade at (9%) levels. What is noteworthy, is the maximum and minimum values. Some 
universities receive no research grant fraction while others receive as much as (43%). It appears 
that most UK universities were hardly dependent on research grants or incomes and on average 
this situation has hardly changed across the decade (see Tables 7). Large numbers of 
universities (nearly 52% of all university year observations) earned less than 5% of their total 
income from research while a few of them (less than 1% of the data set) earned as high as 30-
43% of their income from this source. This distinctive pattern is a preliminary confirmation of 
arguments advanced in the Culture & Quality Assurance (CQA) theoretical paradigm about the 
dwindling quality in UK research (Canado in Blessinger & Anchan (eds), 2015:55; Eurydice, 
2010:24; Brown & Carasso, 2013 144-168; Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; Palfreyman, 2010). The 
fact that most universities earn next to nothing from research suggests that they lack the skills 
and competence to generate resources from this highly competitive sector. 
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Table 7: Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Performance 
Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Performance  
Variables: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
RPI: Research Performance Index 
Mean 207.666 229.0212 221.1556 219.0257 - 208.2422 201.6778 201.3409 198.5217 197.9393 201.3403 204.0676 
Median 198.0395 232.6351 223.5802 214.9101 - 193.8905 189.6947 187.654 183.1669 182.9632 186.8099 189.5096 
STD 40.87049 34.23181 37.87466 38.35283 - 43.96849 40.03092 40.23602 40.68209 41.67301 39.80342 39.24552 
CV .1968087 .14947 .171258 .1751065 - .2111411 .1984895 .1998402 .2049252 .2105343 .1976923 .1923162 
Minimum 129.8801 157.1375 149.7937 149.7571 - 143.3908 145.7924 139.0404 133.9586 129.8801 136.1901 144.9552 
Maximum 312.1263 312.1263 310.0207 306.4429 - 307.5002 307.5331 307.4383 308.4206 306.8635 309.1741 311.3969 
RQ: Research Quality 
Mean 37.13213 60.75911 60.37879 56.73554 - 41.07304 29.07658 27.68549 26.92762 26.34146 26.60422 26.67218 
Median 34.88372 68.18182 67.42424 61.36364 - 26.15385 16.21622 13.95349 12.19512 11.85185 11.77778 11.77778 
STD 28.92105 23.09889 23.2945 25.24143 - 29.947 25.05892 25.61677 25.36692 25.07927 25.16937 25.10797 
CV .7788686 .3801717 .385806 .4448963 - .7291157 .8618251 .9252777 .9420411 .9520834 .9460668 .9413545 
Minimum 0 7.575758 7.575758 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 .6666667 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 - 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
RGF: Research Grant Fraction 
Mean .0943918 .0995783 .0980832 .092078 .093442 .0940843 .0935653 .0940159   .0925701   .0924094 .0930417 .0957339 
Median .0465621 .0541409 .0526034 .0490078 .0482894 .0445159 .0453411 .045145 .0425256 .0435512 .0427195 .046461 
STD .0986629 .095619 .0960443 .0958763 .0976915 .1004063 .1021097 .1014003 .099263 .0981657 .0987565 .1030859 
CV 1.045248 .9602392 .9792127 1.041251 1.045477 1.067195 1.09132 1.078545 1.0723   1.062291 1.061421 1.076795 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum .4369483 .3853796 .4069535 .4136162 .4235437 .4267778 .4277241 .4244216 .4100335 .3999228 .4058093 .4369483 
TPI: Teaching Performance Index  
Mean 169.3254   170.2762 163.8089 165.1341 - 166.3763 170.0396 169.2596 168.6768 168.9535 172.6296 175.4925 
Median 166.8273 170.2088 164.5041 160.6616 - 164.781 167.4167 166.1165 164.267 164.2137 168.2076 172.747 
STD 19.22052 14.27968 17.5311 19.14733 - 19.50108 18.96165 19.03322 19.83144 20.99016 19.53654 18.94515 
CV .1135123 .0838618 .1070217 .1159502 - .1172107 .1115132 .1124498 .1175706 .1242364 .1131703 .1079542 
Minimum 122.6914 146.9586 126.9453 128.6928 - 133.2226 133.8969 132.8866 126.1024 122.6914 125.1516 134.8542 
Maximum 219.121 202.1388 202.6141 214.5283 - 215.4522 215.6825 213.4344 218.0201 215.0857 217.2607 219.121 
TGF: Teaching Grant Fraction 
Mean .3009262 .3889369 .387905 .3776879 .3613594 .3483193 .3343147 .3185422 .2929882 .2186967 .1644564 .1185552 
Median .2855349 .4131778 .4130308 .4126563 .384764 .3693768 .3470723 .330348 .3092564 .2210988 .1431528 .0847147 
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Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Performance  
Variables: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
STD .155281 .1433928 .1504555 .1470546 .1384706 .1328311 .1284399 .1242865 .1167508 .1015839 .1043257 .1068141 
CV .5160101 .3686788   .3878668 .3893549 .3831936 .3813486 .3841885 .3901729 .3984831 .4644968   .634367   .9009653 
Minimum .053357 .0807707   .0020798   .053357 .0013063 .0005838   .0015085   .0024903 .0031122 .0029953 .0029953 .0018501 
Maximum .7113031 .7113031 .7011411 .6429751 .6632633 .704868 .6958703 .67426 .656284 .6701003 .6669917 .6495573 
SATIS: Overall Student Satisfaction  
Mean 4.085029 3.978788 3.970297 4.025397 4.066222 4.039888 4.041186 4.078195 4.134296 4.167841 4.184307 4.19758 
Median 4.1 4 4 4.019333 4.083889 4.058333 4.037917   4.082963 4.153333 4.191538 4.195517 4.210286 
STD .1836054 .1727761 .1835998 .1878717 .1890418 .1836306 .1800308 .1717424 .1567288 .1520066 .1356813 .1306723 
CV .0449459 .0434243 .0462434 .0466716 .0464908 .0454544 .044549 .0421124 .0379094 .0364713 .0324262 .0311304 
Minimum 3.328889 3.5 3.4 3.56 3.477143 3.447778 3.328889 3.35333 3.5125 3.666 3.7087 3.873333 
Maximum 4.6575 4.3 4.4 4.595 4.6575 4.486667 4.595714 4.538333 4.486667 4.5575 4.465556 4.572 
GHONR: Good Honors 
Mean 62.44991 59.51818 59.51818 59.24444 - 60.11416 61.51316 62.5193   62.68707 64.03846 66 67.74344 
Median 61.45 58.1 58.1 58.65 - 58.8 61.2 61.5 61.5 62.4 63.1 66.7 
STD 10.97206 10.52977 10.58985 10.499 - 11.23511 10.88022 10.89174 10.92082 10.73701 10.29857 9.931409 
CV .1756937 .1769168 .1778163   .177215 - .1868962   .1768763 .1742141 .1742117 .167665 .1560389 .1466033 
Minimum 38.5 39.3 39.7 38.5 - 40.6 44.4 42.3 42.7 42.2 43.9 43.5 
Maximum 91.8 89.3 90.4 88.4 - 90.1 91.1 91.8 91.2 90.9 90.9 91.5 
CPRATE: Completion Rate 
Mean 84.59483 85.29293 84.719 84.17037 - 83.32832 83.58246 84.24159 84.90776 83.76207 85.82149 86.02623 
Median 84.75 86 85.15 83.95 - 83.4 84.05 83.5 84.6 84.25 86 85.85 
STD 7.721634 6.531326 8.290565 7.981208 - 8.193535 8.292424 7.557975 7.449227 8.469635 7.208805 6.789452 
CV .0912778 .0765752 .0978596 .0948221 - .0983283 .0992125 .0897179 .0877332 .1011154 .0839977 .078923 
Minimum 56 65 62 66.6 - 63.3 56 62.6 57.2 57.5 62.9 67.4 
Maximum 99 98 98.5 98.9 - 98.6 99 98.6 98.7 98.8 98.8 98.9 
GRPROS: Graduate Prospects  
Mean 65.70658 71.57071 62.954 63.59815 - 65.91239 68.60439 66.14211 63.65862 63.47692 64.87438 66.67623 
Median 65.6 71.2 62 63.4 - 63.8 68.75 66.2 61.95 62.8 63.7 66 
STD 9.598116 6.874506 8.62686 8.982548 - 9.316145 8.588811 8.930765 9.864676 10.35956 10.27018 10.18977 
CV .1460754 .0960519 .1370343 .1412391 - .1413413 .1251933 .1350239 .1549621   .1632021 .1583087 .1528246 
Minimum 39.4   54.9 43   41.7 - 45.2 50.9 45.3 45.4 39.4 43.7 46.1 
Maximum 90.6 89.8 85.4 86.9 - 89.3 90.6 88.9 87.5 87.8 89.2 89.9 
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Univariate Descriptive Analysis for University Performance  
Variables: All 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AT: Asset Turnover 
Mean .3775446 .2610234 .2611874 .2830374 .3028236 .3304958 .3536976 .3710947 .3977158 .4769528 .5358993 .5772528 
Median .3505248 .2561531 .2513397 .2687744 .2987545 .3341654 .3581083 .3739431 .4042323 .523282 .5949422 .6334063 
STD .1582327 .0845527 .0943894 .0967052 .0941551 .0996175 .1028855 .1048694 .1097063 .1363031 .1633554 .1857341 
CV .4191101 .3239278 .3613857 .3416693 .3109241 .3014182 .2908854 .2825948 .2758409 .2857789 .3048248 .3217552 
Minimum .0215609 .0805616 .0719974 .0215609 .0719588 .080481 .0858079 .1017536 .1128741 .1270569 .1379523 .0981435 




Teaching Performance Index 
 
The teaching performance index was constructed using four measures, overall student 
satisfaction, degree completion rate, graduate prospects and good honors. Teaching grant 
fraction was used still used as a teaching performance indicator but not as part of the index for 
reasons explained in chapter four.  
 
Teaching Grant Fraction  
 
A clear reduction in teaching grants can be seen in Table 7. The mean and median average has 
dropped more than 50% from 2005 to 2015. Also there seems to be a stark contrast among 
universities, some universities are exhibiting as high as 70% of its income are from teaching 
grant providers while at the other end of the spectrum appears to show fractions of as small as 
1%-5% levels.  
 
Overall Student Satisfaction  
 
overall student satisfaction has remained fairly the same in the past decade with a slight 
increase when comparing the average mean score of (3.97) in 2005 to (4.19) in 2015. The 
minimum and maximum for student satisfaction has been steadily improving throughout the 
years (see Table 7). Education is an experience good, the student based indicator is based on 
the students perception of the consumed goods. Several scholars have suggested that student 
are uniformed consumers, and the true value of their experience can only be assessed in the 
future (Bonroy & Constamntatos, 2008; Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; Van Vught et al., 




Completion rates  has not fluctuated and remained more or less the same throughout the decade 
with an mean average of 84.5% for all years. The minimum has shown a steady increase from 
65% in 2005 to 67.4% in 2015 (see Table 7). Then maximum value has remained high and 
have not decreased. It appears more students are finishing the courses they have started than in 
2005.   
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Graduate Prospects  
 
The mean value has changed across the decade, reaching its highest score in 2005 with a value 
of 71.5% and then decreasing to a minimum of 62.9% in 2006 and then steadily increasing 
until reaching a value of 66.6% in 2015. The same pattern applies to the minimum and 




A very clear picture appears when you look at the means average from 2005 to 2015, there 
seems to be a substantial 219e-education in asset turnover in  2006, 2007 and 2008. This 
coincides with the economic financial crisis at that time, this can also be reflected in the 
minimum and maximum being the lowest in that period. Although asset turnover regains 
strength and continues to increase year on year reaching an all high in 2015.  
 
 
5.2.3. Descriptive Statistics for the Control Variables 
 
 
This section analyses the 4 control variables which are university size (total assets, total income 
and total staff), University affiliation/alliance (Russell Group), Age (Pre1992) and region 
(England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland).  
 
5.2.3.1 University Size 
 
A rapid and steady increase in the size control variables (total assets, total income, total staff) 
can be seen. In the past decade total assets has increased by more than (50%), from a median 
average of 193,522.5 million GBP in 2005 to 300,000 million GBP in 2015. The minimum and 
maximum has also shown to be on the up rise with total assets doubling in value in the past 
decade. Total income in UK universities have risen rapidly almost doubling on average across 
the decade from 134.8769 million GBP in 2005 to 239.2913 million GBP in 2015 (see Table 
8). This is clear corroboration of how the quasi-market introduced in 2010 and subsequent 
freeing up of tuition fee caps for domestic students have significantly benefited the average 
institution (Shattock, 2010: Parker, 2011: Middlehurst, 2013; Browne, 2010, Ntim et al., 2017). 
But there is tremendous diversity in university financial earnings and the data sample in this 
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variable can hardly be considered to be normally distributed. Large fraction of universities are 
earning below 50 million GBP per year. These are the institutions facing huge financial 
constraints. Total staff has been raising in the UK mainly due to public pressure being applied 
on universities to increase its student coverage, together with the fact that universities have 
been increasing their student population to generate more revenues after reduced government 
support (Brown & Carasso, 2013; McDonald, 2013; Davern et al., 2006; Bachan & Reilly, 
2015). This has been pressured universities to recruit more staff in order to cope  with the influx 
of student demands.   
 
5.2.3.2 Russell Group, Pre-1992 University and Region 
  
These 3 variables were used as dummy variables to measure University affiliation, age and 
regional distribution of all 132 universities in the UK (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland).   
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for the Control Variables 
Descriptive Statistics for the Control Variables 
Variables Total 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
TA: Total Assets 
Mean 297174.5 193522.5 212185.1 227716.7 248770.5 268386.9 291241.2 315512.9 331407.8 359249.8 389758.8 427458.7 
Median 201628 148217 153829 170327.5 184257 202267 204904 234287.5 242185.5 254300.5 271572 300089 
STD 350223.9 204848.7 234859.4 252488.4 271241.9 285553.1 311441.7 337529.7 360420.4 423651.2 450286.1 511115 
CV 1.178513 1.058526 1.106861 1.108783 1.09033 1.063961 1.06936 1.069781 1.087544 1.179266 1.155294 1.195706 
Minimum 8655 8750 8655 10311 11332 13683 18224 14078 12923 15400 17793 24316 
Maximum 3628607 1487138 1769826 1899353 1928740 1973675 2219303 2347726 2482816 3145928 3289488 3628607 
TINC: Total Income 
Mean 190370.9 133395.2 144428.2 155483.8 172256.6 185488.3 196106 203270 206447.5 216060.1 231307.7 248858.2 
Median 142560.5 106768 114906 126623 141380 150792 159378 166052 164094.5 171408 180362.5 187864 
STD 191076.3 119812.6 136023 147279.2 161633.3 176108 183939.5 190694.7 202261.1 216615.9 230467 261506.3 
CV 1.003705 .8981776 .9418033 .9472319 .9383286 .9494289 .9379599 .9381346 .9797218 1.002572 .9963655 1.050825 
Minimum 8335 8335 8706 9289 11483 11991 13921 16062 15993 17606 17232 20087 
Maximum 1638282 694624 890748 958166 1074018 1139897 1189669 1251484 1322128 1438245 1504477 1638282 
TST: Total Students 
Mean 1289.837 1166.405 1175.282 1204.405 1239.921 1272.362 1290 1299.325 1305.595 1344.008 1424.28 1462.88 
Median 1080 1050 1045 1055 1055 1090 1050 1090 1142.5 1135 1205 1160 
STD 1027.084 863.3443 896.3561 921.4288 955.7437 982.4023 1009.41 1017.863 1045.783 1086.71 1180.271 1262.044 
CV .7962895 .7401755 .762673 .7650491 .77081 .772109 .7824886 .7833783 .8010007 .808559 .8286791 .8627119 
Minimum 5 90 5 5 15 20 20 25 30 35 35 35 
Maximum 7070 4320 4820 4760 4930 5080 5370 5425 5660 5965 6470 7070 
RGROUP: Russell Group Universities          
Mean .1832061 .1832061 .1832061 .1832061 .1832061 .1832061 .1832061  .1832061  .1832061  .1832061  .1832061  .1832061  
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
STD .3869697 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 .3883204 
CV 2.11221 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 2.119582 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PRE92: Pre-1992 Universities 
Mean .3819444 .3816794 .3816794 .3816794 .3816794 .3816794 .3816794 .3816794 .3816794 .3816794 .3846154 .3816794 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
STD .4860318 .4876634 .4876634 .4876634 .4876634 .4876634 .4876634 .4876634 .4876634 .4876634 .4883863 .4876634 
CV 1.27252 1.277678 1.277678 1.277678 1.277678 1.277678 1.277678 1.277678 1.277678 1.277678 1.269804 1.277678 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
REGION: Regional Distribution (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) 
Mean 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 1.374046 
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
STD .7552544 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 .7578906 
CV .5496574 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 .5515759 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 






5.3 Correlation Analysis 
 
The next section of this chapter is a detailed cross-correlation analysis that critically 
evaluates each potential; pair of variables both separately and in combination with all 
others. This is done with a view to developing the most parsimonious multiple regression 
models in the next chapter that will be able to decipher the complex multi-dimensional 
links between university governance and performance. In line with this aim section 5.3.1 
presents selective cross-correlation tables that pair key variables involved in various 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. This is then followed by section 5.3.2 which presents 
and analyses the complex implications for full model development. These include 
specification considerations, partial correlation tables and multicollinearity metrics. 
 
5.3.1 Selective Correlations  
 
Given that research, teaching and financial performances constitute the main dependent 
variables in this thesis the section first analyses select performance indicators with their 
likely governance based antecedents. In the process the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 
3 are simultaneously evaluated. However governances and performances are also 
correlated amongst themselves too in the later part of this section to richly unpack the 
multi-dimensional, endogenous and process-like links between university governance and 
performance.  
 
5.3.1.1 Research Performance  
 
University research performance as argued earlier is multi-dimensional and therefore 
cannot be mapped solely by one variable. In order to capture the complete picture of a 
university’s research performance of the several university year variables in this data set 
the following six are chosen as the most relevant indicators. The detailed univariate 
analysis of each variables has already been done in the earlier part of this chapter. But the 
rationale for their joint use here is briefly justified against each variable below. 
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Research Quality,  is an indicator constructed and moderated by the Times Guide using 
both HESA and RAE (2008) data but updating it each year with information supplied by 
the university as described in the previous chapter. Given the robustness of this exercise 
this is arguably a prime indicator of research performance.  
1. Research Grant Fraction –HESA figures for both Research grants and Total Income 
are used to compute this. The argument here is that a university that has higher 
fractions of its total income earned from research is a higher performer. Hence this 
variable is used as a second important proxy for research performance. 
2. Research Income per Academic – HESA figures for research grants as well as 
research only plus research/teaching staff numbers are used to compute this. The 
logic here is that a per capita figure of how much a university attracts in terms of 
research grants per research academic in its employ reflects its performance. 
3. Good Honours proportion – This variable is sourced from the TIMES and reflects 
the overall academic performance of a given university. It can be argued that a 
university with higher proportions of good honours degrees is likely to be a high 
performer in academics including both teaching and research. 
4. Graduate Prospects – The percentage of students who either take up employment 
or further study reflects a university’s research standing at least partially. That is 
the logic underlying this variable’s inclusion. 
5. Completion Rate – Although this variable is a projection of students expected to 
complete their study each year still given that this is a time series across the decade 
it can be argued that it proxies the university’s academic performance to progress 
both its taught and non-taught (i.e. Mphil/Phd) students.  
 
The first step here is to examine the correlations between all these indicators of university 







Table 9: Shows the Correlations Between University Research Performance Indicators 












Research Quality 1.0000      
Research Grant Fraction  0.7199*** 1.0000     
Research Income per Academic 0.1339*** 0.3210*** 1.0000    
Good Honours  0.6075*** 0.7101*** 0.4313*** 1.0000   
Graduate Prospects  0.5730*** 0.6159*** 0.2406*** 0.6188*** 1.0000  
Completion Rate  0.6588*** 0.5865*** 0.1996*** 0.7340*** 0.5981*** 1.0000 
Table 9 fully defines all the variables used. *,**,***,**** Correlation is significant at 5, 1, 0.1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  
 
Variables are correlated with each other at 1% significance levels. But what is noteworthy 
is the strong correlation of research quality and all variables (above 0.55) except research 
income per academic (0.1339). To construct one research performance index variable that 
robustly maps the research function of a university a factor analysis combined with a 
principal components analysis is jointly performed here a method already attempted by 
Lokuwaduge (2011) and  Lokuwaduge  & Armstrong (2015) in her smaller cross sectional 
sample of Australian universities.  
 
As anticipated the factor analysis using principal factors retains 3 factors out of 6 potentials 
with an LR test of independence Chi-squared of 4075.61 and extremely low p-value. The 
Eigen values range from positive 3.45272 to -0.16234 suggesting that it is research quality, 
research grant fraction and research income per academic that have linked factor 
explanations of research performance i.e. positive Eigen values. The other three variables 
with negative Eigen values stand apart possibly due to their contrarian and different 
explanation of research performance.   
 
The final table using the principal components analysis method with orthogonal Varimax 
rotation of the six variables with Kaiser Correction is shown below.  5 of the 6 variables 
had factor loadings above 0.71 for the solitary factor retained as shown below.  
 
1 Lokuwaduge (2011) cites Field (2209) who opines that factor loadings above 0.7 are indicative of a well-
defined correlation structure and ought to be applied in constructing the index, although in other 
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Table 10: Factor Analysis: Principle-Component Factors Varimax (Kaiser on) for RPI 
Variables Factor 1 Uniqueness  
Research Quality 0.8303 0.3106 
Research Grant Fraction  0.8933 0.2020 
Research Income per Academic 0.5401 0.7083 
Good Honours  0.8745 0.2352 
Graduate Prospects  0.7819 0.3886 
Completion Rate  0.8129 0.3391 
   
Retained factors  1  
Variance 3.81616  
Proportion  0.6360  
cumulative 0.6360  
Factor rotation matrix 1.000  
 
Research income per academic with a loading of just 0.5401 is consequently dropped from 
the index construction. Hence the research performance index is constructed as follows: 
 
Research Performance  Index = 0.8303 * Research Quality + 0.8933 * Research Grant 
Fraction + 0.8745 * Good Honours + 0.7819 * Graduate Prospects + 0.8129 * 
Completion Rate 
 
The index accords different weights to each of the five variables but it is worth noting the 
highest weights to research grant fraction. Good honours, research quality in that 
descending order within the index. As anticipated in the correlation table amongst all 
variables research grant fraction is thrown up with the highest factor loading (0.8933). It 
supports the earlier contention that this variable is the strongest candidate for a 
comprehensive proxy for university research performance.  
 
 
circumstances 0.6 is still considered an acceptable factor loading. (Hair et al., 2006)  This suggestion is 
followed here. 
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Yet it should be mentioned that despite different weights for each index variable their 
differences are not substantial ranging from 0.7819 (Graduate Prospects) to 0.8933 
(Research Grant Fraction). It may therefore be interpreted as largely an equal weighted 
index.  
 
In what follows a detailed correlation analysis of this research performance index with 
related research governances, internal governances and various intended control variables 
is conducted. To richly unpack the multiple dimensions and trade-offs characterizing 
university performance (i.e. the principal research gap of this thesis) this correlation 
analysis also includes wherever important the correlation structure with index components 












Table 11: Correlation Metrics of Dependent and Independent Variables for Research Performance 




Research Quality Research Grant  Completion Rate Good Honours Graduate Prospect Research 
Income Per 
Academic 
BSIZE  0.3818*** 0.4208*** 0.3081*** 0.2719*** 0.2276*** 0.2360*** 0.0599*** 
BGDIV  -0.1501*** -0.1869*** -0.0845*** -0.1106*** -0.0004 -0.1778*** 0.0349 
BEDIV  -0.2383*** -0.1689*** -0.2282*** -0.2553*** -0.2112*** -0.1928*** -0.1106*** 
IGOV  -0.5751*** -0.5201*** -0.4997*** -0.4780*** -0.5246*** -0.4389*** -0.0725** 
GBMFS  0.1445*** 0.0939*** 0.2063*** 0.0847*** 0.2200*** 0.1377*** 0.1193*** 
ETMS  0.2854*** 0.2003*** 0.2827*** 0.3751*** 0.3181*** 0.1123* 0.2648*** 
SSR  -0.7388*** -0.6562*** -0.7064*** -0.5778*** -0.6264*** -0.6200*** -0.6837*** 
ES  0.9238*** 0.7912*** 0.7613*** 0.7896*** 0.8555*** 0.7309*** 0.2410*** 
PTTSR  -0.3385*** -0.2911*** -0.4782*** -0.1782*** -0.2737*** -0.3713*** -0.1655*** 
FSF  -0.5283*** -0.5555*** -0.5256*** -0.3060*** -0.3378*** -0.3711*** -0.1565*** 
TRST  -0.5182*** -0.4548*** -0.3970*** -0.4066*** -0.4360*** -0.3015*** -0.2641*** 
TONLY -0.1075*** -0.0829*** -0.2875*** -0.0306 -0.1192*** -0.1748*** -0.0995*** 
RONLY 0.7889*** 0.6995*** 0.9431*** 0.5750*** 0.7022*** 0.6020*** 0.3618*** 
PGINT  0.5217*** 0.4857*** 0.4563*** 0.3625*** 0.4336*** 0.4506*** -0.0367 
TFEE  -0.5019*** -0.5883*** -0.4871*** -0.2139*** -0.2150*** -0.3174*** -0.2046*** 
INTS  0.4165*** 0.3888*** 0.4067*** 0.2519*** 0.3761*** 0.3625*** 0.0051 
ENDWTA  0.5450*** 0.5448*** 0.5319*** 0.3800*** 0.4521*** 0.3404*** 0.0728*** 
VCPAY  0.3011*** 0.1577*** 0.3954*** 0.3137*** 0.4675*** 0.3482*** -0.0161 
BIG4 0.3087*** 0.2672*** 0.2996*** 0.2363*** 0.2602*** 0.2640*** 0.0901*** 
UGCOM -0.2743*** -0.2679*** -0.1800*** -0.2496*** -0.1852*** -0.1751*** -0.0775*** 
SFSPEND 0.3954*** 0.1907*** 0.4776*** 0.4315*** 0.5970*** 0.4251*** 0.0723** 
CTA -0.2596*** -0.2713*** -0.1372*** -0.2486*** -0.1347*** -0.2205*** 0.1686*** 
DTA 0.0323 0.0238 -0.0694** 0.1495*** 0.0336 0.0011 -0.1059*** 
FTA 0.1076*** 0.1436*** -0.0291 0.1082*** -0.0096 0.0858*** -0.2221*** 
SUBCOM 0.0147 0.0555* 0.0542* -0.0757*** -0.0053 -0.0119 0.0298 
ADSIZE 0.0754* 0.0791* 0.0197 0.0825** 0.0598 0.0348 -0.1063*** 
TA 0.5627*** 0.4566*** 0.6065*** 0.5028*** 0.5928*** 0.4904*** -0.0664** 
TINC 0.5924*** 0.5002*** 0.6757*** 0.4918*** 0.5955*** 0.5012*** 0.0654** 
TST 0.5833*** 0.5286*** 0.5427*** 0.4835*** 0.5102*** 0.4613*** -0.2117*** 
RGROUP 0.6123*** 0.5252* 0.7332*** 0.5101*** 0.5502*** 0.4794*** 0.1180*** 
PRE92 0.7286*** 0.6828* 0.6533*** 0.5245*** 0.6115*** 0.5156*** 0.0817** 
REGION 0.0315 0.0259 0.2305*** -0.1720*** 0.0932** 0.0627* 0.1800*** 
Notes: The table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients for independent variables with the teaching variables. Variables are defined as follows: 
governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender diversity (BGDIV); board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); independent governors (IGOV); frequency of governing 
board meetings (GBMs); frequency of executive team meetings (EFMs); student to staff ratio (SSR); entry standards (ES); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); 
female staff fraction (FSF); teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching only staff (TONLY);  research only staff (RONLY); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); 
tuition fee (TFEE); international students (INTS); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); vice-chancellor (VCG); audit firm size 
(BIG4); and governance committee (GCOM); service and facility spend (SFSPEND); cash to total asset (CTA); debt to total asset (DTA); fixed to total assets 
(FTA); number of governance sub-committees (SUBCOM); audit committee size (ADSIZE); total assets (TA); total income (TINC); total staff (TST); 228ndogen 
group (RGROUP); pre-1992 university (PRE92); region (REGION). Table 11 fully defines all the variables used. *,**,***,**** Correlation is significant at 5, 
1, 0.1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
A few interesting and noteworthy results, in this the UK longitudinal sample, board size 
results indicate that larger boards are positively correlated with research performance. 
Lokuwaduge in her Australian cross-sectional sample does not even find a significant 
correlation between council size and research performance. This offers preliminary 
indications towards  hypothesis (6a) with a positive sign. This positive association confirms 
for one that specifying a maximum board size of 25 as currently stipulated is irrelevant and 
might even be harmful to university research performance. The Board ethnic diversity 
variable shows a contrarian negative result at (-0.2383). this seems to indicate a  
contradiction to our hypothesis (6c)  that UK university boards with higher levels of ethnic 
diversity perform poorly on research. Board independence seems to strongly negatively 
correlate with research performance (-0.5751). This result also does not lend support to the 
developed hypothesis (6g) advanced in Chapter 3. Although these results tally with 
Lokuwaduge’s (2011) Australian results and corroborate that UK universities are similar 
to their Australian peers at least in respect of research performance.  
 
Results also indicate that research performance index is strongly positively correlated with 
Entry standards. The relationship is similar with Research Quality (0.7912) and Research 
Grant Fraction (0.7613). There is some proof here that diversity in research student 
populations i.e. a more inclusive entry standards governance mechanism (lower entry 
standards) has a negative impact on research performance. This offers initial indication that 
supports our hypothesis. UK Universities that set high standards in selecting research 
students obviously are better at research.  
 
Research performance is strongly negatively correlated with student staff ratio a key 
internal governance mechanism among universities (-0.7388). UK universities that 
indiscriminately recruit students under pressure from external regulators are severely 
compromising their research performances and the effect persists across the years. They 
have to find the right level of balance between student population coverage, staff utilization 
and research performance which is no easy task.  
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The gender diversity in staff members employed in a university strongly negatively 
correlates with research performance (-0.5283). The gender diversity in staff members 
employed in a university strongly negatively correlates with research performance. 
Ironically the larger the numbers of female staff employed at a given university the poorer 
seems to be its research performance at least on the surface. 
 
 As anticipated by theory especially the culture-quality assurance (CQA) paradigm there is 
indeed a significant negative correlation between Part-time to total staff ratio (-0.3385) 
and research performance. Given that the variable maps the proportion of ad hoc staff 
employed at a university it should indicate the quality of internal research and teaching 
governance priorities. A careful and judicious use of part-time staff is indeed an important 
governance priority that UK universities should adhere to (Brown & Carasso, 2013, Jack 
2008). 
  
The proportion of teaching and research staff employed by a university is strongly 
negatively correlated with research performance index (-0.3385). growing staff 
populations definitely imply both external pressures i.e. activist teaching union exertions 
to employ more standard contract (teaching and research) staff (Dearlove, 2002; Toma, 
2007; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Parker. 2011) and internal governance pressures (rising 
numbers of student enrolment) to tackle rising academic workload (Middlehurst, 2013; 
Parry, 2013; Rowlands, 2013; Taylor, 2013a). 
 
As per their respective missions universities do specialize in either undergraduate or 
postgraduate courses or both (Tarbert et al., 2008; Bachan & Reilly, 2015). It can therefore 
be inferred that the proportion of post graduate students enrolled at a given institution 
reflects its internal governance priorities towards research. The results show that UK 
Universities high postgraduate intensity perform better on the research dimension. This is 
a clear vindication of the Culture/Quality Assurance prediction that the culture and quality 
based ethos stemming from a mission of being more than just a finishing school aids 
research. It also suggests that such focused institutions possibly mobilize specialized 
research related resources and this is what shows up in their higher performance.   
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The results show a strong positive correlation between this financial governance of 
choosing an endowment level and research performance (0.545). this suggests that 
financial independence clearly seems to correlate with excellence in research. 
 
Both Tarbert et al. (2008) and Bachan & Reilly (2015) suggest that Fraction of International 
Students is a good proxy for whether a given institution is likely to invest higher than 
average amounts (arguably arising from the higher tuition fees charged from this student 
fraction) in research and teaching governances. It is unsurprising therefore that UK 
universities show a moderate positive correlation between the variable and research 
performance. 
 
Control variables logtotalincome (0.5924), logtotalassets (0.5627), logtotalstaff (0.5833) 
All the indicators controlling for size of a university display a strong positive correlation 
with research performance index. This is a very similar result to those found elsewhere 
particularly by Lokuwaduge (2011), McDonald (2012) and Bachan et al. (2015). Such 
result confirms the existence of a size related effect in university research performance.  
 
5.3.1.2 Teaching Performance 
 
Just like research, University teaching performance is also multi-dimensional although 
capturing it from even the wide set of variables available in this UK sample has proved 
challenging. Six potential candidate variables are identified each of which is briefly 
justified below. However simple correlation analysis among these strongly suggests an 
index combining only four of them. This is also justified subsequently. 
 
1. Teaching Grant fraction – HESA provides details of funding grants for teaching, 
research and other activities provided by independent fund providers to each 
university every year. From this total figure the component pertaining to research 
is subtracted and the resultant figure is divided by the total income of the university. 
It is inferable that this fraction does indicate how an external body rates the teaching 
function of a university but not necessarily in a straight forward manner as in 
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research. Instead here financial support could be provided as a function of how the 
university fulfills its mission based mandate2. 
2. Overall student satisfaction – This is the NSS collated sample scores based entirely 
on student ratings of academic services received by them. A major criticism here is 
that this variable is biased and generally based on the opinions of uninformed users 
i.e. students. Still it must be considered for what it is worth. 
 
The fourth fifth and sixth variables i.e. Graduate prospects, Good Honours and 
Completion Rate are the same as those considered in research performance. It is 
obvious that each of these variables indicates both research and teaching performance 
and so despite the overlap they ought to be considered.  
Correlation  between the variables clearly show how the 2nd  3rd 4th and 5th variables are 
strongly positively correlated with each other and overall student satisfaction.  
However, teaching grant fraction exhibit fairly moderate significant negative 
correlation with all others. This confirms that constructing a teaching performance 
index (TPI) in this sample has to span at most overall student satisfaction3 and the last 
set of three overlapping variables outlined above.  But given the strong likelihood that 
the first variable of teaching grant fraction (TGF) is an objective and independent 
assessment of the teaching performance of any given university it is retained on its 
own4. 
 
2 HESA and its policies clearly suggest that teaching and other infrastructure related grants are means tested 
and critically based on a range of factors including whether the given university furthers student population 
coverage. This implies that there is already an expectation that this variable will behave differently from the 
others but potentially present a unique otherwise undiscoverable dimension of teaching performance. Hence 
its inclusion here is vital.  
3 Jongbloed et al (2018) point to several voices in the emerging literature on university governance 
including Bonroy & Constantos (2008) Dulleck & Kerschbamer (2006) and Vught et al (2012) all of whom 
identify university education as a “credence good”.  Its quality is difficult to estimate especially by student 
users who can at best be classified as uniformed. Their ratings of teaching performance must therefore 
not be accepted at face value.   
4 One important additional reason for retaining this variable is that funding bodies are dividing their 
available resources based on their independent assessment of universities. The logic that such bodies 
would indeed do detailed due diligence before laying their money on the table is compelling. But equally 
important is the fact mentioned earlier that teaching performance is not as straight forward as research. 
Teaching is a knowledge transmission function that transforms the student from a lower skill level to a 
higher skill level. Therefore a university that takes highly competent students may actually be failing in the 
value addition of its teaching role.  
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Table 12: Factor Analysis: Principle-Component Factors Varimax (Kaiser on) for TPI 
Variables Factor 1 Uniqueness  
Overall Student satisfaction  0.5939 0.6591 
Graduate prospects  0.6992 0.5208 
Good Honours  0.8480 0.2809 
Completion Rate  0.8095 0.3447 
   
Retained factors  1  
Variance 2.19457  
Proportion  1.1369  
cumulative 1.1369  
Factor rotation matrix 1.000  
 
The above factor analysis table shows the factor loadings with Varimax rotation and Kaiser 
Normalization. All four factor loadings are used despite the fact that overall student 
satisfaction has a loading below 0.7 as it is still fairly high i.e. 0.5939 and displays the 
strongest uniqueness of 0.6591.  Therefore, Teaching Performance Index is defined as 
below. 
 
Teaching Performance Index = 0.6922 * Graduate Prospects + 0.8480 * Good 
Honours + 0.8095 * Completion rate + 0.5839 * Overall Student Satisfaction  
 
The index accords different weights to each of the four variables but it is worth noting the 
highest weights to Good Honours. Completion Rate and Graduate Prospects in that 
descending order within the index. It should be mentioned that the different weights for 
each index variable are substantial ranging from 0.5939 (Overall Student Satisfaction) to 
0.8480 (Good Honours). The index cannot therefore be interpreted as an equal weighted 
index.  
 
In what follows a detailed correlation analysis of this teaching performance index with 
related research governances, internal governances and various intended control variables 
is conducted. To richly unpack the multiple dimensions and trade-offs characterizing 
university teaching performance. This correlation analysis as with research also includes 
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the correlation structure with index components separately. But in contrast to research here 
the excluded teaching grant fraction variable is not a footnote to the analysis but instead 
constitutes an integral part of it. This is because it appears that teaching performance is 











Table 13: Correlation metrics of dependent and independent variables for teaching performanc




Student Satisfaction Completion Rate Good Honours Graduate Prospect Teaching Grant 
BSIZE  0.2972*** 0.1502*** 0.2719*** 0.2276*** 0.2360*** -0.1496*** 
BGDIV  -0.1142*** -0.0570* -0.1106*** -0.0004 -0.1778*** -0.0528* 
BEDIV  -0.2513*** -0.2442*** -0.2553*** -0.2112*** -0.1928*** 0.0205 
IGOV  -0.5216*** -0.3572*** -0.4780*** -0.5246*** -0.4389*** 0.3145*** 
GBFMS  0.1602*** 0.1042*** 0.0847*** 0.2200*** 0.1377*** -0.1449*** 
ETMS  0.3039*** 0.2388*** 0.3751*** 0.3181*** 0.1123* -0.3309*** 
SSR  -0.6935*** -0.4170*** -0.5778*** -0.6264*** -0.6200*** 0.4481*** 
ES  0.9118*** 0.4465*** 0.7896*** 0.8555*** 0.7309*** -0.4812*** 
PTTSR  -0.3197*** -0.2626*** -0.1782*** -0.2737*** -0.3713*** -0.4782*** 
FSF  -0.3974*** -0.2173*** -0.3060*** -0.3378*** -0.3711*** 0.2728*** 
TRST  -0.4405*** -0.2958*** -0.4066*** -0.4360*** -0.3015*** 0.2269*** 
TONLY -0.1113***   0.0238 -0.0306 -0.1192*** -0.1748*** 0.0871*** 
RONLY 0.7205*** 0.3997*** 0.5750*** 0.7022*** 0.6020*** -0.4703*** 
PGINT  0.4751*** 0.3016*** 0.3625*** 0.4336*** 0.4506*** -0.4744*** 
TFEE  -0.2771*** 0.0506* -0.2139*** -0.2150*** -0.3174*** -0.4048*** 
INTS  0.3925*** 0.2172*** 0.2519*** 0.3761*** 0.3625*** -0.5622*** 
ENDWTA  0.4256*** 0.2882*** 0.3800*** 0.4521*** 0.3404*** -0.3665*** 
VCPAY  0.4570*** 0.2585*** 0.3137*** 0.4675*** 0.3482*** -0.5068** 
BIG4A 0.2959*** 0.1366*** 0.2363*** 0.2602*** 0.2640*** -0.1418*** 
UGCOM -0.2271*** -0.1114*** -0.2496*** -0.1852*** -0.1751*** 0.0938*** 
SFSPEND 0.5777*** 0.4770*** 0.4315*** 0.5970*** 0.4251*** -0.6354*** 
CTA -0.2057*** 0.0243 -0.2486*** -0.1347*** -0.2205***   0.0320 
DTA 0.0697** 0.0115 0.1495*** 0.0336 0.0011 -0.1493*** 
FTA 0.0480 -0.0760*** 0.1082*** -0.0096 0.0858*** 0.0537** 
SUBCOM -0.0274 -0.0646** -0.0757*** -0.0053 -0.0119 0.0324 
ADSIZE -0.0826* 0.0273 0.0825** 0.0598 0.0348 - 0.1335*** 
TA 0.5940*** 0.2207*** 0.5028*** 0.5928*** 0.4904*** -0.5678*** 
TINC 0.5984*** 0.2085*** 0.4918*** 0.5955*** 0.5012*** -0.5621*** 
TST 0.5385*** 0.1300*** 0.4835*** 0.5102*** 0.4613*** -0.4726*** 
RGROUP 0.5859*** 0.2456*** 0.5101*** 0.5502*** 0.4794*** -0.4236* 
PRE92 0.6437*** 0.4527*** 0.5245*** 0.6115*** 0.5156*** -0.5361* 
REGION 0.0534* 0.1266*** -0.1720*** 0.0932** 0.0627* 0.1417* 
Notes: The table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients for independent variables with the teaching variables. Variables are defined 
as follows: governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender diversity (BGDIV); board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); independent governors (IGOV); 
frequency of governing board meetings (GBMs); frequency of executive team meetings (EFMs); student to staff ratio (SSR); entry standards (ES); 
part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); female staff fraction (FSF); teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching only staff (TONLY); research only 
staff (RONLY); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); tuition fee (TFEE); international students (INTS); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); vice-
chancellor pay (VCPAY); vice-chancellor (VCG); audit firm size (BIG4); and governance committee (GCOM); service and facility spend 
(SFSPEND); cash to total asset (CTA); debt to total asset (DTA); fixed to total assets (FTA); number of governance sub-committees (SUBCOM); 
audit committee size (ADSIZE); total assets (TA); total income (TINC); total staff (TST); 235ndogen group (RGROUP); pre-1992 university (PRE92); 
region (REGION). Table 13 fully defines all the variables used. *,**,***,**** Correlation is significant at 5, 1, 0.1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively  
A few results here are worth discussing.  Board size just like research, teaching 
performance too displays a positive correlation with board size although its magnitude is 
much smaller (0.2972). Board ethnic diversity as in the case of research teaching 
performance is also negatively correlated with board ethnic diversity but the correlation 
magnitude is slightly higher (-0.2513). 
 
Board Independence once again shows a significant and strong negative correlation (-
0.5216) which suggests a contradicting  association to hypothesis. Board independence 
interferes with teaching performance just as with research. The finding is at odds with 
Lokuwaduge (2011) who finds a positive correlation with all her teaching performance 
variables within the Australian context. In the UK sample then all the theoretical reasoning 
and justifications implied in research performance discussed earlier apply in teaching too. 
However as usual the teaching grant fraction shows a different dimension of teaching 
performance with a weak but significant positive correlation (0.3145). 
 
Teaching performance strongly positively correlates with entry standards. However the 
picture changes completely when teaching grant fraction is used as a proxy for teaching 
performance. The relationship is moderately negative (-0.4812) and significant. The 
complexity of teaching performance which unlike research has a transformational 
dimension is neatly captured. 
 
Teaching quality and performance depend on an average student’s access to one-on-one 
teacher time and this is clearly substantiated in the strong negative correlation between this 
internal governance and the teaching index (-0.6935). 
 
As anticipated university teaching performance seems strongly positively correlated with 
a university’s spending on teaching related infrastructure (0.5777). Teaching grant fraction 
reverses the above finding with a significant and strong negative correlation (-0.6354). 
 
Teaching and  research staff fraction contracts negatively correlate with teaching 
performance (-0.4405). As with research performance the largest fraction of academic staff 
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employed on standard employment Similar arguments as with research performance 
combining union activism with internal governance based pressures may be advanced here 
as well. Although teaching grant fraction shows a smaller positive correlation deeper 
analysis through pooled regressions show that this is not a straightforward association. 
Overall it does seem that in line with quality assurance assertions (Attwood, 2008b; Yorke, 
2009a, b; Allen, 2011; Palfreyman, 2010) merely employing more numbers of academic 
staff do not necessarily improve teaching performance5. 
 
5.3.1.3 Financial Performance  
 
University financial performance is the remaining dimension here but arguably more 
straightforward to measure. A single variables is used to map it viz., Asset Turnover. On 
the one hand the characteristics of this UK sample favors the use of this variables6. It also 
represents Important aspects of financial performance in the institution i.e. at the level and 
at the profit/surplus level7 (Lukawaduge, 2011; Lukawaduge & Armstrong, 2015).  
 
In what follows a brief summary analysis of the correlations between all the independent 
governance and control variables and the chosen financial variables is conducted. This 
analysis is nowhere near as detailed as the previous two performances as the financials of 
universities remain ancillary to the core focus of this thesis. 
 
5 The quality of the incoming teaching staff and their ability to transform a wide range of student abilities 
in the incoming class make a significant difference to teaching performance.  
6 In detailed analyses within the sample included within the appendix return on assets (ROA) turns out to be 
a weak indicator not correlating significantly with almost all financial and internal governances. Hence it is 
excluded here (Appendix 8).  
7 A university’s ability to generate revenues is an important indicator of its financial performance especially 
its ability to uniquely market its entire asset and brand portfolios within the UK student market. This is a 
broader indicator than return on equity which maps out the institution’s ability to manage various costs. Both 
are inevitably important and different and so are separately used here. 
Table 14: Correlation Metrics of Dependent and Independent Variables for Financial Performance 
Financial Performance Indicators 
Variable Asset Turnover 
BSIZE  0.0658** 
BGDIV  -0.0154     
BEDIV  -0.0689**     
IGOV  0.0493     
GBMS  0.0361     
ETMS  0.2310***     
SSR  -0.0061     
ES  -0.1253***     
PTTSR  -0.1088***     
FSF  -0.0964***     
TRST  -0.1095***     
TONLY -0.0712***     
RONLY 0.1192***     
PGINT  -0.1474***     
TFEE  -0.1754***     
INTS  -0.1267***     
ENDWTA  -0.0604**     
VCPAY  -0.1697***     
BIG4 -0.0067     
UGCOM -0.0768***     
SFSPEND -0.2153***     
CTA 0.2704***     
DTA -0.1567***     
FTA -0.3722***     
SUBCOM 0.0573**     
ADSIZE 0.0695*     
TA -0.3836***     
TINC -0.1055***     
TST -0.3125***     
RGROUP -0.0742***     
PRE92 -0.0510*     
REGION 0.1450***     
Notes: The table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients for independent variables with the teaching variables. Variables are 
defined as follows: governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender diversity (BGDIV); board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); independent 
governors (IGOV); frequency of governing board meetings (GBMs); frequency of executive team meetings (EFMs); student to staff ratio 
(SSR); entry standards (ES); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); female staff fraction (FSF); teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching 
only staff (TONLY); research only staff (RONLY)postgraduate intensity (PGINT); tuition fee (TFEE); international students (INTS); 
endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); vice-chancellor (VCG); audit firm size (BIG4); and governance 
committee (GCOM); service and facility spend (SFSPEND); cash to total asset (CTA); debt to total asset (DTA); fixed to total assets (FTA); 
number of governance sub-committees (SUBCOM); audit committee size (ADSIZE); total assets (TA); total income (TINC); total staff 
(TST); 238ndogen group (RGROUP); pre-1992 university (PRE92); region (REGION). Table 14 fully defines all the variables used. 
*,**,***,**** Correlation is significant at 5, 1, 0.1 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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The picture of correlations between asset turnover and governances/control variables in this 
UK sample is intriguing as well as remarkable. First no correlation in the table above exceeds 
a magnitude of 0.39 whether positive or negative. The implication is clearly that university 
financial performance is significantly weaker in its correlations with internal governances or 
controls when compared to teaching/research. Second correlations with some important 
variables such as Students to staff ratio, lay member board fractions, BIG4 Audit and Current 
Ratio are insignificant even at 5% and are so not displayed8. Third, the three financial 
governances of fixed to total assets (-.3722), cash to total assets (.2704) and debt to total assets 
(-.1567) confirm that universities do not need to invest in higher proportions of fixed assets; 
university financial performance reflects in robust cash levels and lower credit levels. Finally 
the contrarian directions of some correlations such as those of Services & Facilities spend per 
student (-.2153) and log VC pay (-.1697) need explanation. Here is clear evidence that like 
extant research (Tarbert et al., 2008; Bachan & Reilly, 2015) in this longitudinal UK sample 
there is evidence that the VC goes unrewarded for financial performance9.  Similarly higher 
spending on teaching/research infrastructure coincides with slightly lower turnover ratios 




A detailed and systematic univariate and bivariate analysis of the UK longitudinal sample of 
university governance and performance data. In the process an interesting pattern has emerged 
which lends support to many of the hypotheses posed in Chapter 3 while extending/expanding 
them in rich and varied dimensions. Methodologically the chapter has collated a rich body of 
analytical evidence on sample descriptors and correlations that can form the basis for any 
further sophisticated analysis. Overall there is now adequate empirical evidence to justify each 
of the five inter-linked research objectives posed in the introductory chapter. These clearly 
emerge as the main axes along which any rational and comprehensive investigation of 
university governance and performance must proceed. Additionally, the three main empirical 
 
8 The fact that current ratio is not materially significant in this sample calls to question other empirical work such 
as that of Lokuwaduge (2011) who incorporates this variable as indicative of financial performance. Even 
theoretically coverage of liquid liabilities by liquid assets can at best be considered to be a measure of liquidity.  
9 Soh’s (2007) finding that there are significant economies of scale in university VC pay remuneration as 
compared to corporate CEOs is also relevant here. Additionally this finding also corroborates Tarbert Lee & 
Watson’s (2008) finding that VC pay levels face downward drags despite good financial performance due to 
legitimation concerns within the UK university sector.  
10 Most of the other correlations are extremely low in magnitude except Audit independence (-.2172) which as 
expected is negatively correlated with financial performance.  
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gaps identified in chapter 3 have now been displayed/demonstrated in different ways. The 
hypotheses supports along with the other findings in the chapter have illustrated the multi-
dimensionality of university governance/performance; the complex trade-offs/ process like 
characteristics embedded in them; culture/quality assurance connotations and the longitudinal 
inter-relationships. The stage is thus set for the more complex multivariate regression analyses 




Table 15: Correlation Metrics of Independent Variables 
Variable BSIZE GDIVG GBAME IGOV GBMS ETSIZE ETMS SSR ES PTTSR FSF TRST TONLY RONLY PGINT TFEE INTS 
BSIZE  1.000 -0.2526*** -0.0636** -0.3052*** -0.1079*** 0.1851*** 0.1515*** -0.2557*** 0.2933*** -0.1537*** -0.2657*** -0.1427*** -0.0505* 0.2657*** 0.2719*** -0.2191*** 0.2671*** 
GDIVG  -0.2526*** 1.000 0.1494*** 0.0945*** 0.0657** 0.0891** -0.1190** 0.0634* -0.1037*** 0.1389*** 0.2416*** -0.0383 0.0829*** -0.0657** -0.0849*** 0.1720*** -0.0146 
GBAME  -0.0636** 0.1494*** 1.000 0.1640*** -0.0235 -0.0263 -0.1642*** 0.1732*** -0.2293*** 0.1924*** 0.0225 0.1643*** 0.0252 -0.2352*** 0.0300 0.2669*** 0.1088*** 
IGOV  -0.3052*** 0.0945*** 0.1640*** 1.000 -0.1885*** -0.0840** -0.1077* 0.4590*** -0.5585*** 0.2623*** 0.2498*** 0.3231*** 0.0679** -0.5256*** -0.3743*** 0.3359*** -0.2104*** 
GBMS  -0.1079*** 0.0657** -0.0235 -0.1885*** 1.000 0.0851** -0.0707 -0.0364 0.1819*** -0.2138*** -0.1419*** -0.0535* -0.1644*** 0.2802*** 0.0843*** -0.0487* 0.0571** 
ETSIZE  0.1851*** -0.0891** -0.0263 -0.0840** 0.0851** 1.000 -0.3078***  -0.2971*** 0.2479*** -0.2102*** -0.3068*** -0.0794** -0.1131*** 0.2167*** 0.0711* -0.1502*** 0.2786*** 
ETMS  0.1515*** -0.1190** -0.1642*** -0.1077* -0.0707 -0.3078*** 1.000 -0.2301*** 0.2953*** 0.0005 -0.1952*** -0.3460*** 0.0860 0.3425*** 0.2133*** -0.0588 0.1786*** 
SSR  -0.2557*** 0.0634* 0.1732*** 0.4590*** -0.0364 -0.2971*** -0.2301*** 1.000 -0.7245*** 0.2995*** 0.4033*** 0.4124*** 0.1022*** -0.6544*** -0.4344*** 0.3429*** -0.3774*** 
ES  0.2933*** -0.1037*** -0.2293*** -0.5585*** 0.1819*** 0.2479*** 0.2953*** -0.7245*** 1.000 -0.3770*** -0.4693*** -0.3751*** -0.2073*** 0.8104*** 0.4753*** -0.3879*** 0.3568*** 
PTTSR  -0.1537*** 0.1389*** 0.1924*** 0.2623*** -0.2138*** -0.2102*** 0.0005 0.2995*** -0.3770*** 1.000 0.3861*** -0.1703*** 0.5797*** -0.5184*** -0.0786*** 0.3310*** -0.0006 
FSF  -0.2657*** 0.2416*** 0.0225 0.2498*** -0.1419*** -0.3068*** -0.1952*** 0.4033*** -0.4693*** 0.3861*** 1.000 0.2308*** 0.1555*** -0.5350*** -0.1891*** 0.2963*** -0.3996*** 
TRST  -0.1427*** -0.0383 0.1643*** 0.3231*** -0.0535* -0.0794** -0.3460*** 0.4124*** -0.3751*** -0.1703*** 0.2308*** 1.000 -0.7202*** -0.3912*** -0.2133*** 0.2620*** -0.2861*** 
TONLY -0.0505* 0.0829*** 0.0252 0.0679** -0.1644*** -0.1131*** 0.0860 0.1022*** -0.2073*** 0.5797*** 0.1555*** -0.7202*** 1.000 -0.3334*** -0.0805*** 0.1171*** 0.0411 
RONLY 0.2657*** -0.0657** -0.2352*** -0.5256*** 0.2802*** 0.2167*** 0.3425*** -0.6544*** 0.8104*** -0.5184*** -0.5350*** -0.3912*** -0.3334*** 1.0000 0.4520*** -0.5025*** 0.3789*** 
PGINT  0.2719***  -0.0849*** 0.0300 -0.3743*** 0.0843*** 0.0711* 0.2133*** -0.4344*** 0.4753*** -0.0786*** -0.1891*** -0.2133*** -0.0805*** 0.4520*** 1.000 -0.0748*** 0.5738*** 
TFEE  -0.2191*** 0.1720*** 0.2669*** 0.3359*** -0.0487* -0.1502*** -0.0588 0.3429*** -0.3879*** 0.3310*** 0.2963*** 0.2620*** 0.1171*** -0.5025*** -0.0748*** 1.000 0.0949*** 
INTS  0.2671*** -0.0146 0.1088*** -0.2104*** 0.0571** 0.2786*** 0.1786*** -0.3774*** 0.3568*** -0.0006 -0.3996*** -0.2861*** 0.0411 0.3789*** 0.5738*** 0.0949*** 1.000 
ENDWTA  0.2135*** -0.0761*** -0.1305*** -0.5091*** 0.1812*** 0.2318*** 0.1160** -0.4130*** 0.4853*** -0.1839*** -0.3122*** -0.2987*** -0.0887*** 0.5610*** 0.3484*** -0.300*** 0.3685*** 
VCPAY  0.0464 -0.1571* 0.0006 -0.1966*** 0.2263*** 0.1861*** 0.1852*** -0.2641*** 0.3648*** -0.1579*** -0.1532*** -0.0228 -0.2233*** 0.3856*** 0.3259*** 0.1295*** 0.3309*** 
VCG 0.0522* -0.1571** -0.1135** -0.0430 -0.0815*** 0.0835** 0.1284** -0.0584* 0.0195 -0.0551** -0.0943*** -0.0015 -0.0845*** 0.1124*** 0.1255*** 0.0088 0.0696** 
BIG4 0.1727*** -0.0323 -0.1144*** -0.1543*** 0.0995*** 0.2392*** -0.0522 -0.2905*** 0.2958*** -0.2261*** -0.2047*** -0.0463 -0.1670** 0.2827*** 0.1113*** -0.1645*** 0.1462*** 
UGCOM -0.2203*** 0.0971*** 0.0434 0.0927*** 0.0680** 0.0055 -0.1494** 0.2169*** -0.2017*** 0.0521* 0.2041*** 0.1214*** 0.0173 -0.1943*** -0.2189*** 0.1342*** -0.1411*** 
SFSPEND 0.0204 0.0615* -0.1020*** -0.3286*** 0.2152** 0.1291*** 0.1457** -0.4401*** 0.5146*** -0.2004*** -0.2194*** -0.1307*** -0.1949*** 0.4664*** 0.3083*** 0.1765*** 0.4151*** 
CTA -0.0724** 0.0736** 0.0650** 0.1716*** -0.0538*  -0.0537 0.0037 0.1592*** -0.2217*** 0.0596** 0.0846*** 0.0061 0.0634** -0.1396*** -0.0906*** 0.1599*** -0.0237 
DTA 0.0322 -0.0157 0.0152 0.0291 -0.0470 -0.1239*** 0.0664 -0.0084 0.0022 0.1342*** 0.0528* 0.0799*** 0.0200 -0.1019*** 0.0441 0.1500*** 0.0862** 
FTA 0.0740** -0.0381 -0.0599** -0.0577* -0.0859*** 0.0326 -0.1831*** -0.1026** 0.0707** 0.0506* 0.0656** 0.1065*** -0.0330 -0.0650** -0.0222 -0.0762*** 0.0285 
SUBCOM 0.0940*** -0.0308 0.0200 -0.0026 0.0696** 0.0558 -0.0276 -0.0254 0.0267 -0.0680** -0.0916*** 0.0715** -0.1207*** 0.0564* -0.0281 -0.0994*** 0.0563* 
ADSIZE 0.1080*** 0.1649*** -0.0856** -0.0991*** -0.0556 -0.1673*** 0.0492 -0.0063 0.0369 -0.0747** 0.1213*** 0.0415 -0.0608 0.0305 -0.0132 0.0087 0.0042 
ADMS -0.0514 0.0268 -0.0534 0.0193 0.2729*** 0.1639*** -0.0593 0.0263 -0.0641* -0.1669*** -0.1018*** 0.0947*** -0.0891*** -0.0140 -0.1069*** 0.0702** -0.0316   
ADIND 0.0226 0.1883*** 0.0015 0.0290 -0.0369 -0.0365 0.1408** -0.1410*** 0.1607*** -0.1061*** -0.0592 -0.0391 -0.1381*** 0.1965*** 0.0207 -0.1058*** 0.0649 
TA 0.0640** 0.0187 -0.0162 -0.3635*** 0.2986*** 0.2570*** 0.1890*** -0.4973*** 0.6267*** -0.2477*** -0.3283*** -0.0445* -0.3585*** 0.6182*** 0.4024*** -0.0533** 0.3846*** 
TINC 0.1094*** 0.0010 -0.0259 -0.3714*** 0.3309*** 0.2522*** 0.2564*** -0.5391*** 0.6405*** -0.3011*** -0.3988*** -0.0767*** -0.3911*** 0.6859*** 0.3987*** -0.1058*** 0.3908*** 
TST 0.0982*** -0.0239 0.0320 -0.3059*** 0.2283*** 0.2312*** 0.2690*** -0.5286*** 0.5988*** -0.0884*** -0.3192** -0.0892*** -0.2218*** 0.5247*** 0.4152*** -0.0845*** 0.3763*** 
                                         (continued) 
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Variable ENDWTA VCPAY VCG BIG4 UGCOM SFSPEND CTA DTA FTA SUBCOM ADSIZE ADMS ADIND TA TINC TST 
BSIZE  0.2135*** 0.0464 0.0522* 0.1727*** -0.2203*** 0.0204 -0.0724** 0.0322 0.0740** 0.0940*** 0.1080*** -0.0514 0.0226 0.0640** 0.1094*** 0.0982*** 
BGDIV  -0.0761*** -0.1571* -0.1571** -0.0323 0.0971*** 0.0615* 0.0736** -0.0157 -0.0381 -0.0308 0.1649*** 0.0268 0.1883*** 0.0187 0.0010 -0.0239 
BEDIV  -0.1305*** 0.0006 -0.1135** -0.1144*** 0.0434 -0.1020*** 0.0650** 0.0152 -0.0599** 0.0200 -0.0856** -0.0534 0.0015 -0.0162 -0.0259 -0.3059*** 
IGOV  -0.5091*** -0.1966*** -0.0430 -0.1543*** 0.0927*** -0.3286*** 0.1716*** 0.0291 -0.0577* -0.0026 -0.0991*** 0.0193 0.0290 -0.3635*** -0.3714*** -0.3059*** 
BMFS  0.1812*** 0.2263*** -0.0815*** 0.0995*** 0.0680** 0.2152** -0.0538* -0.0470 -0.0859*** 0.0696** -0.0556 0.2729*** -0.0369 0.2986*** 0.3309*** 0.2283*** 
ETSIZE  0.2318*** 0.1861*** 0.0835** 0.2392*** 0.0055 0.1291*** -0.0537 -0.1239*** 0.0326 0.0558 -0.1673*** 0.1639*** -0.0365 0.2570*** 0.2522*** 0.2312*** 
ETMS  0.1160** 0.1852*** 0.1284** -0.0522 -0.1494** 0.1457** 0.0037 0.0664 -0.1831*** -0.0276 0.0492 -0.0593 0.1408** 0.1890*** 0.2564*** 0.2690*** 
SSR  -0.4130*** -0.2641*** -0.0584* -0.2905*** 0.2169*** -0.4401*** 0.1592*** -0.0084 -0.1026** -0.0254 -0.0063 0.0263 -0.1410*** -0.4973*** -0.5391*** -0.5286*** 
ES  0.4853*** 0.3648*** 0.0195 0.2958*** -0.2017*** 0.5146*** -0.2217*** 0.0022 0.0707** 0.0267 0.0369 -0.0641* 0.1607*** 0.6267*** 0.6405*** 0.5988*** 
PTTSR  -0.1839*** -0.1579*** -0.0551** -0.2261*** 0.0521* -0.2004*** 0.0596** 0.1342*** 0.0506* -0.0680** -0.0747** -0.1669*** -0.1061*** -0.2477*** -0.3011*** -0.0884*** 
FSF  -0.3122*** -0.1532*** -0.0943*** -0.2047*** 0.2041*** -0.2194*** 0.0846*** 0.0528* 0.0656** -0.0916*** 0.1213*** -0.1018*** -0.0592 -0.3283*** -0.3988*** -0.3192** 
TRST  -0.2987*** -0.0228 -0.0015 -0.0463 0.1214*** -0.1307*** 0.0061 0.0799*** 0.1065*** 0.0715** 0.0415 0.0947*** -0.0391 -0.0445* -0.0767*** -0.0892*** 
TONLY -0.0887*** -0.2233*** -0.0845*** -0.1670** 0.0173 -0.1949*** 0.0634** 0.0200 -0.0330 -0.1207*** -0.0608 -0.0891*** -0.1381*** -0.3585*** -0.3911*** -0.2218*** 
RONLY 0.5610*** 0.3856*** 0.1124*** 0.2827*** -0.1943*** 0.4664*** -0.1396*** -0.1019*** -0.0650** 0.0564* 0.0305 -0.0140 0.1965*** 0.6182*** 0.6859*** 0.5247*** 
PGINT  0.3484*** 0.3259*** 0.1255*** 0.1113*** -0.2189*** 0.3083*** -0.0906*** 0.0441 -0.0222 -0.0281 -0.0132 -0.1069*** 0.0207 0.4024*** 0.3987*** 0.4152*** 
TFEE  -0.300*** 0.1295*** 0.0088 -0.1645*** 0.1342*** 0.1765*** 0.1599*** 0.1500*** -0.0762*** -0.0994*** 0.0087 0.0702** -0.1058*** -0.0533** -0.1058*** -0.0845*** 
INTS  0.3685*** 0.3309*** 0.0696** 0.1462*** -0.1411*** 0.4151*** -0.0237 0.0862** 0.0285 0.0563* 0.0042 -0.0316   0.0649 0.3846*** 0.3908*** 0.3763*** 
ENDWTA  1.000 0.2098*** 0.0776*** 0.1667*** -0.1446*** 0.2843*** -0.0374 -0.0916*** 0.0056 0.0711** 0.0314 -0.1036*** 0.0235 0.3541*** 0.3660*** 0.3380*** 
VCPAY  0.2098*** 1.000 0.0539* 0.1728*** -0.0089 0.6296*** -0.0447 0.0793*** -0.0536* 0.0155   0.1156*** 0.0090 0.0518 0.6622*** 0.6570*** 0.5524*** 
VCG 0.0776*** 0.0539* 1.000 0.0089 -0.0095   0.0136 0.0792*** -0.0931*** -0.0740*** 0.1143*** -0.0101 -0.0095 -0.0631   0.0751*** 0.1220*** 0.1031*** 
BIG4 0.1667*** 0.1728*** 0.0089 1.000 -0.0969*** 0.1445*** -0.0747*** -0.1108*** 0.1070*** 0.0410 -0.0202 0.1551*** -0.1218*** 0.2464*** 0.2442*** 0.1791*** 
GCOM -0.1446*** -0.0089 -0.0095   -0.0969*** 1.000 0.0160 0.0691** 0.0106 0.0111 0.0786*** 0.0799** 0.1037*** 0.0066 -0.0970*** -0.1338*** -0.1113*** 
SFSPEND 0.2843*** 0.6296*** 0.0136 0.1445*** 0.0160 1.000 -0.0060 0.0559* -0.0234 0.0080 0.1237*** 0.0356 0.1000 0.6245*** 0.6013*** 0.4769*** 
CTA -0.0374 -0.0447 0.0792*** -0.0747*** 0.0691** -0.0060 1.000 -0.1428*** -0.4145*** -0.0098 -0.1019*** -0.0308 -0.0410 -0.2649*** -0.2127*** -0.3001*** 
DTA -0.0916*** 0.0793*** -0.0931*** -0.1108*** 0.0106 0.0559* -0.1428*** 1.000** 0.1557*** -0.0299 0.2117*** -0.0946*** 0.1097*** 0.0886*** 0.0469* 0.0807*** 
FTA 0.0056 -0.0536* -0.0740*** 0.1070*** 0.0111 -0.0234 -0.4145*** 0.1557*** 1.000 0.0401 0.2209*** 0.0339 0.2250*** 0.0771*** -0.0522* 0.0517* 
SUBCOM 0.0711** 0.0155   0.1143*** 0.0410 0.0786*** 0.0080 -0.0098 -0.0299 0.0401 1.000 0.0552 0.1214*** -0.0506 0.0431 0.0681** 0.0403 
ADSIZE 0.0314 0.1156*** -0.0101 -0.0202 0.0799** 0.1237*** -0.1019*** 0.2117*** 0.2209*** 0.0552 1.000 -0.0169 0.6259*** 0.0935** 0.0340 0.0261 
ADMS -0.1036*** 0.0090 -0.0095 0.1551*** 0.1037*** 0.0356 -0.0308 -0.0946*** 0.0339 0.1214*** -0.0169 1.000 0.0454 0.0554* 0.0876*** 0.0374 
ADIND 0.0235 0.0518 -0.0631   -0.1218*** 0.0066 0.1000 -0.0410 0.1097*** 0.2250*** -0.0506 0.6259*** 0.0454 1.000 0.2256*** 0.1719*** 0.1288*** 
TA 0.3541*** 0.6622*** 0.0751*** 0.2464*** -0.0970*** 0.6245*** -0.2649*** 0.0886*** 0.0771*** 0.0431 0.0935** 0.0554* 0.2256*** 1.000 0.9462*** 0.9014*** 
TINC 0.3660*** 0.6570*** 0.1220*** 0.2442*** -0.1338*** 0.6013*** -0.2127*** 0.0469* -0.0522* 0.0681** 0.0340 0.0876*** 0.1719*** 0.9462*** 1.000 0.935*** 
TST 0.3380*** 0.5524*** 0.1031*** 0.1791*** -0.1113*** 0.4769*** -0.3001*** 0.0807*** 0.0517* 0.0403 0.0261 0.0374 0.1288*** 0.9014*** 0.935*** 1.000 
Notes: The table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients. Variables are defined as follows: governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender diversity (GDIVG); board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); independent governors (IGOV); frequency of governing board meetings (GBMs); executive 
team size (ETSIZE); frequency of executive team meetings (ETMS); student to staff ratio (SSR); entry standards (ET); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); female staff fraction (FSF); teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching only staff (TONLY); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); tuition fee 
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(TFEE); international students (INTS); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); vice-chancellor (VCG); audit firm size (BIG4); and governance committee (GCOM); service and facility spend (SFSPEND); cash to total asset (CTA); debt to total asset (DTA); fixed 
to total assets (FTA); number of governance sub-committees (SUBCOM); audit committee size (ADSIZE); audit committee meeting frequency (ADMS); audit committee independence (ADIND); total assets (TA); total income (TINC); total staff (TST). Table 15 fully defines all the variables used. 
*,**,*** Correlation is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively
6. Chapter Six: Multivariate Analyses 
 
Armed with the detailed results of the previous chapter the research delves deeper to unravel the best 
multiple regression models that robustly explain the multi-dimensional links between university 
governance and performance. In what follows a range of models are developed explaining research, 
teaching and financial performance of universities as well as their governances. However, these models 
are far from uniform and/or homogenous in keeping with the complex inter-linked research objectives of 
this thesis. 
 
An eclectic approach is followed in model development. Independent Variables in this data set are entered 
selectively into each model using three criteria. First the theoretical/empirical justification for the variable 
itself; Second, how it contributes to extending the span of explanation covering missing dimensions of 
university governance; and finally the overall parsimony in explanation achieved in the GLS Fixed-Effects 
(FE) model as a consequence of its entry (Newman, 1956; Morrison, 1983; Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 42).  
However based on justification mentioned in the methodology chapter (see Chapter 4.7, pg.185), GLS 
(FE) fixed-effects is used as the main model and treated as the base.  
 
The rationale for such an approach is threefold. First, the multiple dimensions of university governance 
and performance and the complex trade-offs underlying their associations imply that there is no alternative 
to the unusually large numbers of dependent (6), independent (25) and control (6) variables in this data 
set.  The theoretical indications from the earlier chapters (Gayle et al., 2003; Alvenson, 2002; Vukasovic 
et al., 2018; Hooghe & Marx, 2003; Piattoni, 2010; Braun, 2008) and the nature of research 
objectives/gaps identified in the thesis make it vital that all these variables are simultaneously investigated. 
Without this a core objective of this investigation will remain unanswerable.  This has already been 
mentioned in the empirical chapter and the methodology section therein.  
 
Second, unlike corporate firms several process like characteristics and trade-offs characterize 
research/teaching/financial performances and the internal governances of a university (Chou & Gornitzka, 
2014; Chou et al., 2017; Eitken, 2015: Peters, 2015; Gayle et al., 2003; Entwhistle, 2007; Trowler, 2008). 
These complexities can only be explicated if different models are extracted from the data set each with its 
own distinct dependent/independent/control variable combination. In fact, this is one very important facet 
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of the research gap identified in Chapter 3. But here too there is the danger that university level unobserved 
factors in each model may be at work interfering and influencing these process-like characteristics and 
trade-offs. This is why each model is actually estimated and interpreted using the GLS FE.  
 
This sample data set has important abnormalities. The main appendix shows that many variable 
distributions fail standard tests of skewness/kurtosis (see Appendix 3). It is also characterized by elements 
of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity (see Appendix 4 & 5). Despite scaling all 
variables i.e. ensuring that all of them are either fractions or natural logarithms the problem of abnormality 
persists (see Appendix 3). Winsorization although an alternative is strictly avoided here in line with the 
statistical principles enunciated by Draper & Smith (Damodar & Gujarati, 2009: 497). This is to avoid the 
clear danger that it might remove the rich explanation of multiple dimensions, trade-offs and process like 
characteristics of the governance-performance relation emerging from outlier observations in the dataset. 
But in order to ensure a clear window in the model results that displays and accommodates these data-set 
abnormalities, it is the GLS FE that is used as the prime result in all interpretations.  
 
Due to the iterative selection process involved in the model development it is worth clarifying three 
aspects. First and foremost, the iteration here is not driven by a blinkered R-square maximization 
approach. In fact, the entire process is entirely driven by theoretical/empirical indications and hypotheses 
testing. R-squares, coefficient statistics and sample coverage are only ever used as adjunct to the main 
process to achieve parsimony. This is in complete accordance with established econometric guidelines 
(Judge et al., 1982; Damodar & Gujarati, 2009: 206). 
 
Second, it is not without justification that 6 different models explaining research, financial and teaching 
performances as functions of internal governances are developed. This is intended to fill the main research 
gap identified in this thesis.  Complex multi-dimensional university performance whether it be research, 
teaching or financial is not simple or straightforward. It cannot be captured by one index or variable no 
matter how comprehensive (Lokawduge & Armstrong, 2015; Boliver, 2015). It is several different things 
all at once and needs to be studied in its varied dimensions. The choice of 3 different dependent 
measurements for research performance and 2 different ones for teaching performance is deliberately 
intended to unpack this complexity. Similarly, multi-dimensional university governance has several layers 
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and textures and the wide selection of 25 different independent governance variables is intended to 
simultaneously capture this.  
 
Finally, every model is chosen with theoretical underpinnings, and interpretations are based primarily on 
the GLS FE regression results within each model. This ensures that the university level specific factors 
that may be unobserved in a regular panel OLS model are nevertheless fleshed out and accounted for. 
Panel OLS will be used merely to display the results for the control variables, that would naturally get 
omitted in a GLS FE regression. Nevertheless, the results will be interpreted and based on the more 
advanced GLS FE, thus the thesis completely avoids the major likely flaws of variable omission and 
university level heterogeneities.    
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into 5 main sections that implement the above detailed model 
development procedure. Section 6.1 presents and discusses selected advanced multivariate models 
rigorously developed to explicate university research performance. In each model here eclectic selections 
of  internal, board-level, research/teaching and financial governances alongside size/age, mission-based 
and region-based controls are used. Apart from the main GLS FE regression on which the discussion 
pivots two other GLS regression results are presented to assess the sensitivities of the main result. Two 
instrumented regressions namely the IV 2SLS and the IV 2SGMM are also presented to account for 
obvious endogeneities apparent in the main model. A robust battery of tests confirm the validity of each 
regression result11.Sections 6.2 and 6.3 do likewise with teaching and financial performance respectively. 








11 A detailed analysis of control regressions performed with respect to research teaching and financial performances in this 
sample. The chosen model and its variable choices are always based on the most comprehensive theoretical/empirical 
indications. Parsimony is only ever used as an adjunct to this main basis. 
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6.1 Research Performance Advanced Models 
 
As underlined earlier the multi-dimensional complex links between University performance and 
governance make it essential that a model development that is at once wide-spanned and eclectic is used. 
Therefore, in what follows below three important and robust models relating research performance in its 
many dimensions to internal, board level, research, financial governances and controls are primarily 
discussed. Each model uses a different research performance dependent variable namely Research 
Performance Index (RPI) in model 1, Research Quality (RQ) in model 2 and Research Grant Fraction 
(RGF) in model 3 respectively. The choice of these dependents is based on theoretical/empirical 
indications already discussed earlier in the data descriptive statistics chapter. To recapitulate briefly, RPI 
is a composite index subsuming many different facets of university research performance. Research 
Quality is an independent regulatory assessment of every UK university’s research function based on the 
quantity and quality of its published work. Research Grant Fraction indicates how much financial support 
research grant providers are willing to provide based on their independent assessment of the research 
performance of a given institution. Thus combining three different dependents achieves a holistic and 
multi-dimensional explanation of university research performance.  
 
Before moving on to the main discussions it is important to note the results of tests for normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and non-linearity shown in Appendix 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
Some variables (dependent & independent) have abnormal distributions in all three models. This is despite 
the fact that these variables are invariably scaled i.e. are either fractions or natural logarithms. Mean levels 
of VIF across the models do not exceed 5 but the variables of Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT), Teaching 
Only Staff (TONLY), and Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) do exhibit high values here.  None of the 
independent variables exhibit endogeneity except Entry Standards. Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test 
was used to detect for endogeneity in all three research model. Entry Standard (ES) is the endogenous 
variable in models 1 and 2 and Teaching and Research Only Staff (TRST) is the endogenous variable in 
model 3 (see Appendix 6). Breusch-Pagan Test  and White Test has been used to test for heteroscedasticity 
(see Appendix 5).  
 
In what follows three separate multivariate models of University Research performance are critically 
analysed. Sub-section 6.1.1 is a model with Research Performance Index (RPI) as the dependent variable 
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while sub-sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 are the two models with Research Quality (RQ) and Research Grant 
Fraction (RGF) as the dependent variables respectively. Please note that each of these models includes 
board level governance variables already used in extant research wherever they are parsimonious. But 
more importantly for the first time new original governance variables mapping the very distinct multiple 
dimensions of university governance are used here to answer the research objectives. 6.1.1 Research 
Performance Index (RPI) Model 
 
 
6.1.1.1 GLS Fixed-Effects Model 
 
The table 17 below shows the status of the nine hypotheses based primarily on the results from the GLS 
FE regressions with robust standard errors using nine different internal governance variables and three 
different control variables. The dependent variable is Research Performance Index (RPI). The independent 
governances span the theoretical/empirical field of investigation and simultaneously represent one of the 




Table 16: Model 1 all regressions with robust standard errors for dependent variable Research Performance Index (RPI) 
 






IV 2S GMM 
 
Panel OLS Model 
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Variables:       
ES .3291(.129)*** 0.822(.11369)*** 1.228(.075)*** 3.350(.272)*** 3.306(.270)*** 2.005(.054)*** 
INTS -46.184(17.541)*** -37.386(9.179)*** -5.116(8.536) 7.244(6.471) 10.691(6.208) 15.356(5.404)*** 
BSIZE 7.662(4.720)* 8.999(2.417)*** 5.133(2.518)** 11.137(3.375)*** 10.223(3.328)*** 4.999(2.383)*** 
TRST 0.102(4.286) -2.274(3.206) -1.688( 3.422) 1.904(4.436) -0.384(4.379) -4.289(2.542)* 
GCOM -5.637(2.516)** -5.199(1.578)*** -3.842(1.629)** -3.390(1.307)*** -3.489(1.285)*** -2.221(.953)** 
SSR 0.015(.273) -0.280(.211) -0.5148(.198)*** 1.513(.608)** 1.473(.603)** -0.641(.198)*** 
IGOV 2.884(7.768) -4.508(5.293) -8.290(4.504)* 20.203(8.385)** 22.316(8.284)*** -7.620(3.821)** 
FSF -180.745(29.939)*** -141.706(16.672)*** -49.778(13.776)*** 31.320(16.246)* 24.905(16.010) 20.730(7.878)*** 
CTA -28.023(10.310)*** -32.671(7.416)*** -10.253(6.968) -24.235(7.905)*** -21.737(7.735)*** -14.128(5.740)** 
Controls Variables:       
TST 7.290(3.931)* 5.059(1.991)** 5.264(1.483)*** - - 2.496(.825)*** 
PRE1992 - 29.274(4.481)*** 24.516(2.734)*** - - 13.579(1.282)*** 
REGION - -3.625( 2.272) -2.956(1.310)** -1.903(.950)** -2.123(.943)** -1.827(.735)*** 
YEAR - - - - - -1.772(.143)*** 
CODE - - - - - -0.014(.0146) 
Constant  167.830(18.818)*** 114.395(17.281)*** -75.275(36.577)*** -66.674(36.380)*** 3623.785(.194)***  
Number of Obs 827 827 827 827 827 827 
F-Value 10.92 - - - - 899.34 
R2 0.5547 - 0.8799 0.8353 0.8393 0.9257 
Wald Chi2 - - 1483.69 3910.90 4064.04 - 
LR Chi - 358.21 - - - - 
rho .93216293 .8198504 - - - - 
Autocorrelation coef (yt-
1) 
- - .70851549 - - - 
Theta median - - 0.3112 - - - 
Instrumented  - - - ES ES - 
Instruments  - - - TST; Pre1992 TST; Pre1992 - 
Estat overid score 
chi2(1) p 
   22.4727  (p = 0.0000)   
Sargan chi2    25.6487  (p = 0.0000)   
Basmann chi2    26.0855  (p = 0.0000)   
Score chi2    22.4727  (p = 0.0000)   
Hansen’s J chi2     22.4727 (p = 0.0000)  
Notes: The table reports all regressions with robust standard errors. Regressions defined as follows: Generalized least square fixed-effects (GLS Fixed-Effects); generalized least square 
maximum likelihood estimation (GLS Maximum Likelihood); generalized least square auto-regression (GLS AR); instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS); instrumental 
variable two-stage; instrumental variable generalized method of moments (IV 2S GMM), panel ordinary least square model (Panel OLS Model); Variables are defined as follows: entry standards 
(ES); fraction international students (INTS); governing board size (GBSIZE); teaching and research staff (TRST); the existence of a separate governance committee (GCOM); student to staff 
ratio (SSR);  independent governors (IGOV); female staff fraction (FSF); cash to total assets (CTA); total staff (TST); pre-1992 (PRE1992); region (REGION); year (YEAR); and code (CODE). 
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
Clearly RPI seems to be a positive function of ES (sig.), TRST (insig.), BSIZE (sig.), SSR 
(insig.), IGOV (insig.), TST (sig.), PRE1992 (sig.), but a negative function of GCOM (sig.) 
and CTA (sig.). 
 
Table 17: : Summary of the Findings and Hypothesis of Governance and Research Performance Index (RPI) 
 
Entry Standards (ES) 
Entry Standards and its significant positive impact (at 1% level) on Research Performance, 
this confirms sub-hypothesis (H1a). Universities choosing high entry standards in this 
sample are seen to improve their research performance. Previous empirical work can be 
divided in two strands. One associates ES with some measures of academic performance 
such as research quality, student outcomes and satisfactions and find a positive association 
(Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Bolivar, 2015; Bachan, 2016; Johnes & Soo, 2013). The second 
does not link ES wih university performance but in general examines and evaluates patterns 
of Entry Standards among the different types of universities in UK (Gorard et al., 2019; 
Jerrim & Vignoles, 2015; Chowdry et al., 2008; 2013). 
 
On the surface this result seems to substantiate theoretical contentions of Quality 
Assurance and Optimal Contracting (Filippakou & Tapper, 2008; Sawir, 2013; Eurydice, 
2010, pg. 24; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; Palfreyman, 2010; Yorke, 
Dependent Variable Research Performance Index (RPI) 




Finding sig. Hyp. Status 
Governance Variables:      
Entry Standard (ES) H1a + + Sig. (1%) Acep.  
International Students ratio (INTS) H4a + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
Board Size (BSIZE) H6a + + Sig. (10%) Acep. 
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) H3a - + insig. Rejt. 
Unique Governance Committee (GCOM) H6l + - Sig. (5%) Rejt. 
Student Staff Ratio (SSR) H2a - + insig. Rejt. 
Independent Board Members (IGOV) H6g + + insig. Rejt. 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) H3j + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
Cash to Total Asset (CTA) H5j - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter 3. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting hypothesised 
relationships, respectively.  
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2009a, b, 2000; Boliver, 2013; Bright 2004; Anyanwu 2004; Barron 2006; Furedi 2004) 
that being rigorous in selection procedures is essential to maintain the integrity and quality 
of the academic function. On the other hand it seems to make clear why UK universities 
face a challenge in remaining fair access institutions to the large majority of student 
populations a goal emphasized by Public Accountability, Stakeholder and Legitimacy (Coy 
et al., 2001; Blanden, & Machin, 2004; Coy et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2002; Parker, 2012; 
Boliver, 2013; Burrows, 2012; Gunasekerage & Reed, 2008; Wicks & Parmar, 2004; De 
Villiers & Van Staden, 2006).   
 
Fraction of International Students (INTS) 
INTS displays a negative and significant coefficient (1% level) with research performance.  
This contradicts the earlier sub-hypothesis (H4a). Universities with higher fractions of 
international students seem to perform worse at research.  
 
Diversities in student populations stemming from entry of students from different parts of 
the globe appear to be burdening the research function imposing constraints on the well-
established teaching and learning regimes (TLRs) of UK universities. Pedagogical 
ambiences are negatively impacted by students coming from diverse learning cultures 
(Trowler, 2008, 2019; Trowler & Cooper, 2002). These students definitely seem to require 
heavier teaching and adaptation inputs from the faculty and this could be reducing the 
university’s research productivity. Here is clear evidence that due to higher levels of 
international students’ university time and workload are suboptimally organised, 
publishing quality is declining and staff resources are stretched to the fullest (Hartnett et 
al., 2004; Niles, 1995; Barron, 2006; De Vita & Case, 2003). Empirically although studies 
that associate INTS with academic performances of universities find mixed impacts on 
different types of such performances, the main debates in the literature remain contested 
on the issue of how international students affect university research performance (Marshall 





Board Size (BSIZE) 
Hypothesis (H6a) is confirmed. Board size is positively associated (at 10% level) with 
research performance. At least four theoretical arguments are confirmed. Larger board 
sizes will incorporate all stakeholders; such boards will benefit from a wider range of 
networks and resources as well as a wider legitimacy among constituents and will be better 
able to implement checks and balances on the executive team and hence will improve 
university research performance (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Smallman 2004; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997) . 
But the result contradicts the expectations of Public Accountability (Coy et al., 1997, 2011; 
Nelson et al., 2003; Coy & Dixon, 2004) i.e. it is not just larger boards but instead higher 
numbers of lay members who ensure a public purpose in the board. Quality Assurance 
Assurance i.e. it is the expertise and experiential richness of board members that matter the 
most rather than just an expanded board and Optimal Contracting i.e. size should be 
optimally calibrated to suit the mission and scope of the institution (Edmans & Gabiax, 
2009; Van-Essen et al., 2015; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 1996; 
Trowler, 2008; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mallin et al., 2015). 
 
Empirically the result does not lend support to Lokuwaduge’s finding in her Australian 
sample that board size has an insignificant association with university research 
performance. But it does seem to fit Olson’s (2000) finding of a positive association albeit 
with respect to university non academic performance. 
 
 Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
Sub-hypothesis (H3j) is rejected. Gender diversity within the university staff seems to be 
a strongly significant negative influence (at 1% level) on university research performance. 
On the surface Stakeholder and Public Accountability predictions (Roberts, 1992; 
Freeman, 2010; Mitchell et al., 1997; Coy et al., 2011) of a higher research performance 
due to fuller representations of both genders in academic staff or a more cohesive 
egalitarian gender balance are rejected. Similarly having more female staff do not seem to 
bring UK universities any legitimacy gains or a wider talent pool that could transalate to 
better research performance (Pfeffer, 1987; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995; 
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Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Empirically earlier research has not directly associated staff 
female diversity with research performance. But large strands of scholars have emphasized 
important aspects such as gender bias in university research (Santos & Van Phu, 2019; 
Blake & La Valle, 2000; Witteman, 2019; Huang et al., 2019; Metcalf et al., 2005; Botella 
et al., 2019) and employment (Dearden et al., 2012; Blackaby & Frank, 2000; Duflo, 2012; 
Moss-Racusin et al., 2012).  
 
Teaching & Research Staff Fraction (TRST) 
Sub-hypothesis (H3a) is rejected in the positive sign of this coefficient although without 
statistical significance. Higher fractions of omnibus tenure track staff (TRST) have no 
significant impact on a university’s research performance. This lack of significance in the 
coefficient implies that one is unable to either corroborate or contradict the many 
theoretical predictions. Neither can one confirm whether TRST results in a privileging of 
research tasks as predicted by public accountability (Coy et al., 2001; Butt, 2019; 
Blackmore, 2016; Deem & Baird, 2019; Bexley et al., 2011; Probert, 2013) i.e. better 
research performance nor can we assess whether staff lose motivations in such dual 
contracts and underperform as suggested by resource dependence and stakeholder (Pfeffer 
& salancik, 2003; Fowles, 2014; Wise et al., 2020; Freeman, 2010; Bryson & Barnes, 
2000a, b; Locke, 2012; Freeman, 2010 ; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014). Empirically 
hardly any scholars associate this variable with university academic performances although 
there are several normative and argumentative voices that discuss whether the contract 
remains relevant in the changing UK HEI context (Oxford, 2008; Whitchurch, 2016; AUT, 
2005; Sikes, 2012).  
 
Unique Governance Committee (UGCOM) 
Sub-hypothesis (H6l) is rejected. Merely instituting a special committee of governance 
seems to harm research performance. UK universities that implement such bureaucratic 
policies are seen to visibly reduce their research performance in this sample. Stewardship 
precepts and Managerial power tenets that argue for slim and effective managerial 
(Bebchuck et al., 2009; Donaldson & davis, 1991; Perez & Ode, 2013), audit and 
governance structures seem reflected here (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Agrawal & 
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Knoeber 1996). The UK university also does not seem to gain any research benefits from 
the enhanced legitimacy out of instituting such committees (Suchamn, 1995; Scherer et al., 
2013). Empirically Ntim et al. (2017) does find that there is a positive association between 
UGCOM and university voluntary disclosure.  
 
Student-Staff Ratio (SSR) 
Sub-hypothesis (H2a) cannot be confirmed. There is now a positive sign on the coefficient 
unlike the bivariate correlation but it’s insignificance implies we are unable to decide on 
the true direction of its association with RPI. The levels and degrees of staff to student 
interactions captured in this ratio seems not to matter to a university’s research function. 
The finding contrasts with McDonald (2012), Bradley et al. (2008), Biddle & Berliner 
(2002), Glass & Smith (1979), and Kokkelenberg et al. (2005, 2008) negative impact on 
academic performance.  
 
Lay board member fractions (IGOV) 
The coefficient is insignificant although its sign remains positive. Yet sub-hypothesis 
(H6g) is rejected. Lokuwaduge’s (2011) Australian HEI study where the author finds a 
significant negative impact on research performance seems to contrast with this result. 
Based on this result one is able to confirm the overall refrain in the university governance 
normative resource dependence stakeholder and policy literature (Ntim et al., 2017; Collet 
& Hrasky, 2005; Beekes & Brown, 2006; Samaha et al., 2015; Nelson et al., 2003; Maingot 
& Zehgal, 2008; Schofield, 2009; CUC, 2009) that larger numbers of lay members on a 
university’s board are salutary to its research performance. Similarly, one is unable to 
contradict voices from the optimal contracting literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et 
al., 2006a, b; Bozec & Bozec, 2012) that argue against this principle of board independence 
and favour cohesion in policy making. This finding also fails to provide any fresh support 
to earlier studies in corporate governance.  That evidence such a positive association 
between board independence and firm performance (Cobham & Subramaniam, 1998; 
Mishra & Nielson, 2000; Pathan, Skully & Wickramanayake, 2007) document that board 
independence has a positive relationship with service sector firm performance.  
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Cash-To-Total Assets (CTA) 
The cash to total assets, a unique financial governance, shows a clear negative impact (at 
1% level) on university research performance. This confirms hypothesis (H5j) and is in 
stark contrast with large strands of corporate governance scholarship (Mikkelson and 
Partch , 2003; Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2013). 
These scholars find that firms holding as much as a quarter of their assets in cash perform 
better than their peers. For public sector institutions holding too much cash is not an 
indication of strategic intent. Instead it suggests that these institutions are working under 
financial constraints (Bates, Kahle, and stulz, 2007) and/or agency conflicts (Gao et al., 
2013).  Holding too much cash on the balance sheet is a sure sign that the university is 
working under financial constraints. In such a scenario discretionary research spending is 
the first casualty as suggested by scholars in the Stewardship and Optimal Contracting 
literature (Lazerson, 1997; Swansson, Mow & Bartos, 2004; ; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 
2012; Davis et al., 1997; Perez & Ode, 2013). After all research spending is long term in 
nature and can be postponed whereas staff salaries and other contingent administrative 
costs cannot. It can therefore be inferred that the decline in research performance associated 
with higher cash levels on university balance sheets is due to this. 
 
TST (Log Total Staff) 
The size control based on the staff size of the institution remains positive and significant 
(at 10% level) in the main GLS fixed effects model. Clearly larger UK universities on the 
whole perform better at research than their smaller peers. This is an anticipated result give 










6.1.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A robust set of four additional regressions are performed in order to test the sensitivity of 
various assumptions in the above GLS FE model. First and foremost, Generalized Least 
Squares Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) regressions  are implemented to tackle 
the main problem that many of the variables in this model display abnormalities as shown 
in the univariate statistics. In such cases and in moderately large samples like the one in 
this data set the econometric literature (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pg.102-103) recommends 
such an estimation method. GLS MLE regression is implemented to test the difference in 
fixed-effects coefficients if the assumption of fixed-effects is relaxed (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009, pg. 102-105). As shown in the appendix many of the governance and performance 
variables in this data set are abnormal despite scaling. Although Winsorization is an option, 
it is not implemented in this dataset so that the rich explanations emerging from outliers is 
not lost. Therefore, the GLS MLE coefficients are a robust check using a different method 
from the GLS FE. Third a GLSAR auto-regression is used to in order to implement a Koyck 
transformation (Koyck, 1954; Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pg. 624-630) but through a 
generalized rather than a fixed-effects regression. The reasoning behind this is part 
theoretical and part empirical. Given that governance calibration takes time to implement 
it is reasonable to assume that the effect on university performance will be with a lag and 
as shown by Koyck (1954) this is most easily accounted for by the lagged performance 
dependent variable. Empirically this data set has just 10 years of data i.e, T is small with 
significant numbers of missing values. Lagging the independent variables i.e. distributed 
lag model will result in further loss of degrees of freedom reducing the representativeness 
(i.e. N) and robustness (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pg. 598) of the model. The use of GLSAR 
is an added validation here as the lagged dependent variable is a potential source of 
collinearity as well as serial correlation (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pg. 626). 
 
Fourthly tests of endogeneity (Hausman specification test: Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pg. 
702) on each of the independent variables in the model (see Appendix 6) show that Entry 
Standards (ES) is a strong likely channel for reverse causality here. Hence, two additional 
instrumental variables (IV) regressions instrumenting for ES are implemented here in line 
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with the recommendations of Theil (1953), Basman (1957, pg. 77-83) and Gujarati & 
Porter (2009, pg. 718-721). The first is an IV two stage Least Squares approach i.e. IV2SLS 
whereas the second is an IV Generalized Method of Moments i.e. IV2SGMM approach. 
For each of these a set of over-identification tests (i.e. Sargan, Basman and Hansen’s J) are 
conducted. Each of these tests confirm lack of over-identification in these regressions.  
 
Finally, the results of the panel OLS regression with robust standard errors is also displayed 
here, only in order to display important patterns among controls i.e. university regional, 
mission age and time based control variables that gets omitted in the main model GLS FE. 
Here and in all the other models to follow these five sensitivity regression results are also 
interpreted in order to further explicate and test the governance antecedents of university 
research performance.  
 
Entry Standards (ES) 
The strongly significant and unchanged positive sign of the coefficient of this variable 
across the suite of four additional regressions seems to highlight the importance of 
selectivity in student recruitment to university research performance. In particular, while 
GLS coefficients decline in magnitude their significances remain at 1% levels. 
Interestingly, when endogeneity in this variable is instrumented for the coefficient jumps 
in magnitude (greater than the fixed-effects) while remaining significant and unchanged in 
direction. It is important to note that the strong significances and positive magnitudes in 
IV regressions suggest a strong reverse causality. Clearly entry standards positively 
associate with Research Performance and simultaneously over time better research 
performance allows for even higher entry standards. There is evidence for a cycle here that 
although virtuous for the individual institution in the top quartile of performance is clearly 







Fraction of International Students (INTS) 
The coefficient remains negative  in  GLS MLE and GLS AR but with significance (at 1% 
level) in the former and without significance in the latter. However, in the IV regressions 
signs are positive and insignificant. Reading this together with  the non-linearity in the 
bivariate correlations of this variable with research performance (see Appendix 2) one is 
forced to conclude a weaker yet largely negative association here. Overall, then, the 
complex implications inferred in the earlier discussion persist.  
 
Board Size (BSIZE) 
A very robust set of results are on display here. The coefficients remain positive, and 
significance improves across all GLS (from 10% to 1% in GLS MLE and from 10% to 5% 
in GLS AR) and IV regressions (from 10% to 1% Level) without any change in the original 
positive sign. In addition, all coefficient magnitudes are higher than in the main FE model 
except for the GLS AR. Overall then university board size is a strongly positive antecedent 
of research performance The theoretical/empirical arguments advanced earlier especially 
the fact that restrictions on board size do not seem appropriate in the UK HEI sector are 
robustly confirmed. 
 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
Both the GLS MLE and the GLS AR confirm the main fixed effects model in terms of a 
significant and negative association here (1% level). But the IV stage wise regressions 
display positive and significant coefficients (at 10% level in 2SLS). This rather mixed 
result seems to fit with the bivariate correlations in this variable.  Overall, then one could 
argue that the sensitivity result weakly confirms the ‘systematic discrimination against 
women’ argument in UK HEI research. Arguably universities should take steps to employ 
more female staff although this must not come at the expense of aptitude-skill-talent 
considerations in the recruitment process. There is an optimality in this process of 
calibrating the governance of staff level gender diversity and this should not be lost sight 
of. 
 
Teaching & Research Staff Fraction (TRST) 
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The variable remains insignificant across all GLS and IV regressions. It displays no change 
in sign across the GLS MLE, GLS AR and IV2SLS but changes sign to positive in the 
IV2SGMM. In totality then the implications derived in the main fixed effect model seem 
appropriate and fully explanatory.  
 
Unique Governance Committee (GCOM) 
The coefficients here show a neat pattern of increasing magnitudes without sign changes 
or insignificances in all the GLS and IV regressions. Overall, then, there is no change to 
theoretical/empirical findings here. Universities that merely institute a special governance 
committee only add red-tape. Therefore, they have almost no impact on research 
performance.  
 
Student-Staff Ratio (SSR) 
A complex pattern emerges in this variable. While GLS MLE coefficient is insignificant 
the GLS AR display significant negative coefficient. On the other hand, the IV2SLS and 
IV2SGMM show significant positive coefficients. The true association of SSR is difficult 
to determine. But in Chapter 3 previous empirical work (Johnson, 2010; Kennedy & 
Siegfried, 1979; Zietz & Cochran, 1997; Lopus & Maxwell, 1995) has been shown to 
underline many methodological problems with this variable. Scholars have found that SSR 
associations often display different signs of association based on the methods chosen even 
within one sample. Therefore, such an ambiguous result here is not entirely surprising.   
 
Lay board member fractions (IGOV) 
The coefficients become significant in GLS AR (at 10% level) and the two IV regressions 
(at 5% level in 2SLS and at 1% level in GMM). However, the signs change to negative in 
GLS MLE and GLS AR, while they remain positive in the last two IV regressions.  This 
mixed nature of results here seems to reflect the complex non-linearity already spotted in 
this variable in the bivariate correlations. Overall then, the evidence seems to suggest that 
UK universities should not just adhere to a blind policy of employing 50% or more 
externals as most of them currently do (see Chapter 5, table 6). Instead they should pay 
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close attention to the experience/resource credentials of external board members before 
they co-opt them. 
 
Cash To Total Assets (CTA) 
The coefficients show a neat pattern staying significant (except GLS AR at 15%) and 
increasing in magnitudes without any change in the negative sign. The earlier 
theoretical/empirical arguments stand robustly confirmed. Overall then holding too much 
cash on the balance sheet detracts from university research performance. 
 
TST (Log Total Staff) 
The size control remains robustly positive in both the additional GLS (MLE and AR) 
regressions confirming our earlier interpretation. 
 
Region, Yea r& Pre-1992 (REGION, YEAR & PRE1992)  
 
REGION coefficient although omitted in the main GLSFE regression shows a robust 
negative sign across GLS MLE GLS AR, IV2SLS, IV 2GMM and panel OLS. As 
anticipated in various normative theories linking university governance with regional 
culture  (Zhou et al., 2008; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Bachan, 2017), this UK sample 
exhibits significant negative differences in research performance across the different 
regions i.e. Wales, England, Scotland and North Ireland. In other words there is clear 
evidence of a worrying drop in research performance across the decade 2005 to 2015 in 
this sample as one moves northward or westward from the base English region. Similarly, 
with YEAR the results also highlight a drop in UK university research performance across 
the decade 2005 to 2015 as suggested by Shattock (2013), Middlehurst (2013), Ntim et al. 
(2017) and several others. This can be inferred clearly in the negative sign of the coefficient 
in the panel OLS result. The university age control of Pre-1992 although omitted due to 
collinearity in the main GLS FE model displays a strong positive coefficient in the GLS 
MLE, GLS AR and panel OLS. Overall there is evidence that older and earlier established 
universities in this sample outperform newer peers at research. 
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6.1.2 Research Quality (RQ) Model 
 
 
6.1.2.1 GLS Fixed-Effects Model 
 
The table 19 below shows the status of the eleven hypotheses based on the results from the 
GLS fixed-effects regressions with robust standard errors using eleven different internal 
governance variables and three different control variables. The dependent variable is 
Research Quality (RQ). Note that although this is a constituent of RPI it is a variable that 
captures the quality of the research publications actually delivered by UK universities. The 
independent governances still span the theoretical/empirical field of investigation. But 
some variables here are as in the previous model while others are unique.  However, like 
the RPI model, this too, represents one of the most parsimonious combination of 




Table 18: Model 2 all regressions with robust standard errors for dependent variable Research Quality (RQ)  








Panel OLS Model 
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Variables:       
ES -0.073(.084) 0.422(.088)*** 0.471(.055)*** 2.159(.219)*** 2.230(.224)*** 0.881(.048)*** 
BIG4A 1.378(1.534) 1.714(1.166) 1.608(1.123) -1.043(1.353) -1.111(1.389) 1.873(.799)** 
BSIZE 6.400(3.821)* 7.599(1.997)*** 4.298(1.892)** 7.446(3.516)** 6.623(3.605)* 9.971(2.261)*** 
FSF -90.104(22.074)*** -121.208(13.852)*** -71.540(11.587)*** -42.011(11.957)*** -36.732(12.190)*** -43.510(6.619)*** 
BGDIV -2.544(4.672) -4.903(3.738) -0.761(3.318) -2.922(5.730) -3.248(5.871) 9.339(3.926)** 
VCPAY 0.242(2.459) -4.201(2.124)*** -1.560(1.644) -15.396(3.053)*** -16.000(3.122)*** -4.977(2.135)** 
ENDWTA -33.280(19.349)* 24.534(10.732)** 37.253(8.635)*** 3.330(9.772) 3.466(10.092) 26.757(5.040)*** 
PGINT 99.782(46.112)** 174.625(25.798)*** 126.911(23.441)*** 16.290(40.015) 5.887(41.246) 103.630(15.226)*** 
PGINT2 -172.097(84.887)** -288.230(43.750)*** -203.954(38.874)*** -11.247(63.507) 4.634(65.507) -175.398(24.972)*** 
PTTSR -11.419(5.775)** -8.013(4.518)* 0.938(3.734) 19.226(3.963)*** 18.768(4.056)*** 13.787(2.972)*** 
TFEE -9.788(4.802)** -26.070(3.183)*** -36.831(3.501)*** -13.963(6.088)** -12.073(6.226)* -6.859(3.604)* 
SFSPEND -0.006(.001)*** -0.008(.001)*** -0.004(.001)*** -0.014(.002)*** -0.015(.002)*** 0.003(.000)*** 
Controls Variables:       
TI -29.120(3.452)*** -6.591(1.985)*** -1.112(1.274) - - 1.886(.765)** 
PRE1992 - 22.776(4.255)*** 18.198(2.335)*** - - 12.298(1.177)*** 
REGION - -6.578(1.719)*** -5.554(1.157)*** -3.969(.847)*** -3.984(.871)*** -3.665(.627)*** 
YEAR - - - - - -3.090(.220)*** 
CODE - - - - - 0.039(.011)*** 
Constant 411.119(44.521)*** 171.053(30.757)*** 60.945(22.931)*** 117.909(37.691)*** 123.374(38.617)*** 6197.516(433.996)*** 
Number of Obs 883 883 883 883 883 883 
F-Value 42.13 - - - - 471.67 
R2 0.1821 - 0.8145 0.7371 0.7236 0.8819 
Wald Chi2 - - 1130.55 2777.29 2599.36 - 
LR Chi -  - - - - 
rho .97957706 0.7908521 - - - - 
Autocorrelation coef (yt-1)  - 0.73898638 - - - 
Theta median  - 0.3570 - - - 
Instrumented   - - ES ES - 
Instruments   - - TI; Pre1992 TI; Pre1992 - 
Estat overid score chi2(1) p    8.22837(p=0.0041)   
Sargan chi2    7.96617(p=0.0048)   
Basmann chi2    7.90214(p=0.0049)   
Score chi2    8.22837(p=0.0041)   
Hansen’s J chi2     8.22837(p=0.0041)  
Notes: The table reports all regressions with robust standard errors. Regressions defined as follows: Generalised least square fixed-effects (GLS Fixed-Effects); generalised least square maximum 
likelihood estimation (GLS Maximum Likelihood); generalised least square auto-regression (GLS AR); instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS); instrumental variable two-stage; 
instrumental variable generalized method of moments (IV GMM); panel ordinary least square model (Panel OLS Model). Variables are defined as follows: entry standards (ES); if HEI is audited 
by a big four auditor (BIG4A); governing board size (GBSIZE); female staff fraction (FSF); board gender diversity (BGDIV);  vice-chancellor emolument (VCPAY); endowment to total asset 
(ENDWTA); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); tuition fee fraction (TFEE); service and facility spend per student (SFSPEND); total income (TI);  pre-1992 
(PRE1992); region (REGION); year (YEAR); and code (CODE). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
RQ seems to be a positive function of BIG4A (insig), BSIZE (sig.), VCPAY (insig) and 
PGINT (sig.), but a negative function of ES (insig),  FSF (sig.), BGDIV (insig), ENDWTA 
(sig.),  PGINT2 (sig.), PTTSR (sig.), TFEE (sig.), SFSPEND (sig.) and TI (sig.). 
 
Table 19: Summary of the Findings and Hypothesis of Governance and Research Quality  (RQ) 
Dependent Variable Research Quality (RQ) 




Finding sig. Hyp. Status 
Governance Variables:      
Entry Standard (ES) H1a + - Insig. Rejt.  
Big-4 Auditor (BIG4A) H6o + + Insig. Rejt. 
Board Size (BSIZE) H6a + + Sig. (10%) Acep. 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) H3j + - Sig. (1%) Rejt.  
Board Gender Diversity (BGDIV) H6c + - Insig. Rejt. 
Vice-Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) H6p + + Insig. Rejt.  
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) H5f + - Sig. (10%) Rejt. 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT) H4c + + Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Part-time to Full-time Staff (PTTSR) H3g - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) H5a - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Service and Facility Spend per Student 
(SFSPEND) 
H5c + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter 3. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting hypothesised 
relationships, respectively.  
 
Entry Standards (ES) 
Entry Standards now displays a negative association although one that is insignificant. This 
contradicts the signs of association in the earlier RPI model. The fact that this negative 
impact is not significant and could well be zero raises doubts about sub-hypothesis (H1a). 
It is hard to interpret this result. One way to interpret this result is to pay attention to the 
exact dependent variable in this regression. It is the published research quality of the 
university. This means that at least some universities in the sample that do not stipulate 
very high entry standards still perform equally well in the quality of their published output. 
For the first time then a slightly less skewed picture emerges. The elite and exclusive nature 





BIG 4 External Audit (BIG4A) 
Although the sign on this variable is positive the coefficient is insignificant. Sub-hypothesis 
(H6o) is rejected. Just because a university contracts to get its processes, systems and 
finances audited by a BIG4 audit firm it does not necessarily produce better research. This 
seems intuitive. Good research is an artefact of a sound system of idea generation, debate 
and refinement rooted in the teaching learning regimes (TLRs) evolved by a university 
over decades (Trowler, 2008, 2019; Trowler & Cooper, 2002; Gayle et al., 2003). 
Therefore, it is to be anticipated that merely ensuring transparent objective external audit 
will not change these longstanding research processes.  Yet this is not to suggest that this 
lack of direct association implies that reputed external audit may not actually improve the 
teaching and learning ambience in the university. It could do this by for instance ‘lending 
a halo of legitimacy’ to the university and thus improving the research atmosphere 
(Deegan, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Saltman et al., 2000; Marginson & Considine, 2000; 
Swansson, Mow & Bartos, 2004; Suchman, 1995). From another angle it could also check 
managerial hubris improve stakeholder representation and reduce manager-academic 
conflicts (Freeman et al., 2004; Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004; Kesner & Johnson, 1990; 
Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 
2015; Kalyta & Magnan, 2008). Yet this result does not corroborate any of these theoretical 
predictions. Empirically Ntim et al. (2017) and Gordon et al. (2002) too find that BIG4 
audit does improve university voluntary disclosure. In coporate studies a positive 
association is confirmed by Chen et al. (2013) between BIG4 audits and firm performance 
 
Board Size (BSIZE) 
Board size and its positive impact (at 10% level) on research quality further confirms and 
corroborates hypothesis (H6a) It is in line with model 1 above. Larger board sizes seem to 
improve the research quality of published output of these UK universities. The theoretical 
expectations and interpretations alluded to in model 1 apply here too. But specifically the 
results here seem to strongly suggest that the resource networks and experience diversities 
of larger boards seem to provide better strategic direction to the research scholarship within 
a university. This is to be expected in a complex knowledge institution such as a university 
where the research function is original creative and ideational (Fowles, 2013; Pfeffer & 
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salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006). Every new board member added brings to bear fresh 
alternative perspectives and this enriches the idea generation and modification process 
inherent to research. This is what is generally confirmed in earlier empirical work here, 
notably, Olson (2000). It can be inferred that this is what is resulting in the higher research 
quality of the published output of such institutions. 
 
Board Gender Diversity (BGDIV) 
Gender diversity at the board level displays a negative association but without significance. 
Sub-hypothesis (H6c) is rejected. Therefore on the one hand the association predictions of 
Public Accountability, Legitimacy, Resource Dependence, Stakeholder and Stewardship 
(Coy et al., 2011; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Mitchell et 
al., 1997; Pfeffer, 1987; Mitchell et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) that inclusivity 
and gender balance on the board improve research integrity and value remain unsupported 
here. But on the other the result also does not support the contentions of Managerial power 
and Optimal Contracting theorists (Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; 
Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996) who call for homogenous single gender boards 
because they avoid conflicts and analysis-paralysis . There seems very little evidence in 
this UK sample for the “unconscious bias” arguments (Santos & Van Phu, 2019; David, 
2017; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Prena, 2005) rife in the governance literature. This result 
is also at odds with the earlier corporate governance (Carter et al., 2003; Van der Walt & 
Ingley, 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015)   and university governance (Harris, 2014; 
Olson, 2000) research that have found evidence for a positive association.  
 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 
The negative and significant association (at 10% level) of this coefficient in the main GLS 
FE model rejects sub-hypothesis (H5f). High quality university research in this sample 
seems to come from institutions that have distinctly lower proportions of endowment. 
Universities with larger endowment resources do not necessarily forge an independent 
research strategy (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Bouwman, 2011). As 
predicted by resource dependence. But the negative association here seems to support 
public accountability (coy et al., 2001; Butt, 2019l Parker, 2012) concerns that high 
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ENDWTA will mean over alignment with corporate research interests and thus reduce the 
independence and integrity of the research function. It also seems to support the legitimacy 
prediction that an endowment rich university will only legitimate itself to donors and in the 
process lose its legitimacy in the wider academic research community (Asforth & Gibbs, 
1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Earlier empirical work has indicated that larger older and 
research-intensive universities in the UK tend to have the largest endowments (Boliver, 
2015; Fazackerley, 2013).  
 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT) 
The proportion of postgraduate students at a university as expected is positively correlated 
with Research Quality. Thus sub-hypothesis (H4c) is confirmed. Universities that 
specialize in postgraduate courses create and facilitate the right research ambience in their 
various departments. A mission-based ethos is inculcated in the institution as suggested by 
Culture/Quality Assurance theorists (Gayle et al., 2002; Trowler, 2008; Alvesson, 2002; 
Brown, 2004, 2009; Salter & Tapper, 2000; Cremonini et al., 2015; Wilmott, 1993), Public 
accountability (Coy et al., 2011; Vidovich & Slee, 2001) theorists and other governance 
scholars (Tarbert et al., 2008; Bachan & Reilly, 2015). This also seems to drive the 
institution to invest in the resources appropriate to high quality research as argued by 
Resource Dependence (Flowes, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Callen et al., 2010; 
Verbruggen et al., 2011; Donaldson & McNicholas, 2004, p.349; Angell et al., 2008; smith 
et al., 2010). This is what seems to be showing up in the higher quality published research 
of such institutions. Earlier empirical research has not directly aasociated this variable with 
university academic performance although there are many normative and argumentative 
voices (Donaldson & McNicholas, 2004; Staurt et al., 2008) that opine that higher levels 
of postgraduate students will improve academic performance.   
 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT)2 
For the first time in the results there is clear evidence in this research quality model of a 
quadratic non-linear effect that is significant. Obviously the negative quadratic coefficient 
here must be read in conjunction with the positive linear term coefficient above . PGINT 
does not display a simple linear association. There is an important trade-off here. Just 
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increasing post graduate student intake indiscriminately may harm the research quality of 
the institution. Resource dependence arguments (Pfeffer, 1987; Fowles, 2014) that too 
many postgraduate students exert heavy resource burdens on the university that might 
interfere with the integrity of the research function do find some support here. Such a 
finding also lends some support to the critics (Collini, 2005; Collis, 2004; Rowlands, 2012; 
Middlehurst, 2013; Parker, 2011) of the increasingly marketized student market in UK HEI 
who argue against excessive post graduate student places at recent universities. Perhaps in 
many of these recent universities the number of such students far exceeds the 
instruction/interaction limits imposed by existing staff and other resource facilities. This 
may be what is showing up in the evidence here as a complex linear positive non-linear 
negative combined impact.  
 
Part-time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 
There is a negative and significant association (at 5% level) between this variable and 
Research Quality. This fits with its sign in the bivariate correlations. The main GLS FE 
model thus confirms sub-hypothesis (H3g). There is undoubtedly significant merit in 
Quality Assurance tenets (Brown, 2004, 2009; Filippakou & Tapper, 2008; Rowley, 1996; 
Angell et al., 2008; Eurydice, 2010, pg. 24; Brown & Carasso, 2013, pg. 144-163; Attwood, 
2008b; Yorke, 2009a, b; Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; Palfreyman, 2010; Coughlan, 2015) that 
normatively argue that ad-hoc contractual arrangements destroy the quality of academic 
work.  
Services & Facilities Spend (SFSPEND) 
The proportion of a university’s spending on academic facilities/services shows a negative 
and significant association (at 1% level) with Research Quality. This contradicts sub-
hypothesis (H5c). The result does not support either the arguments of neo-classical/optimal 
contracting (Price et al., 2003; Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Rosen, 
1990) that expect an optimal academic environment due to facility spending or a better 
husbanding of resources leading to better research (Nelson et al., 2002) theories. UK 
universities that spend larger fractions on library, computing and other knowledge 
facilitating assets in this sample do not seem to improve the quality of their published 
output a rather counter-intuitive finding. The finding also contradicts extant empirical 
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research (Earthman, 2002; Ganyaupfyu, 2013; Mushtaq & Khan, 2012; Kirmani & 
Siddiquah, 2008; Karemera et al., 2003; Young, 1999) that finds a positive impact on 
university performance especially with regard to teaching.  
 
 
 Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
In line with model 1 results and its bivariate correlations this variable displays a negative 
and significant association with Research Quality. This, thus rejects sub-hypothesis (H3j). 
Once again the variable  contradicts our ex-ante expectation. Staff level diversity unlike its 
board level counterpart shows a significant and negative association. It clearly seems to 
reduce the quality of research output of UK universities. This contradicts several voices in 
the policy and normative literature (Collini, 2005; 2008; Trowler, 2008; Ritzer, 2002; Ntim 
et al., 2017; Bryson, 2004) that suggest that gender balance and inclusivity should improve 
research performance and quality. It also does not lend any support to the theoretical 
arguments of public accountability resource dependence Legitimacy and Stakeholder (Coy 
et al., 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Suchman, 1995; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Ullman, 
1985; Roberts, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997) all of which argue for a richer research ambience 
stemming from tighter gender balance among research staff. In this sample unmistakeably 
higher levels of female staff simply reduce the quality of the published output of a 
university. Although empirical scholarship does not have any direct results to 
validate/contradict the result, many studies here highlight how female staff contributions 
are generally undervalued in the published research of the university (Wenneras, 1997; 
Witteman, 2019; Budden et al., 2008; Helmer et al., 2017). 
 
Vice Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 
This variable displays a positive association with Research Quality but the coefficient is 
insignificant. Sub- hypothesis (H6p) is rejected. Therefore One is unable to fully reject 
Public accountability and Legitimacy arguments (Clarke & Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Melis et 
al., 2015; Reverte, 2009) that top research universities hold down the pay of their chief 
executives in order to meet critical public scrutiny and moral legitimacy concerns. After 
all unlike CEOs of firms Vice Chancellors are public servants and so cannot and must not 
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be paid liberally like their corporate counterparts. Simultaneously this insignificance 
suggests that even the monopsony arguments of Optimal contracting (Raff & Summers, 
1987; Banker et al., 1996; MacLeod & Malcomson, 1998; Tarbert et al., 2008) are not 
completely without merit. High research quality UK universities are specialist employers 
and VCs are in many ways dependent upon them for their jobs. Therefore, such institutions 
are able to drive a hard bargain and negotiate down the salary of their VCs.  
 
This finding is in stark contrast to the CEO pay literature in corporate governance where 
many studies (Murphy, 1999; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Joskow & Rose, 1994; Kaplan; 
1994; Boschen & Smith, 1995; Hallock, 1998; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Unite et al., 2008) 
document the positive association between firm performance and CEO salaries. This 
unique sample finding is amply supported in a growing VC pay empirical literature 
(Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Tarbert et al., 2008). These scholars document that UK 
universities do underpay their VCs in relation to comparable CEOs and suggest that this is 
due to the legitimacy/public accountability concerns as well as the monopsony arguments 
alluded to earlier. 
 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 
TFEE i.e. the fraction of a university’s total income that is derived from student fees, 
negatively associates with Research Quality. Sub-hypothesis (H5a) is confirmed. 
Theoretical arguments of Instrumental versions of Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 2010; 
1999; Wise et al., 2020; Mitchell et al., 1997; Heller, 1997; 1999; Peter & Waterman, 1982; 
Handy, 1993; Gayle et al., 2003; Gunasekera & Reed, 2008; Gomes & Novaes, 2005) seem 
to be supported here. Universities that derive large fractions of their incomes from student 
fees prioritize internal governances that facilitate teaching and student learning. 
Consequently, research governances and processes are neglected. This is what shows up in 
reduced Research Quality. Legitimacy and Resource dependence too predict such a result. 
After all a university that is highly dependent on fee paying students would focus on 
legitimating itself to these important constituents as a priority (Fowles, 2014; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003; Mangan et al., 2010a, b; Sutton Trust, 2004). It would therefore marshal 
internal resources towards teaching and its facilitation. Research would definitely be 
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downplayed and this is what is evident in the sample. Similarly, the large resources derived 
from student fees would impel internal governors to prioritize student learning and 
facilitation  (Molesworth et al., 2012, Wellman et al., 2009; Flowes, 2014; Jabbar et al., 
2017; Nixon et al., 2016; Jarvis, 2014). Empirical studies (Dunnett et al., 2012; dao & 
Thrope, 2015; Migin et al., 2015) generally find evidence supporting a positive association 
between tuition fees and teaching facility spending by UK universities and thus seem to 
suggest a de-emphasis of the research function.  
 
Total Income (TI) 
The size control based on the total incomes of the university shows a robust negative 
association with research quality . This seems to suggest that universities with lower 
incomes outperform their higher income earning peers  at published research an unexpected 
finding. While this is hard to explain it does seem to lend some support to voices in the 
argumentative literature that call to question the real contribution of large well established 
universities to true knowledge creation (Collini, 2012; Boliver, 2013). 
 
6.1.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
As in the previous model a set of five additional regressions are implemented here to 
address heteroscedasticity, abnormal distributional concerns, multi-collinearity, 
autocorrelation and endogeneity. The same empirical and methodological justifications 
apply here too as discussed there (please see all relevant tests in appendix 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
for this model).  
 
Entry Standards (ES) 
A complex result emerges in this variable. The insignificant and negative association in the 
main GLS FE model is contradicted by the GLS MLE and GLS AR and both IV (2SLS 
and GMM) all of which display positive significant associations at 1% level. In totality the 
result expands and enriches the issue. Research Quality i.e. the quality of the published 
output of a university unlike its overall research performance (RPI) seems less positively 
aligned with the selectivity in its recruitment standards (ES). This is the first sign of 
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evidence in this UK sample that there definitely are some universities that outperform at 
least in published research quality without imposing stiff selectivity barriers in student 
recruitment. Public Accountabilty and legitimacy theorists (Schwartz, 2004; Higings & 
Forster, 2009; Boliver, 2013; 2011; Zimdars, 2010; Jones & Thomas, 2005; Harrison, 
2011) who warn against an elitist selectivity approach in HEI obtain some support from 
these findings. Simultaneously the dangers of applying a straightjacket neo-classical and 
neo-managerial (Murdoch, 2011; Molesworth et al., 2012; Van Vught, 2008; Marginson, 
2004, 2002; Trowler, 2008; Brown, 2010; Meyer, 2002; Biggs, 2003) perspective to 
universities is richly supported by this complex result. Clearly, not all high quality 
published research output is necessarily derived from elite scholars with privileged 
academic and social backgrounds. Transformation of the research skills and output of 
incoming students continues to be an important university function and here is some, albeit 
weak proof, that it does work and produces equally valid research.  
 
BIG4A 
All the GLS coefficients here lose significances/magnitudes but do not change their 
positive sign. However, in the IV regressions without significance the coefficient switches 
to negative with a reduced magnitude. Ambiguity is then the primary theme in this variable 
and its impact on Research Quality. Overall, then, there is far weaker evidence in this model 
that audits by reputed external auditors necessarily improve the quality of research of any 
given UK HEI.  
 
Board Size (BSIZE) 
As in model 1, the positive sign on this coefficient remains unchanged across all GLS and 
two IV regressions. However, there are drops in magnitude across all regressions here. 
GLS MLE coefficients remain as significant i.e. at 1%. GLS AR and IV2SLS drop to 5% 
significance whereas GLS FE and IV 2GMM drop to 10% significance respectively. 
Regardless, however, the overall conclusion of the GLS remains robust. Larger boards are 
a significant positive influence on Research Quality in this sample. Overall, then, there is 
no empirical evidence to support board size restrictions emphasized by regulators  in the 
UK HEI sector.   
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Board Gender Diversity (BGDIV) 
All the GLS and IV coefficients remain negative but lose significance. Overall, there is no 
need to modify the interpretations derived from the main GLS FE. The influence of this 
variable seems fairly weak and ambiguous. Apart from the low levels of this ratio itself 
(never exceeding 34% on average (mean/median) in any year; see univariate statistics 
Table 6) already mentioned above it must be noted that there are relatively larger numbers 
of missing values (1,111 observations i.e. 30.3%) in this variable in the sample. This could 
be at the base of the weak statistical significances in the additional GLS and IV regressions 
here. 
 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA)  
The negative sign on this coefficient in the main GLS FE switches to positive with 
significance in GLS MLE (5%), GLS AR (1%) and without significance in the IV 
regressions. This strongly suggests that the original interpretation that ENDWTA should 
be treated with caution is completely valid. While the main FE model shows a negative 
association this must not be taken completely at face value. There are contrarian indications 
within this sample especially when accounting for abnormalities, autocorrelations and 
endogeneities. In many ways this fits within the narrative of ‘no straight-jacket’ and 
cautious calibration of this variable as already suggested above.  
 
Post Graduate Intensity (PGINT) & PGINT^2 
The pattern of sensitivities in respect of the linear and non-linear terms here are remarkably 
similar and so it makes sense to discuss both together. All the GLS coefficients display 
similar signs and significances in both GLS MLE (1% significance) and GLS AR (1% 
significance) as in the main model. However, both the IV coefficients lose 
significance/magnitudes although they do not change signs. On the whole this is a robust 
result. Heteoskedasticity, abnormality and auto-correlations in the data sample do not 
change the main mixed  linear positive and non-linear negative  impact of this new hitherto 
untested internal university governance.  
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In this robustness one can infer some process-like and culturally moderated characteristics 
of this variable (Chou & Gornitzka, 2014; Chou et al., 2017; Eitken, 2015; Peters, 2015; 
Gayle et al., 2003; Entwhistle, 2007; Trowler, 2008). Levels of post graduate students 
impel universities to change other related governance priorities such as student facilities, 
subject mix, staffing, research culture & ethos and so on. It is due to these processes that 
the research quality at the institution would ultimately improve. Yet these linked processes 
are neither assured nor certain. The sample result here and its robust twin directional 
associations seems to be suggesting this complex chain of processes that need to work. A 
UK university wishing to climb up the research quality chart would need to carefully think 
through the proportion of post graduate courses/places it should offer in the HEI quasi-
market. Blindly aping its peers could seriously harm it especially in the long run due to the 
various process linkages.  University Governors would do well to take a comprehensive 
balanced view of all internal governances before taking a calibrated decision here. 
 
Part time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 
 
GLS MLE coefficient retains the negative sign (at 10% level) while GLS AR changes sign 
to positive and insignificance. It is only in the IV 2SLS and IV 2GMM that the coffient 
switches to a positive and significant association (at 1% level). A mixed and ambiguous 
picture of the association of this variable with Research Quality now emerges. Use of Part 
time staff is not necessarily all negative in its implications. There are some signs that 
stewardship and optimal contracting scholars (Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 
2006; Rosen, 1990) may not be completely wrong in their contentions that the part time 
contract if appropriately designed and implemented might actually introduce elements of 
accountability and performance amongst all staff.  In totality then there is a rich and mixed 
pattern in this variable unlike TRST in model 1. The trade-offs already mentioned in the 
use of part time staff seem further emphasized in this. Levels and types of part time staff 
have significant impacts upon the published research output of the university and there is 




Services & Facilities Spend (SFSPEND) 
All the GLS and IV coefficients robustly confirm the negative association here. Only the 
panel OLS regression changes sign to positive with significance. But as discussed before 
despite its importance as a filtering and explanatory regression one should not rely on it. 
Therefore, there is no need here to interfere with the narrative developed in the main GLS 
FE model above.  
 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
The coefficients remain negative and significant (at 1% level) in their associations across 
the five regressions.. This is a robust result and fully confirms the interpretations from the  
main GLS FE  model above. Staff level gender diversity needs a sensible governance 
approach. At one level employing female staff must be on merits and should not just be for 
the sake of improving gender diversity compliance targets. At another level there is a clear 
need to expand and strengthen training and skilling inputs aimed at female research staff 
to address any long standing skill gaps in their academic repertoire.   
 
Vice Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 
All GLS IV and panel OLS regression coefficients change their signs uniformly to negative 
and are significant except for the GLS Auto-regression. Unlike the fixed effects model 
where there was ambiguity about the sign of the association as the coefficient was 
insignificant there seems to be some evidence now in the full suite of regressions of a 
negative association between VC PAY and research quality. One is unable to fully reject 
Public accountability and Legitimacy arguments (Clarke & Gibson-Sweet, 1999; Melis et 
al., 2015; Reverte, 2009) that top research universities hold down the pay of their chief 
executives in order to meet critical public scrutiny and moral legitimacy concerns. After 
all unlike CEOs of firms Vice Chancellors are public servants and so cannot and must not 
be paid liberally like their corporate counterparts. Simultaneously this mixed sensitivity 
shows some evidence of the monopsony arguments of Optimal contracting (Raff & 
Summers, 1987; Banker et al., 1996; MacLeod & Malcomson, 1998; Tarbert et al., 2008). 
High quality research universities are specialist employers and VCs are in many ways 
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dependent upon them for their jobs. Therefore such institutions are able to drive a hard 
bargain and negotiate down the salary of their VCs.  
 
This finding is in stark contrast to the CEO pay literature in corporate governance where 
many studies (Murphy, 1999; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Joskow & Rose, 1994; Kaplan; 
1994; Boschen & Smith, 1995; Hallock, 1998; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Unite et al., 2008) 
document the positive association between firm performance and CEO salaries. VC pay 
has a different and weakly negative association with the performance indicator of research 
quality. This unique sample finding is amply supported  in a growing VC pay empirical 
literature (Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Tarbert et al., 2008). These scholars document that UK 
universities do underpay their VCs in relation to comparable CEOs and suggest that this is 
due to the legitimacy/public accountability concerns as well as the monopsony arguments 
alluded to earlier. 
 
A final note of caution here seems to be in order. The sample evidence can be interpreted 
to mean that  high quality UK research universities perversely underpay their VCs while 
their poorer quality peers overpay them. One could argue that in general the latter i.e. the 
poor research quality performers chase “star rated” VCs in a bid to improve their legitimacy 
and gain resources/networks. This is not a sustainable strategy for these institutions in the 
long run. Regulatory guidelines about how universities should pay their Vice Chancellors 
seem to be in order. 
 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 
All GLS IV and panel OLS coefficients remain robustly negative at 1 % level in GLS MLE 
and GLS AR. The significance drops back again in the IV 2SLS to 5% and 10% in IV 
GMM. There is also a rise in magnitudes across all 5 regressions although significances 
weaken in some. Overall then the distinctive sample findings in respect of this variable and 
the complex trade-offs alluded to in the main model remain strongly relevant.  
TI (Log Totatl Income) 
The size control of TI remains robustly negative  in all GLS regressions and therefore our 




This university mission based control remains robustly positive in both the additional GLS 
regressions and the panel OLS underlining that across this sample older established 
universities produce higher quality research, an anticipated result. 
 
Region & Year (REGION & YEAR) 
Just like in model 1 above both these variables display a significant negative coefficient. 
University Research Quality has been secularly declining across the decade. Scottish, 
Welsh and Northern Irish universities are clearly lower in research quality than their 
English peers. Region does not change sign in all the sensitivities, whether GLS MLE, GLS 
AR, Panel OLS or IV 2SLS and IV GMM regressions, coefficients remain significant at 
1%,  and negative. Clearly the negative regional effect persists in research quality, just as 
in RPI. Eslsewhere, from the panel OLS coefficient, the worrying trend of decline in 
research quality across the decade is obvious, although this result is based on panel OLS 













6.1.3 Research Grant Fraction (RGF) Model 
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6.1.3.1 GLS Fixed-Effects Model   
 
The table 21 below shows the status of the seven hypotheses based on the results from the  
main GLS fixed-effects FE regression with robust standard errors using eleven significant 
and explanatory internal governance variables and three different control variables. The 
dependent variable is Research Grant fraction (RGF). Just like Research Quality  this is a 
constituent of RPI. But  it is a monetary indicator potentially capturing the research funding 
agencies’ independent assessment of the research performance at a given university.. The 
independent governance still span the theoretical/empirical field of investigation. But some 
variables here are as in the previous model while others are unique.  However, like the RPI 
and RQ models, this too, represents one of the most parsimonious combination of variables 










Table 20: Model 3 all regressions with robust standard errors for dependent variable Research Grant Fraction (RGF) 








Panel OLS Model 
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Variables:       
BMFS 0.006(.003)** 0.006(.002)*** 0.001(.002) -0.032(006)*** -0.023(.005)*** -0.032(.004)*** 
BEDIV -0.017(.010)* -0.020(.010)* -0.021(.010)** 0.052 (.021)** .0114(.017) -0.033(.012)*** 
TRST -0.100(.023)*** -0.127(.012)*** -0.194(.012)*** -0.679(.019)*** -0.669(.019)*** -0.459(.022)*** 
PTTSR -0.022(.009)** -0.031(.008)*** -0.030(.008)*** 0.015(.014) .023(.014) -0.044(.012)*** 
TONLY -0.094(.024)*** -0.119(0.012)*** -0.186(.013)*** -0.650(.019) -0.655(.019)*** -0.429(.025)*** 
ENDWTA 0.008(.028) 0.026(.019) 0.074(.020)*** -0.037(.031) -0.064(.030)** 0.012(.024) 
FSF 0.037(.045) 0.023(.020) -0.011(.022) 0.020(.036) -0.036(.033) -0.077(.023)*** 
       
Controls Variables:       
TST 0.006(.005) 0.010(.002)*** 0.015(.002)*** - - 0.021(.002)*** 
RGROUP - 0.129(0.013)*** 0.097(.008)*** - - 0.020(.005)*** 
YEAR - - - - - 0.001(.000)*** 
CODE - - - - - 0.000(.000)** 
Constant 0.114(.037)*** 0.088(.020)*** 0.137(.022)*** 0.691(.021)*** 0.702(.020)*** -2.377(.686)*** 
Number of Obs 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 
F-Value 6.65 - - - - 585.36 
R2 0.8354 - 0.7977 0.8259 0.8259 0.8900 
Wald Chi2 - - 1264.80 4521.33 5123.11 - 
LR Chi -  - - - - 
rho .97701098 0.9460321 - - - - 
Autocorrelation coef (yt-
1) 
 - 0.6430441 - - - 
Theta median  - 0.6639 - - - 
Instrumented     TRST TRST  
Instruments     RGROUP; TST RGROUP; TST  
Estat overid score 
chi2(1) p 
   11.0401  (p = 0.0009)   
Sargan chi2    143.656  (p = 0.0000)   
Basmann chi2    165.189  (p = 0.0000)   
Score chi2    11.0401  (p = 0.0009)   
Hansen’s J chi2     11.0401 (p = 0.0009)  
Notes: The table reports all regressions with robust standard errors. Regressions defined as follows: Generalised least square fixed-effects (GLS Fixed-Effects); generalised least square maximum 
likelihood estimation (GLS Maximum Likelihood); generalised least square auto-regression (GLS AR); instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS); instrumental variable two-stage; 
instrumental variable generalized method of moments (IV GMM);  panel ordinary least square model (Panel OLS Model). Variables are defined as follows: board meeting frequency (BMFS); board 
ethnic fraction (BEDIV); teaching and research staff fraction (TRST); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); teaching only staff fraction (TONLY);  endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); female 
staff fraction (FSF); total staff (TST);  278ndogen group university  (RGROUP); year (YEAR); and code (CODE). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
Clearly RGF seems to be a positive function of BMFS (sig.), ENDWTA (insg.), FSF (insig.) and 
TST (insig.),but a negative function of BEDIV (sig.), TRST (sig.), PTTSR (sig.), TONLY (sig.). 
 
Table 21:  Summary of the Findings and Hypothesis of Governance and Research Grant Fraction  (RGF) 
Dependent Variable Research Grant Fraction (RGF) 




Finding sig. Hyp. Status 
Governance Variables:      
Board Meeting Frequency (BMFS) H6i + + Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) H6e + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) H3a - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Part-time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) H3g - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) H3e - - Sig. (1%) Acep.  
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) H5f + + Insig.  Rejt.  
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) H3j + + Insig. Rejt. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter 3. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting hypothesised 
relationships, respectively.  
 
 
Board Meeting Frequency (BMFS) 
Board Meeting frequency is significant at (1% level) and shows a positive association with 
Research Grant Fraction. This result confirms sub-hypothesis (H6i). In this UK sample there is 
strong evidence that university boards that meet more often are able to generate significantly higher 
levels of research grants. The finding lends support to all core theoretical predictions of Public 
Accountability, Stakeholder Resource Dependence, Stewardship and Legitimacy. Clearly frequent 
meetings vocalize public purpose better(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Coy et al., 2001; ), allow for 
value-added interactions among relevant stakeholders (Mitchell., 1997; Roberts, 1992), enable 
resource rich members to contribute (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Pfeffer, 1987; Reverte, 2009), help 
the institution spot and correct problems earlier (Vafeas, 1999) and use the halo of board legitimacy 
more effectively (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Suchman, 1995). Empirically Lokuwaduge (2011) 
corroborates this result in her Australian university sample although corporate governance studies 






Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) 
Board ethnic diversity as reflected in the numbers of ethnic minorities (Black, Asian and 
minorities) on the board seems to be a  negative influence (At 10% level) on university research 
grant acquisition. The finding contradicts sub-hypothesis (H6e).  The finding seems to be 
supporting the predictions of optimal contracting and managerial power that suggest that ethnically 
diverse boards may pull in different directions and create academic policy logjam resulting in 
poorer research performance (Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson & 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996). 
 
On the other hand it directly contradicts public accountability (Coy et al., 2011) suggestions of 
ethnic diversity resulting in greater neutrality leading to better research; legitimacy predictions of 
greater credibility with research grant providers due to ethnic diversity (Suchman, 1995; De 
Villiers and Van Staden, 2006). ; stakeholder predictions that accommodating diverse stakeholder 
interests will lead to a balanced focus on research (Roberts, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997) or resource 
dependence arguments that ethnically diverse members will bring a better network reach 
generating more research funds (Pfeffer, 1987; Verbruggen et al., 2011). Empirical work in 
corporate and university governance generally contradicts this result (Erhardt et al., 2003; Ntim et 
al., 2015) although at least some policy/argumentative papers (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2009; 
Goodstein et al., 1994) suggest that greater diversity may lead to conflict and underperformance.  
 
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) 
The proportion of teaching and research staff employed by a university is strongly negatively 
correlated with research performance (at 1% level). This result confirms sub-hypothesis (H3a). 
Resource dependence and Stakeholder concerns (Norton, 2013; Oancea et al., 2010) with the high 
workloads and motivational drag of such contracts seem to echo in the result. Yet research grant 
providers do not seem to agree that TRST contracts will improve research function in the university 
as indicated by public accountability (Bryson & Barnes, 2000a, b; Locke, 2012). Earlier empirical 
work associating this variable with research performance is almost non-existent but many 
normative voices Whitchurch, 2016; AUT, 2005; Sikes, 2012; Chalmers, 2010 call for a 
reevaluation of the omnibus tenure track contract and its place in the university sector. 
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Part-Time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 
As anticipated by theory especially the culture-quality assurance (CQA) paradigm there is indeed 
a significant negative impact (at 5% level) between the number of part-time staff a university 
chooses to employ and  its research grant acquisitions. Similarly, Legitimacy and Stakeholder 
arguments (Suchman, 1995; Freeman, 2010; Wise et al., 2020; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014; 
Stensaker, 2018) that too many part time staff paint a grim picture of the research ambience of a 
university to students and research grant providers seem to be corroborated. High percentage of 
part time staff clearly interfere with the ability to attract research grants. Therefore sub-hypothesis 
(H3g) is confirmed.  
 
Earlier empirical work do not associate this variable directly with research performance but 
several qualitative surveys and normative voices do raise the demotivational aspects of the part 
time contract. Staff employed on such contracts neither feel valued nor are able to access the full 
range of academic resources and hence find themselves unable to contribute to research 
proposals (Purcell et al., 1999; Allen-Collinson, 2004; Thewlis, 2003; Ackers & Oliver, 2007).  
  
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) 
The negative and statistically significant (at 1% level) coefficient on teaching only staff strongly 
underlines how universities employing larger fraction of teaching only staff systematically 
deteriorate their own research grant acquisition. This result confirms sub-hypothesis (H3e). 
Employing high levels of Tonly staff who have a teaching focus and do not contribute to research 
naturally do not improve research performance as predicted by Optimal contracting and quality 
assurance (Ackers & Oliver, 2007; Probert, 2013; Sikes, 2006). Grant providrs as instrumental 
stakeholders see high levels of such staff and assume that the university may face difficulties in 
completing research projects on time as predicted by resource dependence (Kessner & Johnson, 
1990, Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Harley, 2002; Oxford, 2008). Earlier empirical studies have not 
associated TONLY with research performance.    
 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 
The coefficient on endowment to total assets suggests an insignificant but positive effect on 
research grant fraction. Hence we reject sub-hypothesis (H5f). Research performance as assessed 
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by the grant providers does not positively associate with a university’s endowment levels. There 
is no evidence of resource dependence predictions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Fowles, 2014; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) that universities with higher endowments will adopt independent 
research trajectories and excel in it. Similarly the result does not seem to fit with public 
accountability or legitimacy arguments of lack of public orientation reducing publically relevant 
research performance or inordinate vested endowment donor interests creating a corporate bias 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Van Essen et al., 2015, Butt, 2019). Earlier 
empirical work has generally flagged the higher endowment levels at older established UK 
universities (Boliver, 2015) without directly drawing any link with research performance.   
 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
Female staff fraction is insignificant in the main GLS FE model but with a positive association. 
The result is at odds with both research models 1 and 2 above. The sub-hypothesis (H3j) is 
therefore rejected. It seems that decisions to award research grants are not materially affected by 
the gender compositions of UK universities. The result is much in line with public accountability 
and legitimacy arguments (Suchman, 1995; Coy et al., 2001) that strongly argue for gender 
neutrality in research processes and governances. There seems to be no support for the resource 
dependence argument that higher female staff levels will attract higher levels of gender and soft 
subject research grants. The result seems to imply that UK research grants are driven solely by 
merit, a finding echoed elsewhere within the empirical UK governance literature (Blake & La 
Valle, 2000; Santos & Van Phu, 2019).  
 
TST (Log Total Staff) 
The size control based on the staff size of the institution is insignificance in the main GLS fixed 
effects model. Therefore we are uable to support the narrative that larger UK universities on the 
whole perform better at research than their smaller peers (Ntim et al., 2017). This is an anticipated 






6.1.3.2 Sensitivity test Analysis 
 
Board Meeting Frequency (BMFS) 
BMFS remains negative and significant in GLS MLE (at 1%) but loses significance in GLS AR. 
However, the coefficient changes its sign with significance (at 1%) to negative in both the IV 2SLS 
and IV 2GMM regressions. There is clearly some element of ambiguity now in the impact of this 
variable. Not all university boards that meet frequently in this UK sample actually improve 
research grant acquisition.  Some boards despite implementing a regime of increased meetings 
continue to remain inefficient and ineffective. 
 
Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) 
Board ethnic fraction does not change sign and remains significant throughout the GLS 
regressions at 10% level although the significance level rise to 5% in GLS AR What is 
noteworthy is that BEDIV changes sign from negative to positive in the IV 2SLS (5% 
significance level), but remains positive without significance in IV GMM. This result is complex 
and ambiguous. It does validate the cautious interpretation advanced in the main GLS FE model 
above. Board level ethnic diversity needs careful nurturing and support from UK HEI regulators.  
 
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) 
 The optimal fraction that a university should employ is arguably one of the most difficult facing 
both heads of departments and university governors.  This is robustly confirmed in all the 
sensitivities. The negative association between this variable and research grant fraction is robust 
through all the GLS and IV regressions (at 1% level). The results clearly indicate that universities 
under pressure to employ more staff on omnibus contracts and submit to union pressures and also 
to cope with the growing student population are at risk of being overlooked by research grant 
providers thus hindering their research performance.  
 
Part-Time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 
The variable maintains its negative association with significance in all GLS regressions (at 1% 
level). In the IV regressions significance is lost but there is a sign reversal. The sensitivities in this 
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variable largely confirm the main narrative developed above. PTTSR is a variable that universities 
must employ with careful consideration to their overall staffing policies. It is imperative that HEI 
regulators frame guidelines and develop best practice to guide universities here.  
 
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) 
The negative and significant result is corroborated in all the GLS and IV 2GMM regressions (at 
1% level). Only the IV 2SLS loses significance although the sign of association remains negative. 
There is no need to interject or modify the interpretation developed in the main GLS FE model 
developed above.  
 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 
The coefficient remains positive in all GLS but is significant only in the GLS AR (at 1%). In the 
IV 2SLS there is aign reversal without significance but in IV 2GMM the negative association is 
significant (at 5%). The sensitivities in this variable although somewhat mixed still support the 
idea of a weak association.  The main result here that ENDWTA levels do not materially influence 
the research grant sanctioning process of fund providers developed in the main GLS FE seems still 
largely relevant.  
 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
All the GLS and IV coefficients remain insignificant but GLS AR associations turn negative. The 
sensitivities support most of the rich explanations and arguments already advanced in the main 
GLS FE model and there seems to be little need to modify them.  
 
Log Total Staff (TST) 
A positive association without significance seems to suggest that size of faculty at a given 
university does not seem to matter in the research fund granting process. One could interpret this 
finding as yet another indication of the largely neutral merit based research grant sanctioning 






Russell Group (RGROUP) 
The strongly significant positive coefficient here provides robust evidence that the elite Russell 
Group of universities outperform peers in respect of research grants. One could read into this result 
two opposite interpretations. On the one hand this may be proof that these 24 universities produce 
higher quality research proposals deemed worthy by the grant providers. On the other hand, this 
could be seen as confirmation of a selection bias by RGF providers against non-elite universities 
often debated in the policy and argumentative literature (Brown & Carasso, 2013; Boliver, 2015). 
 
YEAR 
The strongly positive coefficient is in contrast to the other two dependent variables in research 
performance i.e. RPI and Research Quality. As anticipated Research Grants have been increasing 
across this decade in line with trends mapped elsewhere in the normative and qualitative literature 
























6.2 Teaching Performance Advanced Model  
 
This section implements the same model development approach as in research performance 
critically discussed earlier, with Teaching Performance.  
 
The same approach is now implemented with Teaching Performance. Therefore, in what follows 
below two important and robust models relating teaching performance in its many dimensions to 
internal, board level, teaching, financial governance and controls are primarily discussed. Each 
model uses a different teaching performance dependent variable namely Teaching Performance 
Index (TPI) in model 4 and Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF) in model 5 respectively. The choice 
of these dependents is based on theoretical/empirical indications already discussed earlier in the 
data descriptive statistics chapter. To recapitulate briefly, Teaching Performance Index (TPI) is a 
composite index weighting and combining different likely dimensions of teaching performance 
captured in 4 different variables already critically discussed earlier. In that sense in itself the index 
is holistic and comprehensive. However, it includes overall student satisfaction scores, which as 
discussed before, are a biased and subjective assessment of teaching performance. Therefore in 
order to provide a robust alternative perspective a second dependent variable viz. Teaching Grant 
Fraction is also used in model 5. TGF measures how much financial support independent teaching 
grant providers are willing to provide based on their independent assessment of the teaching 
performance of any given university. Thus combining two different dependents achieves a 
relatively unbiased and multi-dimensional explanation of university teaching performance.  
 
Before moving on to the main discussions it is important to note here too the results of tests for 
normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity endogeneity and non-linearity shown in Appendix 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 . Some variables (dependent & independent) did exhibit abnormal distributions in 
the two teaching performance models here. This is despite the fact that these variables are 
invariably scaled i.e. are either fractions or natural logarithms. No winsorization is attempted here 
to avoid the rich patterns that might be lost with the outlier data points in the sample. Mean levels 
of VIF across the models do not exceed 5 but the variable of Research Only Staff (RONLY) does 
exhibit high values here. Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test was used to detect for endogeneity in 
both teaching models, and unlike Research Performance, three of the independent variables here 
 287 
exhibit endogeneity namely, Entry Standards (ES), Tution Fees (TFEE) and Research Only Staff 
(RONLY). Breusch-Pagan Test and White Test has been used to test for heteroscedasticity (see 
Appendix 5).  
 
In what follows these two separate multivariate models of University Teaching performance are 
critically analysed. Sub-section 6.2.1 is the model with Teaching Performance Index (TPI) as the 
dependent variable while sub-sections 6.2.2 is the one with Teaching Grant Fraction (RGF) as the 
dependent variable. The same carefully calibrated selection strategy intended to achieve parsimony 
and theoretical/empirical span is implemented in each of these models as with Research 
Performance above.  
 
An eclectic approach is followed in model development. Independent Variables in this data set are 
entered selectively into each model using three criteria. First the theoretical/empirical justification 
for the variable itself; Second, how it contributes to extending the span of explanation covering 
missing dimensions of university governance; and finally the overall parsimony in explanation 
achieved in the GLS FE as a consequence of its entry (Newman, 1956; Morrison, 1983; Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009, pg. 42).  Due to a range of statistical problems apparent in every model if panel 
OLS is used (see Appendix 7), it is the GLS (FE) fixed effects results that are treated as the base. 
 
The rationale for such an approach is threefold. First, the multiple dimensions of university 
governance and performance and the complex trade-offs underlying their associations imply that 
there is no alternative to the unusually large numbers of dependent (6), independent (25) and 
control (6) variables in this data set.  The theoretical indications from the earlier chapters (Gayle 
et al., 2003; Alvenson, 2002; Vukasovic et al., 2018; Hooghe & Marx, 2003; Piattoni, 2010; Braun, 
2008) and the nature of research objectives/gaps identified in the thesis make it vital that all these 
variables are simultaneously investigated. Without this a core objective of this investigation will 
remain unanswerable.  This has already been mentioned in the empirical chapter and the 
methodology section therein.  
 
Second, unlike corporate firms several process like characteristics and trade-offs characterize 
research/teaching/financial performances and the internal governances of a university (Chou & 
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Gornitzka, 2014; Chou et al., 2017; Eitken, 2015; Peters, 2015; Gayle et al., 2003; Entwhistle, 
2007; Trowler, 2008). These complexities can only be explicated if different models are extracted 
from the data set each with its own distinct dependent/independent/control variable combination. 
In fact, this is one very important facet of the research gap identified in Chapter 3. But here too 
there is the danger that university level unobserved factors in each model may be at work 
interfering and moderating these process-like characteristics and trade-offs. This is why each 
model is primarily estimated and interpreted using the GLS FE.  
 
Finally, this sample data set has important abnormalities. The main appendix shows that many 
variable distributions fail standard tests of skewness/kurtosis. It is also characterized by elements 
of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. Despite scaling all variables i.e. ensuring 
that all of them are either fractions or natural logarithms the problem of abnormality persists (see 
Appendix 3, 4, 5 and 6). Winsorization although an alternative is strictly avoided here in line with 
the statistical principles enunciated by Draper & Smith (1992) and Damodar & Gujarati, 2009, pg. 
497). This is to avoid the clear danger that it might remove the rich explanation of multiple 
dimensions, trade-offs and process like characteristics of the governance-performance relation 
emerging from outlier observations in the dataset. But in order to ensure a clear window in the 
model results that displays and accommodates these data-set abnormalities it is the GLS FE that is 













6.2.1 Teaching Performance Index (TPI) Model  
 
6.2.1.1 GLS Fixed-Effects   
 
The table 23 below shows the status of the eight hypotheses based on the results from the GLS 
fixed-effects (FE) regressions with robust standard errors using eight different internal governance 
variables and three different control variables. The dependent variable is Teaching Performance 
Index (TPI). The independent governance span the theoretical/empirical field of investigation and 
simultaneously represent one of the most parsimonious combination of explanations achievable in 
the sample.
 
Table 22: Model 4 all regressions with robust standard errors for dependent variable Teaching Performance Index (TPI)  






IV 2S GMM 
 
Panel OLS Model 
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Variables:       
ES 0.277(.096)*** 0.746(.067)*** 0.869(.045)*** 1.651(.097)*** 1.657(.097)*** 1.188(.036)*** 
SSR -0.372(.169)** -0.445(.120)*** -0.396(.124)*** .321(.218) 0.346(218) -0.272(.134)** 
TFEE 18.730(4.181)*** 14.517(2.076)*** 14.775(2.473)*** 25.222(2.772)*** 25.166(2.780)*** 13.408(2.660)*** 
FSF -5.365(17.151) 15.797(8.382)* 22.540(7.331)*** 34.971(5.993)*** 35.492(6.003)*** 26.855(5.018)*** 
CTA -0.968(5.913) -2.858(3.995) -0.470(3.990) -0.388(3.730) 0.469(3.701) -6.708(3.304)** 
BEDIV 1.860(5.772) -4.694(4.552) -4.898(4.415) -4.460(4.809) -4.611(4.817) -9.529(4.433)** 
BGDIV 2.080(3.304) 1.274(2.762) -2.403(2.872) -6.861(2.796)** -7.055(2.800)** -6.396(2.608)** 
SFSPEND 0.002(.001)* 0.002(.000)*** 0.003(.000)*** -0.001(.001) -0.001(.001) 0.000(.000) 
Controls Variables:       
TA 3.354(2.304) 3.160(.781)*** 2.508(.672)*** - - 0.859(.426)** 
PRE1992 (omitted collinearity) 8.042(1.743)*** 6.616(1.289)*** - - 3.110(.694)*** 
REGION (omitted collinearity) 0.331(.868) 0.130(.678) 0.376(.422) 0.340(.423) 0.736(.483) 
YEAR - - - - - 0.305(.162)* 
CODE - - - - - -0.024(.008)*** 
Constant 109.639(26.111)*** 74.626(9.816)*** 72.701(9.154)*** 45.756(10.875)*** 44.775(10.899)*** -536.552(323.354)* 
Number of Obs 849 849 849 849 849 849 
F-Value 17.69 - - - - 571.69 
R2 0.6923   - 0.8624 0.8482 0.8474 0.8784 
Wald Chi2 - - 1584.70 4153.63 4130.49 - 
LR Chi - 495.28 - - - - 
rho 0.88431646 0.597(0.057) - - - - 
Autocorrelation coef (yt-1)  - 0.52309537 - - - 
Theta median  - 0.3536 - - - 
Instrumented   - - ES ES - 
Instruments   - - TA; Pre1992 TA; Pre1992 - 
Estat overid score chi2(1) 
p 
   3.64378  (p = 0.0563)   
Sargan chi2    4.0372  (p = 0.0445)   
Basmann chi2    4.00394  (p = 0.0454)   
Score chi2    3.64378  (p = 0.0563)   
Hansen’s J chi2     3.64378 (p = 0.0563)  
Notes: The table reports all regressions with robust standard errors. Regressions defined as follows:; Generalised least square fixed-effects (GLS Fixed-Effects); generalised least square maximum likelihood 
estimation (GLS Maximum Likelihood); generalised least square auto-regression (GLS AR); instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS); instrumental variable two-stage; instrumental variable 
generalized method of moments (IV 2S GMM); panel ordinary least square model (Panel OLS Model). Variables are defined as follows: entry standards (ES); student staff ratio (SSR); tuition fee fraction (TFEE); 
female staff fraction (FSF); cash to total assets (CTA); board ethnic diversity fraction (BEDIV); board gender diversity fraction (BGDIV); service and facility spend per student (SFSPEND); total assets (TA); 
pre-1992 (PRE1992); region (REGION); year (YEAR); and code (CODE). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
Clearly TPI seems to be a positive function of ES (sig.), TFEE (insg.), BEDIV (insig.), BGDIV 
(insig.) SFSPEND (sig.) and TA (insig.), but a negative function of SSR (sig.), FSF (insig.) and 
CTA (insig.). 
 
Table 23: Summary of the Findings and Hypothesis of Teaching Performance Index (TPI) 
Dependent Variable Teaching Performance Index (TPI) 




Finding sig. Hyp. Status 
Governance Variables:      
Entry Standard (ES) H1b + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Student Staff Ratio (SSR) H2b - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) H5b + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) H3k + - Insig. Rejt. 
Cash to Total Assets (CTA) H5k - - Insig. Rejt. 
Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) H6f + + Insig. Rejt. 
Board Gender Diversity (BGDIV) H6c + + Insig. Rejt.  
Service and Facility Spend per Student 
(SFSPEND) 
H5d + + Sig. (10%)  Acep. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter 3. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting hypothesised 
relationships, respectively.  
 
Entry Standard (ES) 
The variable displays a significant positive impact (at 1% level) on TPI. This confirms sub-
hypothesis (H1b) Selectivity in entry standards seems an important positive influence on teaching 
performance in this UK sample. Previous empirical work has largely found a similar positive 
association between ES and student outcomes, retention rates and proportions of good honours 
(Johnes & Soo, 2013; Boliver, 2015; Bachan, 2017; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012). However, there 
are other voices in the literature who argue that this positive association is also symptomatic of a 
deep abiding elitism within UK HEI, combined with an abnegation of the academic transformation 
intended by university teaching (Jerrim & Vignoles, 2015; Furedi, 2004; Anyanwu, 2004; Barron, 
2006; Freemam, 2015; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010; 2012; Waller et al., 2017; Schwartz, 2004; 
Margison, 2018).  
 
The result seems to substantiate a quality-based linkage between high entry standards and teaching 
performance (Palfreyman & Tapper 2012; Filippakou, & Tapper, 2008; Brown, 2004). It also 
seems to lend credence to a resource dependence imperative within university student recruitment 
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i.e. select students using criteria that only the elite can easily fulfil (Marginson, 2018; Freeman, 
2015). There is also the related question of the inordinate salience of important stakeholder parents 




Student Staff Ratio (SSR) 
 
The student staff ratio is significantly (at 5% level) and negatively associated with TPI. This aligns 
with the negative bivariate correlations of the variable and confirms sub-hypothesis (H2b) A 
university’s ability to intelligently calibrate its students to staff ratio is shown here to be a very 
important negative antecedent of its teaching performance. The normative predictions of a host of 
governance scholars including Shattock (2013), Taylor, (2013a), (2013b), Knight (2002), Trakman 
(2008), Melville-Ross (2010) and Hordern (2013) seem fulfilled. Teaching effectiveness in the 
lecture room unlike its research counterpart is a strong and unambiguous positive function of ease 
in one-to-one interaction. Lower SSRs that enable such an ease consequently improve teaching 
performance.  
 
Theoretically Resource dependence and Optimal Contracting (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Fowles, 
2014; Edmans & Gabiax, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callanghan, 1996) 
emphasize value for money in the delivery of teaching through staff utilization and so encourage 
high SSRs while culture and quality assurance (Rowley, 1996; Trowler, 2008; Gayle et al., 2003; 
Yorke, 2009a, b; Varouchas et al., 2018; Salter & Tapper, 2002) is concerned with the interaction 
intensity that is the basis of teaching effectiveness and so recommends low SSRs. Empirically this 
result corresponds with a large number of earlier studies (Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Bandiera et 
al., 2009; Bedard & Kuhn, 2008; Gannaway et al., 2018; Shane, 1961; Kokkelenberg et al., 2008; 
Arias & Walker, 2004) that have found a negative association between SSR and teaching 
performance. 
 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 
The significant positive coefficient on this variable confirms the ex-ante expectations in sub-
hypothesis (H5b) Instrumental stakeholder, legitimacy and resource dependence (Mitchell et al., 
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1997; Heller, 1997; 1999; Peter & Waterman, 1982; Handy, 1993; Gayle et al., 2003; Gunasekera 
& Reed, 2008; Fowles, 2014; Boliver, 2013; Jabbar et al., 2018; Browne, 2010) seem to be robustly 
corroborated in this result. After all, for universities highly dependent on tuition fees, 
students/parents become the most instrumental stakeholders whose teaching priorities are 
paramount. Small wonder that such institutions focus on teaching governances and outperform in 
teaching. Students and parents, by providing a larger part of the university’s budget, also become 
the most important target with whom the university needs to acquire and maintain legitimacy by 
ensuring high teaching performances. Finally, internal governors are impelled to act in specific 
ways by their resource dependence on tuition fees. Students and their teaching become higher 
priorities and so governance is focused around enhancing student satisfactions. These theoretical 
arguments are fully corroborated and confirmed in this result. Empirically while many governance 
scholars take issue with the growing tuition fee dependence of UK universities (Nixon et al., 2016; 
Dunnett et al., 2012; Collini, 2012; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Fowles, 2014) there is less direct 
work examining the association between TFEE and teaching performance. 
 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
The coefficient is insignificant but with a negative sign. Sub-hypothesis (H3k) is rejected. Public 
Acoountability (Coy et al., 2001; Kreysing, 2002; Coy & Dixon, 2004), Resource Dependence, 
legitimacy and Stakeholder (Suchman, 1995; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Verbruggen et 
al., 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Clarke, 2004)  predictions that gender diversity should 
improve teaching performance through an unbiased teaching infrastructure and enhanced 
reputation based instrumental stakeholder engagement are not supported. At another level the 
arguments of qualitative and normative university governance scholars notably Mestre et al. 
(2009), Kaschak (1978), Acker (1994) and many others about the higher emotional empathy of 
female staff improving teaching functionalities is also unsupported here. There is no empirical 
work directly associating FSF with university teaching performance although a range of 
argumentative voices (Haung et al., 2019; Metcalf et al., 2005; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012, Barrett 







Cash to Total Assets (CTA) 
The association is negative but it is insignificant. Therefore, sub-hypothesis (H5k) is rejected. The 
result is in stark contrast to the negative and significant association of this variable with research 
performance in model 1. The likely negative impact of high cash levels on teaching performance 
posited in theory do not find any robust support here. Thus public accountability arguments for 
fiscal prudence or the good steward argument of optimal liquidity (McGettigan, 2012; Hayes & 
Wynyard, 2002; CUC, 201; 2017; HEC, 2014; Dalton & Kesner, 1987; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Kenser & Johnson, 1990; Coy et al., 2001; Perez & Ode, 2013) leading to better performance do 
not seem supported in the sample. Neither is there any evidence for the resource dependence 
argument against discal profligacy or the legitimacy argument for maintaining prudent fiscal 
management (Flowes, 2014; Parker, 2012; 2013; Jabbar et al., 2018; Mcgettigin, 2013). Empirical 
while there has been no work associating cash levels with university teaching performance many 
scholars discuss issues related to cash management and the fiscal health of UK universities (Inman, 
2018; Hilman, 2018; Jack, 2018b; OFS, 2019a). 
 
Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) 
Board level ethnic diversity displays an insignificant but positive association with TPI. This 
contrasts with the variable’s negative significant association with RGF in model 3. Sub-hypothesis 
(H6f) is rejected. Diversity in ethnicities on university boards do not seem not to affect a 
university’s teaching performance.  
 
The lack of significance here is against all theoretical expectations. For one the predictions of 
Public Accountability, Resource Dependence, Stakeholder and Legitimacy (Coy et al., 2011; 
Pfeffer, 1987; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Roberts, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997;  Pfeffer, 1987; 
Verbruggen et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006) that diverse boards 
improve the teaching ambience at universities are not confirmed. But so too are the arguments of 
managerial power and optimal contracting (Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; 
Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996) about likely policy disagreements and logjam 
generated from ethnically diverse university boards and consequent teaching underperformance. 
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The insignificant association here is very different from what has been found in the many ethnic 
diversity studies in corporate governance. An overwhelming number of studies find a positive 
association here i.e. that firms with diverse boards perform better (Carter et al., 2003; Van der 
Walt & Ingley, 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015). However a few do find evidence of a 
negative impact here notably Pitts & Jarry (2007), Churchill & Valenzuela (2019), Branchuk & 
Dybvig (2009) and Brammer et al. (2007). Earlier empirical work (Lokuwaduge, 2011; Harris, 
2014; Olson, 2000) in university governance has not examined ethnic diversity and its university 
performance impact. However Ntim et al. (2017) find that such diversity does have a positive and 
significant impact on university voluntary disclosure.  
 
Board Gender Diversity (BGDIV) 
Like research quality in model 2 the association between board gender diversity and university 
teaching performance is positive but insignificant. One has to reject sub-hypothesis (H6d). 
Theoretically the result does not confirm the predictions of dysfunctionality attributed to gender 
and other forms of diversity by Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting theorists (Williamson, 
2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996). At another level 
one is also unable to support the contention that gender balance on the board brings any gains to 
teaching performance due to its fulfilment of public purpose or its legitimating effect or the 
availability of gender voices or capture of gendered stakeholder interests or a better checks and 
balances due to gender presence (Coy et al., 2011; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Verbruggen 
et al., 2011; Mitchell et al., 1997). Earlier empirical work in corporate governance (Luckerath-
Rovers, 2013; Ntim et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2003; Terjesen et al., 2015) largely documents a 
positive association between gender presence on the board and firm performance. In university 
research Ntim et al. (2017) find a positive significant association between gender presence on the 
board and university voluntary disclosure.  
 
Service and Facility Spend per student (SFSPEND) 
The coefficient displays a positive and significant association (10% level) confirming sub-
hypothesis (H5d).  The budgetary proportion of a university’s spend on knowledge infrastructure 
in this UK sample clearly improves its teaching performance. The result here is in stark contrast 
to the negative impact seen in this variable with respect to Research Quality in model 2. But such 
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a positive result is anticipated here especially given the positive externalities and reputational 
effects of extra SFSPEND.  
 
Optimal Contracting, Stewardship tenets and Resource Dependence (Binsardi & Ekwulugo, 2003; 
Price et al., 2003; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012; Middlehurst, 2004; 
2013; Bennett, 2002; Knight, 2002; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Daily et al., 2003; Christopher, 2010; 
Dedman, 2000) presage such a result. Libraries, Information Technology and Laboratory spending 
have both direct and indirect positive effects on learning and teaching. By spending more on such 
assets a university is acting as a good steward, contracting early/optimally and aligning its 
resources well. Small wonder then that such a university does better on teaching outcomes as well 
as student satisfaction. Earlier empirical work largely corroborates a positive impact of Services 
and facilities spend on teaching performance and student/staff satisfaction (Karemera et al., 2003; 
Young, 1999; Metcalf et al., 2005; Earthman, 2002; Ganyaupfu, 2013). 
 
Empirical work in UK governance richly corroborates this result. The largest strand (Ganyaupfu, 
2013; Mushtaq & Khan, 2012; Kirmani & Siddiquah, 2008; Karemera et al., 2003; Young, 1999) 
find that universities that spend heavily on knowledge assets help students achieve the best 
learning outcomes and grades. At least three papers (Dao & Thrope, 2015; Migin et al., 2015; 
Wiers-Jenssen et al., 2002; Price et al., 2003; Tang et al. 2004; Joseph & Joseph, 2000) find 
evidence that UK students gravitate towards institutions with the best IT and knowledge 
facilitating assets. Elsewhere (Metcalf et al., 2015; Price et al., 2003) collate evidence that UK 
academics too favour universities that invest heavily in knowledge infrastructure. Overall the 
sample results then confirm that UK universities that display a strategic intent towards larger 
fractions of knowledge assets not only demonstrate their academic credentials but also create a 
facilitative academic ambience and thus improve teaching performance.  
 
Total Assets (TA)  
the size coefficients is positive but insignificant in the main GLS FE model, but positive and 
significant in the baised OLS model. Larger UK universities do not seem to perform better on the 
teaching function than their peers. 
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6.2.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Once again a rich suite of six additional regressions are implemented here to test the assumptions 
of homoscedasticity, autocorrelation, multicollinearity, normality in distributions and endogeneity. 
The arguments for this remain the same as in the research performance models and various test 
results robustly confirm this as shown in the appendix. It must be noted that only Entry Standards 
is seen to be the endogenous variable in this model (significant at 1%) and so it is instrumented 
for using the size and age controls here as in the research models.  
 
Entry Standards (ES) 
The coefficient remains strongly significant and positive across other GLS and IV at 1% level. 
Interestingly both the IV regressions display higher magnitudes once the endogenous variable is 
accounted for. But in all six regressions selectivity in student entry standards remains a positive 
antecedent of University teaching performance. Thus, accounting for heteroscedasticity, 
multicollinearity and abnormality in variable distributions robustlt confirm the fundamental result. 
The variable also has an independent albeit weaker positive impact even after accounting for 
autocorrelation in the GLS AR. Overall, then, the earlier theoretical/empirical interpretations of 
the GLS FE model remain valid. In addition, the rise in magnitudes of coefficients in the IV 
regressions suggest the strong validity of the endogenous channel active through this variable. The 
worryingly exclusive and elite orientation of UK universities in teaching performance is 
characterized by a vicious cycle of repeated exclusion across the years and needs regulatory 
correction.  
 
Student Staff Ratio (SSR) 
All GLS regressions display the same negative association with as strong if not more significance 
than the main FE model (at 1% level). It should be noted that GLS AR suggests that even after 
accounting for the auto-correlation, SSR is still negatively associated with teaching performance . 
A similar argument must be made for the GLS MLE coefficient which proves that abnormalities 
in variable distributions does not interfere with the result and remains negative at 1% level. Only 
the IV regressions lose significance and reverse signs. Overall then it should be inferred that the 
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conclusions of the negative association of SSR drawn in the GLS FE remains largely valid. 
Teaching performance unlike research is unambiguously improved by lowering SSR.   
 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 
A strong rise in magnitudes and significances  in all GLS and IV regressions validates all the earlier 
theoretical/empirical arguments in the main GLS FE model. Adjusting for heteroscedasticity, 
multicollinearity and abnormality in variable distributions only strengthen the positive 
associations. The coefficient also displays a strong independent positive impact outside the 
autocorrelation channel inherent in teaching performance in the GLS AR, and once accounting for 
endogeneity in both the IV regressions 2SLS and GMM the coefficient magnitudes strengthens. 
Overall, there is robust evidence in this UK sample that universities that are highly dependent on 
student fees perform better than their peers in teaching performances. 
 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
All other GLS and IV regressions displays a positive and significant association with Teaching 
Performance. Although this is some partial evidence that female staff levels do improve teaching 
performance at UK universities one should be cautious in going too far with this interpretation. 
The most appropriate explanation would be to reflect on the complexity of this result in light of 
the endogeneities embedded in this model. Therefore, due to the sensitivity with this variable with 
TPI, the result should be interpreted with care. The result from the main GLS FE model stands 
nonetheless.  
 
Cash to Total Assets (CTA) 
All coefficients in th GLS MLE, GLS AR, IV 2SLS and IV 2GMM lose significance. It can be 
inferred that the negative association of this variable is really weak. Adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity autocorrelation, 298nalysed298ty and abnormality in variable 
distributions strongly suggests lack of any association. Overall, then the earlier inferences in the 
GLS FE do not need modification. There is no significant  association between a university’s 
teaching performance and the proportion of cash held by it in this UK sample.  On average 
universities in UK seem to insulate teaching from changes in theur cash levels. 
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Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) 
All GLS MLE, GLS AR, IV 2SLS and IV 2GMM regression coefficients remain insignificant but 
change associations to negative. After adjusting for heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity 
autocorrelation,  299ndogeneity and abnormality in variable distributions we still observe a lack 
of any association.Only the panel OLS regression coefficient displays a negative and significant 
association.  But given the likely biases in the Panel OLS (see Chapter 4.7)  there is no need to 
change the interpretations of this coefficient in the main FE model.  
 
Board Gender Diversity (BGDIV) 
All GLS regressions remain insignificant with a mixture of signs. But the IV coefficients become 
significant (at 5% level) and stay negative. The sensitivities seem more nuanced than BEDIV 
above. There is some trace of a negative effect on teaching performance but it is not fully 
ascertained. Overall, then Board gender diversity prescriptions as currently stipulated (Metcalf et 
al., 2005; Parry, 2013; Parker, 2011; Olson, 2000; Harris, 2014; Ntim et al., 2017) must continue 
as suggested earlier until such time that we are truly able to ascertain the exact relationship between 
BGDIV and TPI. 
 
Services & Facilities Spend (SFSPEND) 
The GLS regressions do not change signs but it rises in significance in GLS MLE and GLS AR 
from 10% in FE to 1% level. Once accounting for endogeneity both IV 2SLS and GMM reverse 
sign but lose significance completely. Similarly, in panel OLS lose significance the sign remains 
positive but without significance. In totality there is no reason to interfere with the detailed 
interpretations of the main GLS FE model.  
 
Total Assets (TA) and Pre-1992 (PRE1992) 
Size control TA loses significance in the GLS FE but remains significant positive and increases in 
magnitude in all other GLS regressions. The age control PRE1992 is omitted due to collinearity in 
the GLS FE but shows a similar pattern in all other GLS regressions. There seems to be no reason 
to interfere with the panel OLS interpretations. Elsewhere, the age control coefficient in GLS MLE 
and GLS AR is positive and significant in this result. Some of he controls are omitted in the main 
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model GLS FE. All in all, it seems that larger and older UK universities are seen to perform better 
on the teaching function than their peers.  
 
Region (REGION) 
REGION coefficients is positive in this model. Which indicates that teaching performance of 
universities in this sample are seen to improve as one moves away from the England region. There 
is also evidence that university teaching performances unlike research have improved across the 
decade.  But looking at this result along with the more advanced sesnsitivity regressions , all the 
GLS coefficients turn insignificant with the variable even being omitted in GLS FE. There is now 
complete ambiguity about the region based increases in teaching performance outside England 
identified in the panel OLS.  
 
6.2.2 Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF) Model 5 
 
6.2.2.1 GLS FE Main Model 
 
The table 25 below shows the status of ten hypotheses. These are based on the results from the 
GLS fixed-effects (FE) regression with robust standard errors using ten different internal 
governance variables and three different control variables. The dependent variable here is 
Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF). TGF maps university teaching performance from the perspective 
of teaching grant providers and arguably is an independent critical assessment of the institution. 
This is because such grant providers tend to be guided not just by student satisfaction surveys (a 
rather dubious teaching performance measure) but more by a composite evaluation of student 
facilities, student service levels and student population coverage (Collini, 2012; Brown & Carasso, 
2013). In this sense the model here is a completely different measurement of university teaching 
performance.  
Table 24: Model 5 all regressions with robust standard errors for dependent variable Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF)  
 
Independent Variables GLS FE GLS MLE 
 
GLS AR IV 2SLS IV GMM Panel OLS Model 
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Variables:       
TFEE -0.876(.027)*** -0.871(.015)*** -0.853(0.019)*** -0.770.058)*** -0.805.058)*** -0.773(.035)*** 
FSF 0.336(.108)*** 0.279(.080)*** 0.045(0.084) 0.365(.112)*** 0.525(.106)*** -0.386(.078)*** 
PTTSR -0.115(.043)*** -0.131(.030)*** -0.096(.028)*** -0.355(.064)*** -0.345(.061)*** -0.260(.034)*** 
RONLY -0.403(.104)*** -0.446(.051)*** -0.351(.050)*** -0.897(.092)*** -0.774(.087)*** -0.735(.043)*** 
ENDWTA -0.051(.051) -0.069(.036)* -0.076(.040)* -0.091(.051)* -0.168(.045)*** -0.060(.023)** 
TRST -0.044(.018)** -0.047(.010)*** -0.026(.012)** -0.053(.038) -0.002(.037) -0.085(.019)*** 
ETFS -0.004(.004) -0.005(.003) -0.004(.003) -0.008(.008) -0.019(.008)** -0.017(.005)*** 
BSIZE -0.039(.011)*** -0.039(.011)*** -0.020(.011)* -0.020(.025) -0.020(.025) 0.027(.015)* 
VCPAY -0.026(.010)** -0.023(.009)** -0.006(.008)   0.021(.016) 
IGOV 0.045(.019)** 0.045(0.018)** 0.024(.015) -0.041(.035) -0.059(.034)* -0.011(.024) 
Controls Variables:       
RGROUP - -0.030(.028) -0.046(0.020)** - - 0.022(.010)** 
Pre1992 - -0.122(.023)*** -0.153(0.017)*** - - -0.158(.007)*** 
YEAR - - - - - 0.001(.001) 
CODE - - - - - 0.003(.000)*** 
Constant 1.300(.143)*** 1.103(.118)*** 0.918(.109)*** 0.818(.143)*** 0.754(.139)*** -2.754(2.813) 
Number of Obs 273 273 273 273 273 273 
F-Value 275.12 - - - - 491.11 
R2 0.5865 - 0.8504 0.8108 0.8079 0.9200 
Wald Chi2 - - 2525.60 965.33 1041.96 - 
LR Chi - 821.23 - - - - 
rho 0.96828161 0.920(.019) - - - - 
Autocorrelation coef (yt-
1) 
- - 0.67190961 - - - 
Theta median - - 0.6362 - - - 
Instrumented     TFEE;RONLY TFEE;RONLY  





Estat overid score 
chi2(1) p 
   84.2141  (p = 0.0000)   
Sargan chi2    140.16  (p = 0.0000)   
Basmann chi2    276.438  (p = 0.0000)   
Score chi2    84.2141  (p = 0.0000)   
Hansen’s J chi2     84.2141 (p = 0.0000)  
Notes: The table reports all regressions with robust standard errors. Regressions defined as follows: Generalised least square fixed-effects (GLS Fixed-Effects); 
generalised least square maximum likelihood estimation (GLS Maximum Likelihood); generalised least square auto-regression (GLS AR); instrumental variable two-
stage least squares (IV 2SLS); instrumental variable two-stage; instrumental variable generalized method of moments (IV 2S GMM); panel ordinary least square model 
(Panel OLS Model) . Variables are defined as follows: tuition fee fraction (TFEE); female staff fraction (FSF); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); research only 
staff fraction (RONLY); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); teaching and research staff fraction (TRST); executive team meeting frequency (ETFS); governing 
board size (BSIZE); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); independent board governors (IGOV); 301nalyse group university  (RGROUP); pre-1992 universities (PRE1992); 
year (YEAR); and code (CODE). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Clearly TGF seems to be a positive function of FSF (sig.) and IGOV (sig.), but a negative 
function of TFEE (sig.), PTTSR (sig.), RONLY (sig.), ENDWTA (insig.), TRST (sig.), ETFS 
(insig.), BSIZE (sig.) and VCPAY (sig.).  
 
Table 25: Summary of the Findings and Hypothesis of Governance and Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF) 
Dependent Variable Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF) 




Finding sig. Hyp. Status 
Governance Variables:      
Tuition Fee (TFEE) H5b + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) H3k + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Part-time to Total-staff Ratio (PTTSR) H3h - - Sig. (1%) Acep.  
Research Only Staff (RONLY) H3c - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) H5g + - Insig. Rejt.  
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) H3b - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Executive team meeting frequency (ETFS) H6k + - Sig. (1%) Rejt.  
Board Size (BSIZE) H6b + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
Vice-chancellor Pay (VCPAY) H6q + - Sig. (5%). Rejt. 
Independent board members (IGOV) H6h + + Sig. (5%).  Acep. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter 3. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting 
hypothesised relationships, respectively.  
 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 
The variable shows a highly significant (at 1% level) negative association with TGF. This is in 
contrast to its positive association with Research Quality in model 2 above. The result also 
contradicts the positive association documented in teaching performance model 4. Ex ante 
expectations in hypothesis (H5b) are contradicted. In the main it appears that this result 
supports public accountability arguments that exclusivity associates with TFEE dependence in 
a university and therefore a teaching performance external assessor such as TGF should avoid 
encouraging it (Fowles, 2014; Boliver, 2013; Mangan et al., 2010a, b; Sutton Trust, 2004). The 
negative result also is in line with the legitimacy and resource dependence (Fowles, 2014; 
Taylor, 2013a,b; Marginson, 2018; OFA, 2019; Molesworth et al., 2009) argument that high 
TFEE dependence reduces the ability of a university to deliver education to the widest swathe 
of students from all backgrounds. Empirically while there is less direct work associating TFEE 
with teaching performance the growing levels of TFEE have been a matter of intense debates 
and scrutiny in the literature (Foskett, 2010; Fowles, 2014; Heller, 1999; Boliver, 2013; 




Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
Unlike the variable’s negative associations in research models 1 and 2 and in contrast to the its 
insignificance in research model 3 and teaching model 4 this variable of staff level gender 
diversity shows a significant positive association (at 1% level) here. This confirms hypothesis 
(H3k) UK universities with higher fractions of female staff are more likely to attract teaching 
grants.This is strong confirmation of the predictions of Public Accountability, Resource 
Dependence, Legitimacy Culture & Quality Assurance and Stakeholder theories (Coy et al., 
2001; Suchman, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Brown, 2004; Nuninger, 2016; Smart, 2008; 
Hellstorm, 2004; Cowen, 1996; Henkel, 1997; Barnett, 1996; Williams, 1997; Deem, 2004; 
Wood, 2002; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Fielden & Lockwood, 1973; Jones, 2002). After all 
female staff bring their unique teaching abilities and enrich the TLRs of the universities 
(Trowler, 2019; Trowler & Cooper, 2002). This generates greater community wide recognition 
i.e. public accountability, allows a balance in usage of teaching resources i.e. resource 
dependence and enables a reputational halo of legitimacy derived from gender affirmative 
action. Earlier empirical work directly associating FSF with teaching performance are rare. 
However, many empirical voices (Mackie, 1976; Kaschak, 1978; Acker, 1994; Ferber & 
Huber, 1975)suggest the natural proclivities of female staff towards teaching activities and 
therefore seem to imply a positive impact on teaching performance.  
 
Part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR) 
In line with its negative associations in research model 2 and 3 here too the variable exhibits a 
negative and significant association (at 1% level) with TGF. This confirms sub-hypothesis 
(H3h). As expected Quality Assurance theoretical contentions (Eurydice, 2010, pg. 24; Brown 
& Carasso, 2013, pg. 144-163; Attwood, 2008b; Yorke, 2009a; Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; 
Palfreyman, 2010) that too many adhoc staff interfere with the integrity of the teaching function 
seem to be robustly corroborated in this result. Optimal contracting tenets (Ward et al., 2001; 
Bryson & Barnes, 2000a, b; Nollen & Axel, 1996; Purcell et al., 1999; McColgan, 2003; 
Freedman, 2004)  - ad hoc staffing arrangements indicate sub-optomal contracting; Legitimacy 
arguments that too many part time staff reduce reputational legitimacy and credibility among 
staff, students and parents (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995) are all ratified here. Empirical 
studies (Thewlis, 2003; Allen-Collinson, 2004) have associated PTTSR with university 
teaching functions and have often found a similar negative association.  
Research Only Staff Fraction (RONLY)  
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The coefficient shows a significant (at 1% level) negative association. As anticipated this 
confirms sub-hypothesis (H3c). Teaching performance as assessed by Teaching Grant 
providers in UK HEI displays a negative association with proportions of research only staff at 
the institution. Universities that employ larger than usual staff on research only contracts surely 
emphasize research. Teaching Grant providers do not seem to see this positively perhaps due 
to a suspiscion that such institutions may neglect teaching functionalities..Resource 
dependence tenets (Kessner and Johnson, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003 and Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003) that predict that university research or teaching priorities are closely reflected 
in their staff based resource dependences. Thus, larger proportions of RONLY suggest the 
university’s focus on research and therefore teaching performance suffers. Culture, Quality 
Assurance and optimal contracting (Byrd et al., 2010; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Custodio 
et al., 2013; Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Gayle et al., 2003; Sikes, 2012; Chalmers, 2010;  Elton, 
2008; Ritzer, 2002) principles too may be invoked. Too many research only staff may shift the 
academic ambience and culture towards research, reduce the quality of resources dedicated to 
teaching and thus lead to lower teaching performance as in this result. Previous empirical work 
directly associating RONLY to university teaching performance do not exist but many 
normative and argumentative voices (Probert, 2013; Shelton et al., 2001; Locke, 2012; 
Blackmore, 2016) suggest how the contract has become widespread as a means to generate a 
research ambience and reputation for the university. 
 
Endowment to Total assets (ENDWTA) 
Unlike its negative significant coefficient with RQ in model 2 but like its insignificant 
association with RGF in model 3, ENDWTA here displays an insignificant coefficient in this 
TGF model. Therefore, sub-hypothesis (H5g) is rejected.  
 
Teaching performance as assessed by teaching grant providers in UK HEI does not seem to 
depend on university endowment levels.  So, there is no substantiation in this sample that 
endowments as independent university resources enable institutions to demonstrate to external 
fund providers that they will facilitate teaching or learning. At another level  there is no proof 
either for the public accountability and legitimacy arguments (bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen 
et al., 2015; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995) that higher endowments might make 
institutions opaque to student, parent and public pedagogical concerns with regard to teaching. 
Empirically endowment levels in universities have been significantly contrasted in the different 
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types of UK universities but there is less direct work in associating them with teaching 
performance.  
 
Teaching and Research Staff Fraction (TRST) 
TRST displays a significant negative association with TGF thus confirming sub-hypothesis 
(H3b). This is similar to its negative significant association in RGF model 3. The result here 
seems to contradict resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; Fowles, 
2014) expectations that dual function contracts could represent an efficient use of staff 
resources while corroborating optimal contracting and culture & quality assurance (Trowler, 
2008; Gayle et al., 2003; Alvesson, 2003)  predictions of the onerous nature of such contracts 
and their consequent negative teaching performance implications. There has been hardly any 
empirical work associating TRST with any type of academic performance but there are several 
normative arguments (Macfarlane, 2011; Locke, 2014; Bryson, 2013) here about the 
difficulties of an omnibus dual contract and how it might encourage a neglect of teaching 
functions. 
 
Executive Team Meeting Frequency (ETFS) 
The coefficient is insignificant in the GLS FE. Sub-hypothesis (H6k) is rejected. There is no 
evidence that more frequent VC level meetings improve external assessments of university 
teaching performance by independent teaching grant providers.  
 
The result does not support either the prediction that effective checks on university managerial 
power (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2015; Exworthy & Halford, 1999; Deem et al., 
2007) by frequent executive level meetings improve teaching outcomes or that such meetings 
help good stewarding principles (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Schleifer & Vishny, 1997; bebchuk 
et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2015; Kalyta & Magnan, 2000 )to flourish and improve teaching 
functionalities or allow optimality in academic governance mechanisms and check the 
tendency to privilege research over teaching (Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Soh, 2007; Tarbert et al., 
2008). There is no support in this sample that a hands-on more active interventionist role by 
the executive team necessarily impresses teaching grant providers or improves teaching 
functionalities. Neither can one confirm the contentions of Legitimacy (Middlehurst, 2013; 
Lambert, 2005; Parker, 2011; Shattock, 2013a, b) and Resource Dependence (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006). Even VC teams that tailor their meeting to exigent evolving 
governance needs of the institutions and meet less often may or may not attract more teaching 
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funds. Earlier empirical work is rare in this variable and its association with academic 
performance in university governance literature.   
 
Board Size (BSIZE) 
Board size is significantly and negatively  associated (at 1% level) with TGF. This contradicts 
ex-ante sub-hypothesis (H6b). The negative association here is in stark contrast to the positive 
associations found in both research performance model 1 and research quality model 2. The 
result does not support the larger board more stakeholders better teaching performance 
argument of stakeholder theory (Davis et al., 1997; Fama, 1980; Freeman, 1984) or the larger 
boards more constitutent coverage greater legitimacy better teaching performance argument of 
legitimacy theory (Hyples, 1995; Tilling, 2004; Deegan, 2004). It also does not corroborate 
resource dependence predictions of the higher resources and networks of larger boards leading 
to better  performance (Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006  or the larger boards greater 
checks and balances better performance arguments of stewardship (Saltman et al., 2000; 
Swansson, Mow & Bartos, 2004). In the main this negative association seems to support public 
accountability views Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 1996; Trowler, 2008; 
Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mallin et al., 2015 that balanced boards serve public purpose better, 
quality assurance perspectives  that the  quality of experience and resources of board members 
is what would matter not larger sizes and the optimal contracting contention that right sizing 
board size is what would generate higher performance. 
 
Earlier empirical work in university governance especially Lokuwaduge (2011) and 
Lokuwaduge & Armstrong (2015) find no significant association between board size and 
teaching performance. Ntim et al. (2017) find a negative and insignificant association between 
this variable and voluntary disclosure. There are a few corporate studies (Yermack, 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Tomasic et al., 2003) 
that support a negative association between board size and firm performance just like in this 
result.  
 
Vice Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 
 The coefficient is significant and negative in its association (5% level) with TGF. This 
confirms sub-hypothesis (H6q). Universities with high levels of VC pay seem to attract lower 
levels of teaching grants.  The fact that such universities are unable to attract teaching grants 
seems to echo legitimacy and public accountability concerns (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Tilling, 
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2004; Judge et al., 2008; Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Coy et al., 2001) with high levels of VC 
pay.  
 
Earlier empirical work in VC pay does not associate it with teaching performance specifically, 
but instead more generally with academic or financial performance. Results here are mixed 
with some studies finding a positive association (Gounopoulos et al., 2019; Johnes & Virmani, 
2019; Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Johnes & Virmani, 2019; Dolton & Ma, 2003) while others 
finding a negative one (Cheng, 2014; Gschwandtner & McManus, 2018; Walker et al., 2019).   
 
Lay board member fractions (IGOV) 
The coefficient displays a positive and significant association (5% level) in the GLS FE. This 
confirms ex-ante sub-hypothesis (H6h). Independent boards seem to improve university 
teaching performance as assessed by independent teaching grant providers. Such boards seem 
to balance out vested stakeholder interests and check executive neglect of teaching 
307nalysed307ty307ies, effectively moderate quality assurance concerns and enhance the 
academic reputation of the institution and thus improve TGF providers’ impressions of 
teaching performance at these institutions (Cashmore et al., 2013; Fabrice, 2010; Hayes, 2019; 
Coy et al., 2001; Pathan et al., 2007; Stensaker, 2018; Kim, 2008). 
 
6.2.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Once again a rich suite of six additional regressions are implemented in model 5 above to test 
the assumptions of homoscedasticity, autocorrelation, multicollinearity, normality in 
distributions and endogeneity. The empirical/methodological arguments for the first four 
remain the same as in the research/teaching performance models earlier. Various test results 
robustly confirm this as shown in the appendix (see Appendix 6). However, in this model, 
unlike all earlier models two variables namely TFEE and RONLY display strong endogeneity 
at 1% significances. Therefore, both these are instrumented for using three instruments. Two 
of these as in all earlier models are the control variables, based on university mission i.e. 
RGROUP and university age i.e. PRE1992 (Basman, 1957; Theil, 1953; Gujarati & Porter, 
2009, pg. 718-730). The third instrument used here is VCPAY and it is based on the logic that 
although it is strongly correlated with the dependent variable TGF (-0.5068), it is only weakly 
correlated with either TFEE (0.1295) or RONLY (0.3856). It is therefore a good instrument 
(Seddighi et al., 2000, pg. 155-156; Sargan, 1964; Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pg. 669). The high 
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R-squares as well as small p-values in over-identification tests of the resultant two stage least 
squares (IV2SLS) and generalized method of moments (IV2SGMM) shown in the table 
confirm this strategy.   
 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 
Both GLS MLE and GLS AR, coefficients remain robustly negative and significant at 1%. 
Similarly in IV 2SLS and GMM and after accountaing for the 308nalysed308ty the signs 
remain negative and the coeffient magnitude remains relatively the same. Here is robust 
confirmation that after accountaing for hetroscedasticity, autocorrelation, 308nalysed308ty and 
endogeneity the interpretation already advanced in the main GLS FE remains valid. It may be 
noted how the variable is highly endogenous and instrumented for in this model. Teaching 
grant provider assessments persist in cyles across the decade and confirm their largely negative 
view of universities with high TFEE fractions. 
 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 
GLS MLE retains significance but GLS AR loses it. The IV coefficients remain significant at 
1%. In all 5 regressions the sign of the association remains positive. Magnitude drops in GLS 
MLE but only by a small percentage. Magnitudes rise in the IV regressions. Overall then after 
accounting for abnormalities in variable distributions and endogeneity within this sample there 
is still evidence that the association is indeed positive. The interpretations in the GLSFE main 
model need no further modification.  
 
Part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR) 
A robust confirmation of the GLS FE  result is seen here. All the GLS MLE and GLS AR, IV 
2SLS and IV 2GMM coefficients remain strongly significant and negative at 1% level. There 
is a drop in the magnitudes of the former but there is even a significant rise in the magnitudes 
of the latter. Thus adjusting for heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and abnormality in 
variable distributions only reduces the degree of negative impact but does not change it. On 
the other hand, accounting for the reverse causality in the model actually increases the degree 
of negative impact. The theoretical/empirical inferences drawn in the GLS FE need no 
modification here. Overall, then the sophisticated arguments in the main GLS FE model are 
robustly corroborated in the sensitivities. Higher levels of part-time staff employed by a 
university seem to damper on teaching functiontionalities of the institution with Teaching 
Grant providers reducing grants to such institutions.    
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 Research Only Staff (RONLY) 
Here too there is robust confirmation of the GLS FE result just like PTTSR. Both GLS MLE 
and GLS AR remain negative and significant at 1%. Similarly, IV 2SLS and GMM coefficients 
remain strongly significant at 1% and negative. Magnitudes remains relatively the same in GLS 
MLE and drops in the GLS AR regressions but rise to almost double in the IV 2SLS and GMM 
regressions. Note too that this is the other endogenous variable instrumented for in this model 
implying a strong cyclicality in the relationship. Hence one can argue that all the 
theoretical/empirical inferences drawn in the GLS FE are robustly corroborated. Overall, then 
employing too many Research only staff are perceived to be an obstacle to higher teaching 
performance. Teaching Grant providers are right in reducing funds to such institutions.  
 
Endowment to Total assets (ENDWTA) 
A fairly mixed result is seen here. The coefficient remains somewhat significant at in GLS 
MLE, GLS AR and IV 2SLS (10% respectively) and IV GMM (1%) with a negative sign. One 
cannot completely rule out some negative link between endowment levels and TGF in this 
sample. Therefore, the interpretations in the main GLS FE model above should be taken with 
a liberal dose of caution. It would be presumpotuous to dismiss this slight negative association 
seen in five regressions entirely and internal governance policy framers need to be cognizant 
of this.   
 
Teaching and Research Staff Fraction (TRST) 
Both the GLS MLE and GLS AR coefficients are significant at 5% or above and remain 
negative with drops in magnitudes. But the IV 2SLS and IV GMM coefficients turn completely 
insignificant once endogienty has been accounted for. Therefore, accounting for 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, autocorrelation and abnormality in variable distributions 
does not change the direction of association but weakens it. But accounting for endogeneity in 
the model makes the variable insignificant although the association still remains negative. On 
the whole the interpretation of the GLS FE that teaching grant providers seem to opine that 
universities that employ too many TRST staff are the ones that seriously risk teaching 
underperformance seem corroborated.  
 
Executive Team Meeting Frequency (ETFS) 
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Both the GLS MLE and GLS AR coefficients 310nalys insignificant although their negative 
sign remains unchanged. In the IV regressions too the signs do not change but the least squares 
2SLS coefficient remains insignificance, while the GMM coefficient changes to significant at 
5% with an increase in magnitude. In general, then the variable’s impact is really weak and 
accouting for  heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, autocorrelation and abnormality as well as 
relaxing the many assumptions of OLS reveals that it hardly matters to teaching grant 
providers. Overall then all the earlier theoretical/empirical inferences of the FE model remain 
valid. Executive team meetings in this UK sample do not really have a robust negative impact 
on TGF. 
    
Board Size (BSIZE) 
Beside the spurious OLS result, all GLS regression coefficients change sign to negative. In the 
GLS MLE the result remains positive and significant at 1% level with the coeffient magnitude 
remaing the same. GLS AR remains positive and significant albiet with a drop in significance 
from 1% in the main FE model to 10% and with a slight drop in coeffient magnitude. Both the 
IV 2SLS and GMM regression coefficients however remain insignificant and negative. 
Tackling heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and abnormality in variable distributions seems 
to reveal that Teaching Grant providers actually reward universities with small boards. 
Adjusting for the endogeneity in TFEE and RONLY simply weakens the negative impact but 
does not change it. Overall, then for the first time in this UK sample evidence emerges that fits 
the predictions of Public Accountability, Quality Assurance and Optimal Contracting (Lipton 
& Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 1996; Trowler, 2008; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mallin 
et al., 2015). Board size has a negative impact on TGF and the finding and interpetations from 
the main FE model are moderately robust.  
 
Vice Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 
Both GLS MLE and GLS AR coefficients remains negative with the latter losing significance. 
Only in the biased and difficult to explain panel OLS result above that VCPAY becomes 
positive but without significance. After tackling the problems of heteroscedasticity, 
multicollinearity and abnormality in variable distributions the true association of this variable 
is now shown to be negative, which is in line with research performance model 2. Overall, then 
it appears there is now strong evidence at least in this UK sample that even these independent 
assessors of university teaching performance i.e. teaching grant providers believe higher levels 
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of VC pay detract from the teaching/transformation function of universities. The main fixed-
effects interpretation seem moderately validated and robust.  
 
Lay board member fractions (IGOV) 
A slightly complex pattern is seen here.  GLS MLE coefficient remains positive and significant 
at 5%, and with the magnitude being unchanged from the main FE model. GLS AR follows 
suit but loses significance. IV2SLS coefficient becomes insignificant but changes its sign to 
negative. IV2SGMM coefficient on the other hand becomes significant at 10% but increases 
in magnitude and is negative. Tackling heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and abnormality in 
distributions seem to suggest a positive impact but instrumenting for endogeneity confuses the 
issue. Overall, then there is significant ambiguity about the true nature of association here. 
 
RUSSELL GROUP (RGROUP) & Pre-1992 (PRE1992) 
Both coefficients are significant but RGROUP displays a positive coefficient while PRE1992 
displays a negative one. Clearly teaching grant providers are seen to be partial to members of 
the elite Russell Group but avoid funding older well established universities i.e. the PRE1992 
group. This seems deeply contradictory flawed and puzzling. After all, if teaching and learning 
regimes require financial support this would be outside both these groupings and largely among 
the newer and less established institutions. Perhaps this contradiction would get resolved in the 
sensitivity analysis below. While both controls are omitted in GLS FE they correctly display 
negative signs in GLS RE GLS MLE and GLS AR. The contradiction referred to in the panel 
OLS result gets resolved. Teaching Grant providers are correctly seen to avoid funding both 













6.3 Financial Performance advanced model 
 
University financial performance is the next theme of the chapter.  Just as in research, there are 
multi-dimensional complex links between University financial performance and governance.  
Once again, therefore, a model development that is at once wide-spanned and eclectic is used. 
Within this sample there are two main variables available to proxy university financial 
performance namely Asset Turnover (AT) and Return on Equity (ROE). However the 
univariate and bivariate analyses done earlier strongly suggest the weak statistical properties 
of the latter when compared with the former. Hence, only one robust panel model is developed 
and critically analysed using Asset Turnover (AT) as the dependent variable here.  
 
Before moving on to the main discussions it is important to note here too the results of tests for 
normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, endogeneity and non-linearity shown in tables 
3, 4, 5, and 6 in the appendix. Some variables (dependent & independent) do exhibit abnormal 
distributions in the financial performance model. This is despite the fact that all variables as 
before are invariably scaled i.e. are either fractions or natural logarithms. No winsorization is 
attempted here to avoid the rich patterns that might be lost with the outlier data points in the 
sample. Mean levels of VIF in the model do not exceed 5 but the variable of Research Only 
Staff (RONLY) does exhibit high values here. Unlike earlier models three of the independent 
variables here exhibit endogeneity namely,  
 
In what follows in sub-section 6.3.1 this sole financial performance model using Asset 
Turnover as the dependent variable is critically analysed. The same carefully calibrated 
variable selection strategy intended to achieve parsimony and theoretical/empirical span is 











6.3.1 Asset Turnover (AT) Model  
 
6.3.1.1 GLS Fixed-Effects  
 
The table 27 below shows the status of fourteen hypotheses. These are based on the results 
from the GLS fixed-effects (FE) regression with robust standard errors using fourteen different 
internal governance variables and four different control variables PRE1992, RGROUP, TA and 
REGION. The dependent variable here is Asset Turnover (AT), a financial performance 
measure that reflects how well a given university marshals its assets to generate revenues.  As 
before, the independent governances here too span the theoretical/empirical field of 
investigation and simultaneously represent one of the most parsimonious combination of 
explanations achievable in the sample.
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Table 26: Model 6 all regressions with robust standard errors for dependant variable asset turnover (AT)  
Independent Variables GLS FE GLS MLE 
 
GLS AR IV 2SLS IV GMM Panel OLS Model 
(Model) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Governance Variables:       
FTA -0.039(.085) -0.061(.053) -0.131(.075)* 0.103(.414) 0.402(.420) -1.109(.132)*** 
DTA -0.126(.082) -0.134(.049)*** -0.228(.069)*** -0.285(.113)** -0.052(.108) -0.188(.113)* 
CTA -0.289(.137)** -0.274(.078)*** -0.145(.101) 1.900(.562)*** 0.857(.597) 0.472(.241)* 
SFSPEND .00004(.0001)*** 0.000(.000)*** 0.000(.000)*** -0.335(.167)** -0.0001(.00003)*** -0.000(.000) 
ENDWTA -0.138(.159) -0.130(.120) -0.061(.158) -0.0001(.00002)*** -.0537(.1417)*** -0.639(.143)*** 
RONLY -0.330(.298) -0.166(.120) 0.214(.140) 0.114(.243) 0.650(.237)*** 1.603(.363)*** 
TONLY -0.044(.065) -0.044(.033) 0.032(.047) 0.058(.128) -0.074(.120) -0.305(.132)** 
UGCOM -0.008(.019) -0.012(.013) -0.034(.019)* -0.058(.036) 0.027(.026) -0.069(.027)** 
PTTSR -0.044(.157) -0.026(.066) -0.147(.084)* -0.378(.232) 0.303(.209) 0.457(.180)** 
GBMFS 0.081(.030)*** 0.080(.019)*** 0.052(.026)** 0.201(.078)*** -0.074(.048) 0.103(.039)*** 
VCPAY 0.091(.030)*** 0.096(.023)*** 0.088(.028)*** -0.063(.071) -0.024(.080) 0.160(.079)** 
INTS 0.822(.241)*** 0.805(.119)*** 0.565(.170)*** 0.323(.140)** 0.217(.142) -0.084(.141) 
PGINT -0.143(.140) -0.153(.112) -0.162(.146) -0.213(.228) 0.234(.199) -0.609(.217)*** 
ADSIZE 0.056(.022)** 0.055(.015)*** 0.036(.018)** -0.009(.047) 0.082(.049)* 0.001(.040) 
Controls Variables:       
TA -0.402(.030)*** -0.396(.021)*** -0.372(.025)*** - - -0.303(.050)*** 
RGROUP - 0.452(.113)*** 0.3145(.072)*** - - -0.045(.039) 
Pre1992 - .056(.092) 0.015(.055) - - 0.063(.026)** 
REGION  - 0.057(.046) 0.0386(.0260) - - -0.097(.0186)*** 
YEAR - - - - - -0.003(.005) 
CODE - - - - - 0.001(.000)*** 
Constant 4.364(.489)*** 3.980(.341)*** 3.986(.407)*** 1.343(1.040)*** 0.486(1.183)*** 10.173(10.711) 
Number of Obs 543 543 543 543 543 543 
F-Value 24.56 - - - - 14.44 
R2 0.1231 - 0.3443   0.2825 0.0707 0.6291 
Wald Chi2 - - 356.17 58.57 81.28 - 
LR Chi - 433.35 - - - - 
rho .98328055  - - - - 
Autocorrelation coef (yt-1) - - .58774795   - - - 
Theta median - - 0.7552   - - - 
Instrumented     FTA;RONLY FTA;RONLY  
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Estat overid score chi2(1) p    28.977(p = 0.0000)   
Sargan chi2    98.464(p = 0.0000)   
Basmann chi2    116.50(p = 0.0000)   
Score chi2    28.977(p = 0.0000)   
Hansen’s J chi2     28.977(p = 0.0000)  
       
Notes: The table reports all regressions with robust standard errors for dependent variable asset turnover (AT). Regressions defined as follows: Generalised least square 
fixed-effects (GLS Fixed-Effects); generalised least square maximum likelihood estimation (GLS Maximum Likelihood); generalised least square auto-regression (GLS 
AR); instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS); instrumental variable two-stage; instrumental variable generalized method of moments (IV 2S GMM); 
panel ordinary least square model (Panel OLS Model). Variables are defined as follows: fixed to total assets (FTA); debt to total assets (DTA); cash to total assets 
(CTA); service and facility spend per student (SFSPEND); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); research only staff (RONLY); teaching only staff (TONLY); 
presence unique governance committee (UGCOM); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); governing board meeting frequency (GBMFS); vice-chancellor pay 
(VCPAY); fraction of international students (INTS); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); audit committee size (ADSIZE); total assets (TA); 315nalyse group university 
(RGROUP); pre-1992 universities (PRE1992);  region (REGION); year (YEAR); and code (CODE). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. 
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Clearly AT seems to be a positive function of SFSPEND (sig.), GBMFS (sig.), VCPAY (sig.), 
INTS ( sig.) and ADSIZE (sig.), but a negative function of FTA (insig.), DTA (insig.), CTA 
(sig.), ENDWTA (insig.), RONLY (insig.), TONLY (insig.), UGCOM (inisg.), PTTSR 
(insig.), PGINT (insig.) and TA (sig.). 
 
 
Table 27: Summary of the Findings and Hypothesis of Governance and Asset Turnover  (AT) 
Dependent Variable Asset Turnover (AT) 




Finding sig. Hyp. Status 
Governance Variables:      
Fixed to Total Assets (FTA) H5m - - Insig. Rejt.  
Debt to Total Assets (DTA) H5i - - Insig. Rejt.  
Cash to Total Assets (CTA) H5l - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Service and Facility Spend per Student 
(SFSPEND)  
H5e + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) H5h + - Insig. Rejt. 
Research Only Staff (RONLY) H3d + - Insig. Rejt.  
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) H3f - - Insig. Rejt.  
Unique Governance Committee (UGCOM) H6m + - Insig. Rejt.  
Part-time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) H3i + - Insig. Rejt.  
Board Meeting Frequency (GBMFS) H6j + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Vice-Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) H6r + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
International Students Ratio (INTS) H4b + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT) H4d + - Insig. Rejt.  
Audit Committee Size (ADSIZE) H6n + + Sig. (5%) Acep. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter 3. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting 
hypothesised relationships, respectively.  
 
 
Fixed to Total Assets (FTA) 
There is an insignificant association between the proportion of fixed assets a university chooses 
and its asset turnover. This contradicts sub-hypothesis (H5m). Theoretical indications in 
Optimal Contracting and stewardship precepts (Bachan, 2017; Bradley et al. 2008) argue that 
institutions that carry less fixed assets have the flexibility to design optimal contracts and 
husband their resources efficiently respectively. This should help them to generate high levels 
of turnover. The evidence in this UK university sample does not confirm this. But the contrarian 
prediction of resource dependence (Vegas & Coffin, 2015)  that universities with higher levels 
of fixed asset ownership are able to use such resources more effectively than peers is also 
unable to be determined in this sample. All that stands out in this result is that fixed to total 
asset proportions in UK universities have no discernible impact on their asset turnover. 
 317 
 
A comparison with corporate research is useful here. At least one study Kotsina & Hazak, 
(2012) finds that firm choices of fixed asset levels has no significant association with AT. 
Others find empirical evidence on both the positive (Al-Ani, 2014; Olatunji & Adegbite, 2014; 
Okwo et al., 2012; Reyhani, 2012; Azadi, 2013; Iqbal & Mati, 2012; Inyiama et al., 2017)  and 
negative sides (Li, 2004; Dong et al., 2012) of the debate. In totality it does appear that at least 
for UK universities FTA levels do not really matter to financial performance in asset turnover. 
 
Debt to Total Assets (DTA) 
 The main GLS FE result here shows an insignificant but negative association with Asset 
Turnover. Sub-hypothesis (H5i) is rejected. Most theory i.e. Optimal Contracting, Managerial 
power, Stewardship and Legitimacy all warn against too much debt. High leverage levels are 
harmful to a university’s financial abilities and cramp its revenue generation capability 
expressed in its Asset Turnover. Optimal Contracting (Callender & Jackson, 2008; Brigham & 
Houston, 2004; Hutchison, 1995; Jensen, 1986; Miller & Rock, 1985; Smith, 1986; Champion) 
suggests that high debt levels reduce the institution’s independence/flexibility to strike the 
optimal contractual bargains. Managerial Power (Williamson, 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 
2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996) argues that it disallows the institutions’ 
governors from establishing an effective independent direction in policy making. Stewardship 
(Donaldson, 1990; Mallin et al., 2015; Yermack, 1996) points to the pernicious games 
generated from high debt levels that stymie financial stability and ability. Legitimacy (Hillman, 
2018; HEPI, 2019; Iman, 2018; Margolis, 2004; Hayes & Wynyard, 2002) points to the 
reputational damage inflicted by leverage dependence. Earlier empirical work in debt levels is 
copious in corporate research but within university research both scholars and regulators warn 
against excessive debt and its negative implications (HEPI, 2019; UCU, 2018; HEC, 2014; 
OFS, 2019a, b; Moody, 2019) 
 
Cash to Total Assets (CTA) 
CTA displays a negative and significant association (at 5% level) with AT. This confirms sub-
hypothesis (H5l). Higher cash levels on the balance sheet reduce the university’s asset turnover. 
The finding seems to reflect public accountability concerns with too much cash holdings on 
university balance sheets (Taylor, 2013a,b; Shattock , 2010; Kelleher, 2004). It also echoes 
stewardship and agency problems that tend to go hand in hand with higher cash levels thus 
reducing financial performance (Bates, Kahle, and stulz, 2007; Gao et al., 2013). Earlier 
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empirical work in CTA association with university financial performance is scant although 
large numbers of studies raise important normative issues with high cash levels on university 
balance sheets (Mikkelson & Partch, 2003; Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999).  
 
Services & Facilities Spend (SFSPEND) 
The coefficient is significant  (at 1% level) and displays a positive sign. But it is noteworthy 
that it has a  very small magnitude. Still one is able to confirm sub-hypothesis (H5e). The result 
here fits intuitive expectations that universities that spend higher amounts on tangible services 
and facilities attract more fee-paying students hence the higher AT. Resource dependence and 
Legitimacy arguments (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; Suchman, 1995; Taylor, 2012; 
Knight, 2002; Fabrice, 2009; Parker, 2011, 2012, 2013; Taylor, 2013a,) are clearly fulfilled 
here. Universities that display higher levels of educational resources and infrastructure attract 
higher fee paying clientiele and also raise their reputational legitimacy. Quality Assurance and 
Optimal Contracting predictions (Price et al., 2003; Williamson, 2005; Shattock, 2010; Prowle 
& Morgan, 2005; Binsardi & Ekwulugo, 2003) are also validated here. Higher per capita spend 
on facilities assures students of the quality of the institution while it suggests a long-term 
orientation in governance which is optimal for the institution. Empirical work on this variable 
in university governance finds very similar results. Several scholars (Fabrice, 2009; Dao & 
Thrope, 2015; Migin et al., 2015; Wiers-Jenssen et al., 2002; Price et al., 2003; Ganyaupfu, 
2013; Mushtaq & Khan, 2012; Kirmani & Siddiquah, 2008; Karemera et al., 2003; Young, 
1999; Tang et al., 2004) demonstrate in their UK based sample that universities that showcase 
their higher educational facilities attract fee paying students/parents and academics alike.  
 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 
The association of this variable is insignificant but with a negative sign.  Sub-hypothesis (H5h) 
is rejected. UK university endowment levels do not seem to positively increase the  revenue 
generation of universities in the sample. Universities that have high levels of endowments are 
resource rich (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Bouwman, 2011). And  feel 
less need to increase their revenues and this shows in an insignificant association with their 
asset turnovers. It also seems that such universities are self assured and their managers do not 
see the need to chase revenue streams (Williamson, 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006). 
Empirically there is almost no reference to university endowment levels in relation to financial 
performance although many policy and normative scholars do criticize the impact of such 
endowments on university performance in general (Butt, 2019; Squire, 2014; Parker, 2012). 
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Research Only Staff (RONLY)  
An insignificant negative coefficient is displayed. The proportions of research only staff 
employed by a university seem to have no discernible impact on its asset turnover. The result 
rejects sub-hypothesis (H3d). Therefore it is now hard to find support for Stewardship, optimal 
contracting Legitimacy and Resource Dependence arguments in this result. Staff on research 
only contracts ought to be able to attract distinct streams of revenues and thus husband the 
available resources i.e. the university’s assets better (Probert, 2013; Fabrice, 2009, pg. 47; 
Sikes, 2006; Henkel, 2005; Ackers & Oliver, 2007; Locke, 2014; Eurydice, 2010, pg. 24; 
Ehrenberg & Zhang, 2006; Himanen et al., 2009). But the actual evidence is weak. Similarly, 
the Research-only contractual form ought to be optimally suited to improving the revenue 
performance of a university (Nyamapfene, 2018; Graham, 2015; Bexley et al., 2013; Probert, 
2013). It should also be an effective resource focused on generating research grants and thus 
raise AT. But the weak insignificant negative coefficient suggests otherwise. Finally, the 
empirical qualitative literature often argue that the reputational legitimacy of a university in 
terms of its research expertise should increase with larger RONLY (Whitchurch, 2016; Ackers 
& Oliver, 2007; Coughlan, 2015; Parker, 2008; Coate & et al., 2001; Norton, 2013; Locke, 
2012, 2014; Blackmore, 2016). This should have positive impacts on research grant income as 
well as international fee paying students. But here too the sample evidence weakly suggests 
the opposite.  
 
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) 
The coefficient is insignificant but negative in its association. Therefore, sub- hypothesis (H3f) 
is rejected. The proportion of teaching only staff does not seem to have any discernible impact 
on the revenue generating ability of the university. This contradicts resource dependence and 
optimal contracting expectations (Flowes, 2014; Rowley, 1997; Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; 
Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; Williamson, 2005; Van Essen et al., 2015) that 
TONLY staff will reduce salary bills and thus enable universities to generate higher revenues 
on their asset base. Empirically there has been scant work associating TONLY contracts with 
financial performance although many scholars (Duflo, 2009; Locke et al., 2016; Nyamapfene, 
2018) suggest the cost saving benefits that acrrue to universities out of employing such fixed 




Unique Governance Committee (UGCOM) 
The coefficient is insignificant and negative. Therefore sub-hypothesis (H6m) is rejected. One 
is unable to decipher the true association between UGCOM and AT in this sample. The overall 
interpretation here can only be that establishing such a unique governance committee has no 
significant impact on a university’s revenue generation. Once again here is proof that adding 
layers of red-tape and bureaucracy do not materially impact the financial performance of a 
university. This is intuitive and appealing. After all this is what Stewardship and Managerial 
Power opine (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012; Davis et al., 1997; 
Perez & Ode, 2013). The result clashes with the positive association found between this 
variable and voluntary disclosure in the university governance empirical literature by Ntim et 
al. (2017).  
 
Part-time to Full Time Staff (PTTSR) 
The coefficient is insignificant and negative in GLS FE regression. Sub-hypothesis (H3i) is 
rejected. Stewardship predictions that a university will be able to husband its resources more 
effectively through checking executive tendencies for profligacy in full time contracts (davis 
et al., 1997; perez & Ode, 2013; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Van Essen et al., 2015; Williamson, 
2005; raff & Summers, 1987) and thus improve financial performance is not proved here. 
Neither are we able to find any evidence for effective resource utilization or cost savings from 
optimal staff contracting (Fowles, 2014; Pfeffer & Salncik, 2003; Locke et al., 2016; Thewlis, 
2003) in this insignificant negative association. Empirically while studies have not directly 
associated PTTSR with university financial performance many commentators (Ackers & 
Oliver, 2007; Bryson & Blackwell, 2006; Brown & Carasso, 2013) commend the use of such 
contracts in order to save the institution money.  
 
Governing Board Meeting Frequency (GBMFS) 
 An important board level governance mechanism i.e. how often the board meets, shows itself 
to be a significant (at 1% level) positive antecedent of Asset Turnover. This confirms ex-ante 
expectations in sub-hypothesis (H6j). Higher numbers of board meetings seem to improve asset 
turnovers in this UK HEI sample. There is no evidence for the dysfunctionality and group think 
arguments advanced by some governance theories or even the optimality arguments of others 
(Reverte, 2009; Schofield, 2009). Yet the contentions of governance theories like stakeholder, 
legitimacy stewardship, Resource Dependence and Public Accountability seem fulfilled here. 
Frequent meetings seem to enable effective incorporation of stakeholder concerns thus 
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resulting in higher revenue generation (Vefeas, 1999; Sonnenfeld). Such meetings also create 
greater legitimacy for the board both within and without the institution arguably enabling 
revenue generation. Boards that meet more often implement their good stewardship quickly 
identifying problems as they arise and solving them thus enabling higher asset turnovers (davis 
et al., 1997; perez & Ode, 2013). By meeting more often such boards are able to tap into board 
member resources networks and expertise (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990). Finally, a fuller annual calendar of meetings of the board also seem to impress 
the wider public who aid the positive momentum required to accelerate revenue generation in 
such a university (Kohli & Saha, 2008; Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004).  
 
This result is unlike earlier corporate governance studies that provide a mixed i.e. both positive 
and negative picture of how board meetings in firms affect their financial performance. 
However, it is broadly in line with the positive association found by two studies in university 
governance and performance by Lokuwaduge (2011) and Lokawaduge & Armstrong (2015).  
 
Vice-Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 
The variable displays a significant (at 1% levels) positive coefficient here. This confirms ex-
ante expectations in sub-hypothesis (H6r). It is also opposite the negative association found 
between this variable and Research Quality in model 2 and its true negative association with 
Teaching Grant Fraction documented in model 5. The finding aligns with stewardship 
predictions that VCs who are paid well will work in synch with the institution’s financial aims 
and thus produce better financial performance (Bebchuck et al., 2002; Edmans & Gabiax, 2009; 
Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015; Mallin et al., 2015). It also seems to support 
the idea that resource rich CEOs will only bring their expertise and networks when they are 
rewarded well (Edmans et al., 2009; Walker et al., 2019; Gabiax & Landier, 2008). A high pay 
to them will result in better financial performance. There is also evidence here that universities 
that pay their VCs well, optimally contract such individuals who are consequently more 
focused on delivering financial results (Soh, 2007; Johnes & Virmani, 2019; Raff & Summers, 
1987; Gabiax & Landier, 2008).  
 
Earlier empirical work in universities has either found a positive association with many 
different financial measures of performance (Dolton & Ma, 2003; Bachan & Rielly, 2015; 
Walker et al., 2019; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Baimbridge & Simpson, 1996), or no significant 
association with such performance (Tarbert et al.,, 2008; Cheng, 2014). 
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Fraction of International Students (INTS) 
The variable displays a significant (at 1% level) and positive coefficient here. This is opposite 
the direction of its association with Research Performance in Model 1. The result confirms ex-
ante hypothesis (H4b). As anticipated the proportion of its international students (INTS) at a 
university improves its asset turnover. Legitimacy theory prediction of the  academic ambience 
enhancing effects of international students are seen in the result. This is why a growing asset 
turnover is the impact here. Simil resource dependence contentions about the impact of higher 
fees paid by such students and the necessity to court them seem borne out here. While direct 
work is rare many voices in the literature mention the likely positive financial gains of a 
university from the number of international student places it offers (Du et al., 2019; Vickers & 
Bekhradnia, 2007; Coate, 2009; De Vita & Case, 2003; Kuo, 2007; Soo & Elliott, 2010; Sutton 
Trust, 2010; Universities UK , 2015; Ianella & Haung, 2014; Parker, 2013; Guthrie & Parker, 
2010; Nania & Green, 2004; Throsby, 1998). 
 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT) 
An insignificant negative coefficient is displayed here. Sub-hypothess (H4d) is rejected.  
The result does not support either the resource dependence argument that postgraduate students 
might bring higher levels of fees and thus help the university generate higher revenues on the 
same asset base or the legitimacy argument of a reputational halo and consequent further 
attraction of fee-paying students (Parker, 2008; Angell et al., 2008; Donaldson & McNicholas, 
2004; House, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Dolton & Ma, 2003). Voices in the empirical literature 
(Angell et al., 2008, Smith et al., 2010; HESA, 2015; House, 2010; Wilson, 2012; Universities 
UK, 2015; Harris, 1996) opine that although postgraduate students generally constitute a 
minority of the student body at most universities, a fact confirmed in this sample (see Chapter 
5, table 6), still these students are a financial positive for the university but the result here does 
not support these either.    
  
Audit Committee Size (ADSIZE) 
A positive and significant (5% level) coefficient is displayed on this audit related board level 
governance variable. This confirms ex-ante expectations in sub-hypothesis (H6n). Clearly 
universities with larger audit committees are able to generate higher revenues on their asset 
bases than their peers. Public Accountability, Resource Dependence, Stakeholder, Legitimacy 
Stewardship and Quality Assurance arguments seem to be confirmed (Coy et al., 2001; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 2003; Pfeffer, 1987; Flowes, 2014; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Wise et al., 2020; 
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Suchman, 1995; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014; Stansaker, 2018; Perez & Ode, 2013). Larger 
audit committees are able to draw on their resources, networks, expertise and effective 
oversight abilities to help universities attract and exploit diverse revenues streams 
(Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Adelope, 2011; Jetty & Beattie, 2012; DeSimone & Rich, 2019; 
Montondon & Fischer, 1999). Earlier research is thin and sparse in university literatures. 
However, in corporate research (Raghunandan & Rama, 2007; Al-Najjar, 2011; Nelsom & 
Devi, 2013; Kipkoech & Rono, 2016; Archambeault et al., 2008; Klien, 2002) have found that 
large audit committee sizes aid expertise, oversight and internal financial efficiency which 
generally positively impacts the firm’s financial performance. The sample evidence in UK HEI 
is in line with this corporate finding. Larger audit committees have a positive influence on the 
revenue generating ability of the university.  
 
Total Assets (TA) 
As expected a highly significant (at 1% level) negative coefficient is displayed on this size 
control. This is much in line with all our ex-ante expectations. Larger universities just like 
larger firms are only able to grow their asset turnovers slower than their smaller peers (Hymer 




Once again a rich suite of six additional regressions are implemented in model 5 above to test 
the assumptions of homoscedasticity, autocorrelation, multicollinearity, normality in 
distributions and endogeneity (see Appendix 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). The empirical/methodological 
arguments for the first four remain the same here as in all previous models. Various test results 
robustly confirm this as shown in the appendix. However, in this model, unlike all earlier 
models three variables namely FTA, RONLY and ENDWTA display strong endogeneity at 1% 
significances (see Appendix 6). Therefore, all three are instrumented for using all four control 
variables in the model. But such a strategy completely breaks down the IV process. Both the 
IV regressions display zero R-squares and lack any significances. Over-identification tests also 
strongly suggest that the IV is over-identified and therefore the coefficients in these regressions 
are not reliable. Therefore, the variable with the lowest levels of endogeneity among the three 
i.e. ENDWTA is dropped and only the other two are instrumented for. The high R-squares as 
well as small p-values in over-identification tests of the resultant two stage least squares 
(IV2SLS) and generalized method of moments (IV2SGMM) shown in the table confirm this 
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strategy. Therefore, it is these two variables that are instrumented for in the sensitivity analysis 
here. 
 
Fixed to Total Assets (FTA) 
GLS MLE remains insignificant but in GLS AR and once accounting for autocorrelation by 
lagging the dependant variable the coefficient becomes significant at 10% level. Both display 
negative associations. Also after accounting for the endogenous variable in the model, both  IV 
2SLS and GMM regressions remain insignificant but switch sign to positive. The panel OLS 
is significant with a negative sign. Overall, the evidence that FTA does not seem to significantly 
impact AT does not need to be modified, but should be interprtued with care. 
 
 Debt to Total Assets (DTA) 
A more complex pattern is seen in this variable that needs some careful delineation. Except 
IV2SGMM all the other GLS, IV and panel OLS coefficients display a negative and significant 
association. The magnitudes of coefficients even rise in GLS AR and IV2SLS. Accounting for 
heteroscedasticity weakens the result. But adjusting for abnormality in variable distributions 
does not. Further when the autocorrelation and endogeneity in the model are addressed there is 
in fact a strengthening of the negative impact on Asset Turnovers.  
 
The true negative impact of a university’s leverage on the institution’s revenue generating 
ability now emerges. All the theoretical predictions mentioned in the main GLSFE analysis 
above are seen fulfilled and strongly corroborated here. Unlike the corporate firm there are no 
mitigating circumstances when a university should take high levels of debt. This rather strong 
sensitivity result adds credence to the many voices in the normative, policy and qualitative 
empirical literature (McGettigan, 2013, Foskett, 2010; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Brown, 2010, 
Gibbs, 2012; Hamsley-Brown, 2011; Kim, 2008, Molesworth et al., 2010, Hayes & Wynyard, 
2002; Margolis, 2004) that have been criticising the UK Government’s increasingly laissez-
faire neo-liberal stance towards UK HEI. This is despite much empirical evidence of the 
lowered reputational legitimacy of overleveraged universities among students and staff (CUC, 
2018; HEPI, 2019; Watson, 2012). This active marketization of student markets has even led 
to many universities notably even Cardiff and SOAS overstretching finances by projecting 
overoptimistic student recruitment numbers which were simply unattainable (Turner, 2019). 
The financial situation of these institutions have floundered especially after BREXIT and 
recent leverage surveys of UK HEI have highlighted the unsustainable huge debt in the sector 
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(£12bn). Many universities have even tethered on the brinks of bankruptcy in recent times 
(Hillman, 2018), But even recent pronouncements of the OFS (OFS, 2019a, b) have not gone 
far enough and merely tinkered with the policy response here. The regulator has merely 
repeated corporate research based injunctions (Cartwright et al., 2007; Zeeman & Benneworth, 
2017; McGettigan, 2013) hoping that takeovers/mergers/leveraged-buyouts will do the trick in 
HEI as they have in the corporate sector. But the sample results clearly show how universities 
are unique entities and should singularly avoid the debt problem entirely.  
 
Cash to Total Assets (CTA) 
GLS MLE remains negative and significant (at 1%) but GLS AR although negative becomes 
insignificant. Both the IV2 SLS and panel OLS (merely used as a sensitivity – see Chapter 4.7) 
reverse signs to positive and significant while the IV2SGMM is positive without significance. 
This is a fairly mixed result especially when considering endogeneity. There is no evidence of 
cyclicality in the CTA-AT relationship. On the whole then although the interpretation in 
GLSFE above is not in need of any drastic  change it should be interpreted with an element of 
caution. 
 
Services & Facilities Spend (SFSPEND) 
Both the GLS MLE and GLS AR coefficients remain positive and significant (at 1% level) 
which corroborates the main fixed-effects findings. The IV 2SLS and GMM regressions 
change signs to negative with  significance. In this result too then the endoegeneity regressions 
seem to rule out a positive cycle in SFSPEND AT relation.  There seems to be no need to 
drastically modify the GLS FE interpretation above.  
 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 
All GLS coefficients remain negative and insignificant but the IV 2SLS and GMM and panel 
OLS coefficients turn significant at 1% and display a negative sign. There is no change in the 
negative sign across the entire suite of regressions including the GLSFE main regression. This 
is moderately strong evidence that ENDWTA’s influence is indeed negative. Overall, then it 
does seem that there is no need to change the complex GLS FE interpretation of this variable 
above. The financial complacency argument does not need modification.  ENDWTA clearly 




Research Only Staff (RONLY) 
All GLS coefficients remain insignificant but GLS AR changes sign to positive. However the 
panel OLS and IV2SGMM are both positive and jump in significance to 1%. A curious result 
thus emerges in the sensitivities of this variable. Undoubtedly there is heteroscedasticity, 
abnormality in distribution, autocorrelation at work in this variable which explains so many 
significance and sign reversals. But some weak evidence of a positive association between the 
variable and AT cannot be ruled out. In particulat the positive coefficient in IV two stage GMM 
suggests that it is not right to entirely dismiss the theoretical predictions of positive association 
as suggested in GLSFE main model above. In fact, there may be some slight evidence of a 
positive cycle of reinforcement in the IV2SGMM. Universities with high RONLY attract more 
research funds and then go on to hire even more RONLY an argument often advanced in the 
normative university literature (Locke, 2012; Nyamapfene, 2018; Deem, 2004; Locke et al., 
2009; Jongbloed et al., 2018; Oancea et al. 2010; Proberts, 2013; Whelan, 2017). On the whole 
then it may be useful to admit that the exact nature of association between RONLY and AT is 
ambiguous in this sample and in need of further investigation. 
 
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) 
GLS MLE remains negative but GLS AR turns positive but both remain insignificant. IV2SLS 
coefficient changes sign to positive without significance while IV 2GMM remains negative but 
again without significance. This result is even weaker than RONLY above. Overall, then the 
interpretations of the GLS FE main model need no modification here, and TONLY’s 
insignifant association is robustly evident in the suit of all advanced regressions.   
 
Unique Governance Committee (UGCOM) 
Although all coefficients except IV 2GMM remain negative and except GLS AR none are 
significant. GLS AR, and after accounting for autocorrelation by lagging the dependent 
variable (AT) is showing a negative association at 10% levels, the result is very weak and one 
is only able to conclude that this variable does not seem to have any effect on asset turnover. 
Overall, after accounting for endogeneity, hetroscidasticity, abnormality, multicollieanrity and 
autocorrelation the association is very weak and insignificant. There is no need to modify 





Part time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 
The GLS MLE remains negative and insignificant while GLS AR does not change sign but 
becomes significant at 10 % level and increase in magnitude. The panel OLS, although biased, 
is the only coefficient that is positive and significant (at 5%). IV 2SLS and GMM are both 
insignificant although the latter changes sign to positive. On the whole the result is very weak 
and there is no need to interfere with the main GLS FE model interpretation above.  
 
Board Meeting Frequency (GBMFS) 
All GLS and panel OLS coefficients remain positive and significant. IV2SLS coefficient rises 
in magnitude and stays positive and significant. But the IV2SGMM coefficient changes sign 
to negative and loses significance. This is a moderately strong result. Accounting for 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, abnormality in variable distributions, autocorrelation and 
endogeneity does not change the robust positive association here. Some evidence of a positive 
cycle in meetings to asset turnover positive relationship is also seen. Overall, then the 
theoretical/empirical insights advanced in the GLSFE with regard to this variable do not need 
any modification. 
 
Vice Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 
The GLS MLE and AR coefficients remain robustly significant and positive just like with the 
main fixed-effects model. But both IV 2SLS and GMM coefficients lose significance and turn 
negative. Endogenous mechanisms merely weaken the result. Clearly one is unable to infer a 
positive cycle in this association. Overall, then, there is no need to interfere with the GLS FE  
interpretations. VCPAY is indeed positively associated with university asset turnover in this 
sample. 
 
Fraction of International Students (INTS) 
The findig are robust across all GLS regression, GLS MLE and GLE AR, at 1% level, and even 
after accounting for endogeneity the cofficients remains significant and positive in IV 2SLS at 
5% level. Only the IV GMM coefficient lose significance but remains with an unchanged 
positive sign. Accounting for heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, abnormality, 
autocorrelation and endogeneity does not materially alter the positive association with asset 
turnover. Clearly then, this evidence suggests that the important insights from the GLS FE 
regression above are robust and remain valid.  
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Post Graduate Intensity (PGINT) 
All the GLS regressions, GLS MLE and GLS AR, display a similar result to the main fixed-
effect finding of negative and insignificant associantion. Even after accouting for the 
endogenous variable, both IV 2SLS and GMM remain insignificant except the latter changes 
sign to positive. Although biased, the panel OLS regressions is the only significant association 
and is negative. There is no need to add further to the already nuanced discussion of this 
variable in the GLSFE model. The insignificant association in the suite of advanced regression 
is a further robust validation of the main fixed-effect finding.  
Audit Committee Size (ADSIZE) 
All GLS coefficients, GLS 2SLS and GMM remain significant at 5% or above. Coefficient 
remain positive and magnitudes is unchanged in GLS MLE and drops slighltly in GLS AR. IV 
2GMM coefficient is still positive and significant at 10%, but IV 2SLS remains changes sign 
without significance. Overall after accounting for heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, 
abnormality, autocorrelation and endogeneity There seems to be sufficient corroborated 
evidence that sub-hypothesis (H6n) is held in this sample. UK universities with larger audit 
committees are able to generate higher revenues on their asset bases than their peers.  
 
Total Assets (TA) 
The sign remains negative and coefficient magnitudes rise and they remain significant at 1%. 
The size control remains a strong negative antecedent of Asset Turnover. The panel OLS 
interpretation stands strongly validated. 
 
Russell Group (RGROUP) 
The coefficient is strongly significant at 1% and the sign turns positive with rises in 
magnitudes. Clearly the panel OLS result which is negative but insignificant is completely 
rejected when the econometric issues within the sample are accounted for. Asset Turnovers of 
this elite group as anticipated are higher than their peers.  
 
PRE1992 
A significant (at 5% level) positive coefficient is displayed only in the panel OLS, which 
indicates that older established UK universities seem to grow their asset turnovers at a faster 
pace than their newer peers. Panel OLS is only used as part of the sensitivity tests with regard 
to the controls, as the controls get 328nalyse in GLS FE. In all the other GLS tests (GLS MLE 
& GLS AR) coefficients turn insignificant. The panel OLS interpretation is weakened. There 
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A highly significant (at 1% level) negative coefficient is displayed in the panel OLS, It does 
seem as though asset turnovers decline as one moves away from England. However, this must 
interpreted with care because after this is based on the panel OLS which is merely used in the 
sensitivity tests for the controls which gets omitted in GLS FE. Also, the result just like with 
PRE1992, all other GLS coefficients turn insignificant and so one is forced to conclude that 
there is weak evidence in this sample that University Asset Turnovers vary by region. 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has presented and interpreted the results of the six multivariate regression models 
developed in university governance and performance in this UK sample. Research, teaching 
and financial performances and their multiple governance antecedents have been 329nalysed 
to identify the many associations between them. Apart from the main GLS fixed effects 
regression a suite of five additional sensitivity regressions were also presented and 329nalysed 
to robustly assess these associations. In the next chapter the interpretations of these six models 
are combined compared and evaluated in a detailed qualitative manner linking back to theory 






















This penultimate chapter weaves together the complex multi-layered findings from the 
previous analytical chapters 5 and 6 in order to understand their full meaning and scope. It 
forges a unitary coalesced narrative that uniquely draws together the different threads of 
theoretical and empirical insights emerging from the previous chapters. From this a novel 
understanding of the complex multi-dimensional governance performance challenges and 
trade-offs of UK universities emerges. The Chapter thus presents a summarised qualitative and 
macro understanding based on the quantitative interpretations of the results conducted in 
Chapter 5 band 6.  
 
 Universities are, as already discussed in Chapter 1, unique multi-dimensional institutions 
characterized by complex difficult to resolve trade-offs in their governance and performance. 
This is because society requires them to foster an extraordinary variety of intellectual, scientific 
and cultural knowledge. They are also required to manage complex societal goals associated 
with inter-generational divides and inter-segmental priorities. In all this they are significantly 
different from corporate firms. Knowledge creation i.e. research and knowledge dissemination 
i.e. teaching both constitute their most important functions. Creativity and innovation thus 
constitute their fundamental fabric. Any study of this Higher Education Institution must 
therefore be approached with a theoretical/empirical/methodological lens that squarely 
accounts for these differences.  
 
Extant university governance-performance scholarship has failed to do this. The rare 
quantitative studies (Lokuwaduge, 2011; lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Olson, 2000; 
Harris, 2014) that do exist here have merely applied the corporate governance performance 
paradigm and its theoretical/empirical lens to this unique institution. This is not flawed, but 
overlooks other important dimensions. Not only is university governance multi-dimensional 
and significantly different from firms. But University performance is also multi-dimensional 
with research, teaching and financial performance each trading off against one another and 
associating in complex ways with important internal governance decisions. A need had 
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therefore been identified in Chapter 1 to accomplish a singular unpacking of the complex 
relationships between university governance and performance in the UK.  
 
For the first time, then, in this thesis, this need is answered. Five distinctive aspects of the thesis 
must be highlighted upfront in this context. 
 
First and foremost, it comprehensively crafts unique definitions of university governance and 
performance encompassing the multi-dimensionality of either theoretical construct (Gayle et 
al., 2003; Shattock, 2010; Jongbloed et al., 2018; Collini, 2012). These definitions in 
themselves expand earlier ones and enable a true unpacking of the associations between 
governance and performance in the UK HEI. Second, it establishes the relevance of a novel 
seven-fold theoretical framework and proceeds to critically analyse each theory and its 
implications to the research question (see Chapter 2.4). Third, from this and a critical review 
of the empirical literature the five important empirical and methodological research gaps are 
identified in the body of knowledge. Fourth, to fill these gaps, hypotheses are advanced 
capturing the multi-dimensional associations between university governance and performance.  
Fifth, a novel data sample consisting of 25 governance and 6 performance measurements for 
132 UK universities across 10 years is collated. Finally, univariate, bivariate and multivariate 
analyses are innovatively and rigorously done in this data sample in order to answer the 
hypotheses posed. It is the interpretations of these results conducted in chapter 5 and 6 that 
constitute the basis of all the critical discussion to follow in this chapter. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured into seven main sections. The first section to follow i.e. 7.2 
summarizes important novel findings about the university governance variables studied here 
and their important hitherto unexplored characteristics. In this, the section summarizes findings 
about five different missing dimensions of university governance aside from the usual Board 
and audit related ones. Section 7.3 forges together a narrative coalescing the different insights 
about UK university research performance and its antecedents from Chapter 5 and 6. The 
section first discusses insights about the research impacts of missing dimensions of university 
governance. It then draws insights about the usual board level and audit related dimensions. 
section 7.4 does likewise with university teaching performance. In section 7.5 the complex 
trade-offs between university research and teaching performance as evidenced in the sample 
are discussed. Section 7.6 fleshes the insights from university financial performance just like 
research and teaching earlier. Section 7.7 attempts to understand what the sample evidence 
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means for the trade-offs between a university’s academic and non-academic performance. 
Section 7.8 is a summary conclusion of this penultimate chapter of the thesis.  
  
7.2 The multiple dimensions of UK University Governance 
 
From the univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses of previous chapters a large number 
of missing dimensions of UK university governance emerge as central antecedents of 
university performance. The usual board level governances i.e. Board size, Board diversity 
etc., routinely studied by most scholars such as Lokuwaduge (2011), Lokuwaduge & 
Armstrong (2015), Olson (2000), Ntim et al. (2017) and others undoubtedly continue to be 
important influences on research, teaching and financial performances of UK universities. But 
singularly this research uncovers a range of other important dimensions of governance that 
impact these performances. This is an important contribution to the scholarly literature. These 
include selectivity in entry standards (ES), instruction intensity in student-staff ratio (SSR), 
Research/teaching modalities reflected in staff level diversities (FSF, PTTSR, TRST, 
TONLY, RONLY), pedagogical orientations captured in student body diversities (INTS, 
PGINT) and strategic financial choices expressed in chosen asset and revenue structures 
(ENDWTA, CTA, FTA, DTA, TFEE, SFSPEND). These new aggregate dimensions of 
university governance that emerge from the theoretical/empirical analysis of this thesis 
represent key additions to the body of knowledge here. In what follows the key insights 
emerging from both types of governance antecedents i.e. those already studied and those trailed 
in this thesis for the first time are critically coalesced to suggest the new complete picture of 
UK university governance in all its different dimensions.  
 
7.2.1 What we know so far about the dimensions of UK University Governance 
 
Most of the UK university governance and performance literature has been focused around the 
board (Lokawaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017; Harris, 2014; 
Olson, 2000). It is almost as though the rest of the organization simply does not matter. 
However, the range of empirical evidence uncovered in this thesis suggests that University 
Governance unlike that of a firm works in multiple ways and dimensions12. It is expressed 
 
12 The reader is directed to Chapters 2 & 3 (sections 2.2.1 & 3.1.1) for a detailed analysis of this and the 
associated empirical gap identified by this thesis. 
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largely as a set of complex choices that universities implement not just at the board level but 
in various other parts of the entity. It is useful to first reflect on many of the new discretionary 
governance choices that have emerged in the sample.  
 
Selectivity in Entry Standards  
In line with the arguments of several policy and normative governance scholars (Shattock, 
2008; Dearing, 1997; Dearlove, J. 2002; Frankel, 2011; McDonald, 2013; Trakman, 2008, 
Collini, 2012, Sawir, 2013; Brown & Carasso, 2013) the univariate analysis in Chapter 5 
uncovers rich evidence for heterogeneity in ES across UK universities. Universities have been 
richly differentiating themselves from their peers in terms of how selectively they recruit 
students i.e. their ES. This more than confirms how important this decision is. It is not taken 
lightly or just at the board level but across the institution in departments, their committees and 
in myriad interactive ways. The public student coverage imperative along with the legitimacy 
of an overexclusive university clashes with the student/parent need for quality assured higher 
education, a fact deliberated extensively in hypothesis development in Chapter 3.2.1.1. On the 
whole coelascing all the univariate findings (see Table 6, pg. 198-202; Appendix Table 1, pg. 
419-422) in this dimension it is overwhelmingly apparent that calibrating Entry Standards is a 
singular challenge facing university governance.    
 
Interaction Intensity in Student Staff Ratio (SSR) 
The rich heterogeneity in the levels of this ratio in this UK sample effectively interpreted in 
Chapter 5 demonstrate the many challenges faced by universities in this dimension. 
Universities are heterogenous in their choices of SSR (Chapter 5, pg. 205, 198-202; Appendix 
Table 1, pg. 419-422). Student places and Staff strengths to support them are the greatest 
challenge facing such knowledge institutions which have to balance conflicting concerns of 
student coverage, staff morale, union activism and quality of academic interactions (Coy et al., 
2001; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014; Stensaker, 2018; Marginson, 2018; Freeman, 2015; 
Foskett, 2010; Fowles, 2014; Wise et al., 2020). Pulling together all the univariate 
interpretations on this dimension (Chapter 5, pg. 208, 198-202; Appendix Table 1, pg. 419-
422) there is now definitely evidence that a university’s SSR is individually rooted and hard to 





Research/Teaching/gender modalities in Staff level diversities 
Research and teaching are the most important twin functions of a university. Resource 
Dependence, Stakeholder, Culture, Quality Assurance and Optimal Contracting (Collinson, 
2004; Verschuere & De Corte, 2014; Pfeffer, 1987; Fowles, 2014; Brown, 2004; Edmans & 
Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014; Rowley; 1996) posit that 
academic staff and their diverse contracts represent key modalities whereby the university 
calibrates governance associated with these functions. Evidence in Chapter 5 for the first time 
proves how female staff fraction (FSF), part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR), Teaching & 
Research staff ratio (TRST), Teaching Only staff ratio (TONLY) and Research Only Staff 
Ratio (RONLY) are carefully considered trade-offs emerging from the teaching and learning 
regimes philosophies in the uniquely individual evolution of each UK university (Trowler, 
2002). It is in the choice of staff contracts that important internal governance policies are 
expressed. The wide variation in these contractual levels point to a UK HEI sector clearly 
searching for complex governance answers to the puzzle of how to structure specific contracts. 
Several governance policy commentators have often underlined (Mintzberg & Rose, 2003; 
Minor, 2003; Campbell, 2003; Meyer, 2002; Sora, 2001; Collini, 2005; Parker, 2011; 
McGettigan, 2013; Shattock, 2008; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Toma, 2007; Vidovich & Currie, 
2011; Parker, 2012; Rowlands, 2013; Molesworth et al., 2010) this turmoil in the increasingly 
marketized UK university sector. This research provides comprehensive quantitative evidence 
that this is indeed true.  
 
 Pedagogical orientations in student body diversities 
The univariate analysis of proportion of International Students (INTS) and Postgraduate 
Studens (PGINT) in Chapter 5 discovers many revealing nuance (see Table 6, pg. 198-202; 
Appendix Table 1, pg. 419- 422). UK universities displays keen differences in course choices, 
student places and professed specializations within the overall higher education market place 
in the country. These differences have been on the rise especially after the increasing 
marketization of UK Higher Education. Collis (2004), Molesworth et al. (2010), McGettigan 
(2013), Collini (2005), Foskett (2010), Brown & Carasso (2013), Shattock (2013), Kim (2008) 
and Ntim et al. (2017) take note of this fast emerging paradigm.  Such an active differentiation 
in the sector proves for the first time that pedagogical orientation of universities is in itself a 
key governance dimension. It creates the academic ambience of the university and should 
therefore be deliberately accounted for. Many theories notably optimal contracting, legitimacy, 
stakeholder and public accountability predict this and argue for its inclusion (Pfeffer, 1978; 
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Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Scherer et al., 2013). This thesis proves these 
arguments in the rich diversity of univariate results. Here then is proof that calls for inclusion 
of pedagogical orientation by normative and policy scholars (Dearlove, 2002; Shattock, 2008; 
Hillman, 2014; House, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; De Vita & Case, 2003; Harris, 1996; Hesketh 
& Knight, 1999; Bolsmann & Miller, 2008; Pittaway et al., 1998; Throsby, 1998; Coate, 2009; 
Hemsley-Brown & Oplatka, 2006; Collini, 2005; Parker, 2011; McGettigan, 2013) are not 
misplaced.  
 
Strategic Financial Choices in chosen asset/revenue structures 
The nature of strategic financial choices facing a university are different from those of a 
standard corporate firm in two important ways. First the endowment is an important financial 
structure that although similar to the financial reserves of a firm has significantly different 
characteristics. In many ways it captures the financial and academic autonomy of this 
institution but it also reflects some of its predilections as often underlined by Resource 
Dependence, Optimal Contracting and Stakeholder (Flowes, 2014; Toutkoushian, 2001; 
Taylor, 2013a; Parker, 2013, 2012; Fosto & Nkote, 2007; Ferry & Eckersley, 2011; Brown et 
al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2017; Kim, 2008). The sample evidence shows a wide variation in the 
way universities choose or maintain the balance in Endowments within their asset structures. 
For the first time then in extant university governance studies endowment to total assets ratio 
(ENDWTA) is studied here and reflects an important missing dimension. Second Resource 
Dependence, Quality Assurance, Public Accountability, Legitimacy and Optimal Contracting 
predict that the sources from which the university earns its important income streams will have 
key governance based trade-offs (Pfeffer, 1978; Stensaker, 2018; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 
2014; Hoecht, 2006; Brown, 2004; Ferry & Eckersley, 2011). Tuition Fees and Research 
Grants are the two main streams of revenue for a UK university. By findings detailed evidence 
for heterogeneity in tuition fee fraction (TFEE) in this UK sample the thesis proves how 
universities are indeed cognisant of the difficulties they face in relying too heavily on either 
tuition paying students or research grant donors. It also suggests another important difference 
from the corporate firm that does not face such a trade-off. Once again for the first time here is 
proof that TFEE is indeed a missing strategic governance choice in the university sector. 
 
Apart from these two variables the usual set of financial variables with governance implications 
i.e.  leverage (DTA), fixed asset proportion (FTA) and Cash ratio (CTA) are also shown to 
exhibit rich differences and thus the thesis answers normative/theoretical calls (UK 
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Universities, 2015; Washburn, 2008; Carrington et al., 2018) for consideration of all financial 
aspects of governance in their totality.   
 
Standard Board and related measures 
The usual internal governance measures of a university extensively studied in earlier research 
i.e. Board composition and Audit related are combined in unique ways by this thesis (Ntim et 
al., 2017; Olson, 2000; Harris, 2014; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015). 
Board compositions in terms of size (BSIZE) and diversities (BGDIV, BEDIV), board meeting 
frequencies (BMFS) and board independence (IGOV) display rich heterogeneity in line with 
theoretical and empirical predictions. Similarly, a range of auditory governance measure such 
as the presence of a unique governance committee (GCOM) and conduct of BIG-4 audit 
(BIG4A) remain importantly influential in the sample data. Some hitherto less used governance 
measure also show significant patterns here such as Vice Chancellor Pay (VCPAY), Executive 
Team Meeting Frequency (ETFS) and Audit Committee Size (ADSIZE). 
 
7.3 UK university Research Performance and its Governance antecedents 
 
A highly complex and nuanced picture of University Research Performance emerges from the 
univariate bivariate and multivariate analyses conducted on this UK HEI sample in the previous 
chapters 5 and 6. This section coalesces, qualitatively, the findings drawn from the three 
different advanced Research performance models in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.1, pg. 246-284). 
The intention is to fit together and weave the many complexities that obviously emerge here 
and thus present a comprehensive yet detailed picture of the governance antecedents of UK 
University Research Performance.  
 
The following section divides into three main sub-sections. 7.3.1. discusses the multiple 
dimensions of university research performance in UK HEI as evidenced in the sample. In sub-
section 7.3.2 summary insights are extracted from the uni/bi/multi variate analyses about how 
university research performance associates the missing dimensions of university governance 
(Entry Standards, Student Staff Ratio, Research/Teaching/ Gender Modalities in Staff 
Contractual Diveristies, Padagogical Orientations in Student Body Diversities and Strategic 
Financial Choices in Asset/ Revenue Structures). The Final sub-section 7.3.3 discusses similar 
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summary insights about how university research performance associates with the usual board 
and audit related governance measures.  
 
7.3.1 Multiple Dimensions of University Research Performance 
 
University Research Performance is multi-dimensional. It can be measured assessed and 
evaluated in different ways by students, researchers, governors, regulators and the general 
publics (Chapter 2, pg. 44-55; Chapter 5, pg. 222-238; Chapter 6, pg. 243-247; 285-287; 311). 
It is this multi-dimensionality that makes it so difficult to measure as suggested by empirical 
scholars (Jongbloed et al., 2018; Asif & Searcy, 2013; Palomares-Montero & Garcia-Aracil, 
2011). Hence, there is a need to coalesce the various interpretation in Chapter 5 and 6 about 
university research performance to fully understand them. Singularly in extant UK HEI 
empirical literatures this thesis uses three distinct measures of university research performance. 
Research Performance Index (RPI) is a composite indicator combining and weighting scores 
from five separate variables (RQ, RGF, GHONR, GPRO, CR) as per a factor analysis in 
Chapter 5. Of these 5 variables, two viz. RQ and RGF are separately associated in the 
multivariate regression on their own due to their important independent angles on the research 
performance of the university. RQ i.e. Research Quality is after all an independent assessment 
of the published work of the institution derived from the RAE exercise of HEFC (Higher 
Education Funding Council) while RGF i.e. Research Grant Fraction is the fraction of total 
income that a given university earns from its research grants. From this at least three 
dimensions of university research performance are neatly captured. First and foremost, the 
index construction of RPI in Chapter 5 balances out different perspectives on research 
performance emerging from a range of different university stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Mitchell et al., 1997Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014; Wise et al., 2020). Since the index 
combines 5 variables each measuring a different angle of research performance and the factor 
analysis weights these based on a rational assessment of each it represents a synthesis of all 
types here. Second, the legitimacy and quality assurance contentions about research quality 
(RQ) being a vital indicator to the community at large about a university’s academic orientation 
and achievements is richly captured (Stensaker, 2018; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Filippakou & 
Tapper, 2008; Nuninger, 2016). Finally, resource dependence, optimal contracting and 
managerial power  are fully reflected in the RGF results which examine research performance 
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as a function of its marketability to fund providers (Bebchuck et al., 2002; Deem et al., 2007; 
Pfeffer & Salancilk, 2003; Fowles, 2014).  
 
The results and their rich interpretations in Chapter 6 clearly show how multiple dimensions 
of university research performance exist simultaneously and pose serious challenges to the 
universities, regulators and policy makers. RPI, RQ and RGF prioritizes a very different set of 
internal governances in models 1, 2 and 3 and weights them in different ways to reflect the 
many conflicting concerns embedded in university research performance. Three notable 
differences between these research performance GLS FE models interpreted in Chapter 6  
highlights this. First, RPI and RQ differently account for Entry Standards, the new missing 
dimensions uncovered by this thesis. Importantly RPI suggests a strong significant positive 
association while RQ demonstrates a less significant mixed association. Thus, one dimension 
of university research performance i.e. RPI suggests no redeeming characteristics in this UK 
sample. Only universities that posit high entry standards achieve high RPI confirming 
predictions of optimal contracting, resource dependence and stakeholder theories. But the other 
dimensions i.e. RQ suggests that there might be universities that are more inclusive and yet 
achieve high quality published research. This gives some credence to arguments from public 
accountability and legitimacy.  
 
Second, in a similar vein of the three research models RPI and RQ documents a strong 
significant negative association with FSF i.e. staff level gender diversity. This is corroborative 
evidence that university research whether it be measured in a holistic index or in the published 
research output of the institution does not benefit from larger numbers of females on the 
faculty. By contrast the RGF model displays an insignificant association. Research 
performance of a university as assessed by an external grant provider seems to be uninfluenced 
by the gender balance in the staff. This redeems university research grant providers who seem 
to go purely on the merit of the proposal in front of them rather than the gender balance of the 
institution proposing it. Thus one set of research performance variables i.e. RPI and RQ do not 
support theoretical arguments for beneficial impacts from staff level gender diversity (Metcalf 
et al., 2005; Pfeffer, 1978; Verbruggen et al., 2011) while RGF at least is neutral on this 
question (Blake & La Valle, 2000; Santos & Van Phu, 2019).  
 
Finally, ENDWTA (the proportion of a university’s endowments) shows a rich differentiation 
between the RQ and the RGF models. RQ model displays a strong significant negative 
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association suggesting that rich endowments make university reseach complacent as argued    
in (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2015; Butt, 2019) . But the RGF model strikingly 
finds a positive yet insignificant association documenting how reseach grant providers are 
uninfluenced by the corporare and endowment fund clout of research proposing universities. 
This is much in line with HEFCE (2012) & OFS (2018b, c). Thus, a fuller multi-dimensional 
picture of research performance in UK HEI emerges from the three separate research models 
of RPI, RQ and RGF. 
 
7.3.2 University Research Performance in the missing dimensions of governance 
 
In the multivariate interpretation of Chapter 6 the uniquely identified missing dimesnsions of 
university governance richly explain significant nuances of the three different research 
performances RPI, RQ and RGF in this UK sample. In what follows summary insights about 
these governances are brought together to explain the macro challenges that face a university 
that wishes to improve its research performance. 
 
The two research performance models (RPI and RQ) with Entry Standrds highlight the 
enormity/complexity of the challenge faced by universities in calibrating this missing 
dimension. At the very oiutset it must be stressed that my result that high ES leads to high 
research performance is supported by large numbers of empirical studies notably Ayoubi & 
Massoud (2012), Bolivar (2015), Johnes & Soo (2013), and Bachan (2017).  
 
Although the result implies that setting higher entry standards is an easy way of improving 
university research performance, by the same logic on the other side reducing such standards 
also leads to lower performance. Therefore, it does seem to highlight acutely the conundrum 
facing universities who wish to maintain high research performance without restricting studemt 
access to the best and the brightest. Public accountability and policy scholars do often (Boliver, 
2013; 2011; Jerrim & Vognoles, 2015; Whitehead et al., 2006; Zimdars et al., 2009; Hutchings 
& Archer, 2001; Mangan et al., 2010a, b; Zimdars, 2010; 2016; Adnett et al., 2011; Callender 
& Scott, 2013, pg. 74-79) raise the bogey of exclusivity and elitistism of the UK HEI and the 
result seems to explain why top universities stick to high unflinching entry standards. From a 
legitimacy angle (Avnett, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013; Freeman, 2016; Suchman, 1995; Harrison, 
2014) it is apparent why top performing universities may be choosing high entry standards. 
After all the result seems to imply that this is the easiest and most pragmatic way to improve 
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research performance and reputation. Yet the result seems to amplify concerns that faced with 
such an easy high ES high research performance association the UK university will surely 
struggle to balance the nexus here with its moral obligations to the wider student population 
that too seeks academic improvement and transformation. Scholars in a different context like 
Ntim et al. (2017) have already underlined these moral versus pragmatic legitimacy concerns 
in the UK HEI. Further, from a HEI sectoral perspective it does seem that if all high research 
performers in the sample choose the best and brightest students then the other institutions are 
left facing an adverse selection problem of necessarily dumbing down to fill student places. 
Clearly this is unhealthy for the optimal contracting (Furedi, 2004; Bright, 2004; Anyanwu, 
2004; De Fraja & Lossa, 2002; Edmans & gabaix, 2009) of higher education as a whole in any 
society. 
 
At another level it does seem that across the sample years higher ES has always meant higher 
research performance lending credence to Quality Assurance arguments (Sawir, 2013; Brown 
& Carasso, 2013, pg. 144-163; Brown, 2004; 2009; 2013; Attwood, 2008b; Yorke, 2009a, b; 
Allen, 2011; Jack, 2008; Callender & Scott, 2013; Murdoch, 2011; Henard & Mitterle, 2010; 
Hoecht, 2006; Filippakou & Tapper, 2008; Salter & tapper, 2008; Vidovich, 2002) that 
universities as unique knowledge institutions must resist the tendency to dumb down academic 
standards. 
 
Reading the result in this way suggests some key insights. Elite research performers in the UK, 
do not have any incentive to lower entry standards. Yet UK HEI as a whole might be benefited 
when these top performing institutions become slightly more accommodative in their student 
entry criteria (Harley, 2002; Jones & Thomas, 2005; Chowdry et al., 2013). This will help 
spread the intellectual talent of the incoming cohort across all universities in UK rather than 
being completely absorbed by just the top institutions. It will also help the lower and middle 
level institutions to benefit from the meritorious students entering their portals and raising the 
levels of intellectual debate within them. Perhaps this is why Gorard et al. (2009), Jerrim & 
Vignoles (2015), Boliver (2013), Zimdars et al. (2009), Harris (2010), Glennerster (2001), 
Harrison (2011) and Chowdry et al. (2013) repeatedly raise concerns of growing elitism in UK 
HEI and call for a more egalitarian fair access for students at all universities. On the whole the 
selectivity in entry standards of a UK university stands revealed as a multi-edged and 
challenging governance decision that requires a unique individually rooted and carefully 
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calibrated solution if the institution wishes to improve its research performance and all 
associated externalities. 
 
The second missing dimension of Instruction intensity in Student Staff ratio displays a 
largely ambiguous pattern of associations with research performance.. This is unsurprising and 
in line with a large empirical scholarship referred to in Chapter 3 that find this variable difficult 
to model, interpret or fathom (Edmonson & Mulder, 1924; Johnson, 2010; Kennedy & 
Siegfried, 1979; Zietz & Cochran, 1977; Lopus & Maxwell, 1995). At the outset it should be 
noted that SSR in this thesis is defined in terms of all students at the university i.e. taught and 
research students. To an extent this might explain some part of the ambiguity here. After all 
the burden of taught students might interfere with the research productivity of academics while 
research students may actually aid the idea generation/idea refinement process of research. 
 
But the true meaning of the result could also lie in other directions. A mixed pattern of 
association here could be flagging the difficulty of SSR calibration already highlighted in the 
theoretical and normative governance literatures. After all, a host of culture/quality assurance 
and argumentative university governance scholars including Filippakou & Tapper (2008), 
Brown (2004, 2013), Cremonini et al. (2015), Pollitt (1990), Trowler (2008), Shattock (2013), 
Taylor, (2013a,b), Knight (2002), Trakman (2008), Collini (2012), Collis (2004), Parker 
(2011), Melville-Ross (2010), Hordern (2013)  and Bradley et al. (2008) strongly advocate that 
lower SSRs should enable idea generation and refinement through higher levels of debate and 
interaction both in the classroom and in the research lab. Lower SSRs should therefore improve 
a university’s research function. But on the other hand, Optimal contracting and resource 
dependence theorists (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012; Pfeffer, 
1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) emphasize the importance of right sizing staff resources to 
ensure the university is achieving value for money in its human resource function. Elsewhere, 
Stakeholder perspectives (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; McDonald, 2013; 
Hagenauer & Volet, 2014; Koenig et al., 2015) detail the likely conflicts between staff work 
life balance concerns, student/parent academic quality requirements and the university’s need 
to balance its budgets. A likely triangular trade-off here is often expressed in these stakeholder 
conflicts and the theory suggests that these need careful mitigation by the university. It is these 
opposing and complex theoretical predictions and the trade-offs they highlight that seem to be 
at work in these ambiguous results.   
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With neither a neat positive or neat negative impact university governors face the challenge of 
whether to improve student body coverage i.e. increase SSR and take on the negative of 
academic burdens and work-life imbalances or do the opposite. While idea generation and 
refinement that constitute research might benefit from greater interaction among faculty and 
research students as argued by cultural governance theory such interaction is not essential. The 
sample seems to be pointing more towards optimality in this governance dimension i.e. neither 
too high nor too low SSRs are good for university research performance. At a separate level 
the ambigious pattern may be a strong reflection of deeply entrenched teaching and learning 
regimes (TLRs) in each UK HE Institution (Trowler & Cooper, 2002; Trowler, 2019). In the 
ideational dynamics of research project development there may be deeply held learning beliefs 
both among research students and their supervisors.  
 
Nevertheless, between these two missing dimensions and their impacts on university research 
performance there seems to be a curious pattern that is richly insightful. There is an 
endogeneity in the first dimension of ES that is robustly substantiated across my sample (see 
Appendix 6). When this is controlled for hrough instrumentation the impact of SSR on research 
becomes positive and significant. Reading these results jointly there seems to be at least some 
evidence of a combined and calculated impact. In short once universities choose a high ES they 
obtain the brightest and best and now any SSR increase would improve research performance. 
Thus, exclusive and selective institutions may be able to afford an increase in SSRs because 
they have already applied high entry standards, and their research performance would not drop 
due to the presence of these high achiever self-starter student/researcher (Wyness, 2017; De 
Fraja & Iossa, 2002; Harrison, 2004). Similarly, at the other end of the spectrum universities 
choosing a low ES might not be able to improve their research performance despite lowering 
their SSRs due to the poor creative abilities of the incoming research class. To sum up, the 
endogeneity based sensitivities confirms that the two missing dimensions of university 
governance i.e. ES and SSR have a combined calculus of impacts on university research 
performance and this is another significant part of the challenge here.  
 
The third missing dimension of university governance is research/teaching/gender 
modalities in staff contract diversity. Before presenting the key rich insight that emerge 
within the five different staff contract choices here it is important to reflect on why jointly they 
represent a fundamental rethink of university governance performance relationships. One of 
the main narrative threads drawn across theory, practice, and hypothesis development (Chapter 
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2, pg. 59-90; Chapter 3, pg. 111-113) in this thesis is that research, teaching and gender are 
intertwined and enmeshed within university governance. Staff level contractual structures and 
their diversities are one unique way to unpack the knots here. The sample results in their rich 
complexities and patterns clearly shed enormous light on why university research performance 
is so heterogenous across this UK HEI sample.  
 
First and foremost, the results seem to point towards a tenure track contract TRST that either 
does not influence research performance (RPI) or influences it negatively (RGF). This is not 
entirely unexpected from a theoretical stand point. After all an over burdened faculty doing 
both research and teaching would face severe motivational and morale issues (Tight, 2010; 
Locke, 2016, 2012; Bryson, 2004; MacFarlane, 2011). This is what optimal contracting (Byrd 
et al., 2010; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Custodio et al., 2013; Gabaix & Landier, 2008; 
Cordeiro et al., 2016) and stakeholder theories (Roberts, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997 and Nelson 
et al., 2003; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014) would imply. At another level the likelihood of 
research teaching combinations deteriorating either function is a central concern of academic 
culture and quality assurance scholars (Eurydice, 2010, pg. 24; Ehrenberg & Zhang, 2006; 
Mouwen, 2000; Filippakou & Tapper, 2008; Salter & tapper, 2008; Brown, 2004). Faced with 
doing too much in a TRST contract it is very likely that staff will be forced to compromise in 
key aspects of their work such as applying effectively for research grants. This may be what is 
seen in the negative impact on RGF in my results.   
 
These theoretical problems with the TRST contract and its likely negative research 
performance link have also been identified in a range of normative, policy related and 
argumentative scholarship in university governance earlier.  For example (Ackers & Oliver, 
2007; Locke et al., 2016; Metcalf et al., 2005; Dearlove, 2002; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; 
Parker. 2011; Bryson & Barnes, 2000a, b; McNay, 2005, 2009) highlight how this contract 
although ubiquitous in UK HEI has huge workload work-life balance and motivational issues 
embedded within it. These authors argue that staff faced with rising academic workloads might 
take the easy way out and just satisfice to remain in the job rather than go the extra mile to 
achieve in each of theit myriad academic tasks. My results especially in the RGF substantiate 
such contentions and so there seems to be evidence for a need to remodel/redraft this contract 
to suit the needs of a rapidly changing and evolving UK HEI sector (Kim, 2008; Shattock, 
2008; Middlehurst, 2004; Brown, 2015).  
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Second my results highlight a negative association between the single function TONLY 
contract and Research performance (RGF). Once again such an association seems to fall in line 
with resource dependence arguments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Pfeffer, 1987Locke & 
Bennion, 2011; Jenkins, 1995; Oancea et al., 2010; Adams et al., 2005) that an institution 
highly dependent on staff who lack research skills will obviously drop in research performance. 
These staff are not required to even participate in research projects and so the university will 
be able to apply only for a much lower number of research grants anyway. It also lends 
credence to the instrumental stakeholder angle (Harley, 2002; Oxford, 2008; Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 2005; Skelton, 2012). After all research fund granters in their instrumental 
perspectives will surely be concerned if a university employs too many TONLY staff. How 
much such an institution will emphasize the performance of research obligations is surely 
questionable. The negative association in my result also seems worryingly in line with the 
concerns of many student stakeholders (Neves & Hillman, 2016; Healey, 2005; Blackmore, 
2016) that they feel cheated-out of a quality academic instruction when taught by instructors 
who lack active research credentials.  
 
These questions seem to reflect voices in the empirical and policy based literatures (Vajoczki 
et al., 2011; Oxford, 2008; Blackmore, 2016; Locke & Bennion, 2011; Nyampfene, 2018; 
Harley, 2002)  where the added question of UK universities recently switching to this TONLY 
contract as a response to budget constraints and rising academic workloads is highlighted. 
Elsewhere the fact that academics themselves consider this contract to be academically 
untenable is the theme stressed by Dyer et al. (2017), Oxford (2008), Brew et al. (2017), and 
Peters & Turner (2014, pg. 227). My result seems to thus validate these empirical and policy-
based concerns too. Finally, the TONLY contract is one of the many part-time fixed term 
contracts offered to junior members of the academic community and in many ways represents 
a starting point of the academic journey (Locke, 2014, 2016; UCU, 2014) . So, at one level this 
could reflect why my result shows their impact on research performance to be negative. These 
new inexperienced academics naturally are unable to contribute in any meaningful way to 
research. 
 
Third, this brings us to the rather robust sample result that higher levels of part-time staff 
negatively impact research. Given the growing trends in UK HEI favouring higher student 
population coverage, reduced Government support, and continued expectations of full 
academic contributions of the university it is but natural that there has been a growing trend 
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towards employing more adhoc staffing (Molesworth et al., 2009; Brown, 2015; taylor, 2006; 
Lowrie & Hamsley-Brown, 2013). But these staff do not really have the motivations to 
contribute to research grant proposals or publications. So, it is not surprising that my results 
here are invariably negative. Yet in theory such ad-hoc academic staffing is not entirely without 
potential positive benefits. Optimal Contracting and Resource Dependence(Williamson. 2000; 
2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003; Marginson, 2006) stress how in the search for value for money universities might derive 
some benefit out of choosing ad hoc staff wisely. But my result does not support such an 
argument in university research performance. Instead it is the culture and quality assurance 
(Brown, 2004, 2013; Rowley, 1996; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Eurydice, 2010, pg. 24; Attwood, 
2008b; Yorke, 2009a Cremonini et al., 2015; Palfreyman, 2010) contention of the likely 
deterioration in academic quality due to part-time staff that seems robustly substantiated here.   
 
UK HEI statistics reveal some disconcerting facts that seem to explain why UK universities 
have been employing so many part-time staff over the past decades. After all student 
populations have nearly doubled while staff levels have more or less stagnated (Rosen, 2003, 
pg. 82; Bryson, 2004; Burgess et al., 2006). In the face of this universities have been left with 
no alternative except to use ad-hoc staffing arrangements to make do despite the dangers of 
deteriorating research quality and performance. Earlier scholarly work in university 
governance has also largely confirmed the highly demotivating nature of the part-time contract 
especially with regards to research performance. Thewlis (2003) reveals how the insecurities 
in this contract make researchers fearful for their future and do not allow them to focus on the 
job at hand. My negative result could be interpreted as the direct outcome of such insecurities 
and fears. Elsewhere Ackers & Oliver’s (2007) suggestion that part time staff continue to be 
treated as marginal second-class academic citizens or Purcell et al. (1999) and Allen-
Collinson’s (2004) finding that such staff are isolated from academic community and face 
lower access to vital knowledge resources such as libraries or IT networks must surely be seen 
as one of the many reasons why they are unable to effectively contribute to the research 
function. Qualitative surveys of academics conducted in other strands of literature (Bryson & 
Blackwell, 2006; Allen-Collinson, 2004) too seem to substantiate this academic isolation and 
lower research productivity linkage. 
 
The gender balance question with university staff is tehe final narrative thread in this missing 
diemsnions. Two insights here need careful elaboration as there is significant ambiguity across 
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the sample. First, research performance as whole as well as the quality of published outputs of 
the university is largely adversely affected by higher levels of female staff. This contradicts 
many theoretical expectations. It does seem that universities do not derive any extra legitimacy 
from the presence of more female staff in their faculty (Dowling & Pfeffer; Kesner, 1988; 
Suchman, 1995; Hillman et al., 2002; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Such 
universities do not seem to acquire a gendered research reputation or ambience that helps either 
the quality of their research output or overall research performance. Similarly, my results seem 
to reject the idea that more female staff diversify the talent pool and thus help research 
functionality (Pfeffer, 1987; Verbruggen et al., 2011). There is also no evidence in my result 
that becoming more public spirited (Coy et al., 2001; Deem & Baird, 2019; Shore & Wright, 
2004, UCU, 2012a; Sagaria, 2007) by employing more females directly benefit the research 
performance of a university.  
 
Yet all these theoretical rejections ought not to be interpreted in this straightforward manner. 
It is highly likely that lurking beneath this superficial pattern of negative association are a 
whole host of factors often voiced in many strands of the university governance literatures.    
 
After all a large part empirical, normative and anecdotal literature confirms the existence of a 
deep unconscious negative bias against women in university research. Surely decades of 
underrepresentation and unconscious bias oft referred in the literature (Blake & La Valle, 2000; 
Santos & Van Phu, 2019; Carter et al., 1999; Metcalf et al., 2005; Thorton, 2013; Helmer et 
al., 2017; Court et al., 1996, pg. 25; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Botella et al., 2019) are at work 
behind the scenes here. Women face a steeper threshold than their male counterparts in the idea 
generation and refinement process that underlies all research publications (O’Brien & Hapgod, 
2012; Abramo et al., 2009; Helmer et al., 2017; Blau & De Varo, 2007; Davies et al., 2020). 
This is due to years of institutional neglect where their skill gaps have not been readily 
addressed in university research labs. The argument that they must catch up with their male 
peers without any additional training inputs is unfair. After all their male peers have never 
faced a similar hostile research environment for so many decades. One has to thus place this 
negative association in this sample in this context.  
 
At another level there is a plethora of evidence that females are underrepresented in academia 
compared with women in the labour force (Metcalf et al., 2005; Dearden et al., 2003). In the 
past two decades a number of studies (Blake & La Valle, 2000; Santos & Van Phu, 2019; Carter 
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et al., 1999; Metcalf et al., 2005) have highlighted the obstacles women face in trying to gain 
access to the highest and most prestigious academic often research based positions. Even the 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2002) identified factors which might 
result in women being under-represented in such positions and instead be recruited on fixed-
term impermanent non-research contracts. The house infact found evidence for direct 
discrimination in recruitment to permanent posts, difficulties of return after maternity leave or 
a career break, less control over job mobility, leading to less choice over job scope. Similar 
evidence is marshalled by Dyer (2017) and Angerval et al. (2015) who show how female staff 
are disproportionately employed on TONLY or part-time contracts. Such findings lend 
credence to the argument that the negative impact of female staff levels on research 
performance or published research output could actually have more to do with these systematic 
discriminatory tendencies in UK higher education precluding them from actually contributing 
here. 
 
This is exactly what my sample evidence seems to suggest. On the surface there seem to be 
reasonable levels of female representation in staff contracts (see Chapter 5.2, table 4). But when 
one examines the nature and scope of these contracts one has to admit that research intensive 
roles are few and far between. Most of female staff employed are on either part-time or 
teaching-only positions (Barrett et al., 2011; O’Brien & Hapgood, 2012; Thorton, 2013). This 
is perhaps why the UCU and other regulatory bodies have been repeatedly calling for greater 
gender-based representation in research functions at universities (HEFCE, 2015; UCU, 2012a, 
b; 2011; Yarrow & Davies, 2018; Davies et al., 2019). 
 
Mention should be made here of the RGF result that adds a different angle to the meaning of 
the results. The insignificant association with FSF in this measure of university research 
performance unlike RQ and RPI on the surface seems odd. But although the result implies that 
UK research granters do not discriminate on the basis of gender compositions and decide purely 
on the merits of the research grant proposal in front of them it may actually be hiding some 
complexities. This is empirically substantiated by the two largest empirical studies from the 
UK (Blake & La Valle, 2000; Santos & Van Phu, 2019) that focus on grant applications. Both 
find that although men and women had almost equal success rates for grant applications, 
proposals from the former constituted a larger proportion of the successful ones than the latter 
because women were less likely than men to apply. This seems to suggest like my result that 
research fund granting in the UK is largely gender neutral but female research proposal makers 
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still face the psychological challenge of applying for grants within a system that they feel 
discriminates against them. This is why they do not apply and so are generally under 
represented in successful research grants. Elsewhere a study by (Bornmann et al., 2007) shows 
that, even if women and men were generally equally successful at all career stages, still men 
with previous experience would obtain higher application and funding rates than women at 
similar career points. The studies conclude that there are unconscious biases in operation 
especially in grant review or selection. This echoes with findings that men with enhanced social 
networks tend to receive more favourable treatment from reviewers who are part of their 
network. (Pohlhaus et al., 2011; Perna, 2005; Mason et al., 2013). The RGF result must thus 
actually be read jointly with the negative associations in the RPI and RQ results and their 
clearly negative associations to obtain the complete overall picture. The sample results seem 
to jointly suggest that female staff although capable may be prevented from truly contributing 
due to systematic deficiencies in the environment surrounding research grant processes.   
 
On the whole then the gender staff level diversity result suggests that women themselves may 
not be at fault for their lower research performance. If anything, the true reason might lie in the 
fact that they have faced several decades of hostile university research enviroments with little 
training/skill inputs (Fletcher et al., 2007; David, 2017). This fits with the picture of a sector 
where most university female staff are on short duration teaching only contracts with no 
research function implication (Thorton, 2013; Barrett et al., 2011; O’Brien & Hapgood, 2012; 
Marchant & Wallace, 2013). It must be inferred that this is why such staff therefore have a 
negative impact on research performance and are unable to contribute to research fund 
acquisition. HEI regulators would be well advised to focus attention on the processes of 
training and inputs for effective research and developing best practice guidelines here. 
Universities and their research labs must be encouraged to develop effective training protocols 
aimed to improve the skill sets of female researchers. Therefore, in totality the gender balance 
in academic staff emerges as an important and tricky internal governance challenge for UK 
universities. 
 
In totality, staff contracts and their diversities add further to the enormity of the challenge 
facing university governance(Knight et al., 2007; Metcalf et al., 2005; Bryson & Blackwell, 
2006; Burgess & Connell, 2006). When deciding the staff levels in the different contracts a 
university faces several trade-offs. For example, when reducing levels of tenure track staff 
driven by cost cutting considerations a university may be forced to use teaching-only or 
 349 
research-only single function fixed duration contracts. But these came at the expense of 
research quality and this is evident in the sample. Similarly, when faced with the challenge of 
filling up gender places in the university women may be seen as the most appropriate to employ 
as part-time and short duration teaching only staff. But once again this implies a loss of their 
potentially rich gender-based contribution to research which although not directly visible might 
be huge. Echoes of these arguments are seen in the sample evidence especially when read 
jointly and must not be gainsaid. All in all, then it is obvious that academic staff contracts in 
the UK HEI are at the crossroads and in need of drastic overhaul to meet the growing demands 
of a burgeoning sector.  
 
The fourth missing dimension of pedagogical orientations in student body diveristies 
displays another set of keen patterns and inter-linked governance process-based trade-offs in 
university research in UK. The INTS-RPI negative association underlines how academic 
workloads associated with international students might be detracting the university from its 
research performance as predicted by Optimal Contracting and Resource Dependence (Soo & 
Elliot, 2010; Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Fowles, 2014; Bolsmann & Miller, 2008; 
Williamson 2000, 2005). In fact, many strands in the empirical and policy-based literatures 
(Hartnett et al., 2004; Niles, 1995; Barron, 2006; sawir, 2013; De Vita & Case, 2003) suggest 
that universities face large academic workloads especially with regard to helping international 
students transition to UK teaching-learning regimes. These authors also provide evidence to 
show how international students often disproportionately occupy interaction times in the 
research facilities. Arguably this is what is being seen in my negative research performance 
impact. Elsewhere, authors (Volet & Ang, 1998; Pittway et al., 1998; Lebcir et al., 2008; 
Rienties et al., 2013) find evidence for lack of academic cohesion in the laboratories especially 
due to the increasing presence of international fee-paying students. At another level my result 
also supports the culture and Quality Assurance (Anyanwu, 2004; Jones & Soo; Freeman 2015; 
Brown, 2004) contention that international students might force a dumbing down of academic 
standards both in the classroom and in the research lab. This is echoed by (Trice, 2003; 
Delaney, 2002; Barron, 2006; Bright, 2004, Furedi, 2004) who document how domestic 
students are often resentful of this decline in academic standards and suggest that it contributes 
to their own lower research productivity.   
 
Yet there are contrarian evidences in other empirical work. For For example, (Sawir, 2013; 
Morrison et al., 2005; Wright & Cochrane, 2005) find that international students bring new 
 350 
ideas in to both research and teaching in the classroom thus enriching the academic 
environment of the UK university. Similarly Wilcox et al. (2005),  Pitttway et al. (1998), Volet 
& Ang (1998, pg. 21) and Spencer-Rodgers & McGovern (2002) underline how there are 
positive network externalities associated with growing numbers of international students. Both 
staff and students find many benefits out of the rich diversities in knowledge and experience 
shared in international classrooms and research labs. Obviously, my results do not provide 
support to these strands of earlier empirical work.   
 
My negative result also seems to fly in the face of UK policy scholar exhortations (Hillman, 
2014; Li et al., 2010; Bolsmann & Miller, 2008) that international students are no longer just 
an option for universities but actually a mandatory strategy. There have been growing debates 
about the revenue generating model of UK HEI and its fixation on attracting international fee-
paying students in political and economic discourse (Li et al., 2010; Iannelli & Haung, 2014; 
OECD, 2004). So on the one hand, while the entire system of higher education in the country 
seems focused around increasing the numbers of international students my evidence seems to 
highlight the academic problems associated with such an approach.  
 
On the other hand, postgraduate student places show a finer and subtler impact on UK 
university research. From a culture/quality assurance and legitimacy perspective (Cremonini 
et al., 2015; Stensaker, 2018; Brown, 2004, 2009; Kim, 2008; Trowler, 2008; Alvesson, 2012;  
Filippakou & Tapper, 2008) higher postgraduate students as predicted by theory lead to a richer 
academic ambiance that directly improves research quality at the institutions in my result. 
Empirical scholarship largely concurs with this positive impact of postgraduate intensities on 
university research performance. Angell et al. (2008), Priporas & Kamenidou (2011) and 
Stanton et al. (2009) find evidence that both students and staff at institutions with high numbers 
of postgraduate places benefit from the keener academic environment in such institutions and 
are thus able to both learn and research better. Balmer & Liao (2007) suggest that students 
gravitate towards universities with larger post graduate places as they believe that they will 
benefit from the richer academic inputs and exchanges as well as the academic brand of such 
places. Elsewhere, many voices (Callen et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2001; Iannelli & Huang, 
2014) argue that students and researchers generally gain richer academic networks in 
postgraduate places than they do at their undergraduate peers. It may be these networks that 
show up in intensive and value-added research ideas that subsequently translate into the better 
published research quality seen in my result.  
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This positive impact on research quality can surely be understood in other ways. After all 
(Igraduate, 2013; Staurt et al., 2008, Donaldson & McNicholas, 2004) find evidence that 
potential postgraduate students themselves often use post graduate intensity of a university as 
short hand for academic excellence. These potentials often filter down universities based on 
this criterion and so one could argue that these higher post graduate based institutions attract 
the more serious academic candidate. After entering such universities of their choice these 
serious students are impelled to contribute richly to the academic performance of the 
institution. This is mirrored in my positive research performance impact. Perhaps this also 
explains why a large normative literature (Smith et al., 2010; Leitch, 2006; Roberts, 2002; 
House, 2010) commend postgraduate courses as the very basis of the UK HEI academic 
advantage. These scholars argue that it is these post graduate students who provide the cutting 
edge to UK university research performance. 
 
Yet my result also shows an optimality element here that substantiates an important optimal 
stakeholder prediction (Williamson, 2000, 2005; Jacbson & Andereosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; 
Mitchell et al., 1997; Freeman, 1984; Leisyte & Westerhejiden, 2014). Too many postgraduate 
places might reduce research quality in the same way as too few such places might do. The 
negative element in my result is surely providing some support to the resource dependence 
angle that too many postgraduate students impose resource burdens on the padegogical 
processes. In fact this is robustly corroborated in empirical arguments of Barnes (2007) and 
Adee (1997) who strongly opine that institutions which fall short of the extra investments 
required to support post graduates might experience a loss in university research quality. My 
result, thus, clearly underlines an optimal level of postgraduate places that each university 
would need to carefully determine. In this connection it may be useful to note how House 
(2010), Smith et al. (2010) and Donaldson & McNicholas (2004) recognize this trade-off that 
is crucial to the question of how many post graduate courses/students a UK university should 
admit. Many of the debates here highlight why this decision might have to be supported by 
adequate infrastructural investments before the university is able to reap the benefits. 
 
At a final level my optimality-based result read in synch with the above strands of empirical 
and normative literature is arguably highlighting some keen process like trade-offs that play 
out here. Universities cannot just decide on this governance aspect of  postgraduate places in 
isolation. The university’s entire strategic investment plan of the future is directly and 
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indirectly implicated within this governance decision. Educational facilities and staff resources 
will need to be effectively calibrated in consonance with this PGINT level and only this will 
help the university gain the benefits here. 
 
The above tangential and complex insights when read jointly pose yet another complex 
governance trade-off. Taking on more postgraduate and/or international students both enhances 
a university’s reputational legitimacy and also provides it with extra streams of student fee 
revenues to help bridge budgets. This explains the strong incentives that UK universities 
display in this sample for increasing either of these. But the effects of such unbridled increases 
on research performance can be mixed. The central message of the two results seems to be that 
while both types of students might need careful pruning it is international students that must 
be the focus of attrition at most UK univeisties. Yet this is easier said than done and will prove 
to be the most pressing challenge facing university governors and regulators.  
 
The final missing dimension of Strategic choices in Asset/Revenue Structures proves itself 
to be a very important and complex influence on university research performance.  
 
I begin here with Endowments and their unique role in research performance highlighted in my 
results. First here is the negative association flagged in my research quality performance model. 
Larger endowment levels seem to dampen the published research quality of a UK university. 
Although this seems to support public accountability and legitimacy concerns (Butt, 2019; 
Squire, 2014; Parker, 2012; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Scherer et al., 2013) 
with the problematic corporate and vested interests associated with endowments and rejects the 
resource independence argument (Washburn, 2008; Carrington et al., 2018) still the meaning 
of the result is not straightforward. This is reflected in the opposite sensitivities recorded even 
within my result. It also fits with the insignificant association recorded in my second university 
research performance measure.  
 
Earlier normative and empirical work here argues for a largely positive impact of this 
dimension on research activity and performance. For example (Bolivar, 2015; Ntim et al., 
2017) highlight how older established universities generally exhibit both higher endowments 
and higher research activity. Similarly Frazackerly (2013) and Rogerson (2013) underline that 
irrespective of Russell Group status high endowment universities are the ones that produce the 
best research. My result thus stands out within this context and is hard to explain. Yet at one 
 353 
level it can be argued here may be some evidence of the vested interests associated with higher 
levels of endowments. Perhaps it is this that is showing up in my result. Be that as it may one 
clear message from the result here is that UK universities face a complex challenge in 
calibrating their endowment levels. 
 
TFEE is a strategic financial choice by university governors and it is unsurprising that the 
variable in this UK sample neatly captures the complex trade-off between the two distinctive 
functions of a university namely, research and teaching.  Naturally there is no equivalent within 
the empirical corporate governance literature to compare here. But clearly within the context 
of UK higher education which is at cross-roads facing an increasing dependence on tuition fee 
due to drastic reductions in Government budgetary support and increased peer competition the 
variable and its findings are crucial here. Normative policy analysts Molesworth et al. (2012), 
Brown, R., & Carasso (2013), Rowlands (2013) and Shattock (2013) have often made the case 
that the balance independence and quality of UK university research has suffered due to this 
increasing dependence on student fees. For the first time then in this sample there seems to be 
clear proof that this is indeed the case.   
 
My results in tuition fees show that universities that depend highly on these tend to perform 
worse at research. This is to be expected especially because such universities would wish to 
work towards legitimating themselves to student resource providers and thus tend to 
353rivilege the teaching function (Neves & Hillman, 2016; Jabbar et al., 2018; Fabrice, 2009; 
Blackmore, 2016). After all it is these instrumental stakeholders who would be the focus of 
attention given the universities’ dependence on their fee contributions (Nixon et al., 2018; 
Fowles, 2014; Foskett, 2010; McGettigan, 2013). It is in this vein that Moleworth et al. (2009) 
argues that excessive TFEE dependence is a serious concern especially within the context of a 
UK HEI on the hunt for funding sources in a rapidly marketizing sector. Universities so 
dependent will naturally focus their spending and academic efforts on teaching and its 
facilitation. This will likely lead to a neglect of the knowledge creation function in research. 
This is exactly what my negative research quality result seems to be flagging up. A similar 
argument is advanced by Fowles (2014), Collini (2004) and Alderman (2010) who argue that 
excessive tuition fee dependence in a university creates incentives to spend inordinately on 
teaching facilitation and perversely reduces research spending and orientation. Perhaps this is 
why research processes and mechansims take a backsest resulting in a lowered research 
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performance. So governors of UK universities face a hard choice between increasing student 
places i.e. higher fees and likely dwindling research quality.  
The third insight here relates to Service & Facilities spend of the university. The sample 
suggests that such spending has a small yet visibly negative impact on research quality. This 
contradicts many of the expectations of Optimal Contracting, Stewardship  and Resource 
Dependence theories. For example my negative result does not support the prediction that high 
levels of educational facilities imply effective husbanding of resources and should produce 
better research (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991, pg. 82; Donaldson, 1990). Nor 
does it support the contention that higher facility spending should attract the best research 
students and faculty to join and produce the best research (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Price et 
al., 2003; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012). Empirically, earlier research has focused around 
the improvement in student academic experience and learning outcomes associated with a 
university’s higher facility spending Earthman (2002), Ganyaupfu (2013), Mushtaq and Khan 
(2012) and Kirmani & Siddiquah, (2008) Karemera et al. (2003) and Young (1999). Other 
strands of such literature have been focused around the fact that better knowledge facilities 
attract motivated students and skilled staff (Dao & Thorpe (2015), Migin et al. (2015) and 
Wiers-Jenssen et al. (2002). Normative and policy studies have recently stressed the 
importance of training benefits for higher education institutions (Gayle et al., 2003; Trakman, 
2008; Collini, 2005; Ritzer, 2002; Trowler, 2008). Yet my negative result only documents a 
small negative impact on direct research quality at a UK institution. One way of explaining this 
is by highlighting the very small impact here. Perhaps it is this and the likelihood that such 
facilities spend is more strongly linked to teaching rather than research that is the central 
message here. 
 
Finally, universities holding too much cash perform poorly in research. The insight that 
emerges here is one that is mirrored in Optimal Contracting and Stewardship theories (Davis 
et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Jensen, 1986; Clarke, 2004; Williamson, 2005, 2000; 
Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callanghan, 1996). Holding too much cash in a public institution 
like a university is a clear indication of financial constraints (Bates, Kahle & Stulz, 2007; Gao 
et al., 2013). Such cash is held for meeting routine and regular payments (Brigham et al., 2004; 
Taylor, 2013a; Parker, 2013, 2012). Research payments are discretionary and can be 
postponed. This explains why high levels of cash might signal poor research performance in 
the sample. . Earlier policy and empirical work seems to stress the indebtedness of UK 
universities and their growing dependences on private loan sharks (UK Universities, 2015; 
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Grant Thornton; 2016; HESA, 2016; 2019; Ferry & Eckersley, 2012). It is not difficult to draw 
the link between such loans and high cash levels especially because these funds are generally 
held over years and drawn down in stages related to project investments. A further logical 
inference here would be on the nature of conditionalities that private lenders might impose on 
excessive borrowings by universities. Surely university research projects, their discretionary 
payments and lack of future revenue streams would appear as red flags to these lenders. Perhaps 
this is what is showing up in the negative association in my result. It might also be the reason 
for extensive regulatory initiatives recently seen with regard to fiscal prudence optimal cash 
levels and financial sustainability in UK HEI (HEC, 2014; OFS, 2019a; CUC, 2017; Browne, 
2010; House of Commons of Public Account, 2012). 
 
In sum university research performance in these hitherto underresearched and underexplored 
missing dimensions of governanve show the true contours of the challenge facing these 
institutions. Complex trade-offs emerge in every dimension that are clearly linked to all the 
others. Universities have to forge their own unique governance path while emphasizing 
difference yet maintaining the internal balance and cohesion so important to effective research.  
 
7.3.3 University Research Performance in Board & Audit related Governance 
 
Research performance in this sample shows rich patterns of relationships with the usual Board 
and Audit related governance often studied by earlier scholars. The important similarities and 
differences with earlier findings make for at least seven insights here.  
 
First and foremost, my result of a positive and significant association of board size with 
university research performance is in line with the predictions of the four core theories. Larger 
boards bring rich resources (Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; Fowles, 2014; Pfeffer, 1987), generate 
greater legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), allow better stakeholder 
integration (Davis et al., 1997; Wise et al., 2020; Freeman et al., 2004) and foster a public 
orientated academic stance (Coy et al., 2001; Coy & Dixon, 2004) all of which lead to better 
research performance. There is no evidence in my result for the predictions of optimal 
contracting or stewardship that larger boards might become dysfunctional and thus reduce 
research performance (Saltman et al., 2000; Swansson et al., 2005; Mallin et al., 2015; 
Williamson, 2005). Empirically this positive association is largely unsupported in the corporate 
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governance literature where many scholars find a negative or even a U-shaped association 
between board size and firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Conyon & 
Peck, 1998; Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Tomasic et al., 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach; Adam & 
Mehran, 2005; Cobham & Subramaniam, 1998). By contrast in university governance 
Lokuwaduge (2011) finds no significant association between size of the board and university 
academic performance while Olson (2000) finds a positive association with endowment levels. 
Ntim et al. (2017) finds a negative and insignificant association between board size and 
university voluntary disclosure. The result has clear implications for the regulatory context in 
UK HEI. Recently there have been several prescriptive mandates from the CUC and OFS that 
board sizes would best be restricted to 25 or below (CUC, 2009; Shattock, 2004a, b, 2013, a, 
b). My results do not support such a policy stance. It does seem that UK universities across the 
years have been benefiting from a larger board which seem to have been bringing greater 
academic and experiential resources to the internal governance decisions. This is why my 
results have been unambiguously positive here. Perhaps this also explains the general 
reluctance of older established and generally higher research performing universities in my to 
reduce board sizes sample (see Appendix 1). 
 
Second board diversities generally show a negative association with research performance in 
my results but the only significant association here is with respect to ethnic diversity.  
 
Taking account of board gender diversities my insignificant result does not support either the 
positive or negative predictions within the seven theories. So there seems to be no support for 
the positive public echo of a gender rich board that contributes towards better research (Singh 
et al., 2008; Jensen, 1993; Coy et al., 2011; Neslon, 2013). Neither is there any support for 
female board members either raising the legitimacy or the resource richness by bringing diverse 
ideas, experience and business contracts thus comntributing to higher research performance 
(Pfeffer, 1987; Verbreggen et al., 2011). Similarly, there is no evidence in my sample that the 
instrumentalities associated with female stakeholders necessarily improve the institution’s 
research performance (Mitchell et al., 1997; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Liesyte & 
Westerhejiden, 2014). At the same time, one must acknowledge that the result also does not 
find any support for the optimal contracting or stewardship contentions that gender diversity 
might actually reduce cohesion in the board and thus produce lower research (Williamson, 
2000, 2005; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callanghan, 1996; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991).  
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Empirically my result does not seem to fit with corporate governance results (Erhardt et al., 
2003; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2003) that 
largely find a positive association between gender diversity and firm performance as well as 
voluntary disclosure (Ntim et al., 2017; Brako & Brown, 2008). Unfortunately, there are less 
studies in university governance on this linkage. However, the meaning of my result should be 
carefully interpreted. The insignificant association leaves room for the argument that gender 
balance may not only be the moral, public and politically correct governance stance of a public 
university but also it might still have other rich contributions to the overall functioning of the 
university which must not be gainsaid. Perhaps this is why a range of regulatory directives 
(CUC, 2009, 2014; UUK, 2011; Davies-Report, 2011; FSSG, 2011) have been stressing the 
importance of gender balance on boards. 
 
Taking account of the significant and negative association in board ethnic diversity, my result 
seems to largely support the predictions of optimal contracting and stewardship (Williamson, 
2000, 2005; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callanghan, 1996; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991) both of which argue for homogenous and cohesive boards. There is no evidence 
for the resource rich idee generating expertise, or the legitimacy raising aspects of higher levels 
of ethnic board members (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & salancik, 2003; Suchman, 1995; Stillman, 
1974; Scherer et al., 2013; Melville-Ross, 2010). Neither do my results support either the 
stakeholder predictions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Wise et al., 2020; Polonsky, 1996; 
Mitchell et al., 1997) of ethnic stakeholders improving ethnically orientated research or the 
public accountability contentions of the ethnically diverse boards raising the public profile and 
thus improving research performance (Coy et al., 2001; Kreysing, 2002; Coy & Dixon, 2004; 
Carter et al., 2003). Empirically my result is at odds with earlier corporate literature (Erhardt 
et al., 2003; Ntim, 2015) that has largely found a positive association here while the solitary 
university study by Ntim et al. (2017) documented a positive association with voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
The negative significant association in my result gives less leeway than gender diversity. There 
is no hiding from the fact that at least in my UK sample ethnically diverse university boards 
seem to have a negative impact on research. Perhaps this can be traced to the very low levels 
of ethnic representation that are evident in every year of the sample. UK university boards do 
not seem to have made any efforts to improve their ethnic fractions. At the extremely low levels 
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of ethnicity (see Chapter 5, table 6) it is extremely likely that these board members will not 
have any effective voice in the board. This is why my result shows a negative and significant 
association In fact other empirical voices in the literature like Hewitt (2020), Brammer et al. 
(2007) and Khan et al. (2019) argue how unlike gender ethnicity continues to be a sensitive 
point where universities seem less enthusiastic in implementing reform.     
 
Third my insignificant result in board independence generally seems to support the nuanced 
arguments of resource dependence and stakeholder (Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 
Fowles, 2014; Donaldson & preston, 1995) but there is no support for public accountability or 
legitimacy (Scherer et al., 2013; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Shore, 2004; Coy et al., 2001; Banks 
et al., 1997). Clearly it is in the resource richness of lay board members or their representation 
of salient stakeholders that their beneficial impact on research performance seems to originate. 
By contrast there is no evidence for the public-spirited research contributions or legitimating 
research benefits of lay menbers in my result. Neither is there any evidence for the efficacy of 
the so-called checks and balances role of these independent board members or for the fresh 
ideas and avoidance of “group-think” advanced by stewardship, managerial power and optimal 
contracting. Empirically corporate governance (Cobham & Subramaiam, 1998; Mishra & 
Nielson, 2000; Skully & Wickrammanayake, 2007) has found a predominantly positive 
association between board independence and firm performance. However, in university studies 
Lokuwaduge (2011) finds a negative association between board independence and university 
research performance. Elsewhere other scholars link board independence to better decision 
making (Pathan et al., 2007; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009) within the institutions or with 
voluntary disclosure (Ntim et al., 2017) or revenue generation (Harris, 2014) and find positive 
associations.  
 
This mixed picture of associations especially in university research lends support to my 
insignificant result. It does seem that although UK universities have been largely following 
regulatory mandates (CUC, 2009, 2014) and recruiting more than 50% lay members this has 
not been having the salutary impact on research performance that was expected. It is also 
noteworthy in this regard that Russell Group and older pre-92 institutions have been generally 
recruiting significantly lower numbers of lay board members than their peers (see Appendix 
1). On the whole then board independence is clearly less impactful as an antecedent of research 
performance. One could argue that my result is rather pointing in the direction of the quality 
and types of lay board members recruited and the skills and contributions that they bring to the 
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institution that will improve research performance. Just the fact that more lay members are 
recruited does not necessarily imply this.  
 
Fourth my results show that UK university boards that meet more frequently achieve better 
research performance. This is in consonance with the predictions of all the core theories of 
university governance. Boards that meet frequently seem to bring a zeal for monitoring and 
calibration to public purpose that helps their research performance (Vafeas, 1999; Lipton & 
Lorch, 1992; Sonnenfield, 2002). These boards also seem to follow resource dependence 
advice that frequent meetings help resource rich members to exchange ideas and thus improve 
research mechanisms and this helps research performance (Reverte, 2009; Schofield, 2009). 
My positive result also seems to echo stakeholder predictions Freeman & Reed (1983) that 
frequent meetings help universities to generate new innovative ideas that help research 
governances and consequent performance. There is also evidence here that universities 
generate greater legitimacy through these meetings that help them raise their research profile, 
image and consequently performance (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Melville 
Ross, 2010).  
 
In fact, the positive result here differentiates universities from their corporate counterparts. The 
agency and stewardship corporate argument advanced by Jensen (1993), Shivasani & Zenner 
(2004) and Vefeas (1999) that meeting more often may be counter-productive seems irrelevant 
to this unique knowledge institution. Here there is evidence that frequent board meetings 
actually allow the rich interaction of various factors and thus enable the institution to raise its 
credibility and profile with research sponsors. These frequent board meetings seem to generate 
confidence all around that the university is on top of its research agenda and this naturally 
shows up in its higher research performance.  
 
Most university empirical research such as Lokuwaduge (2011) and Lokuwaduge & Armstrong 
(2015) support my result and find a similar positive association in their Australian sample. In 
the UK Ntim et al. (2017) confirm a positive linkage of board meeting frequencies and 
university voluntary disclosure. Corporate empirical evidence is mixed with scholars like 
Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. (2014), Vefeas (1999), Christensen et al. (2015) and Hahn & Lasfer 
(2007) findings a negative association while others like Chen & Chen (2012), Hu et al. (2010) 
and Karamanou & Vefeas (2005) discovering a positive one. 
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Other theoretical arguments against frequent board meetings also do not seem to apply to 
universities. For example, remaining hands-off except in emergencies, as suggested by, a host 
of corporate governance scholars (Kohli & Saha, 2008; Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004; Bebchuk, 
Cohen & Farrell, 2009) might singularly harm the ability of the university to attract research 
sponsors. Similarly, the corporate picture of analysis paralysis and dysfunctionality often 
evoked by corporate scholars (Lipton, M & Lorsch, 1992; Lipton, 2003) in frequently meeting 
firm boards seem inapplicable to universities. The university board is primarily an academic 
body and thus seems to achieve its best results in the frequent interaction between board 
members. 
 
Fifth the institution of a special governance committee has a decided negative impact on 
university research performance in my sample. My result is clearly at odds with the public 
accountability argument of prioritization of governance through a unique governance 
committee achieving better university performance (Coy et al., 2001; Bedard & Gendorn, 
2006; Jetty & Bertie, 2012). It also does not support the resource dependence view that such a 
unique committee will help identify and correct deficiencies in internal governance through the 
resource expertise of committee members and help achieve higher performance (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006). While such a committee might show regulators that the 
university is indeed serious about its academic role but there is no evidence that this on its own 
helps it achieve higher research performance (Gibbs, 2001; Bradley et al., 2009; Osborne M & 
Bell, 2009; Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002). Finally stakeholder predictions that minority 
interests and competing concerns will get thrashed out in such special committees which will 
consequently raise academic performance is not seen in my sample (Donaldson L & Davis, 
1991; Wicks & Parmar, 2004; Donaldson T & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 2010).  
 
In fact, my negative result seems to concur with the stewardship concern that special 
committees might just turn into another layer of redtape that actually detracts from research 
performance (Marginson & Considine, 2000; Mow & Bartos, 2004). It also seems to align with 
the optimal contracting and managerial power contentions of dysfunctionality and excessive 
bureaucracy (Marginson & Considine, 2000; Mow & Bartos, 2004; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; 
Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van essen et al., 2015; Kalyta & Magnan, 2008; Byrd et al., 2010). 
 
Earlier empirical work (Datar et al., 1991; Wang et al., 2008; Ntim et al., 2012) finds some 
positive effects of oversight committees especially in corporate governance. In university work 
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Ntim et al. (2017) document that UK universities with unique governance committees 
voluntarily disclose more information. Elsewhere Lokuwaduge (2011) and Lokuwaduge & 
Armstrong (2015) find in their Australian sample that universities with larger number of 
committees perform better at research. On the whole then my negative finding here seems to 
throw open the question of the true merit of a unique governance committee.   
 
Sixth my insignificant association between university use of BIG4 audit firm and research 
performance seems to contradict the predictions of all theories of university governance. Thus 
there is no evidence of research performance gains arising out of the robust fulfilment of a 
public remit through employment of a BIG4 audit firm (Coy et al., 1997; 2001). Similarly, 
notwithstanding the agency benefits of using BIG4 audits there seems to be no evidence of a 
salutary research performance impact (Davis et al., 1997; Saltman et al., 2000; Marginson & 
Considine, 2000; Swansson, Mow & Bartos, 2004; DeAngelo, 1981a, b). While the university 
may be gaining a halo of credibility and trust and gaining access to resources due to BIG4 
audits these do not seem to translate to better research performance here (Deegan, 2004; 
Suchman, 1995; Hybels, 1995; Tilling, 2004; Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Stakeholder representation and voice may be improved due 
to the interventions of BIG4 audits but in these UK universities there is no evidence of resulting 
better research performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Freeman, 2010, 1999). Finally even 
optimal contracting and managerial power contentions of a higher level of optimality internally 
or a more effective balance of power in the institution do not seem to result iu better research 
performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; 
Williamson, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2015; Kalyta & Magnan, 2008). 
 
Empirical work in corporate literature largely finds that firms financially benefit from 
employing BIG4 audits. In university literature while Lokuwaduge (2011) does not use such a 
variable, while Ntim et al. (2017) and Gordon et al. (2002) discover a positive association but 
with university voluntary disclosure. My result thus contributes here with this finding of a 
negative impact of BIG4 audits on university research performance. Perhaps given the largely 
financial remit of such audits it is rational to find such a negative association here. 
 
Finally, my insignificant association between VC pay and university research performance is 
at odds with both the positive and negative sides of the theoretical debate. This insignificance 
seems to neither support the accountability tenets of Public Accountability or Legitimacy 
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(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Tilling, 2004; Judge et al., 2008; Donaldson & Davis, 1994; 
Kreysing, 2002; Coy et al., 2001)  nor the stewardship expectation of better chief executive 
alignment when paid appropriately (Daily et al., 2003; Christopher, 2010; Dedman, 2000) or 
the stakeholder argument of better pay leading to governance alignment with stakeholders 
(Ogden & Watson, 1999; Berman et al., 1999; Wicks, Berman & Jones, 1999; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003) or even the managerial power argument of high VC pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003; Finkelstein, 1992; Lucey et al., 2020). However, there is some proof that the result may 
be suggesting the value for money argument of resource dependence (Fowles, 2014; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003; Marginson, 2006; Morgan, 2017; Shackelton, 2017) or the right sizing of VC 
pay argument of optimal contracting.   
 
Earlier empirical work (Tarbert et al., 2008; Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Gschwandtner & 
McManus, 2018) in university governance draws a direct link between VC pay and fulfilment 
of university mission critical performances whether in research or in teaching. It is their finding 
that universities reward VCs for hitting mission critical performance objectives. Bachan & 
Reilly (2015) and Baimbridge & Simpson (1996) even documents how VCs in their sample 
get rewarded for achieving higher levels of  research grants. But my result does not corroborate 
this effect at least with published  research quality. Other strands of work here (Johnes & 
Virmani, 2019; Bosetti & walker, 2010; Walker et al., 2019; Lucey et al., 2020; Soh, 2007; 
Shackleton, 2017) document the fact that VCs are underpaid in relation to their corporate 
counterparts largely due to legitimacy concerns. Policy commentators and regulators in the UK 
have repeatedly raised the issue of high VC remuneration and its anomaly in a public institution 
such as a university (Hubble & Bolton, 2019; CUC, 2018; OFS, 2018a; Morgan, 2017; Grove, 
2018; OFS, 2019a, b; Baker, 2017; Department of Education, 2017). Yet there are voices here 
that also raise the reward-talent conundrum arguing that the best VCs might exit a sector where 
their skills are undervalued (Soh, 2007; Shackleton, 2017, 2019; Simon, 1957; Blanchflower, 
2017; Ross, 2018b, Grove, 2018b, Bennet, 2019; Richarrdson, 2017; Oxford University, 2018). 
My insignificant result must be seen in this growing fractitious context.There is perhaps a 
neutral element here i.e. universities may well be not fully considering a VCs contribution to 
university research performance while deciding his/her remuneration and this does not bode 





7.4 UK University Teaching Performace and its Governance Antecedents  
 
University Teaching Performance too emerges as a highly complex construct from the 
univariate bivariate and multivariate analyses conducted on this UK HEI sample in Chapters 5 
(pg. 230-236) and Chapter 6 (pg. 285-287). This section coalesces, qualitatively, the findings 
drawn from the two different advanced Teaching performance models in Chapter 6.2. 
However, it intersperses many of the discussions here with evidences previously highlighted 
in the univariate and bivariate stages of the overall analysis (see Chapter 5). The intention is to 
fit together and weave the many complexities that obviously emerge here and thus present a 
comprehensive yet detailed picture of the governance antecedents of UK University Teaching 
Performance.  
 
The section neatly divides into three main sub-sections. Sub section 7.4.1 discusses the multiple 
dimensions of University Teaching Performance as captured in the two different constructs of 
TPI and TGF identified in the factor analysis in Chapter 5. 7.4.2 summarises insights extracted 
from Chapter 6 about how university teaching performance associates with the missing 
dimensions of university governance. The final sub-section 7.4.3 discusses similar summary 
insights about how university teaching performance associates with the usual board and audit 
related governances.  
 
7.4.1 Multiple Dimensions of University Teaching Performance 
 
University Teaching Performnace is also multi-dimensional. It is this multi-dimensionality that 
makes it so difficult to measure as suggested by empirical scholars (Jongbloed et al., 2018; 
Pollitt, 1990; Patrick & Stanley, 1998; Nuemann& Guthrie, 2006; Asif & Searcy, 2014). 
Hence, there is a need to coalesce the various interpretation in Chapters 5 and 6 about university 
teaching performance to fully understand them. For the very first time in extant UK HEI 
empirical literatures this thesis uses two distinct measures of university teaching performance. 
While this is unlike research performance which was mapped by three constructs it still 
adequately covers the important dimensions here. Teaching Performance Index (TPI) is a 
composite indicator combining and weighting scores from four separate variables (SATIS, CR, 
GHONR, GPRO) as per a factor analysis in Chapter 5.  Graduate Prospects (GPRO), Good 
Honours (GHONR) and Completion rates (CR) reflect the university’s ability to advance 
student academic outcomes and thus reflect one dimension of teaching performance. By 
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contrast student satisfaction SATIS measured through feedback mechanisms collated from 
students by each university at the end of a course captures the perspective of the student 
consumer. This is a second dimension of teaching performance. However, students are 
uninformed consumers of the credence good of university’s teaching and so their ratings are 
questionable (Woodall et al., 2014; Nixon et al., 2016; Molesworth et al., 2009; Baldwin & 
James, 2000; Abbar et al., 2018). This is why the thesis separately measures teaching 
performance from the perspective of teaching grant providers in TGF. These providers 
arguably present a fresh independent perspective on the teaching of a university. The use of 
two significantly different performance constructs in teaching thus maps the important 
dimensions of this academic performance. 
 
The multiple dimensions of University Teaching performance are distinctly highlighted in the 
choice of these two different constructs i.e. TPI and TGF. Two notable examples suffice here 
to show some keen insights. For instance, tuition fee dependence of universities shows a 
positive relationship with TPI reflecting how universities instrumentally align their 
performances to those fee-paying stakeholders who support them. By contrast providers of 
teaching grants decrease funds to such universities on grounds of inadequate legitimacy or 
skewed teaching protocols favoring high fee payers or even a neglect of public accountability-
based student coverage and fair access. Thus, the use of two different constructs makes for a 
keen understanding of the challenging trade-offs faced by the university in teaching 
performance. Similarly, staff level gender diversity reveals its rather complex multi sided 
relationship with university teaching performance. TPI suggests that more women on the 
academic staff might not matter that much but TGF shows that fund providers feel that 
universities with higher numbers of female faculty are deserving of support. So, while some 
theoretical contentions are weakly supported there are many others like resource dependence, 
quality assurance, legitimacy and instrumental versions of stakeholders that receive robust 
support in the TGF result. Therefore, the use of these two different constructs highlights 






7.4.2 University Teaching Performance in the Missing Dimensions of University 
Governance 
 
University teaching performance positively associates with entry standards which is in line 
with earlier empirical evidence (Johnes & Soo, 2013; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Boliver, 2015; 
Bachan, 2017). Such a relationship shows why top UK universities lack incentive to lower ES. 
Faced with a difficult choice of who to admit the UK university would only be happy to admit 
the best and brightest since there is evidence that this makes easy its ability to outperform in 
teaching. This implies that the easy path for the university is to ignore its transformational role 
and simply focus on delivering academic excellence to incoming students who are already 
excellent. Empirical and normative arguments (Jerrim & Vignoles, 2015; Boliver, 2013:2015; 
Zimdars et al., 2009; Chowdry et al., 2008; 2013; Jones & Thomas, 2005) of fair access, student 
body diversity in class rooms and student academic transformations are thus put in the spotlight 
by this result. The public nature of the university and its legitimate role as an institution that 
admits students from all segments of society is now threatened (Higgins & Foster, 2009; 
Boliver, 2015; Zimdars et al.,2009; Fulton, 1988; Ayoubi & Massoud, 2012; Willetts, 2017; 
Johnes & Soo, 2013). If selecting lower academic level students will directly have such a 
negative impact on teaching performance as my result seems to suggest it is unlikely that top 
universities will do so. 
 
The result also appears to explain why some theorists see UK universities as catering 
exclusively to elite student and parent stakeholders (Willetts, 2017; Brown & Carasso, 2013; 
Marginson, 2016; Tapper, 2007; Sutton Trust, 2007b; Baker, 2008; Boliver, 2011; 2013). After 
all when teaching performance is improved only through a high entry standard then 
parents/students from privileged middle class intellectual backgrounds become highly salient 
to universities. There would be an incentive to pander to these groups and neglect other 
students/parents from underprivileged and less intellectual backgrounds. Similarly given this 
high ES high teaching association universities would surely be driven to court the vested elite 
intellectualized and resourceful elements of society as argued by (Marginson, 2018; Freeman, 
2015; Callen et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Verschuere & De Corte, 2014; Sutton Trust 
2004; 2007a; 2007b) Some of these groups are also the ones who perversely will be able to 
provide universities with donations or higher fees and bridge the funding gap. Large tracts of 
theoretical and empirical debate have often expressed concern about the elitist nature of UK 
higher education (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010, 2012; Freemam, 2015; Waller et al., 2017; 
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Schwartz, 2004; Margison, 2018; Ogga et al., 2009; Shattock, 2012) and nowhere does this 
seem more exemplified than in my result. Such a strong positive association between ES and 
teaching performance implies that top universities seem to reap performance rewards from 
teaching in silos of the best and the brightest. 
 
Yet the ES-Teaching performance positive linkage is worrying for another important reason. 
After all teaching is arguably a more transformative function than research (Blanden & Machin, 
2004; Coy et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2002; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2000). If there are no 
direct rewards to transformation, then universities will be tempted to ignore it. They will admit 
only the crème de la crème of the student population by setting high entry requirements and 
undoubtedly perform in their knowedge dissemination but will surely fail in their overall 
societal obligation. This explains why in the normative and policy related university 
governance literature (Shattock, 2013a; Ntim et al., 2017; Parry, 2013; Rowlands, 2012; 
Middlehurst, 2012; Clark et al., 2009; Waller et al., 2017) improving student skill sets by taking 
in students at lower skill levels and then transforming them to higher skill levels is set up to be 
an important university role. This is why Boliver (2013, 2015) take issue with the fact that in 
their sample studies Pre-1992 institutions have such a selective approach to student 
recruitment. In fact, even QAA, CUC, OFA, OFS and other regulatory mandates (CUC, 2009; 
OFFA, 2004, 2012; BIS, 2011b; Harris, 2010, 2011) regularly emphasize the importance of 
this. Yet UK universities do not seem to have any performance-based incentive to do this.  
 
Thus, the sample results seem to imply that UK HEI regulators cannot and must not avoid 
intervention now. A well calibrated and inclusive entry standards regime is the need of the hour 
especially within the transformational function of teaching and it is time that universities are 
guided and supported to step up to this challenge. 
 
Instruction/Interaction intensity in the student staff ratio and its strongly negative 
relationship with university teaching performance is a sample highlight. UK universities that 
keep class room interaction levels high with lower SSRs are able to demonstrate better teaching 
both in terms of student satisfactions as well as in student academic outcomes. The result does 
not seem to support Optimal contracting suggestions of achieving an optimal balance in SSR 
(Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Williamson, 2005; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012; Trowler, 
2008; Gayle et al., 2003). Low SSRs are the main way of improving teaching performance and 
there is less evidence of need for optimality. Similarly, resource dependence views (Fowles, 
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2014; Pfeffer, 1987; Shattock, 2013a, b; Parry, 2012; Rowlands, 2013) about the effectiveness 
of staff utilization to teaching performance do not seem supported in this result. Public 
imperatives of covering student populations (Coy et al., 2011; Deem & Baird, 2019; Coy  
& Dixon, 2004; Blackmore, 2016) can only lead to lower teaching performance as per this 
result. While Stakeholder perspectives (Mitchell et al., 1997; Freeman, 2010, 1999; Leisyte & 
Westerheijden, 2014; McDonald, 2013; Hagenauer & Volet, 2014; Koenig et al., 2015) detail 
the likely conflicts between staff work life balance concerns, student/parent academic quality 
requirements and the university’s need to balance its budgets and the presence of a likely 
triangular trade-off here, my result does not find any evidence of this. However, the result does 
squarely support the quality assurance contentions (Yorke, 2009a, b; Varouchas et al., 2018; 
Vidovich, 2002; Stansaker, 2018; Brown, 2004, 2009; Parker, 2011; Collini, 2012; Collis, 
2004) that to achieve higher teaching performance low SSRs are essential. 
 
But despite this clear unambiguous result there are several unresolved questions about how this 
lower SSR is to be achieved. Lowering SSRs involve universities having to face an incredibly 
hard triangular trade-off as stressed by stakeholder perspectives (Freeman, 2010, 1999; Wise 
et al., 2020; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Collini, 2005). For instance, hiring more staff or 
recruiting less students or doing a bit of both can lower SSR. But this is easier said than done 
as this would surely lead to higher salaries and/or lower student fee income or both and raising 
resource dependence concerns (Callen et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Verschuere & De 
Corte, 2014; Nagy & Robb, 2008). Further the fact that the university would recruit less 
students implies a neglect of its public-spirited student coverage mandate. This is an unenviable 
triple bind. Similarly hiring less staff and recruiting even lesser students could achieve the same 
goal but culture and quality assurance would suggest that academic work load and work life 
balance might eventually cancel any gains in teaching performance (Gayle et al., 2003; 
Alderman, 2010; Kezar & Eckel, 2004; Alvesson, 2002; Trowler, 2008; Albatch et al., 2005). 
Clearly calibrating SSR is no easy task and each university and its governors will have to take 
a careful decision that will largely be individually rooted in the specific trade-offs faced by 
them. 
 
This challenge is reflected at various levels in the empirical work undertaken to date. There are 
at least three strands of studies here. In one SSRs are conflated with teaching performance 
instead of governance. Lokuwaduge (2011), Ayoubi & Massoud (2012) and Lokuwaduge & 
Armstrong (2015) are the prime studies here. Although SSR does indicate the quality of student 
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to staff interaction it is primarily the result of a discretionary choice in both levels of staff and 
students which are in the hands of university governors. In the second strand (Edmonson & 
Mulder, 1924; SRFICSSL, 2004; Kennedy & Siegfried, 1997; Zietz & Cochran, 1997; Lopus 
& Maxwell, 1995; Haslett, 1976) several scholars find evidence that SSR is difficult to define 
and/or model. This leads to confusion and ambiguity with the signs of association often linked 
to the methods used to analyse the data. Finally, the largest strand of empirical studies 
(Gannaway et al., 2018; McDonald, 2012; Biddle & Berliner, 2002; Glass & Smith, 1979; 
Kokkelenberg, 2008; Johnson, 2010; Gleason, 2012; Koenig et al., 2015) supports our sample 
finding that lower SSRs improve teaching performance although one in the US and one in 
Australia (Bedard & Kuhn, 2008; Bradley et al., 2008; March et al., 1979) seem to suggest a 
negative but non-linear U-shape association.    
 
Teaching performance and its significantly stronger negative association with SSR as opposed 
to research in this sample is not unexpected. Normative scholars in UK governance (Hagenauer 
& Volet, 2014; Lamport, 1993; Denzine & Pulos, 2000; Palmer et al., 2009; Halawah, 2006; 
Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005; Cuseo, 2007; Davern et al., 2006; Dillon et al., 2002; Harfitt & 
Tsui, 2015) have long argued that low SSRs allow for greater range of interactions between 
staff and students. This is robustly reflected in my result. In fact this is why an important 
Government report by Deering in 2002 emphasized the need for lower SSRs.  
 
University teaching performance is richly influenced by staff contractual diversities. The five 
different types of contracts once again demonstrate why they remain an important way to 
unpack teaching and gender modalities in university governance.  
 
The omnibus tenure track contract remains a significant negative influence on university 
teaching performance. In this sample UK universities that employ large fractions of TRST staff 
attract lower levels of teaching grants. This is largely in line with the theoretical predictions of 
culture & quality assurance (Collinson, 2004; McLeaod & Malcomson, 1988; Bexley et al., 
2013; Bryson & Barnes, 2000a, b; MacFarlane, 2011; Locke, 2012; Bryson, 2004) that predict 
that onerous academic burdens in dual contracts may encourage staff to focus on 
rewarding/lucrative/prestigious research activities at the expense of teaching ones. In fact, 
many empirical, normative and policy-based studies (Probert, 2013; Ackers & Brostorm, 2015; 
DfES, 2003, pg. 19; Nyamapfene, 2019) find evidence that given a choice between research 
and teaching academics would indeed privilege the former due to its career and monetary 
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incentives. It was this likely imbalance between research and teaching within TRST roles that 
saw UK regulators forward the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) as a balancing 
mechanism (BIS, 2016a, 2015; Dfe, 2017a; Gibbs, 2016; French & O’leary, 2017; Cui et al. 
2019; O’leary et al., 2019). Yet Blackmore (2016) stresses how this might still not succeed in 
redressing the imbalance. My result of a straight negative association here seems to be 
underlining this growing problem in TRST contracts. At another level my result also seems to 
highlight the motivational issues connected with TRST. Macfarlane (2011) suggests how 
TRST staff are swimming against the tide of change and might lack incentives to perform. This 
fits within the argument that such a contract is cosy and secure and staff might not feel the need 
to outperform especially with regard to teaching. Therefore, once again the sample seems to be 
pointing in the direction of a complete overhaul of the tenure track contract which in teaching 
just as in research seems to be out of synch with the changing UK HEI academic context.  
 
Research only staff are seen to have a negative impact on teaching performance among UK 
universities. This fits the instrumental concerns of such staff (Fung & Gordon, 2016; Oxford, 
2008; PREST, 2000) who are after all hired to do only research and hence do not have any role 
in generating teaching grants for the university. Gaining legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Ashforth 
& Gibbs, 1990; Shelton et al., 2001; Locke, 2012; Polat et al., 2019) through the research only 
staff naturally reduces the ability of the university to pay full attention to teaching and impress 
teaching grant providers. There is the added issue that universities who employ too many such 
research only staff are sending out a signal that downplays the more public-spirited aspect of 
teaching/transformation within their academic function (Tatlow, 2012; Williams, 1997; Kim, 
2008). Perhaps this is why external observers of the institution like teaching grant providers 
feel less confirdent in granting teaching funds to it.  
 
This brings us to my negative result in PTTSR which seems to robustly corroborate the 
predictions of culture quality assurance and optimal stakeholder theories. The fact that these 
part time staff lack the morale and motivation to effectively contribute to the academic function 
has been extensively echoed in earlier empirical work too (Allen-Collinson, 2004; Purcell et 
al., 1999; Bryson & Blackwell, 2006). But within a teaching context it seems my result is 
highlighting another peculiarity. After all Locke et al. (2016) underline how such part-time 
staff are less available to students. Student surveys (Kezar & Maxey; 2014, 2015) often cite 
this staff non-availability as one of the main negatives of this contract. Given their need to be 
in more than one institution since they only earn a part of their income from one university it 
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is but natural to assume that such PTTSR staff will be less available for intensive and repeated 
teaching-based interaction with students. It may be this aspect which is showing up in the 
negative association of my result. Elsewhere in the empirical literature (Ackers & Oliver, 2007; 
Thewlis, 2003; Allen-Collinson, 2004) argue that Part-time staff suffer from job insecurities 
and fears that do not allow them to interact effectively with either other staff members or 
students. These insecurities would surely translate into the classroom where such an insecure 
staff would be less motivated to fully contribute to the teaching learning routine. A related 
argument voiced in the literature (Ackers & Oliver, 2007; Locke, 2016) is the fact that 
universities invest less in upgrading teaching skills of Part time staff. So, the consequence of 
this underskilling may be showing up in the negative association with teaching performance in 
my result. 
 
Female staff levels in universities show definite signs of a rich gendered and positive 
contribution to university teaching performance. This is a clear divergence from university 
research performance. There is some support for the public accountability, stakeholder and 
culture/quality assurance arguments (Acker, 1994; Mestre et al., 2009; Ferber & Huber, 1975; 
Kaschak, 1978; Mackie, 1976; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Leisyte & Westerheijden, 2014; 
Stensaker, 2018; Trowler, 2008) that female staff are inclusive/empathetic by nature and thus 
create a teaching enabled academic ambience. This is perhaps why independent assessors of 
teaching performance i.e, teaching grant providers opine that universities employing higher 
levels of female staff are indeed fulfilling the mandates of the TEF (DfW, 2016; DBIS, 2016; 
Gunn, 2018; Deem & Baird, 2019; O’leary et al., 2019) and thus ought to be supported with 
more teaching grants. The narrative here is also further supported and embellished by 
widespread empirical findings (Ferber & Huber, 1975; Mackie, 1976; Kaschak, 1978) that 
female students necessarily feel more satisfied with teaching instruction/interactions with 
female staff than their male counterparts. Surely this is evidence of the empathy factor that may 
be at play in my result. 
 
But there is a deeper insight that emerges when we consider this positive FSF association 
jointly with the negative PTTSR one above. Empirical scholarship (Barrett et al., 2011; 
O’Brien & Hapgood, 2012; Thorton, 2013; Bexley et al., 2013; Chalmers, 2010; HESA, 2014) 
finds that most of the female staff employed by UK universities are on part-time and teaching 
only roles. One can therefore draw the link that to the extent that these institutions employ 
female staff they do obtain some positive teaching benefits as seen in my FSF result. However, 
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to the extent that such female staff are then employed on inconsequential and part-time roles 
they are unable to fully bring their unique gendered contributions to the classroom. Universities 
employ more women but they push them largely into inconsequential part-time roles where 
their unique teaching abilities are not put to effective use. This feeds into the discourse of why 
women are unable to show their distintive capabilities fully even in university teaching 
performance. 
 
Staff contractual diversities represent a different challenge to university governors in teaching. 
Deciding on the different types of staff contracts is more nuanced here. Undoubtedly similar 
trade-offs just as in research performance are faced in deciding tenure track in relation to other 
types of staff contracts. But universities face singular challenges in recruiting part-time, 
research only and female staff here. The impact of such contracts is more severe in teaching 
and there is an important need to rationally consider and allocate the academic teaching burden. 
New types of sharing contracts may need to be devised and there is even greater need for 
innovation here. Gender empowerment in staff contracts in UK HEI is definitely at the cross 
roads. Even in teaching where women are widely perceived to be better equipped than men 
there is much evidence that universities are employing them largely on part-time and 
inconsequential roles. There is a rich opportunity for UK HEI to step up and change the 
contours of female empowerment at least beginning with teaching. 
 
Revenue and asset structure choices of universities affect their teaching performances in 
distinct ways. I begin here with TFEE or the extent to which universities derive their income 
from fee paying students. My results in the two teaching models provide rich contrast to the 
earlier research performance negative association. Here is some evidence at least in the TPI 
model that tuition fee skews the inter-se prioritisation between research and teaching 
governances in UK universities. Institutions displaying higher dependence on tuition fees 
neglect research and focus on teaching and this interferes with their original knowledge 
creation function but aids their dissemination function an observation often stressed by 
normative scholars (Nixon et al., 2016; Neves & Hillman, 2016; Balckmore, 2016; Collini, 
2005; Parker, 2011; Middlehurst, 2013; Shattock, 2013a, b). There is also some support to the 
empirical findings of some governance studies (Foskett, 2010; Brown, 2010; Brown & 
Ramsden, 2009; Jabbar et al., 2018; Alderman, 2010; Molesworth et al., 2010) in UK HEI that 
ever since the quasi-market like conditions and restricted public funds have been imposed, 
universities have been forced to rely on students as their most important source of funds. This 
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explains the rising levels of TFEE. It also explains why under the pressure of the consumerised 
student stakeholder the internal governance focus has shifted towards teaching and perhaps this 
is what is being seen in my positive TPI impact.  
 
My result can also be seen from the perspective of culture and quality assurance (Trowler, 
2008, Mouwen, 2000; Alvesson, 2012; Nuninger, 2016; Tang et al., 2004; Filippakou & 
Tapper, 2008). High levels of TFEE may be working in a different way to improve teaching 
performance. When the student consumer in UK pays such a high fee for his education it may 
be argued that he/she is more charged up about receieving the full value/quality assured of 
higher education services delivered by the institution (Jabbar et al., 2018; Woodall et al., 2014; 
Nixon et al., 2016). This puts him in the most robust state to improve his/her learning and this 
is what may be showing up in the higher levels of teaching performance seen here. This positive 
TPI TFEE association also seems to robustly fit the globalization narrative of UK HEI (Davies 
et al., 2008; Callender & Jackson, 2008; McGuinness, 2003; Adnett, 2006; Chevalier & Conlon 
2003; O’Leary & Sloane 2005; OECD, 2015; Hazelkorn, 2015; Mangan et al., 2010a, b). After 
all UK universities are increasingly searching to bridge their budgetary defecits by attracting 
the most paying segments of students including international ones (McGettigan, 2013; OECD, 
2004, Li et al., 2010).  
 
Yet some studies seem to highlight the problems associated with this increasing fee focus 
(Dunnet et al., 2012; Flowes, 2014; Boliver, 2013; Mangan et al., 2010a, b; Sutton Trust, 2004) 
trace the link between this pernicious chase for fees and domestic student inability to even 
consider applying to such high ranked performing institutions. This is exactly what public 
accaountability and legitimacy theories have been warning against (Callender & Jackson, 2008; 
Boliver, 2013; Mangan et al., 2010a, b; Suchman, 1995; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Scherer et 
al., 2013; Stensaker, 2018; Department for Education, 2017; Coy et al., 2001). My positive TPI 
result may actually be masking this simmering problem of fee-based access and exclusion fast 
emerging in the UK. Serious questions about the moral legitimacy of such institutions can no 
longer be ignored. The OFS might need to step in with corrective policy action and support.   
 
This is exactly what my second result here in TGF also seems to neatly highlight. Independent 
assessors of university teaching i.e. TGF providers seem to take cognizance of these moral and 
legitimacy-based concerns (Suchman, 1995). They reduce funding to institutions with high 
levels of TFEE. Perhaps one of their arguments here could be that a higher education institution 
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so dependent on tuition fees would put its portals out of reach of the vast multitudes of students 
from average backgrounds. 
 
In services and facilities spend my positive teaching performance result fully corroborates 
theoretical predictions. The fact that a university spends on student stakeholder interests 
naturally legitmates them to these important stakeholders, strongly suggests effective 
husbanding of resources and thus improves student satisfaction with the knowledge services 
provided (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991, pg. 82; Williamson, 2000, 2005; 
Donaldson, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). It is also an indication that the institution is 
optimally spending on the assets that truly matter to teaching facilitation (Edmans & Gabaix, 
2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; Murphy, 2012; 
Middlehurst, 2004; 2013; Bennett, 2002; Knight, 2002). 
 
Empirical work in UK governance richly corroborates this result. The largest strand 
(Ganyaupfu, 2013; Mushtaq & Khan, 2012; Kirmani & Siddiquah, 2008; Karemera et al., 2003; 
Young, 1999) find that universities that spend heavily on knowledge assets help students 
achieve the best learning outcomes and grades. At least three papers (Dao & Thrope, 2015; 
Migin et al., 2015; Wiers-Jenssen et al., 2002; Price et al., 2003; Tang et al. 2004; Joseph & 
Joseph, 2000) find evidence that UK students gravitate towards institutions with the best IT 
and knowledge facilitating assets. Elsewhere (Metcalf et al., 2015; Price et al., 2003) collate 
evidence that UK academics too favour universities that invest heavily in knowledge 
infrastructure. Overall, the sample results then confirm that UK universities that display a 
strategic intent towards larger fractions of knowledge assets not only demonstrate their 
academic credentials but also create a facilitative academic ambience and thus improve 
teaching performance.  
 
High endowment levels are not seen in a positive light by independent assessors of university 
teaching performance i.e. the teaching grant providers. Echoes of public accountability and 
legitimacy concerns with too many endowments and their likely donor biases can be seen in 
this (bebchuk et al., 2002; Van Essen et al., 2015; Butt, 2019; Squire, 2014; Parker, 2012; 
Brown et al., 2010; Shattock, 2008, Trakman, 2008). Empirical work in respect of the 
endowment association with university teaching performance is very limited however many 
policy and normative voices such as Butt (2019), Squire (2014) and Parker (2012 ) raise several 
concerns about rising university endowment levels in UK. These authors suggest that such 
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higher endowments many make universities subservient to corporate/donor interests forcing 
them to neglect their public mineded teaching/transformation mandate (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).  
 
Finally, cash levels in my teaching performance results do not show any significant association. 
Although this contradicts my ex-ante expectations in this variable it is not suprising within the 
context of a UK HEI sector that is undergoing significant shifts in terms of strategic mergers 
and excessive borrowing (Hillman, 2018; McGettigan, 2013; IRF, 2018; Jack, 2018b). May be 
it is this heterogeneity in the cash levels of institutions in my sample and their fluctuating levels 
that is reflected in this insignificant result (see Appendix 1).    
 
Overall, this unique governance dimension of strategic asset/revenue structure choices of UK 
universities shows its singularities in my teaching performance results. The extent to which a 
university depends on tutuin fees naturally impels greater spending on services and facilities 
but the combined impact in this sample makes for an exclusionary ambiance in UK university 
teaching (Bradley et al., 2008; Bachan, 2017). This governance challenge corrodes the true 
legitimacy of higher education as a vehicle of societal transformation (Suchman, 1995; 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). UK university governance will have to seek innovative ways that 
balance between the replacement of government support by attractive student fee revenues and 
the resultant deleterious marketization of university teaching.  
 
7.4.3 University Teaching Performance in the Board and Audit related University 
Governance  
 
My results in teaching performance highlight many salient associations in board and audit 
related university governance.  
 
In Board size I find a negative association here that is a complete contrast to my university 
research performance results. Theoretically, the result seems to support the nuanced views that 
balanced boards provide the cohesion in policy that helps improve teaching governance. Not 
only do these smaller boards avoid the policy logjam and analysis-paralysis associated with 
their larger counterparts but also such boards seem to suggest a teaching policy focus that 
impresses external assessors of university teaching performance (Lipton & & Lorch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 1996; Vefeas, 1999; Nelson, 2002a, b). Such boards also arguably pay 
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more attention to the teaching related credentials of their board members and this pays off in 
terms of teaching at the institution (Coy & Dixon, 2004; Lipton & & Lorch, 1992; Jensen, 
1983; Yermack, 1996). At another level my result also does seem to suggest that smaller boards 
may allow greater independence to plural and teaching advocacy voices on the board and make 
board members effectively contribute to decision making. This is what helps improve teaching 
performance (Collis, 2004; Yermack, 1996). 
 
Empirically for the first time then here is proof at least in university teaching functionality in 
the UK, CUC mandates of limits on board size between 12 and 25 seem to make sense (CUC, 
2009, 2014). Perhaps it is the extra functionality of smaller boards with every board member’s 
effective participation in decisions that is at play in my result. Earlier literature in corporate 
governance has confirmed a similar negative or even a U-shaped association with firm 
performance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Loderer & Peyer, 
2002; Tomasic et al., 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Pathan et al., 2007; Adam & Mehran, 
2005; Cobham & Subramaniam, 1998). But my result contradicts university studies such as 
Lokuwaduge (2011) and Lokuwaduge & Armstrong (2015) who finds an insignificant and 
negative association with university teaching performance, and Ntim et al. (2017) who finds 
an insignificant negative association with voluntary disclosure. Yet surveys of UK universities 
recently have flagged the generally larger board sizes in universities but have noted how many 
have been reducing sizes in response to regulatory mandates (Ntim et al., 2017; CUC, 2014).  
 
This negative result in teaching must be contrasted with my earlier positive result with research. 
Clearly then university governance faces a challenge in terms of calibrating board size which 
may have such opposing effects on the two main functions of a university. The approach in 
this variable has to be university specific and cannot be universal. UK universities would be 
well advised to take account of their peculiarities, heterogeneities and evolutionary 
particularities, and only then decide board sizes. At the same time the research versus teaching 
trade off must also be accounted for here.   
 
Board ethnic diversities do not materially improve university teaching performance in my 
sample. This is disappointing and seems to contradict theoretical expectations of an ethnic 
resource enriching teaching performance (Pfeffer, 1987; Verbruggen et al., 2011) or of an 
ethnic stakeholder representation incorporating ethnic teaching functionalities (Mitchell et al., 
1997; Roberts, 1992; Leisyte et al., 2014; Wise et al., 2020). Similarly there is no evidence that 
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ethnic board members alleviate public accountability concerns of fairness and neutrality in the 
teaching function (Coy et al., 2001; Hoecht, 2006) or that they improve the credibility of the 
university’s teaching in the eyes of external assessors of this function (Suchman, 1995; De 
Villiers and Van Staden, 2006). In fact my result seems to only favor the dysfunctionality 
arguments of optimal contracting, stakeholder and managerial power (Williamson. 2000; 2005; 
Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; 
Roberts, 1992; Freeman & Reed, 1983) that ethnic diversities may interfere with board 
cohesion reducing the effectiveness of teaching related decisions.  
 
Yet my result must be seen in the light of the growing normative and policy concerns across 
both UK HEI and even in the corporate sector that ethnic representations at the highest 
organisational levels are woefully inadequate (Brammer et al., 2007; Garratt, 2005; Huisman 
et al., 2007). Corporate studies have found both positive (Erhardt et al., 2003; Ntim, 2015; 
Carter et al., 2003) and negative (Pitts & Jarry, 2007; Churchill & Valenzuela, 2019) impacts 
on firm financial performance. While earlier empirical work in UK HEI on the board member 
ethnicity angle is rare with Ntim et al. (2017) being the sole recent study confirming a positive 
association with voluntary disclosure, my univariate statistics (see Chapter 5, table 6) shows 
how UK university boards have remained largely exclusive consistently recruiting less than 
7% board members from ethnically disadvantaged groups across the decade. So, it is not 
surprising to find that at these very low levels of representation these ethnic board members 
hardly have any voice in governance policy making and so are unable to contribute their ethnic 
insights to teaching facilitation at the university. 
 
As in ethnicity board gender diversity in my results is insignificant in its association with 
university teaching performance. This too is uninspiring and disappointing. Most corporate 
governance research (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Ntim, 
2015; Singh et al., 2008) as already mentioned has found that gender diversity improves firm 
performance. Earlier empirical research in university governance did find a positive association 
between board gender diversity and financial performance (Harris, 2014), as well as voluntary 
disclosure (Ntim et al., 2017). However, none of these studies were directed towards mapping 
the link with teaching performance specifically. 
 
Many qualitative and normative scholars within the culture and quality assurance strand 
(Trowler, 2008; Alvesson, 2002; Brown, 2004, Salter & tapper, 2000; Sagaria, 2007; Leisyte 
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& Westerheijden, 2014; Stensaker, 2018) in university governance argue that teaching is 
strongly dependent on empathy. It is also behaviourally well known (Mestre et al., 2009; 
Kaschak, 1978; Ackers, 1994; Mackie, 1976; Ferber & Huber, 1975) that women display 
higher emotional quotients greater empathy and thus higher teaching facilitation. At the board 
level a higher proportion of female members should be expected to have a gendered 
contribution into appropriate Teaching and Learning Regimes (TLRs) that particularly enable 
better teaching performance overall. This would also be especially expected in the case of 
female student learning and adaptation to university pedagogy. Therefore, the lack of any 
sample association in the result remains puzzling.  
 
One way of explaining this result may be to refer to the “unconscious bias” and “glass ceiling” 
arguments ubiquitous in the general university literature (Santos & van Phu, 2019; David, 
2017; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Hewitt, 2020, Prena, 2005). It does seem that even at fairly 
healthy 33% female representation on the board recently (see Chapter 5, table 6) these members 
still face a difficult obstacle in terms of making their voice count. Their inability to tackle the 
bias against them is possibly the reason for their weak and uninspiring impact on teaching 
performance in the sample. Perhaps the result also shows that gender diversity and 
empowerment directives in UK HEI need to persist well into the future to really make a 
difference on the ground. 
 
Independent assessments of teaching performance associate positively with the fractions of lay 
members on UK university boards. Clearly my result here accords with the theoretical 
argument that there is a neutral public impact that lay board members bring to the teaching 
governance at the university which positively impacts its performance (Coy et al., 2011; Nelson 
et al., 2003). It also seems to corroborate the prediction that the legitimacy derived from 
independent board members makes a positive impression on independent assessors of the 
university’s teaching performance (Nagy & Robb, 2008; Parker, 2013; Suchman, 1995; 
Vidovich & Glassman, 1979). At another level the obvious lessening of agency conflict due to 
these independent board members seems to reflect in my positive result (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991; Donaldson T & Preston, 1995). Similarly it does seem that independent board members 
are indeed bringing in fresh ideas and preventing “group think” within the university and this 
is helping teaching performance to improve (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Mallin et al., 2015; Yermack, 1996). 
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Board independence has been seen to positively associate with corporate firm financial 
performance Cobham & Subramaniam (1998), Mishra & Nielson (2000) and Pathan, Skully & 
Wickramanayake (2007). Earlier work in university govetnance such as Harris (2014) and 
Lokuwaduge (2011) find a positive association between board independence and student 
retention rates and teaching performance respectively. Policy based and normative strands of 
literature often stress that independent board members are likely to provide a useful checks 
mechanism on internal governance and also bring new ideas and expertise to the organisation. 
This is perhaps what my result is mirroring here. 
 
At another level culture and learning narratives in university governance stress how 
independent and fresh voices at the board level might be essential to support evolution of 
appropriate teaching and learning regimes (Trowler & Cooper, 2002; Trowler, 2019, 2008; 
Alvesson, 2002; Gayle et al., 2003). Teaching infrastructure and budgets will tend to be 
neglected in universities because unlike research, teaching does not draw in resources or raise 
academic reputations. Due to their status and focus on the long term independent lay board 
members would act as an effective check on such tendencies to neglect teaching infrastructures 
and budgets (Trowler, 2008; Tennat & Duggan, 2008; Jack, 2008). My result seems to echo 
such narratives and explanations.  
 
Elsewhere in the empirical literature it is stressed that lay board members can be expected to 
contribute to quality induced changes in university teaching and research governance 
(Schofield, 2009; Greatbtch, 2014; Shattock, 2013a; Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006a; 
Bozec & Bozec, 2012). As outsiders more interested in their own long-term reputation rather 
than pursuing narrow vested interests in the institution they would want the university to focus 
on raising its overall academic credentials in both teaching and research. After all corporate 
governance scholarship (Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006a; 2006b; Bozec & Bozec, 
2012) has found important links between the quality of firm performances and the number of 
laypersons on its boards. My result here is a robust corroboration of a similar quality induced 
effect in universities too. 
 
In this connection it may be apposite to note how a growing number of studies and scholars 
(Bachan, 2017; Bright, 2004; Anyanwu, 2004; Furedi, 2004; Jones & Soo, 2013) have been 
stressing the dwindling quality of academic education in UK HEI. Perhaps lay board members 
are the best way to enfoce higher quality. After all their outsider neutral and independent 
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reputations should act as an effective check on tendencies towards grade inflation or duimbing 
down of standards at universities (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Michelon & Parbonetti, 
2012; Pincus et al., 1989). My positive result here seems to support such a likely positive 
influence. 
 
In totality my board independence teaching performance positive result is a robust confirmation 
that at least in so far as the teaching function in the UK university is concerned regulators seem 
to have got the equation just right. By insisting on at least 50% lay board members CUC (CUC, 
2009, 2014) seems to have done yeoman service to the teaching function at universities. 
 
My negative VC pay result is a robust confirmation of the generally widespread legitimacy and 
accountability concerns (Bachan, 2008; Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Tarbert et al., 2008; Ogden & 
Watson, 2004; Bargh et al., 2000; Suchman, 1995) that high levels of such pay are a negative 
flag for independent assessors of university teaching performance. Recently VCPAY and its 
links with overall university performance has been widely debated in UK HEI (Bachan, 2008; 
Bennett, 2017; 2019; Hubble & Bolton, 2019; CUC, 2018; OFS, 2018a; Grove, 2018; Baker, 
2017; Denmead, 2019). Research has been mixed. Some have found evidence for a positive 
association between VC pay and university academic performance (Dolton & Ma, 2003; 
Walker et al., 2019; Tang et al., 2000; Tarbert et al., 2008), while others have found the 
opposite with regard to financial performance (Dolton & Ma, 2003; Bachan & Rielly, 2015; 
Walker et al., 2019; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Baimbridge & Simpson, 1996). There is also wide 
debate whether VCs should be paid large amounts with some (Morgan, 2017; Backer, 2017; 
OFS, 2018a, c; CUC, 2018; Hubble & Bolton, 2019) taking the legitimacy/public 
accountability angle mentioned above and arguing against it while others (Cornell, 2004; 
Blanchflower, 2017; Lucey et al., 2019) suggesting the global competitive nature of UK VC 
recruitment and arguing for it (Perkman et al., 2013; Tarbert et al., 2008). Elsewhere there are 
strands of arguments emerging from the “good steward” concept that suggest the conflict of 
interest that has been found in VC pay determination at some UK universities (Walker et al., 
2019; daily et al., 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Boyle & Roberts, 2013; Slawson, 2018). The 
dust is far from settled on this debate.  
 
My negative result here cofirms that UK universities that pay their VCs highly fail to attract 
teaching grants. One way of explaining this result is to view it within the context of recently 
constituted UK university Teaching Excellence Framework. This framework seeks to improve 
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the profile of the teaching function at universities. The core argument here is that teaching 
unlike research is not lucrative and so it is the common tendency of institutions to neglect it. 
Perhaps teaching grant providers who closely follow the TEF logic view high levels of VC pay 
at a university as a red flag. VCs earning such high amounts may be forced to chase lucrative 
university contracts rather than focus on low profile teaching mechanisms in order to justify 
their own pay level. This may be the logic here. In fact, such problems with high VC pay levels 
are rife within normative and regulatory literature (Hubble & Bolton, 2019; CUC, 2018, 2017; 
OFS, 2018a; Morgan, 2017) with the OFS recently even suggesting a penalty for institutions 
that are unable to justfy their high VC pays.  
 
My result also raises the question of talent and reward within the VC pay. There are voices 
here (Lucey et al., 2019; Scackleton, 2017; walker et al., 2019) that question the wisdom of 
simply lowering VC pay without giving regard to the scope of the job and the talent of the 
incumbent. While negatively viewing universities that pay their VCs highly may be appropriate 
to encourage a teaching orientation in the institution if this comes with a talent drain from the 
institution would that be a price worth paying? Thus on the whole the question of what is an 
appropriate pay level for VCs remains a contested area and my negative result does not resolve 
the controversy. Obviously regulatory attention in UK HEI must focus on how universities are 
to achieve the right balance between rewarding their chief executives without fostering a 
neglect of the teaching function.  
 
My final result that exeutive team meeting frequency insignificantly impacts teaching 
performance supports arguments in stewardship that stress how frequent board or excutive 
teams may not be salutary. After all such meetings might make executives feel less empowered 
more directed and monitored and also impose burdens on them in terms of travel and time 
which could be counterproductive.  
 
On the whole then board and audit related governance mechanisms show rich and varied 
influences in my sample that are insightful.  
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7.5 The complex governance trade-offs between university research/teaching 
performance 
 
Research and teaching, the two main functions of a university, are not conducted in isolation 
(Pollitt, 1990; Neumann & Guthrie, 2006; Lokuwaduge, 2011). They are intricately 
interconnected yet separate and rich in their own multi-dimensionalities (Jongbloed et al., 
2018; Gohari et al., 2019). It is in the dual yet interlinked character of these knowledge 
functions that universities face the biggest challenge. Important governance decisions within 
the university have multiple impacts on both research and teaching performances (Gayle et al., 
2003; Trowler, 2008, 2019). But more often than not the decisions taken to improve one type 
of performance deteriorates the other and this is what makes governance in universities so 
much more complex than that in corporate firms (Johnes & Virmani, 2019; Vukasovic et al., 
2018). The section uniquely teases out such trade-offs in the sample results to shed light on a 
different dimension of the governance performance debate in UK higher education. 
 
Teaching and research differ in their student staff interaction levels. This is richly illustrated in 
this UK HEI sample. Universities with high levels of such interactions invariably achieve better 
teaching performance. But the same institutions are not guaranteed better research 
performance. The challenge facing the governance decision makers here seems to be ensure a 
reasonable level of interaction intensity that supports teaching without harming the important 
creative individual aspects of the research process. High staffing levels might reduce workload 
and improve teaching but prove redundant and unnecessary to research (Ackers & Oliver, 
2007; Burgess et al., 2006; Locke, 2014). This may be the hidden meaning behind the two way 
impacts of interaction levels on research and teaching in this sample. Interaction intensities 
have another implication that may differ between research and teaching. When universities 
increase interaction levels this benefits current teaching but may actually harm future 
generations of research scholarship due to a neglect of the solo individualistic creative 
processes in the university (Locke et al., 2016; Bryson & Blackwell, 2006).  In totality student 
staff interaction levels have complex effects on research and teaching performances that cannot 
be resolved without considering both current and future likely trade-offs.  
 
Both types of university academic performances benefit from a selective student entry regime 
in this UK sample. But rather surprisingly and worryingly it is research rather than teaching 
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performance that is less sensitive to student entry criteria (see Table 16 & Table 22). This 
makes the task of calibrating this governance across research and teaching that much more 
difficult. After all some universities with lower entry standards are becoming trail blazers in 
published research but are suffering the consequences in lowered teaching performances. This 
might force them to reverse their inclusivity but there is a need to obstruct such a tendency. 
Inclusivity and diversity must become the central theme of UK HEI and this rather stronger 
cycle of higher entry standards leading to higher teaching performance must be cut. This then 
is the challenging trade-off here. University decision makers need to find the optimal level of 
entry standards here that fulfils their transformational mandate even at the risk of some slight 
deterioration in their overall ratings on teaching.  
 
Improving research and teaching performance face another challenging trade-off in staff 
contractual choices. Three key insghts must be mentioned. First female staff levels improve a 
university’s teaching but deteriorate its research (see Chapter 7.3.2, pg. 345-347; Chapter 7.4.2, 
pg. 369-370). UK universities that wish to improve both face a challenge. Either lose the rich 
gendered teaching inputs of female staff or accept the lower research ambience arising from 
public gender biases.  Neither choice may be fully acceptable.  
 
Second too many research-only staff reduce teaching performance while too many teaching-
only staff reduce research performance. So, despite the gain in reputation due to large numbers 
of research-only staff there remains the problem of how to tackle the defecits in the teaching 
function (Probert, 2013; DBIS, 2015, pg. 8; Nyamapfene, 2018; Shelton et al., 2001). Similarly, 
despite a fortified teaching regime due to large numbers of teaching-only staff what must be 
done about the severe loss in research reputation and ambience that result from this. There are 
no easy answers to either question. A related but important question has to do with the very 
nature of these single function research only contracts. It seems reasonable to assume that 
universities that use many such contracts are likely to be focused on applied rather than basic 
research (Geschwind & Brostrom, 2015; thornton, 2013; Fung & Gordon, 2016; Blackmore, 
2016). The very time bound and commercially orientated nature of such research requires 
distribution of workload i.e. many research-only short-term contracts. This would clearly have 
negative impacts on the core basic research ambiance of the institution. Once again, this 
question is not easy to resolve.  
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Finally, part-time contracts might facilitate research in some ways but definitely do not benefit 
teaching. This implies that part-time staff may actually be employed just for their research 
benefits although they interfere with teaching. In addition, given the fact that research is 
lucrative and more prestigious signalling the research-intensive pedagogy through large 
numbers of part time staff who are on research-only contracts may seem to be the easy way for 
the university (Blackmore, 2016; Shelton et al., 2001).  
 
A final trade-off between research and teaching performances must be mentioned. Higher 
levels of dependence on tuition fees have direct instrumental impacts on faculty who focus on 
teaching and delivering to their fee-paying student consumers (Jabbar et al., 2018; Nixon et al., 
2016; Foskett, 2010; Fowles, 2014; Brown & Carasso, 2013). But clearly this reduces faculty 
time and effort in idea generation and refinement processes vital to published research quality. 
The UK university thus faces a tricky decision. Using larger proportions of fee-paying students 
and particularly international ones will force higher focus on services/facilities and teaching 
governance regimes (Trowler, 2019; Taylor, 2013a, b; Molesworth et al., 2010). This will 
undoubtedly have a positive impact on its teaching ambience and student learning facilitation 
(Mushtaq & Khan, 2012; Kirmani & Siddiquah, 2008, Karemera et al., 2003; Young, 1999). 
Yet the adverse impact of this on research quality will mean that in the next round the university 
is unable to attract the very same international students that made it choose this policy in the 
first place (Turner, 2019; Jack, 2018b). So, in this increasingly marketized UK HEI universities 
need to still resist the overweening tendency to use uninformed fee-paying student consumers 
as their yard sticks for revenue and asset structure choices (Marginson, 2004; Molesworth et 




7.6 UK University Financial Performance and its Governance Antecedents 
 
In its financial performance the UK university displays a rich and variegated picture. Both the 
hitherto unexplored missing dimensions of university governance as well as the board level 
and audit related governances effect the financial well being and sustenance of this institution 
in a range of complex ways. The sample uses university asset turnover as the main indicator of 
university financial performance. Given the fact that UK universities are predominantly public 
sector institutions they fall squarely within the gambit of not-for-profit institutions. Profit based 
metrics do not make such sense here. Instead a metric that directly compares the gross incomes 
earned by the institution to the assets it used to generate these incomes is the most appropriate 
one here.  
 
7.6.1 University Financial Performance in the missing dimensions of Governance  
 
 
The CTA-AT negative and significant association confirms my earlier expectations. Liquidity 
levels in universities have a dampening effect on their asset turnovers. The public role and 
profile of the university (Taylor, 2013a,b; Shattock , 2010; Kelleher, 2004; Coy et al., 2001) 
and the widely discussed funding issues of this institution in UK (Foskett, 2010; Kim, 2008; 
Trakman, 2008; Shattock, 2013a, 2010; Brown, 2010; McDonald, 2013; Brown & Carasso, 
2013; Temple, 2015; Belfield et al., 2017; Melville-Ross, 2010) may be marshalled to explain 
this result. Holding too much cash often reflects deeper agency problems at an institution 
(Bates, Kahle, and stulz, 2007; Gao et al., 2013). It suggests the short-term ad-hocism rampant 
in financial decision making at the highest levels. At another level the financial constraints 
(McGettigan, 2012; Callender & Jackson, 2008; IFR, 2018; OFS, 2019; JACK, 2018; CUC, 
2019) that already seem to characterize UK universities in their high levels of indebtedness 
seem to be mirrored here (see Chapter 3, pg. 137-139). Universities that generate lower levels 
of revenues on their asset bases (i.e. low AT) take higher levels of debt (i.e. high DTA) and 
this unsurprisingly shows up as higher cash (i.e. high CTA) on their balance sheet (Hillman, 
2018; Jack, 2018b; Iman, 2018).  
 
The result is at odds with earlier empirical research in corporate governance. Scholars there 
(Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999)  find that firms holding as 
much as a quarter of their assets in cash perform better than their peers.There is hardly any 
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empirical work on cash levels and their link to asset turnovers in the HEI governance literature. 
Here is a golden opportunity to contribute in this area. CTA is a negative influence on the 
revenue generating ability of firms. Universities that hold too much cash are displaying their 
poorer financial judgment by not investing adequately and therefore tend to be unable to 
generate adequate revenues. 
 
My leverage association is insignificant although the negative sign does align with a large 
strand of corporate governance that does find a similar negative association between debt levels 
and firm performance. But the insignificance of the association is also not without precedence 
at least in the corporate literature where (Siddik et al., 2017; Al-Taani, 2013; Ebaid, 2009; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1975) too find such an insignificant association. The result does not lend 
support to public accountability concerns with high debt (McGettigan, 2013; Hayes & 
Wynyard, 2002; CUC, 2017; HEC, 2014; OFS, 2019a,b ) or its delegitimizing influence on 
student/staff constitutents (Jabbar et al., 2018; Toutkoushian, 2001; Taylor, 2013a). There also 
is no substantiation for the stewardship balance in leverage argument (Dalton & Kesner, 1987; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Kenser & Johnson, 1990) or the optimal contracting principle 
(Williamson, 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 
1996).  
 
Explaining this insignificant but negative association requires a circumspect marshalling of the 
empirical policy normative and corporate governance scholarship. There are many firm studies 
that find either a positive (Champion, 1999; Gosh et al., 2000; Hadlock and James, 2002; Abor, 
2005; Arbiyan & Safari, 2009; Taun, 1975; Nerlove, 1968; Baker, 1973; Petersen & Rajan, 
1994) or a negative (Pathak 2011; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Haung & Song, 2006; 
Chakraborty, 2010; Salim & Yadav, 2012; Abor, 2007; Hammes, 2003; Mesquita & Lara, 
2003; Fama & French, 1998; Ramdan & Ramdan, 2015) association of debt with firm 
performance. This is some proof that debt levels in any type of institution may be both a 
financial boost or a drag depending on the individual circumstances. In addition, large strands 
of policy based and normative university literature warns against the growing incidence of debt 
in the UK HEI sector with many scholars even suggesting deleterious impacts on university 
student attraction and retention levels (Mcgettigan, 2013; UCU, 2019; HEPI, 2019; Moody, 
2019). In fact, surveys of UK students have repeatedly proved how many of them closely 
examine the debt levels of institutions and avoid those with high debt levels (UCU, 2019; OFS, 
2019b). Perhaps my insignificant result has more to do with the nature of asset turnover which 
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is after all constructed from revenues that are a pre-costs variable. In that sense there may be 
some merit in referring to my sensitivity regressions where the association is negative and 
significant. Read in totality then my results in this variable should be carefully interpreted. 
Regulatory prescriptions (OFS, 2019a, b; HEC, 2014; Hillman, 2018; House of Commons 
Committee of Public Account, 2012) and growing concerns with excessive debt in universities 
are not misplaced. This is perhaps why OFS has gone to the extent of stating that if university 
debt levels unwind then these institutions are on their own and the regulator will not intervene 
or save them from bankruptcy.   
 
My insignificant association in FTA-AT association does not fit with resource dependence 
expectations (Vegas & Coffin, 2015; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) of higher resource efficiencies 
in higher fixed asset proportions and a likely positive association with university financial 
performance. Neither does my result support Optimal Contracting and stewardship precept 
(Williamson. 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006; Jacobson & Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 1996; 
Davis et al., 1997; Bachan, 2017; Bradley et al. 2008) indications that it is lower fixed asset 
proportions that may help institutions to flexibly design optimal contracts or husband resources 
more effectively and thus achieve better financial performance. My result can only be 
explained by extending Kotsina & Hazak’s (2012) argument advanced in the corporate 
governance literature. The authors suggest that their insignificant result may be attributed to 
the economic business cycle related fluctuations which might be making firm investments in 
fixed assets at the end of a boom or a recession ineffective when examined at a later stage. 
Perhaps this is what is being seen in my result too. UK universities too have been going through 
a rapidly transforming phase with budget cuts, extensive marketisation, changing regulation 
and so on especially during the period 2009-2012 (Browne, 2010; McGettigan, 2013; 
Molesworth et al., 2010; Foskett, 2010; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Middlehurst, 2013). The 
insignificant fixed asset to Asset Turnover association in the decade 2005-2015 in my sample 
can potentially be explained within this turbulent cyclical sectoral context.  
 
My positive and significant result in service and facilities spend corroborates most theoretical 
predictions. A UK university that spends and husbands its resources wisely by intelligently 
spending on libraries, facilities and other knowledge assets is seen to improve its attractiveness 
to potential students and staff and this shows up in its growing asset turnovers (Edmans & 
Gabaix, 2009; Price et al., 2003; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012; Binsardi & Ekwulugo, 
2003; Knight, 2002; Hamsley-Brown & Oplatka, 2006; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 
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1991, pg. 82; Donaldson, 1990). It is also seen to fulfil its public role by providing society with 
a well-equipped educational institution (Farr, 2003; Coy et al., 2001; Mcgettigan, 2013). These 
societal constituents signal their acceptance by joining and paying fees and this shows up in 
rising turnovers in my sample.    
 
Policy related debates also seems to support this result (QAA, 2005, 2009, 2011; Gunn, 2018; 
hayes, 2019; Nixon et al., 2016). Several scholars (Gayle et al., 2003; Trakman, 2008; Collini, 
2005; Ritzer, 2002; Trowler, 2008) stress how universities must pay close heed to educational 
facilitation as they are in the knowledge creation and dissemination role. Such facilitation 
obviously includes effective spending on knowledge infrastructure and so these policy scholars 
seem to underline its importance to university financial performance. 
 
My finding is in line with some strands like Dao & Thorpe (2015), Migin et al. (2015) and 
Wiers-Jenssen et al. (2002) find that the services and facilities provided in a university plays 
an integral part in the student decisions to join. Perhaps this higher student attraction is what is 
mirrored in the growing asset turnovers in my result. Elsewhere Metcalf et al. (2015) finds that 
state of art facilities and equipment are an important incentive to highly skilled academic staff 
to join a university.  Others like Earthman (2002) and Ganyaupfu (2013) underline how such 
investments often have a positive impact on teachers, teaching and student academic 
achievements. Unsurprisingly Mushtaq and Khan (2012) Kirmani & Siddiquah, (2008) 
Karemera et al. (2003) and Young (1999) demonstrate how a student’s better performance is 
directly linked to the expanded library and facilities provided in the university. In all of these 
empirical findings there is substantiation for my positive and significant association.  
My final result in endowment levels of UK universities shows an insignificant association with 
financial performance. To explain this result one can find some support in Resource 
dependence arguments Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Bouwman, 2011  
that institutions that are not as dependent on certain income sources due to possessing a buffer 
such as an endowment may not aggressively chase them. This is what the result seems to be 
mirroring.  This insignificant ENDWTA_AT association also seems to echo managerial power 
(Williamson, 2000; 2005; Chizema & Buck, 2006) arguments. Having these higher 
endowments university governors feel secure and less worried about chasing revenues to 
ensure the financial sustainability of the institution. This is perhaps why AT levels do not show 
any significant association with growing endowment levels. Governors at these institutions 
 388 
have a managerial stance that is relatively independent and self-assured due to the presence of 
these high levels of endowment.  
 
Earlier empirical work in corporate goverance (Al-Ani, 2014; Olatunji & Adegbite, 2014; 
Okwo et al., 2012; Rashid et al., 2008; Reyhani, 2012; Azadi, 2013; Iqbal & Mati, 2012; 
Inyiama et al., 2017) referred to before has often documented the positive impact of financial 
independence and flexibility in the corporate firm on its asset turnover/financial performance. 
Given the lack of any endowment like mechanism in firms this financial independence and 
flexibility is inevitably the closest comparison here. Earlier empirical work in universities 
(Boliver, 2015; Fazackerley, 2013; Rogerson, 2013) has already documented a positive 
association between ENDWTA and academic performance but there is hardly any work 
associating it with university financial performance. My result here is thus a useful contribution 
expanding the insight of how endowments allow universities to become independent of the 
need to chase revenues. 
 
In the UK there have been several calls for universities to improve their financial self reliance 
and sustainability. Recent reform efforts, policy white papers and even CUC guidelines have 
emphasized how universities should adopt a range of best financial practices to avoid typical 
financial profligacy, enhance accountability to stakeholders, improve legitimacy in society and 
demonstrate their effective stewardship (CUC, 2017; OFS, 2019a; HEC, 2014; House of 
Commons Committee of Public Account, 2012; Browne, 2010). This sample puts the spot light 
on such concerns and debates. Indebted universities and those holding large cash on their 
balance sheets reflect a lower ability to generate revenues and this is worrying. After all, if the 
university atkes on debt and holds cash to mitigate its inability to generate revenues it only 
makes a bad problem worse. CUC and other regulators are right to be concered with financial 
sustainability of the UK university revenue model. But when on considers sample evidence 
that endowment levels too simply do not matter to revenue generation or that higher service 
and facilities spend improve it, these concerns are amplified. If universities are taking on more 
debt to spend on higher facilities that attract fee paying students and help in generating higher 
revenues then this is surely unsustainable in the long run (IFS, 2018; Hillman, 2018; Turner, 
2019; Iman, 2018; Jack, 2018b). This is then the governance challenge before UK universities 
i.e. to improve revenue generation without too much leverage and/or service/facility creation.  
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My results for staff contractual forms of RONLY, TONLY and TRST display weak and 
insignificant associations with university financial performance. In the the case of research 
staff positions this is surprising and goes against theoretical predictions of legitimacy and 
stakeholder each of which argue that this contract does have reputational advantages that 
should show up in higher student recruitments and fees (Whelan, 2017; Farr, 2008; Proberts, 
2013; Suchman,  1995; Vidich & Glassman, 1979; Polat et al., 2019; Balmer et al., 2007). Yet 
there is no significant impact on asset turnovers. There is no evidence in my result of even the 
instrumental version of stakeholder argument (Wise et al., 2020; Woodward et al., 1996; 
Geschwind & Brostrom, 2015; Nyampfene, 2018; Oancea at al., 2010; Locke, 2012; Locke & 
Bennion, 2011; Brennan et al., 2007; Jenkins, 1995; Jenkins, 1995) which predicts that research 
only staff may actually be productive to generate research grants and funds and this should 
increase revenues on the same asset base. To explain this theoretically unjustifiable result one 
might refer to the empirical evidence (Chapter 5, table 5; HESA, 2015) that suggest that 
revenue grants only represent smaller proportions of the total income of the UK university and 
so it is likely that although there is some positive effect of RONLY on research grants this may 
not be large enough to make a significant difference to the total income of the institution. 
 
My result in TONLY on the other hand is in line with the general predictions of legitimacy 
resource dependence and stakeholder (DfES, 2003; Cashmore et al., 2013; Strike, 2010; 
Oancea et al., 2010; DfES, 2003, pg. 51; Harley, 2002; Wood, 2002; Adam et al., 2005; Purcell, 
1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Fowles, 2014; Woodward et al., 1996) all of which underline 
the lack of income generation associated with the teaching. This contract is after all widely 
perceived even in the policy and contextual literature (Bryson, 2004; Cummings et al., 2014; 
DfES, 2003, pg. 51; Brennan et al., 2007; Bryson & Blackwell, 2001; Kogan et al., 1994) to 
be a stop gap arrangement generally designed to meet the growing academic teaching burden. 
Many scholars (Locke et al., 2016; UCU, 2014; UCEA, 2015; Duflo, 2009) even suggest that 
teaching only staff are young inexperienced and even students prefer being instructed by staff 
with an active research profile. Naturally the contract does not attract students and their fee 
revenues and this is what is reflected in its insignificant impact on asset turnover. 
 
Finally, the insignificance of PTTSR in my result actually seems to conform to arguments of 
Stakeholder and Legitimacy theories which argue that too many part-time staff might act as a 
negative signal to potential students (Callender, 2008; Kezar & Maxey, 2014, 2015; Campaign 
for the future of higher education, 2015; Yorke, 2009a). Seeing these higher levels of part time 
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staff these potentials might question the efficacy of the academic function at this institution 
and prefer to join its peer. In fact many qualitative student surveys in UK HEI (Neves & 
Hillman, 2017; Locke et al., 2016; Kezar & Maxey, 2014, 2015) cofirm that students prefer 
continuous and day to day engagement with teaching instructors and so are rightly wary of 
institutions with high levels of PTTSR. At another level although PTTSR is essentially a device 
to economise on staff costs my dependent variable does not capture this angle since it is based 
on revenues before any staff costs are taken into account. Therefore, while universities may be 
benefiting in terms of lower costs due to higher PTTSR my result naturally does not capture 
this.  
 
In sum staff contracts even in their largely insignificant associations with university financial 
performance in my results nevertheless demonstrate some important governance policy 
implications. Universities should pay careful attention to their levels of single function and part 
time contracts. There is some evidence supporting the unpopularity of the part time staff 
contract among students. On the othet hand research only staff positions do not necessarily 
lend enough prestige to a university so as to attract more students. As always the teaching only 
staff remain at best a stop gap arrangement and might actually be harming the academic 
reputation of the institution. Therefore my financial results once again put the spot light on 
staff contractual structures and much needed reform in them. 
 
UK universities signal their pedagogical orientations particularly in the numbers of 
international students they recruit. My result shows that higher fractions of such students have 
a significant positive impact on the asset turnover of UK universities. Clearly there is evidence 
that by focusing resource-based marketing efforts on this segment of fee-paying international 
students the universities gain a boost to their revenue generating ability s predicted by resource 
dependence and stakeholder (Fowles, 2014; Foskett, 2010; Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003; Wise et al., 2020; Leisyte & Westerheijden, 2014; Freeman, 2010; Rolfe, 2003; Dolton 
& Ma, 2003; Pittaway et al., 1998; Li et al., 2010). After all such students pay the highest level 
of uncapped fees in the student bodies of UK universities. The legitimacy and credibility gains 
of an international student-based university academic profile too are very much in evidence in 
this result (Scherer et al., 2013; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). Ianneli & Huang 
(2014) shows how the UK has adopted the most liberal norms with regard to international 
student visa and entry to help support universities in their drive to become both financially 
sustainable as well as globally relevant. The author cites the OECD evidence in rocbust support 
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of his claim (OECD, 2004). My result here is the proof that this move has proved richly 
financially rewarding to the universities. He enture host of poicy initiatives under the umbrella 
of “The UK Education Brand” (1999) aggressively pedalled by the Government seem to be 
working for these institutions (Li et al., 2010). 
 
My results however do not support empirical voices that take issue with rising levels of 
international students. Broadly concurring with culture & quality assurance as well as resource 
dependence theoretical strains (Trowler, 2008; Alvesson, 2002; Fowles, 2014; Pfeffer & 
salancik, 2003; Verschuere & De Corte, 2014; Filippaku & Tapper, 2008; Sawir, 2013; Bright, 
2004; Bachan, 2017; Anyanwu, 2004; Barron, 2006) these scholars question the wisdom of 
taking on so many international students because of the extra workloads and declining 
academic standards including instruction/assessment quality that such students seem to 
engender. In fact, this is corroborated in my university academic performance result which 
show a negative association here. On the whole then the meanings of my positive result here 
should not be taken as a carte blanche for higher numbers of international students. Governors 
have to be conscious of the fact that higher levels of such students are likely to have a 
deleterious impact on the academic standards and impose higher academic workloads (Trice, 
2003; Niles, 1995; DEET, 1990, pg. 72; Bolsmann & Miller, 2008). UK universities kept 
unchecked will ignore their domestic clientele and focus on international fee-paying students 
(Cxoy et al., 2001; Callan, 2000; Anyanwu, 2004; Trice, 2003; Spencer-Rodgers & McGovern, 
2002). After all this helps them meet their financial sustainability issues and arguably avoid 
taking debt. Therefore, there is little doubt that UK governance faces a serious challenge here 
in terms of this inordinate trend towards recruiting higher levels of international students. 
Careful regulatory guidance is indeed the need of the hour.  
 
My financial performance results show that the level of post graduate students at a given UK 
university does not have a positive impact on its revenue generation. Regardless of the higher 
reputational legitimacy, academic ambience and quality assured by higher numbers of 
postgraduate students (Parker, 2008; Angell et al., 2008; Donaldson & McNicholas, 2004; 
House, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Dolton & Ma, 2003) PGINT by itself does not seem to increase 
Asset Turnover.  
 
To explain this result, one needs to examine the empirical literature which has many studies 
(Angell et al., 2008, smith et al., 2010; HESA, 2015; House, 2010; Wilson, 2012; Universities 
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UK, 2015) that underline how postgraduate students generally constitute a minority of the 
student body at most universities. This is a fact confirmed even in this sample (see Chapter 5, 
table 4). This lower fraction may be at the root of why their fees do not matter significantly to 
the university’s asset turnover. Elsewhere, studies (Harris, 1996; House, 2010; Smith et al., 
2010) also suggest that at least some streams of postgraduates such as research postgraduates 
at UK universities tend to be funded by bursaries and scholarships. Hence, they pay less fees 
in general. There is also empirical evidence (Donaldson & McNicholas, 2004; HESA, 2015; 
House, 2010; Smith et al., 2010) that many postgraduate students tend to work and pursue 
study only part time and thus pay less fees. All of this combined together seems to explain the 
lack of association between PGINT and AT. 
 
The seemingly insignificant coefficient here must not be taken to imply that this variable is not 
important. As argued by several normative and empirical governance scholars (House, 2010; 
Tarbet el al., 2008; Rudd, 2018; Stanton et al., 2009) PGINT signals the pedagogical 
orientation of a university. It is a highly visible signal especially to potential students who view 
it as a filtering mechanism when deciding their university of choice. Universities with high 
levels of post graduates are considered to be academically superior institutions and this aspect 
should not be under emphasised.  
 
On the whole pedogogical orientations seem to be an important missing dimension of 
universoyty governance that has important impacts on its financial performance. There is need 
for carefully considered regulatory guidance by the authorities to UK universities on how they 
should choose levels of international and post graduate student places and courses.  
 
7.6.2 University Financial Performance in Board level & Audit related 
Governances 
 
University financial performance exhibits a rich range of patterns in the usual board and audit 
related governance of the institution. My positive association between UK university VC pay 
and financial performance generally meets at least three theoretical expectations. Higher levels 
of VC remuneration seem to align the incumbent’s interests with those of the institution and 
thus motivate him/her to aggressively pursue the financial well being of the university (Tarbert 
et al., 2008; Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Walker et al., 2019; Baker, 2017). Similarly paying VCs 
highly seems to ensure that the university gains a person with rich set of resources and expertise 
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that consequently improve its financial performance (Simon, 1957; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Johnes & Virmani, 2019; Becker, 1993; Ehrenberg & 
Bognanno, 1990; Blanchflower, 2017; Shackelton, 2017). Universities paying their VCs highly 
also seem to be contracting optimally and thus ensuring the incumbent has the right incentives 
to generate financial performance (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Mallin et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 
2015; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Edmans et al., 2009; Gabiax & Landier, 2008).  
 
Earlier work in universities seems to support this result (Brown & Lee, 2010; Fahlenbrach, 
2009; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; ). Yet my result needs to be read in line with the negative 
association with teaching performance and insignificant association with research already 
discussed earlier (see Chapter 7.3.2 & 7.4.2). The implication here seems to be that UK 
universities have indeed been prioritising financial performance in general. There have been 
growing indications in the policy and normative literatures that VCs are generally being 
rewarded based on their mission related performances as underlined by Walker et al. (2019) on 
account of student recruitments/retentions and in the competitive league tables. Perhaps this is 
what is mirrored in my positive association here. Within the context of a sector that is 
increasingly starved of funds and forced to depend on internal sources to bridge growing budget 
deficits it is not surprising to find that universities are paying VCs highly and reaping the 
rewards of fee incomes on a priority basis (Hillman, 2018; Foskett, 2010; Fowles, 2014; 
Molesworth et al., 2010; Brown & carasso, 2013). Yet what must not be lost sight of here is 
the fact that such VCs do not really seem to bring their promised academic rewards. My sample 
seems to strongly suggest that VC pays are only positively associated with financial 
performance. A certain commercially oriented mindset seems to have set in to the sector and 
this is perhaps why at least some scholars have issues with the legitimacy and publically 
justifiable aspects of such high pay. A case in point here is the recent case of the VC of Bath 
university who was forced to resign in the wake of very high pay awards (Bennett, 2017; 
Slawson, 2018). 
 
Yet the challenge of VC pay remains centre stage. There are voices in the literature that have 
been arguing that VCs are underpaid in relation to their talent and job scope (Johnes & Virmani, 
2019; Blanchflower, 2017; Soh, 2007). After all these authors claim they are managing a very 
complex multi-dimensional institution with several keen trade-offs that cannot be resolved 
even as easily as in the corporate sector (Simon, 1957). So, universities and their regulators 
face an uneviable challenge to achieve an optimal remuneration level that achieves both a 
 394 
retention of the best talent in the sector while at the same time supporting all round university 
performance especially in academics. It does seem that the stage is set for the OFS to step in 
with detailed guidelines that can shed light on how universities can step up to this challenge.  
 
The positive association between board meeting frequency and asset turnover is similar to my 
result in research performance, and confirms that a frequently meeting board balances 
stakeholder concerns, improves legitimacy, allows resource rich board members to contribute, 
makes for optimality in all revenue contractual mechanisms and thus on the whole improves 
the financial performance of the institution (Reverte, 2009; Schofield, 2009; Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990; Suchman, 1995; Melville Ross, 2010; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Donaldson & davis, 
1991). My result does not support any dysfunctionality arguments for frequently meeting 
boards stressed in optimal contracting, stewardship or managerial power theories. The meaning 
of this result is obvious. In consonance with many empirical voices (Vefeas, 1999; Sonnenfeld, 
2002), director diligence and monitoring abilities are indeed enhanced in my sample and this 
is what seems to result in higher turnover amongst these UK universities. Perhaps here is more 
robust proof in line with earlier studies like (Hillman, 2018; turner, 2019; McGettigan, 2013; 
Jack, 2018b; Inman, 2018) that within the context of heightened uncertainty in UK HEI the 
CUC’s directive of at least 4 board meetings per annum seems to be helping universities 
address financial shortfalls and thus achieve higher turnover (CUC, 2009; 2014). Universities 
would be well advised to meet more frequently with a heightened focus on achieving better 
academic and financial performance.  
 
Audit committee size in my results has a positive and significant association with university 
financial performance. This echoes many theoretical predictions. In my UK sample it seems 
that larger audit committees enforce public purposes of financial sustainability (CUC, 2008; 
Dewing & Williams, 1995; De Simone & Rich, 2019; Browne, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013; 
Montondon & Fischer, 1999), internal process control/transparency (Weir, Laing & McKnight, 
2002; Osborne & Bell, 2009), ensure higher stakeholder inclusion as well as quality/optimality 
focus (Donaldson L & Davis, 1991; Wicks & Parmar, 2004; Donaldson T & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 2010; Marginson, 2006) . It does seem as though my result in this variable ratifies 
CUC recommendations that stress better internal audit mechanisms in UK universities (CUC, 
2017, 2008). There is now empirical evidence that bigger audit committees are indeed more 
effective. Such larger committees seem to be able to scrutinize executive actions better, 
engender transparency all around, bringing a heightened financial focus and this is what is 
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showing up in higher turnovers in my sample (Bedard & Gendorn, 2010; Ghafran & 
O’Sullivan, 2013). Elsewhere in the empirical literature Ditternhofer (2001) and Goodwin 
(2004) claim that internal audit is emerging as an important component of managemet and 
governance mechanisms both in private and public sector, and Ntim et al. (2017) highlights 
how the audit committees are in themselves new to the sector but an effective means to 
demonstrate to outside agencies that the university is indeed serious about internal financial 
mechanisms. My positive result here may be showing this explicitly. Grant providers and other 
external agencies are indeed impressed by robust audit committee functions and thus sanction 
higher levels of grants to such universities.   
 
Finally, my sample shows an insignificant association between the presence of a unique 
governance committee in a university and its financial performance. Unlike how research 
performance is negatively impacted the financials of a university do not seem to be directly 
impacted by such committees. There is support for optimal contracting stewardship and 
managerial power arguments that adding layers of bureaucracy and redtape do not effectively 
improve the financial performance of a university. My result robustly questions the wisdom of 
adding layers of bureaucracy in terms of a unique governance committee. Read together it does 
seem that such committees either negatively impact research performance or do not materially 
alter financial performance. While earlier work by Ntim et al. (2017) has found a positive 
impact on university voluntary disclosure my result here does not extend that positivity into 
university financial performance.  
 
On the whole the discussion above shows how UK university financial performance is 
impacted in a varied manner in the board and audit related governance mechanisms of this 
institution too.   
 
7.7 Governance Trade-offs, inter-relationships and Controls in University 
Performance  
 
This final section of the Discussions and Conclusion Chapter tackles the important research 
objective of understanding and explicating the key trade-offs between UK university academic 
and financial university performances as well as their governance-based antecedents. In the 
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process the thesis also attempt to flag important differences in the sample in relation to the four 
different types of university mission, age region and size controls.  
 
The discussions in the earlier sections of this chapter identify at least three important trade-offs 
that UK universities face in terms of their academic and financial performances. First in 
attracting international students, while UK universities seem to significantly benefit in my 
results such students seem to impose academic workloads and reduce academic especially 
research performance (Trice, 2003; Niles, 1995, DEET, 1990, pg. 72; Bolsmann & Miller, 
2008). So, university governors face a tricky trade-off in terms of how many such students 
should really be admitted. They have to take care of the financial sustainability of the institution 
by seeking out these high tuition fee paying segments but be consciously aware of the academic 
implications alluded to by Sawir (2013) and Li et al. (2010). Second VC pay levels in my 
results have a clear negative impact on university teaching performance but are simultaneously 
seen to improve financial revenue generation and performance. Once again here the university 
is faced with the tricky choice of recruiting the best talent for the top job in the institution by 
paying liberally while at the same time avoiding any loss in legitimacy and student satisfaction 
arising from such a pay policy (Walker et al., 2019; Lucey et al., 2019; Tarbert et al., 2008; 
gabiax & Landier, 2008). Finally, even in the use of TONLY RONLY and PTTSR contracts 
there is evidence that such contracts have no decided impact on university financial 
performance they do indeed have significant negative impacts on different types of university 
academic performance (see Chapter 7.6.2). Thus, within a scenario of budget difficulties and 
cost optimisations largely prevalent in the UK HEI sector universities nevertheless face the 
dilemma of allowing use of single function and cost saving contracts but with the proviso of 
facing academic shortfalls due to their use (Bryson, 2004; Burgess et al., 2006; McGettigan, 
2013). In sum, then my results show how university governors have to face up to these different 
trade-offs and perform a delicate balancing act while deciding such key governances. 
 
At another level across all my results there is evidence of crucial inter-relationships between 
university governances. For example, it is apparent that universities that postulate higher entry 
standards generally might also choose lower student staff ratios in line with a reduced student 
academic burden (see Chapter 7.3.2, pg. 338-341). Similarly, there seem to be a logical and 
likely inter-relationship between a UK university’s spend on services and facilities and its 
ability to attract fee paying international students that may improve financial performance but 
impose higher academic burdens (Dao & Thrope, 2015; Migin et al., 2015; Wiers-Jenssen et 
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al., 2002; Nixon et al., 2016). Finally, student body coverage may fulfil a university’s public 
and societal mandate but force the institution to choose higher levels of single teaching-only 
or part-time staff with a direct deteriorating quality implication (Scott, 1995; Molesworth et 
al., 2010; McGettigan, 2013; Sawir, 2013; Bright, 2004; Barron, 2006). Such interrelationships 
between governances show their nuances within many of my results and there is clearly an 
important need to further investigate these in UK HEI.  
 
My results also highlight a range of different patterns among governance dimensions of UK 
universities in terms of their age, mission, location and size. For example, Pre and post 1992 
UK universities differ significantly in all the governance dimensions. The pre-92 universities 
generally exhibit higher entry standards, lower student staff ratios, lesser prevalence of single 
function and part time staff contracts, higher endowment levels, higher board sizes, less 
diversity and independence in boards. A similar pattern is seen in terms of Russell and non-
Russell Group comparisons (see Appendix 1). Such differences are also seen in university 
research teaching and financial performances. Pre-92 universities generally outperform their 
peers in research and financial performances but there is a mixed picture in terms of teaching 
performances (see Chapter 6.1 & 6.3). Russell Group universities seem to outperform their 
peers in academic performance but do not significantly differ in terms of financial 
performances (see Chapter 6.1, 6.2 & 6.3). Larger universities generally outperform in 
academic performances but do less well than their smaller counterparts in asset turnovers. 
Finally, regionally English universities outperform in both academic and financial 
performance. There is a clear drop in the performance as one moves towards Wales, Scotland 
and Ireland. This discussion clarifies that there is further need for in depth investigation of the 
heterogeneity in the UK university sector in terms of size, age, mission and region.    
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7.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has qualitatively discussed the six regression models of university governance and 
performance developed and interpreted in Chapter 6. Linking each of the earlier findings back 
to the theories of university governance and the vast empirical normative and policy-based 
literatures the chapter drew out a set of key novel insights here. In so doing the chapter has 
contributed in several different ways including identifying and explicating missing dimensions 
of university governance and their performance associations; identifying and explaining a 
range of complex trade-offs embedded in the multiple dimensions of university governance 
and performance and assessing the status of current regulatory and policy based iniatiatives in 
UK HEI. The next chapter brings all of this discussion together to answer both the research 














8. Chapter Eight: Conclusions & Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The Chapter concludes this multi-dimensional exploration of university governance and 
performance in the UK. A brief foregrounding of why such a study remains important within 
a rapidly changing higher education context in the country is appropriate here. The winds of 
change that have been blowing through the sector have left none of the governance structures, 
processes and mechanisms or performance predelictions of these unique knowledge 
institutions untouched (See Chapter 1, pg.16-36). Marketisation of the university, the growth 
of a global higher education ethos, a drastic reduction in Government funding, deteriorating 
academic quality standards, a growing multiplicity of players in the sector and the emerging 
expectations among publics of a multiple role fulfilling institution have put the spotlight on the 
UK university and its multi-dimensionality as never before (Foskett, 2010; Brown & Carasso, 
2013; Molesworth et al., 2010; Shattock & Horvath, 2019; McGettigan, 2013; Kim, 2008; 
Middlehurst, 2013, Collini, 2012; Hayes, 2002; Trowler, 2012). Now more than ever there is a 
growing consensus within the general academic and policy discourse in UK HEI that 
governance studies of this institution must step up to the task of truly transforming it.  
 
In what follows, in section 8.2 the chapter answers the research question posed in the 
introduction. The next section 8.3 details the novel contributions of this thesis to the body of 
knowledge in university governance and performance. Recommendations to policy and 
practice follow in the next section. In section 8.5 the main limitations of this study are 
delineated. Research directions for the rapidly expanding field of university governance studies 








8.2 Summary of Findings  
 
From the insights gleaned in the previous Chapter, the following important conclusions can be 
stated to the crucial research objectives set out in the Introductory Chapter. 
 
RO1: To identify and uncover missing dimensions of university governance in the UK. 
First and foremost, the thesis mined the rich theoretical, policy-based and empirical scholarship 
in university governance to identify five distinct relatively new dimensions of university 
governance that have been largely ignored (Lokuwaduge, 2011; Ntim et al., 2017; Olson, 
2000; Harris, 2014; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Collini, 2004; Middlehurst, 2013; 
Shattock, 2013a,b, 2012; Molesworth et al., 2010; Kim, 2008; McNay, 2005, 2010; Hillman, 
2018, 2014; Watson, 2014; Blackmore, 2016). These are Selectivity in Entry Standards, 
Instruction Intensity in Student Staff Ratio, Research/Teaching/Gender Modalities in Staff 
Contracts, Pedagogical Orientations in Student Body Diversities and Strategic Choices in 
Asset/Revenue Structures. The thesis found much evidence in the policy narratives and 
changing governance context of UK HEI for many of these dimensions and particularly the last 
one (Dearing, 2012; CUC, 2016, 2017; OFS, 2019a,b; HEC, 2014; House, 2010; Hillmam, 
2014; Fowles, 2014; Taylor, 2013; Gayle et al., 2003; Melville-Ross, 2010; Collini, 2012; Scott 
& Callender, 2013; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Mcgettigan, 2013; Shattock, Shattock & Horvath, 
2019; Shattock, 2010, 2008, 2001). The first two of these new dimensions are in themselves 
single variables whereas the last three are composite constructs aggregating into 13 new 
variables. 
 
In uncovering each of these dimensions, related singular features were discovered in this UK 
sample that further confirmed and corroborated the governance challenges embedded in them 
(See Chapter 7.2, pg. 332-336).  
 
In the first two dimensions the distinctive yet widely varying patterns found in the sample 
reflected the difficult research teaching and financial trade-offs embedded in these choices. 
Optimality in these two closely linked dimensions was clearly found to be uniquely 
individually rooted within each university (Murdoch, 2002; Schwartz, 2004; Hillman, 2014). 
In their complex calibrated choices of research, teaching and gender-based staff contracts UK 
universities were seen to be trading off several sets of opposing and complex concerns resulting 
in a variety of such choices. Here is where the important policy challenges faced by university 
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governors were expressed (Metcalf et al., 2005; Blackmore, 2016; Locke, 2016, 2009; Ackers 
& Oliver, 2007; Brew et al., 2017; Geschwind & Brostorm, 2015). In the fourth missing 
dimension UK universities were found to be searching for the right mix of international and 
postgraduate students in their student bodies. Once again, the university-based differences in 
the sample richly underlined the complex academic ambience and reputational implications of 
this dimension (House, 2010; Trice, 2003; Angell et al., 2008; Lowrie & Hemsley-Brown, 
2013). Finally, UK universities were found to be richly different to corporate firms in their 
strategic financial choices of revenue sources and asset structures (Fowles, 2014; Taylor, 
2013a, b, c; Toutkoushian, 2001; Parker, 2012, 2013; Festo & Nkote, 2007; Marginson, 2004; 
HEC, 2014). Here much evidence was discovered that these institutions needed to grapple with 
the opposing problems of financial sustainability and financial independence.  
 
RO2: To evaluate how all dimensions of university governance impact on this 
institution’s research, teaching and financial performances.  
Second in evaluating the impacts of all the multiple dimensions of university governance 
on the research, teaching and financial performance many interesting conclusions were 
found. Among the missing dimensions of university governance, Selectivity in Entry Standards 
exemplified the enormous challenge facing UK universities. The evaluation showed how 
inclusivity-elitist divides have ruptured these institutions (See Chapter 7.3.2, pg. 339-341; 
7.4.2, pg. 365-366; Results in Table 16, 22 & 6; Appendix Table 1, pg. 419-422 ). They need 
a much higher degree of sensitive calibration of the dimension in order to truly achieve 
academic performances that effect knowledge creation and dissemination in the best and most 
socially responsible manner. From the evaluation of Instruction intensity in Student Staff 
Ratios an even greater challenge emerged for the UK university. Lowering the level of this 
dimension was indeed salutary to teaching performance but this proved to be a very small part 
of the problem (See Chapter 7.3.2, pg. 341-342; 7.4.2, pg. 366-368; Results in Table 16, 22 & 
6; Appendix 1, pg. pg. 419-422). The institution’s main challenge was in calibrating this 
dimension to tackle the tricky trade-offs of staff utilization, staff morale and student 
recruitment in the most optimal way without compromising either academic quality/integrity 
or student inclusion.  
 
In the third missing dimension of research/teaching/gender modalities in staff contracts the 
evaluation revealed richly complex and varied impacts on academic and financial 
performances of UK universities (See Chapter 7.3.2, pg. 342-349; Chapter 7.4.2, pg. 368-371; 
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Chapter 7.6.1, pg. 389-390; results in Table16, 18, 20, 22, 24 & 26; Appendix 1, pg. 419-422). 
Whether it was in the growing need for a rethink of the nature and types of academic staff 
contracts in use in the sector, or, in the calibrated use of part-time or single function contracts, 
or even in the manner of gender inclusion strategies at staff levels there were clear indications 
of exaggerated and differentiated impacts on research, teaching and financial performances of 
these institutions. Here is where the evaluation seemed to bring home each university’s 
strategic challenge in not only choosing its academic/financial priorities through staff contract 
levels but also effectively expressing them in staff contract templates.  
 
The evaluation of the fourth missing dimension of pedagogical orientations in student body 
diversities revealed how the UK university needed to carefully think through the numbers of 
international and post graduate places it chose each academic season (See Chapter 7.3.2, pg. 
349-352; Chapter 7.6.1, pg. 390-392; Results in table 16, 18 & 26). Important revenue raising 
considerations had to be traded off against academic resource burdens, potential academic 
standards decline, research reputational advantages, subject specialism benefits, facility 
investment requirements and the institution’s overall academic ambience. Finally, the 
evaluation of the fifth missing dimension of strategic choices in Asset/revenue structures 
revealed nuanced and complicated impacts on university research, teaching and financial 
performance (See Chapter 7.3.2, pg. 352-355; Chapter 7.4.2, pg. 371-374; Chapter 7.6.1, pg. 
384-388; Results in table Table 16, 18, 20, 22, 24 & 26). Questions of university dependence 
on tuition fees or endowments, university spending on services/facilities, university 
management of cash or debt stood revealed as highly complicated inter-linked strategic 
governance puzzles. It was in the complex answers to these puzzles that the UK university’s 
broader challenge lay. A need was seen for this institution to maintain independence, 
sustainability, academic integrity and overall performance in a scenario of dwindling 
government support and rapid marketization of the sector.  
 
Even among the usual board level and audit related governance aspects of universities patterns 
of performance influence were revealed to be varied (See Chapter 7.3.3, pg. 355-362; Chapter 
7.4.3, pg. 374-380; Chapter 7.6.2, pg. 392-395; Results in table 16, 18, 20, 22, 24 & 26). 
Although under regulatory pressures most UK universities were moving to the corporate norm 
of smaller boards there were unmistakeable signs of the academic enrichment engendered in 
universities who defied this norm and maintained larger boards. Board independence and 
various audit related structures were revealed to function and influence performance in nuanced 
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ways among UK universities. The increasing trend towards larger numbers of lay members, 
engagement of external reputed audit firms and institution of specialised governance 
committees under regulatory pressures although pervasive across these institutions were seen 
to be weak antecedents of performance. This corporate trend was further revealed in VC pay 
where universities seemed to ape firms and remunerate their chief executives on the basis of 
their achievement of financial rather than academic missions.  
 
RO 3&4: To critically unpack the tade-offs and interrelationships within each dimension 
of university governance – To analyse how the governance interrelationships and trade-
offs identified in objective 3 impact upon a university’s research, teaching and financial 
performance.  
Third, the many findings of this thesis highlight a series of inter-governance trade-offs and 
their myriad impacts on university performance. Here is where the challenge facing 
universities were revealed to be unique and unlike those in any other sector of the economy. 
For instance, a combined calculus of performance impacts was clear in how UK universities 
tackled the inter-linked decisions of student entry standards and subsequent student staff ratio. 
The decision made in one dimension here narrowed or complicated the trade-offs in deciding 
the other. Similarly, even within a dimension such as that of  Staff Contracts UK universities 
were seen to be facing a singular series of internal trade-offs as levels/types of one contract 
chosen made such choices in the others more restricted (McNay, 2005; McDonald, 2012; 
Bradley et al., 2008). Elsewhere evidence emerged that student body choices put academic 
resource burdens on universities that made some types of single function or part time staff 
contracts inevitable even while they helped the financial sustainabilities of these institutions 
(Iannelli & Huang, 2014; Furedi, 2004; Bright, 2004; Barron, 2006; Bryson & Blackwell, 
2006). Even within the board and audit related governances many performance-based trade-
offs emerged. Board sizes needed a balance that nevertheless eoncompassed diversity and 
independence issues yet improved academic performance. Vice-Chancellor pay needed greater 
alignment with academic acheivements rather than financial milestones (Gschwandtner & 
McManus, 2018; Lucy et al., 2019; Hubble & Bolton, 2019; Bachan & Reilly, 2015; Tarbert 





RO5: To assess the role played by external governance regulation of the UK Higher 
Education in all these inter-relationships and associations.  
Finally, throughout the evaluations the central picture of external regulation that emerges in 
UK HEI seemed to highlight several inconsistencies and weaknesses. Mass student body 
coverage mandates issued by regulators nevertheless failed to grasp the full import of likely 
academic and financial governance burdens of such directives (Scott, 1995; Scott & Callender, 
2013; Molesworth et al., 2010; McGettigin, 2013; Kim, 2008). Moves to make universities 
financially sustainable through unchaining tuition fee/student cap restrictions and/or allowing 
more international student places changed repeatedly without much regard to funding 
imperatives or ensuing academic governance challenges (Hillman, 2014, 2016; Fowles, 2014; 
Foskett, 2010; Brown, 2004, 2013). Surprisingly large areas of internal governance trade-offs 
especially with regard to student entry standards, student staff ratios or nature/types of staff 
contracts have been left largely unaddressed by the regulations. Despite fair access issues being 
repeatedly bandied in policy literature there was little evidence that actual policies mandating 
it were ever implemented (OFFA, 2004, 2012; Harris, 2010; Jones & Thomas, 2003; Schwartz, 
2004; Adnett et al., 2011). The nature and types of staff contracts have rarely been discussed 
or regulated on. This is despite the clear evidence that emerged about the importance of such 
constructs and their complicated impacts on university performance (Whitchurch, 2016; 
Whitchurch & Gordon, 2013; Thewlis, 2003; Blackmore, 2016, 2006; Cui et al., 2019; Locke, 
2016). Even within the several regulations (CUC, 2009; 2016; 2017; House of Commons 
Committee of Public Account, 2012; Higher Education Committee, 2014) mandating board 
sizes, diversities, independences, financial sustainabilities and VC pay there was a 
disconcerting trend towards corporate style pronouncements and managerial/efficiency 
perspectives that did not seem entirely appropriate to higher education. 
 
8.3 Research Contributions 
 
This thesis has fundamentally shifted the contours of the debate in university governance and 
performance. Veering away from a corporate governance paradigm it has discovered a rich and 
complex panoply of insights that differentiate the governance performance relationships of UK 
universities across the years from their corporate peers. Not only is there now a deeper and 
richer understanding of why these institutions’ have unique multi-dimensional governance 
needs but also the thesis has demonstrated the existence of a range of complex trade-offs within 
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these governance needs that impact on their performance (Chapter 7.5, pg. 380-382; 7.7, pg. 
394-296. Thus, it has singularly highlighted and substantiated the difficult challenges facing 
university governors when calibrating internal governances. For the first time, there is now 
empirical evidence supporting the many normative calls to fundamentally rethink the way 
universities are governed and regulated (Collis, 2004; Frankel, 2011; Harrison & Luckett, 
2019; Jongbloed et al., 2018; Parker, 2011; McGettigin, 2013; Trakman, 2008; Middlehurst, 
2013; Collini, 2012; Shattock, 2008, 2006; 2013; 2012 Buckland, 2004; Watson, 2014; Brown 
& Carasso, 2013; Knight, 2002). At least six fundamental and novel additions by the thesis to 
the body of knowledge here must be detailed. Table 28 below provides a summary of key 
findings in congruence with the gaps and key contributions. 
 
At another level the thesis has comprehensively studied a full range of quantitative indicators 
mapping the governance and performance of universities making full use of the existing 
databases now being expanded by the HESA (Chapter 4, section 4.6.1). This is much needed 
and in line with normative calls across the multi-polar debates in UK university governance 
(Parry, 2011; Rowlands, 2013; Horden, 2013; Parker, 2011; Shattock, 2010, pg. 105). It is also 
arguably the first attempt to support substantiate and embellish the UK government’s recent 
Higher Education legislation with factual and quantitatively rigorous analysis (See Table 1, pg. 
19-21). The thesis must therefore be viewed in this light as a novel attempt to bring together 
many different dimensions embedded in university governance and performance and establish 
their complex inter-relationships. As with any knowledge domain much research remains and 
many of these future directions have been indicated in the previous sections. Yet such future 
research effort now does have a very systematic rigorous and quantitatively complete docket 
sheet of conclusions against which to map progress.  
 
First and foremost, the thesis has conceptualised university governance and performance in the 
most comprehensive manner. Crafting an encompassing yet holistic definition of either 
construct that fully captures their multiple dimensions it has restructured the focus towards the 
key aspects that are in need of elaboration (Chapter 2.2, pg. 45-50; 2.3, pg. 45-56). In that sense 
the thesis has arguably expanded the lexicon of university governance and performance. No 
longer can these constructs be either identified with with solely apex level mechanisms and 
processes nor can they exclude crucial academic cultural and quality-based imperatives. Both 
constructs within higher education stand revealed as highly complex yet unified entities in their 
own right. Forthcoming scholarship in university governance will be able to use this expansive 
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conception to further investigate the multi-dimensional associations between university 
governance and performance. 
 
Second, based on a systematic theoretical scrutiny of an eclectic seven theory framework, the 
study has expanded the vocabulary of university governance performance by showing how five 
missing governance dimensions are crucial to a deeper understanding of the multi-dimensional 
associations between them (See Chapter 2.4, pg. 56-92). From the 4-core and 3-ancillary 
theories used here these missing dimensions were explicitly related through a range of key 
hypotheses to academic and financial performances of the university (See Chapter 3.2, pg. 103-
165). In doing so the study has fundamentally altered the theoretical template of university 
governance by including these important missing dimensions and their important performance 
impacts.  
 
Third, by collating a rich and expanded panel data set of institution-wide 
governance/performance quantitative indicators in UK HEI covering a recent full decade the 
thesis contributes to the empirical literature in university studies. For the first time this has shed 
unique light on how data newly made available to the sector by institutions such as HESA can 
be optimally utilized to reveal important multi-dimensional insights. Surely, the detailed 
longitudinal panel analyses here can be viewed as a unique inflexion point in HEI studies which 
have hitherto been narrowly focused on corporate governance style board and audit related 
governance mechanisms (Ntim et al., 2017; Lokuwaduge, 2011; Olson, 2000; Harris, 2014). 
 
Fourth, the robust empirical findings from the rich panel data set of UK HEI in this study 
provides different degrees of confirmation, corroboration and contradictions for the many 
theoretical associations indicated by the multi-theoretical framework used here (Chapter 2.4.1 
& 2.4.2). These findings are a robust check list of university governance performance 
relationships that will surely help both university governors and future researchers. The former 
will be able to chart their institution’s progress towards a better internal governance mechanism 
while the latter will be able to evaluate the impact of governance reform in the sector. 
 
Fifth, the study breaks new ground in the verification/attestation of UK HEI policy changes. 
The longitudinal analyses here arguably represent the first attempt to support substantiate the 
UK government’s recent Higher Education legislation with factual and quantitatively rigorous 
analysis (CUC, 2001; 2006; 2008; 2014; 2018; 2019; OFS, 2018b, c; 2019a; Chapter 1.1.1, 
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table 1). The thesis thus sets the stage for further investigation into the effectiveness of existing 
regulations. Given the important regulatory changes introduced especially in the decade 
included within the study a valuable opportunity presented itself and has been used to test the 
credibility and efficacy of some of these newly introduced changes. At the same time the thesis 
also contributes by showing some important missing regulations especially in terms of staff 
job descriptions and board member recruitments that empirically seem critical antecedents of 
university performance. In totality all of these will surely aid in the cogent formulation of an 
empirical data base of regulatory insights that can be utilized by future regulators and 
researchers. 
 
Sixth, the thesis provides an empirical basis for certain key concepts that have long formed an 
intricate part of the university governance policy normative and argumentative literatures. In 
the many levels of analyses in the study there have been indications of culture/quality-
assurance based trade-offs and process-like characteristics in university governance and 
performance (Gayle et al., 2003; Trowler, 2008, 2019; Trowler & Cooper, 2002). Teaching 
and Learning regimes have also been seen to be implicated in many of the quantitative 
indicators chosen and their inter-relationships. A valuable first attempt at obtaining quantitative 
insight into these crucial aspects of governance has been obtained here. Surely this can aid in 
the enrichment of future empirical work in the sector.  
 
On the whole the brief discussion above has established the wide scale and scope of knowledge 
contributions provided by the thesis. Within the context of a UK HEI sector buffeted by rapid 
and transformative change these knowledge contributions are vital. They hold up a mirror to 
the sectoral policy and regulatory apparatus to assess the extent to which current regimes are 
fit for purpose. They have the potential to help all sector participants, policy makers and 
researchers understand and evaluate their actions. Yet a lot remains to be done here and in that 
too this thesis provides a preliminary but rigorous basis for future work.
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Table 28: A summary of gaps, key findings and contributions 
 
Theoretical/ Empirical gaps        Key findings        Key contribution  
Empirical Gap 1  
The missing multiple dimensions of 




• The study found 5 new dimensions in university 
governance apart from the usual board level and audit 
related ones generally studied in extant literature (Ntim et 
al., 2017; Harris, 2014; Olson, 2000; Lokuwaduge, 2011; 
Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015). These are: Entry 
Standards (selectivity in intake); Student Staff Ratio 
(Instruction intensity); Research/Teaching/Gender 
modalities in staff level contracts; Pedagogical 
orientations in student body diversities; Strategic financial 
choices in asset/revenue structures 
• In order to unpack these new dimensions and their 
interlinked associations with university performance the 
thesis uses 15 hitherto unused governance variables 
(Chapter 4.6.1 & 5.2.1). By doing so it finds rich 
evidence for these interlinked complex associations.  
• To make explicit the above complex associations the 
thesis also spliced university performance into two 
separate constructs namely Academic and Non Academic.  
Academic performance was decomposed into research 
and teaching while non-academic performance was 
interpreted to be largely financial. From a wider variable 
selection research performance was measured in terms of 
one RPI index (composed of 5 separate variables) and two 
distinct variables viz. RQ and RGF. Similarly Teaching 
Performance was measured using one TPI index and one 
distinct variable TGF. Financial performance was 
measured in terms of Asset Turnover. Each of these 
different variables were found to have many of the 
 
• Uncovering these dimensions has allowed us to shift 
the debate of university governances and performance 
away from the corporate governances paradigm. It is 
now amply clear that universities are governed in 
multiple ways and a focus merely on the board or audit 
structures as in a corporate firm is far from adequate 
here. Thus, expanading the definition for university 
governance and performance.   
• Also it reveals a rich and complex picture that 
differentiates the governance-performance 
relationships in UK universities across the years and 
highlights/substantiate the difficult challenges facing 
university governors when calibrating internal 
governances (Vukasovic et al., 2018). For the first time 
there is now empirical evidence for the many 
normative arguments for fundamentally rethinking the 




complex trade-offs characterizing university governance 
and performance (Chapter 7). 
 
Empirical Gap 2  
Missing cultural and quality 
assurance aspects in extant 






• Governance and performance are both outcomes as well 
as processes. This is especially true in Higher Education 
(Laband & Lentz, 2004; Vukasovic et al., 2018). through 
the use of a very wide range of gov-per-variables this 
thesis finds evidence of performance-governance 
endogeneity and continuum type aspects. Where 
governance ends and performance begins or vice-versa is 
difficult to pin down and this is seen in many of the 
results.  
• All the 5 new missing dimensions the thesis finds 
different processes at work leading to underperformance 
of the HEI sector as a whole.  
Notable examples here include the adverse selection 
problems engendered by existing ES/SSR policy fixations 
and regulatory weaknesses; staff level contractual gap 
strengthened by lack of human resource regulation 
planning and vision; pedagogical syndromes encouraged 
by a mindless marketisation of HEI sector and so on.   
• The thesis in several of the findings highlights for the very 
first time the importance of the construct of each 
university’s (TLRs) because it play a vital role in 
university governance-performance processes. Although 
TLRs and their importance have been stressed in the 
normative university governance literature time and again 
this is the first time my thesis shows empirical proof of it. 
• The thesis finds evidence for deep and abiding 
cultural/regional impacts within UK university 
governance-performance processes. In all empirical 
results the mission, location and status of universities is 
seen to play a vital and moderating role. Simultaneously 
the sample evidence proves many of the normative 
 
 
• By identifying process like characteristics in university 
governance and showing their multiple complex 
impacts on performance the study forges a new 
academic trajectory. Future research scholarship would, 
it is hoped, take this on board and design new research 
methods to unravel these processes further. 
• The focus on processes in university governance 
performance has also established several important 
regulatory gaps that need urgent remediation in the UK 
HEI sector. Therefore this thesis has succeeded in 
showing how intricate and detailed knowledge of 
governance processes should form an important input 
into all HEI regulatory design. 
• The constructing of “Teaching and Learning Regimes” 
now finds an important place in the empirical debates 
of university governance and performance.  
• Governance processes culture and Quality Assurance 
now emerge as important influences on university 
research teaching and financial performance. The 
future debates in UK HEI must now incorporate these 




contentions of quality assurance scholars right and some 
of them wrong. Notably the importance of new 
regulations related to the five missing dimensions of 
university governance and major corrections to restrictive 
controls on board and audit related governances are 
highlighted in this sample. In both these findings in 
different ways TLRs are once again highlighted as 
formative influences. 
 




• The thesis examined the impact of university governance 
on university performance using a 10 year panel data 
sample for 132 UK universities. The use of a 10 year 
sample allowed for a detailed consideration of intra-year 
inter-university differences. It is through this detailed 
longitudinal insight that this thesis supports many of the 
earlier findings. 
• The five missing dimensions of university governance and 
their different impacts on R/T/F performance are 
validated only because of the heterogeneity among UK 
universities that has been growing across the decade (See 
Chapter 5, table 4 & Appendix Table 1). This is now 
highlighted in this in-depth longitudinal analysis. 
• Even the usual board level governances and the existing 
regulation gets highlighted only because of the cross-
section of UK universities being studied across several 
years. This allowed us make comparisons between top, 
medium and poor performances and have allowed for a 
rigorous interpretations which strengthen all the findings.  
• Finally the thesis tests many of the existing regulatory 
prescription of the UK higher education sector and 
recommends important corrections based on longitudinal 
findings. In respect of Board Size, Board Diversity and 
  
• All the empirical findings of this thesis stemming from 
detailed longitudinal analyses raise the level and nature 
of debates in university governance and performance. 
The body of knowledge now has a comprehensive set 
of rigorously tested findings that can serve as a guide 
to future research in this field.  
• The thesis comprehensively studies a wide range of 
antecedents mapping out university governance and 
performance making full use of the existing databases 
now being expanded by the HESA and other agencies. 
This can be viewed as an inflection point in 
governance-performance studies in UK HEI and can 
be a robust template for future research. 
• The longitudinal analyses here is also arguably the first 
attempt to support substantiate the UK government’s 
recent Higher Education legislation with factual and 
quantitatively rigorous analysis, and this also set the 
stage for further investigation into the effectiveness of 
existing regulations (CUC, 2018; 2014; 2008; 2006; 
Browne, 2010; Lambert, 2003; OFFA, 2004; 2012; 
OFS, 2018a,b, c; 2019a, b; HEA, 2009; 2004).  
The thesis make important contribution to empirical 
understating by showing how some important 
regulations are missing such as those in terms of staff 
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Board Independence the robust findings allow for a better 
insight into what works and what does not. 
job descriptions and board member recruitments. This 
will allow for a clear data based regulatory insight to 
be generated.  
Theoretical Gap 1 
Existing university governance and 




• Using the contextual theoretical literature encompassing 
higher education culture governance and performance in 
conjunction with my 7-theory-framework the study found 
5 important missing dimensions of university governance.  
• And referring back to this 7-theoretical-framework these 5 
missing dimensions were then found to have complex 
interlinked associations with university 
Research/Teaching/Financial performances. 
• In deciphering these complex associations, many of 
theoretical and largely normative explanations and 
arguments in the wider contextual literature were found to 
be justified (Chapter 2.4 & 3.2).  
• And finally, Expanding the theoretical-framework 
allowed a detailed illustration of key trade-offs that faces 





• This study has expanded the vocabulary of university 
governance performance studies by showing how five 
missing dimensions need to be incorporated in them. 
This has extended the theoretical scope.  
• The 4-core and 3-ancillary theories used jointly in the 
explanations, have helped expand the scope of 
theoretical analysis of university governance and 
performance relationships. The new theoretical-
framework have also resulted in identification of new 
governance and performance variables.  
• What has emerged here is a fresh perspective showing 
the complex trade-offs embedded in university 
governance and performance.  
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8.4 Recommendations & Policy Implications 
 
University performance emerges in the sub-sections above as a complex construct influenced 
by a collage of different dimensions of university governance. For the first time five very 
important unique dimensions of governance articulated at different levels and in different ways 
across the university are shown to be the prime antecedents here. These are Entry Standards, 
Student Staff Ratio, Teaching/Research/Gender modalities in Staff level diversities, 
Pedagogical orientations in student body diversities and Strategic financial choices in 
Asset/Revenue structures. Apart from the board level and related governance dimensions 
prescribed by corporate governance it is these new hitherto unexplored dimensions of 
university governance that require effective calibration by UK universities. Five important 
recommendations need delineation here.  
 
First and foremost, calibrating selectivity in entry standards and the student staff ratio is very 
vital to effective university academic performance. Each of these two governance dimensions 
have very important multiple effects and trade-offs that need careful consideration. But it is 
rather surprising that none of the governance policy planners whether inside UK universities 
or in the HEI regulatory apparatus even explicitly consider these (Hillman, 2014; Boliver, 
2013; Gorard et al., 2006; Harris, 2010; BIS, a,b; DfES, 2003, 2004; OFFA, 2004, 2012; 
Adnett, 2011; Schwartz, 2004). One of the major recommendations then is to incorporate both 
these variables in policy and practice. First, the toolkit of governance in universities must be 
explicitly expanded to include them. Using this toolkit board and departmental university 
governors across UK universities must set into motion new sets of policy initiatives that address 
the challenging trade-offs here. These must effectively calibrate both variables in the context 
of each institution’s evolution, mission and resource complexities to achieve higher academic 
performance. Second the regulatory policy discourse in UK HEI must address these dimensions 
and importantly consider the exclusivity concerns, the resource utilization and staff morale 
predicaments and the student’s need for high value-added knowledge-based interactions in the 
sector. The many trade-offs that universities face in this regard need effective guidelines and it 
is the duty of policy planners to step up to this task.  
 
Second, the specific form of the staff contract is a vital governance policy variable that requires 
important attention among all UK universities. The nature of this contract especially with 
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regard to academic mechanisms, priorities, and gender diversities has been seen above to have 
very important influences on university performance. Universities need to decide levels of    
part time, research only and teaching only staff paying careful heed to the trade-offs that they 
face in each (Metcalf et al., 2005; Locke, 2009; Locke et al. 2016; Adams et al., 2005; Brew et 
al., 2017). The very nature and detail of the standard omnibus tenure contract needs to be 
changed to incorporate clear incentives for staff performance. Here is where there is an express 
need for policy framers to take this up on a country wide HEI basis so that a new contractual 
form template relevant to the fast-changing needs of the UK HEI sector is quickly designed 
and rolled out as a best practice guideline. In this connection there is also the important issue 
of female representations in university staff that bear consideration (Blake & La Valle, 2000; 
Metcalf et al., 2005; Santos & Van Phu, 2019; Nyamapfene, 2019). The results in this thesis 
highlight how surface level non discriminatory staff policies mask a sector that remains highly 
disparaging of women and their academic credentials and contributions. Universities still 
employ them on inconsequential contracts and consider them unsuitable for substantial 
research roles. There is a clear need for engaging with this at the highest levels both within 
universities as well as in external regulation.    
 
Third, Universities need specific guidance on how to calibrate their student recruitment policy. 
Pedagogical orientations in this regard need careful attention and the trade-offs in this 
governance must be explicitly considered at all levels. There is a great tendency to copy high 
performing peers which must be avoided. Not all UK universities need to be international or 
post graduate. Some can indeed be finishing schools with an applied orientation as in Europe 
and the US. Universities themselves need to decide such pedagogical priorities based on a full 
consideration of their internal academic strengths and weaknesses. There is an explicit need to 
halt the widespread hubris amongst university governors to take on large numbers of 
international students just to meet financial sustainability targets. The clear danger to the 
academic quality and integrity of these institutions must be clearly understood and governors 
must not ignore this. This is why OFS too needs to step in here with policy guidance aimed at 
protecting the academic reputation of UK HEI. 
 
Fourth, Endowment levels and tuition fee dependence need active consideration by university 
governance policy planners. Within the growing marketisation of the sector and its depletion 
of Government support, the sustainability of the university itself is under a severe threat 
(Parker, 2011; Molesworth & Nixon, 2010; Foskett, 2010; Brown & Carasso, 2013; Collini, 
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2005; Brown, 2015). Never before have endowment levels or tuition fees taken on such an 
exaggerated importance. The results in this thesis have shown a range of potential pernicious 
effects that policies encouraging too much dependence on either can have on this academic 
institution. There is a need for governors to engage with these aspects and ensure that the 
institution does not face serious problems within its academic independence simply because it 
has gone too far in attracting tuition fee paying students or research sponsoring donors (Turner, 
2019; Hillman, 2018; Britain, 2019; Watson, 2012; HEC, 2014). At the same time these 
governors must also not neglect legitimate knowledge facilitating investments that are crucial 
to the ultimate academic role of the university. This is particularly relevant since there seems 
to be growing evidence that UK universities have been fighting a largely losing battle with debt 
and financial sustainability (CUC, 2019; Jack, 2018a, b). While there are some indications that 
the OFS has begun the process of restraining universities from excessive profligacy much more 
remains to be done here (OFS, 2019a, b, 2018). Policy guidelines must achieve a better balance 
between the university’s challenging conundrums here. The complexity of this balance 
between fund raising, academic integrity/independence and wise spending on the right 
academic facilitation must be fully addressed by policy pronouncements. At the same time 
some fragile institutions might need to be supported both financially and otherwise during these 
challenging times. 
 
Finally board composition in terms of size, diversities and independence remains an important 
influence on university research performance. However instead of prescribing limits on size 
regulatory attention must be focused on how to recruit board members to meet the 
network/resource needs and diversities of universities (CUC, 2014; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Further there is evidence that larger board sizes seem to be salutary in UK 
universities unlike in corporate firms (See results in Chapter 6, table 14, 16 & 22; Chapter 
7.3.3, pg. 354-355; 7.4.3, pg. 373-375). Arguably the ability to accommodate more academics 
with experiential insights on the highest governing body in such an institution is at play here. 
Therefore, a detailed best practice guidelines issued by OFS that stressed how larger boards 
might be beneficial would serve UK HEIs better. Similarly, in terms of external lay persons 
once again rather than stipulating specific percentages of such members (50%) it would be far 
more useful to detail methods to select the most relevant external lay members. At another 
level VC pay policies in universities need much higher levels of policy guidance. This should 
address the obvious trade-offs between a healthy motivation level for the incumbent, talent-
reward relation and legitimate concerns with overpayment. The UK HEI sector can neither 
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afford pervasive profligacy in payment levels across universities nor mass talent drain from the 
sector (Shackleton, 2017; Walker et al., 2019; Blanchflower, 2017; Bosetti & Walker, 2010; 
Lucey et al., 2020). Here is where there is a need for considered and active judgment by the 
university boards. Policy guidance should also be forthcoming. Just stipulating as the OFS has 
done that all salary levels above 150K will need detailed justifications is not enough (Hubble 
& Bolton, 2019; Morgan, 2017; OFS, 2018a). More guidance needs to be provided to alert 
universities to the talent and job scope burdens issue. 
 
8.5 Research Limitations  
 
At least five limitations attend this section and must be mentioned here. First and foremost, 
whether it be university research performance or its governance antecedents the variables used 
for each are debatable. While every effort has been made to make this analysis robust such as 
by measuring research performance by at least two different variables and a composite (5 
variable) index or by using sets of more than 20 governance variables it can always be argued 
that these still do not capture the myriad complexities in these constructs. The answer to this 
limitation is that it is a robust beginning wherein for the first time in extant UK university 
governance-performance research an extensive longitudinal data set of 132 universities 
comprising 24 governance antecedents and 5 research performance variables is investigated.  
 
Second the data used in this study is entirely sourced from annual financial reports of 
universities, the TIMES university guides and UK HEI specialist databases such as those 
collated by HESA (Botosan, 1997, pg. 331). However, university governance and performance 
are conducted in the theatre of the university and so it can be argued that many other sources 
of real data are plausible such as questionnaire surveys of students, policy makers and 
governors or face to face interviews with expert practitioners and stakeholders (Tregida et al., 
2007). In so far as this thesis has not utilized such data sources it has to be admitted that rich 
perspectives on governance and performance may have been overlooked here.   
 
Third the methodology of this research is quantitative. The uni/bi/multivariate analyses 
performed here are taken to be the full basis of all the research findings, conclusions and 
recommendations. This is in line with many other studies in university governance such as 
(Lokuwaduge, 2011; Lokuwaduge & Armstrong, 2015; Ntim et al., 2017; Bachan & Reilly, 
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2015; Olson, 2000; Harris, 2014). It is arguable that such a quantitative methodology might 
miss rich explanations/corroborations/contradictions emerging from other types of 
methodology such as a qualitative one or a mixed method approach. However, given the 
resource and tine constraints involved in such combined approaches it was deemed 
inappropriare here.  
 
Fourth, it can be argued that the entire data set here is riddled with several abnormalities outside 
the classical assumptions of the least squares methodology. While the implementation of four 
GLS and two IV regressions combined with an extensive univariate/bivariate analyses do 
indeed raise the level of robustness of the findings here, still, it could be argued that other more 
advanced methods should have been used. However, it must be remembered that existing 
university governance research has not even done as much. Therefore, this study should be 
viewed in this context i.e as an extensive and comprehensive pilot study in the body of 
knowledge here. 
 
Finally, the data set in this thesis had several variables with relatively accepted proportions of 
missing data. Clearly this posed some methodological challenge here. Nevertheless, the 
research did not attempt to window dress this aspect in any way so as to retain integrity in the 
findings. Many other studies (Pustiens et al., 2007; Raymond & Roberts, 1987; Dong & Peng, 
2013) have maintained that levels of missing data below 40% can still be considered accurate 
although some of them have taken a more manipulative stance here.   
8.6 Future Research Directions  
 
University governance performance relationships needs much greater unpacking. This thesis is 
rightly viewed as a seminal inflexion point in the body of knowledge. Future research needs to 
take this much further using more tailored variables and advanced methods to understand the 
true mechanisms of how the newly discovered governance dimensions presented in this thesis; 
selectivity in entry standards, instruction intensity in student staff ratio, 
research/teaching/gender modalities in staff diversities, pedagogical orientations in student 
body diversities and strategic financial choices in asset/revenue structures, affect university 
performance. This might involve the crafting of new variables, new indices and even new 
techniques to organize and splice the data. These new forthcoming research innovations of 
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future scholars will benefit fundamentally from the existence of this formal and large body of 
quantitative work embodied in this thesis.  
 
Second each of the new dimensions of university governance unwrapped in this thesis need a 
far greater level of theoretical and empirical engagement in the overall discourse. There is need 
for copious qualitative, arguementative and normative debate on entry standards, student staff 
ratios, staff contractual structures and so on in the UK HEI literature. Now that these new 
missing dimensions have been made explicit the lexicon of university governance can now 
move forward and populate these concerns richly so as to enable a standard template of 
university governance studies to emerge. 
 
Third, the challenging and complex trade-offs highlighted in how these missing dimensions 
impact university research, teaching and financial performance require their own research 
trajectories. Future scholars should carry the torch forward and bring to bear a host of new 
research methods as well as data gathering strategies to shed light on these complex trade-offs. 
While doing so it is to be hoped that fresh light will be shed on the process like characterstics 
pervading university governance performance relationships. This would surely lead to a fuller 
understanding of these relationships as well as the vital place of teaching/learning regimes of 
universities in them.   
 
Fourth, it is important within this context to highlight some data challenges that future scholars 
are likely to face in their quest for robust quantitative insights within UK HEI. Throughout this 
thesis singular challenges were faced in terms of several important board level as well as other 
level governance and performance variables. Even the existing regulatory and data collating 
bodies like HESA. were unable to help in redressing the large levels of missing values here. 
This needs to be addressed squarely by the newly formed OFS, HESA and related regulators. 
It is high time that such an important UK HEI sector which needs informed debate and decision 
is equipped with the data needed for the job. Therefore, it is recommended that some research 
projects of the future take up this challenge of independently collecting and organising the vast 




8.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This Chapter finalized the thesis. After a brief foregrounding it presented the main conclusions 
to answer the research question. The novel contributions of the thesis to the body of knowledge 
in university governance and performance were detailed next. This was followed by an 
elucidation of the main recommendations to university governors and policy makers in UK 
HEI to help improve the governance and performance of these institutions. Limitations of the 
research were then summarized. Finally, the chapter made explicit a series of future research 






APPENDIX TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics Russell Group/Non-Russell Group – Pre-
1992 and Post-1992 Universities 
 
Summary Descriptive Statistics of All Governance Variables for All 132 UK HEIs 
       Russell Group - Non Russell 
Group 
Variables Mean Median STD CV Minimum Maximum Mean Diff. Median Diff. 
Panel A: Governance Variables Based on All 131 UK HEIs 
BSIZE (no.) 24.24 24 4.76 0.19 11 43 2.47 2 
BGDIV (%) 0.2911 0.2857 0.0945 0.3246 0 0.5789 -0.0104 -0.0059 
BEDIV (%) 0.0691 0.0513 0.067 0.980 0 0.36 -0.0217 -0.0092 
IGOV (%) 0.5857 0.5769 0.1289 0.2202 0.0434 0.8888 -0.1292 -0.0783 
GBMFS (no.) 4.90 5 1.46 0.29 3 13 0.79 1 
ETMS (no.) 26.30 24 15.67 0.59 0 52 7.64 12 
SSR (no.) 17.52 17.65 3.43 0.19 32.9 7.1 -4.19 -4.35 
ES (no.) 58.54 54.13 14.71 0.25 28.94 100 23.15 25.51 
PTTSR (%) 0.3338 0.3261 0.1612 0.4830 0 0.8639 -0.1724 -0.1954 
FSF (%) 0.4471 0.4444 0.070 0.1575 0.2164 0.70 -0.0668 -0.0614 
TRST (%) 0.5810 0.5487 0.22 0.38 0 1 -0.1503 -0.1344 
TONLY(%) 0.2566 0.2174 0.2132 0.8310 0 1 -0.1449 -0.1341 
RONLST 0.1482 0.0793 0.1590 1.072 0 0.8 0.3065 0.3164 
PGINT (%) 0.2333 0.2202 0.0951 0.4076 0.0060 0.6027 0.0994 0.0887 
TFEE (%) 0.3778 0.3506 0.1579 0.4180 0.0215 0.8229 -0.1377 -0.1249 
INTS (%) 0.1757 0.1605 0.1119 0.6371 0 0.7536 0.0928 0.091 
ENDWTA (%) 0.0468 0.0074 0.0890 1.90 0 0.6325 0.1055 0.0931 
VCPAY  12.36 12.38 0.2421 0.01957 11.36 13.05 0.23 0.22 
BIG4 0.7735 1 0.4187 0.5412 0 1 0.1949 0 
UGCOM 0.2232 0 0.4166 1.86 0 1 -0.1962 0 
SFSPEND 1157.14 1127 599.08 0.5177 0 4090 577.66 482 
CTA 0.0782 0.0486 0.0828 1.05 -0.0013 0.6049 -0.0281 -0.0246 
DTA 0.1563 0.1470 0.1092 0.6986 0 0.6772 -0.0308 -0.0251 
FTA 0.7661 0.7752 0.1063 0.1388 0.0596 0.9882 -0.0113 -0.0276 
Panel B: Governance Variables Based on Russell Group UK HEIs 
BSIZE (no.) 26.19 25 4.59 0.17 18 42 - - 
BGDIV (%) 0.2828 0.2857 0.0941 0.3326 0 0.52 - - 
BEDIV (%) 0.0516 0.0434 0.0475 0.9205 0 0.2 - - 
IGOV (%) 0.4836 0.5217 0.1418 0.2932 0.0952 0.76 - - 
GBMFS (no.) 5.52 5 1.79 0.32 3 13 - - 
ETMS (no.) 31.89 36 19.02 0.59 0 52 - - 
SSR (no.) 14.20 14.05 2.80 0.19 7.10 25.20 - - 
ES (no.) 76.91 76.70 12.70 0.16 33.20 100 - - 
PTTSR (%) 0.1944 0.1772 0.087 0.4525 0.0548 0.5615 - - 
FSF (%) 0.3931 0.3966 0.037 0.0958 0.2643 0.5033 - - 
TRST (%) 0.4595 0.4698 0.072 0.1575 0.2581 0.6260 - - 
TONLY (%) 0.1394 0.1341 0.087 0.6276 0 0.4338 - - 
RONLY 0.3961 0.3698 0.1075 0.2714 0.183 0.728 - - 
PGINT (%) .3137 .2937 .0834 .2659 .1532 .6027 - - 
TFEE (%) 0.2665 0.2470 0.1030 0.3865 0.0215 0.5563 - - 
INTS (%) 0.2507 0.2297 0.1121 0.4473 0.0894 0.6845 - - 
 421 
ENDWTA (%) 0.1321 0.0973 0.120 0.9102 0 0.635 - - 
VCPAY 12.55 12.56 0.2141 0.0170 12.04 13.05 - - 
BIG4 0.9285 1 0.2580 0.2779 0 1 - - 
UGCOM 0.0655 0 0.2479 3.78 0 1 - - 
SFSPEND 1622.52 1554 720.11 0.4438 0 4090 - - 
CTA 0.0549 0.0313 0.0570 1.03 0 0.2577 - - 
DTA 0.1315 0.1274 0.0867 0.6592 0 0.3738 - - 
FTA 0.7570 0.7534 0.0925 0.1222 0.0596 0.9193 - - 
Panel C: Governance Variables Based on Non Russell Group UK HEIs 
BSIZE (no.) 23.72 23 4,66 0.19 11 43 - - 
BGDIV (%) 0.2932 0.2916 0.0945 0.3224 0.0243 0.5789 - - 
BEDIV (%) 0.0733 0.0526 0.0712 0.9708 0 0.36 - - 
IGOV (%) 0.6128 0.60 0.1105 0.1803 0.0434 0.8888 - - 
GBMFS (no.) 4.73 4 1.32 0.27 3 12 - - 
ETMS (no.) 24.25 24 13.73 0.56 0 52 - - 
SSR (no.) 18.39 18.40 3.03 0.16 8.90 32.90 - - 
ES (no.) 53.76 51.19 10.97 0.20 28.9 95.93 - - 
PTTSR (%) 0.3668 0.3726 0.1570 0.4279 0 0.8639 - - 
FSF (%) 0.4599 0.4580 0.070 0.1528 0.2164 0.70 - - 
TRST (%) 0.6098 0.6042 0.233 0.3836 0 1 - - 
TONLY (%) 0.2843 0.2682 0.224 0.7897 0 1 - - 
RONLST 0.0896 0.0534 0.1029 1.1478 0 0.8 - - 
PGINT (%) .2143 .2050 .0875 .4083 .0060 .4966 - - 
TFEE (%) 0.4042 0.3719 0.1572 0.3890 0.0981 0.8229 - - 
INTS (%) 0.1579 0.1387 0.1043 0.6605 0 0.7536 - - 
ENDWTA (%) 0.0266 0.0042 0.065 2.44 0 0.485 - - 
VCPAY 12.32 12.34 0.2252 0.0182 11.36 13.02 - - 
BIG4 0.7336 1 0.4422 0.6028 0 1 - - 
UGCOM 0.2617 0 0.4397 1.68 0 1 - - 
SFSPEND 1044.86 1072 505.90 0.4841 0 2625 - - 
CTA 0.083 0.0559 0.0869 1.03 -0.0013 0.6049 - - 
DTA 0.1623 0.1525 0.1131 0.6974 0 0.6772 - - 
FTA 0.7683 0.7810 0.1093 0.1422 0.2492 0.9882 - - 
Notes: The table reports summary descriptive statistics for all internal governance variables, and mean/ median 
differences for Russell group and non-Russell group UK HEIs, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: 
governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender diversity (BGDIV); board ethnic minorities (BEDIV); independent 
governors (IGOV); frequency of governing board meetings (BMFS); frequency of executive team meetings (EFMs); 
student to staff ratio (SSR); entry standards (ET); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); female staff fraction (FSF); 
teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching only staff (TONLY); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); tuition fee 
(TFEE); international students (INTS); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); audit 
firm size (BIG4); and governance committee (GCOM). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
*,**,***,****Mean/median difference between Russell group and non-Russell group HEIs for the respective is 

















Summary Descriptive Statistics of All Governance Variables for All 132 UK HEIs 
       Pre-1992-post-1992 
Variables Mean Median STD CV Minimum Maximum Mean Diff. Median Diff. 
Panel A: Governance Variables Based on All 131 UK HEIs 
BSIZE (no.) 24.24 24 4.76 0.19 11 43 3.9 3 
BGDIV (%) 0.2911 0.2857 0.0945 0.3246 0 0.5789 -0.035 -0.0316 
BEDIV (%) 0.0691 0.0513 0.067 0.980 0 0.36 -0.0232 -0.0212 
IGOV (%) 0.5857 0.5769 0.1289 0.2202 0.0434 0.8888 -0.1198 -0.0982 
BMFS (no.) 4.90 5 1.46 0.29 3 13 0.266 1 
ETMS (no.) 26.30 24 15.67 0.59 0 52 6.884 7 
SSR (no.) 17.52 17.65 3.43 0.19 32.9 7.1 -3.961 -4.25 
ES (no.) 58.54 54.13 14.71 0.25 28.94 100 19.505 20.225 
PTTSR (%) 0.3338 0.3261 0.1612 0.4830 0 0.8639 -0.078 -0.123 
FSF (%) 0.4471 0.4444 0.070 0.1575 0.2164 0.70 -0.0738 -0.0672 
TRST (%) 0.5810 0.5487 0.22 0.38 0 1 -0.2006 -0.1994 
TONLY (%) 0.2566 0.2174 0.2132 0.8310 0 1 0.0127 -0.0392 
RONLST 0.1482 0.0793 0.1590 1.072 0 0.8 0.1968 0.2396 
PGINT (%) 0.2333 0.2202 0.0951 0.4076 0.0060 0.6027 0.1052 0.0995 
TFEE (%) 0.3778 0.3506 0.1579 0.4180 0.0215 0.8229 -0.0992 -0.1029 
INTS (%) 0.1757 0.1605 0.1119 0.6371 0 0.7536 0.1126 0.1070 
ENDWTA (%) 0.0468 0.0074 0.0890 1.90 0 0.6325 0.0906 0.0539 
VCPAY  12.36 12.38 0.2421 0.01957 11.36 13.05 0.133 0.111 
BIG4 0.7735 1 0.4187 0.5412 0 1 0.1945 0 
UGCOM 0.2232 0 0.4166 1.86 0 1 -0.1901 0 
SFSPEND 1157.14 1127 599.08 0.5177 0 4090 349.23 284 
CTA 0.0782 0.0486 0.0828 1.05 -0.0013 0.6049 -0.025 -0.0227 
DTA 0.1563 0.1470 0.1092 0.6986 0 0.6772 0.0025 0.004 
FTA 0.7661 0.7752 0.1063 0.1388 0.0596 0.9882 0.0164 0.0097 
Panel B: Governance Variables Based on pre-1992 UK HEIs 
BSIZE (no.) 26.580 25 4.718 0.1775 17 43 - - 
BGDIV (%) 0.2704 0.2727 0.093 0.3463 0.0243 0.5555 - - 
BEDIV (%) 0.0572 .0454 .0572 1.000 0 0.3333 - - 
IGOV (%) .5164 .5333 .1186 .2297 .0952 .84 - - 
BMFS (no.) 5.080 5 1.519 .298 3 13 - - 
ETMS (no.) 29.513 30 16.11 .545 0 52 - - 
SSR (no.)  15.262 15.2 2.773 .1817 7.1 25.2 - - 
ES (no.) 69.609 69.230 12.878 .1850 33.209 100 - - 
PTTSR (%) .287 .249 .149 .521 .037 .704 - - 
FSF (%) .4024 .4049 .0496 .1233 .2164 .5247 - - 
TRST (%) .4793 .4718 .1312 .2737 0 .9918 - - 
TONLY (%) .2481 .1956 .1771 .7137 0 1 - - 
RONLY .2663 .2828 .1515 .5691 0 .728 - - 
PGINT (%) 0.2970 0.2847 0.0824 0.2774 0.0739 0.6027 - - 
TFEE (%) .3288 .2964 .1407 .4280 .0215 .7772 - - 
INTS (%) .2472 .2281 .1099 .4447 .0694 .7536 - - 
ENDWTA (%) .1017 .0564 .1178 1.1582 0 .6325 - - 
VCPAY 12.461 12.452 .2329 .0186 11.55 13.05 - - 
BIG4 .8851 1 .3191 .3605 0 1 - - 
UGCOM .1150 0 .3194 2.776 0 1 - - 
SFSPEND 1405.86 1355 588.73 .4187 0 3506 - - 
CTA .0620 .0359 .0658 1.0623 0 .3544 - - 
DTA .1625 .1551 .1136 .6988 0 .4604 - - 
FTA .7764 .7797 .08914 .1148 .05964 .9460 - - 
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Panel C: Governance Variables Based on  post-1992 UK HEIs 
BSIZE (no.) 22.68 22 4.119 0.1815 11 38 - - 
BGDIV (%) 0.3054 0.3043 0.0926 0.3032 0 0.5789 - - 
BEDIV (%) .0804 .0666 .0735 .9140 0 .36 - - 
IGOV (%) .6362 .6315 .1142 .1796 .0434 .8888 - - 
BMFS (no.) 4.814 4 1.402 .291 3 12 - - 
ETMS (no.) 22.629 23 14.177 .626 0 52 - - 
SSR (no.) 19.223 19.45 2.760 .1435 9.4 30.2 - - 
ES (no.) 50.104 49.005 9.493 .189 28.946 93.506 - - 
PTTSR (%) .365 .372 .160 .440 0 .863 - - 
FSF (%) .4762 .4721 .0635 .1335 .2990 .7 - - 
TRST (%) .6799 .6712 .2042 .3003 0 1 - - 
TONLY (%) .2354 .2348 .1973 .8383 0 1 - - 
RONLST .0695 .0432 .0992 1.4260 0 .6156 - - 
PGINT (%) 0.1918 0.1852 0.0785 0.4093   0.0060 0.4959 - - 
TFEE (%) .4280 .3993 .1557 .3638 .09814 .8229 - - 
INTS (%) .13458 .12106 .0846 .62900 0 .4792294 - - 
ENDWTA (%) .0111 .0025 .0298 2.6846 0 .2160 - - 
VCPAY 12.328 12.341 .2080 .0168 11.3621 13.023 - - 
BIG4 .690583 1 .462 .6698 0 1 - - 
UGCOM .3051 0 .460 1.510 0 1 - - 
SFSPEND 1056.63 1071 504.4 .477 0 4090 - - 
CTA .0870 .0586 .0913 1.050 -.0013 .6049008 - - 
DTA .160 .1511 .1056 .6603 0 .677 - - 
FTA .760 .770 .111 .146 .249 .9882 - - 
Notes: The table reports summary descriptive statistics for all internal governance variables, and mean/ median 
differences for Russell group and non-Russell group UK HEIs, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: 
governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender diversity (BGDIV); board ethnic minorities (BEDIV); independent 
governors (IGOV); frequency of governing board meetings (BMFS); frequency of executive team meetings (EFMs); 
student to staff ratio (SSR); entry standards (ET); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); female staff fraction (FSF); 
teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching only staff (TONLY); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); tuition fee 
(TFEE); international students (INTS); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); audit 
firm size (BIG4); and governance committee (GCOM). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
*,**,***,****Mean/median difference between Pre-1992 and Post-1992 universities  group HEIs for the respective 

























APPENDIX TABLE 2: Bivariate Quartile regressions 
 
Selective Quartile Regressions for Research Performance Index  
 RPI Variable 
Variables Lower Quartile 
 
Upper Quartile Lower Quartile 
 
Upper Quartile 














































No result 51.702 
(15.858)*** 































Presence of a unique 
































































Research only staff 
 
    








































Service and facility spend 










































Selective Quartile Regressions for Research Quality  
 RQ Variable 
Variables Lower Quartile 
 
Upper Quartile Lower Quartile 
 
Upper Quartile 
Board size  
 




Board gender diversity  
 
Not Sig.  Not Sig.  -127.534 
(39.167)*** 
Not sig.  























































































Research only staff 
 
    


















  -20.802 
(7.853)*** 
Fraction of international 
students 
    
































APPENDIX TABLE 3: NORMALITY TEST 
 
Table: Test of Normality Model 1  
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
RPI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ES 0.0000 0.0615 0.0000 
INTS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BSIZE 0.7400 0.0198 0.0633 
TRST 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 
GCOM 0.0000 0.0790 0.0000 
SSR 0.2449         0.0980 0.1301 
IGOV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FSF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TST 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PRE1992 0.0000 - - 
REGION 0.0000 0.0000 - 
YEAR 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: RPI denotes research performance index; ES denotes entry standards; INTS denotes fraction 
international students; GBSIZE denotes governing board size; TRST teaching and research staff; 
GCOM denotes the existence of a separate governance committee; SSR student to staff ratio; IGOV 
denotes independent governors; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CTA denotes cash to total assets; 
CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TST), university age (PRE1992), university 
region (REGION), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 1  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
RPI 0.95014 0.00000 
ES 0.94915 0.00000 
INTS 0.91629 0.00000 
BSIZE 0.99724 0.03635 
TRST 0.91374 0.00000 
GCOM 0.99550 0.00157 
SSR 0.99634 0.00975 
IGOV 0.94569 0.00000 
FSF 0.99104 0.00000 
CTA 0.83072 0.00000 
TST 0.94317 0.00000 
PRE1992 0.99930 0.88816 
REGION 0.02060 0.00000 
YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
Notes: RPI denotes research performance index; ES denotes entry standards; INTS denotes fraction 
international students; GBSIZE denotes governing board size; TRST teaching and research staff;  
GCOM denotes the existence of a separate governance committee; SSR student to staff ratio; IGOV 
denotes independent governors; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CTA denotes cash to total assets; 
CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TST), university age (PRE1992), university 




Table: Test of Normality Model 2  
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
RPI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ES 0.0000 0.0615 0.0000 
INTS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TRST 0.4768 0.8427 0.7600 
GCOM 0.0000 0.0790 0.0000 
SSR 0.2449         0.0980 0.1301 
IGOV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FSF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TA 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
PRE1992 0.0000 - - 
REGION 0.0000 0.0000 - 
YEAR 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: RPI denotes research performance index; ES denotes entry standards; INTS denotes 
fraction international students; TRST denotes teaching and research staff; GCOM denotes 
the existence of a separate governance committee; SSR student to staff ratio; IGOV denotes 
independent governors; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CTA denotes cash to total assets; 
CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TA), university age (PRE1992), 
university region (REGION), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 2  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
RPI 0.95014 0.00000 
ES 0.94915 0.00000 
INTS 0.91629 0.00000 
TRST 0.97349 0.00000 
GCOM 0.99550 0.00157 
SSR 0.99634 0.00975 
IGOV 0.94569 0.00000 
FSF 0.99104 0.00000 
CTA 0.83072 0.00000 
TA 0.98578 0.00000 
PRE1992 0.99930 0.88816 
REGION 0.02060 0.00000 
YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
Notes: RPI denotes research performance index; ES denotes entry standards; INTS denotes 
fraction international students; GBSIZE denotes governing board size; GCOM denotes the 
existence of a separate governance committee; SSR student to staff ratio; IGOV denotes 
independent governors; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CTA denotes cash to total assets; 
CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TST), university age (PRE1992), 
university region (REGION), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
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Table: Test of Normality Model 3  
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
RQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ES 0.0000 0.0615 0.0000 
BIG4A    
BSIZE 0.7400 0.0198 0.0633 
FSF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BGDIV 0.3930 0.9951 0.6931 
VCPAY 0.0049 0.0043 0.0006 
ENDWTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PGINT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PGINT2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TFEE 0.0000 0.4537 0.0000 
SFSPEND 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TI 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 
PRE1992 0.0000 - - 
REGION 0.0000 0.0000 - 
YEAR 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: RQ denotes research quality; ES denotes entry standards; BIG4A denotes if HEI is audited by a big 4 
auditor; BSIZE denotes governing board size; FSF denotes female staff fraction;  BGDIV denotes governing 
board gender diversity; VCPAY denotes vice-chancellor emolument; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total 
assets; PGINT denotes postgraduate intensity; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; SFSPEND denotes service 
and facility spend per student; CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TI), university age 
(PRE1992), university region (REGION), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 3  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
RQ 0.93065 0.00000 
ES 0.94915 0.00000 
BIG4A 0.99701 0.01983 
BSIZE 0.99724 0.03635 
FSF 0.99104 0.00000 
BGDIV 0.99856 0.49881 
VCPAY 0.99486 0.00031 
ENDWTA 0.60558 0.00000 
PGINT 0.97922 0.00000 
PGINT2 0.83557 0.00000 
TFEE 0.95476 0.00000 
SFSPEND 0.96707 0.00000 
TI 0.98416 0.00000 
PRE1992 0.99930 0.88816 
REGION 0.02060 0.00000 
YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
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Notes: RQ denotes research quality; ES denotes entry standards; BIG4A denotes if HEI is audited 
by a big 4 auditor; BSIZE denotes governing board size; FSF denotes female staff fraction;  BGDIV 
denotes governing board gender diversity; VCPAY denotes vice-chancellor emolument; ENDWTA 
denotes endowment to total assets; PGINT denotes postgraduate intensity; TFEE denotes tuition fee 
fraction; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per student; CONTS denotes control 
variables for university size (TI), university age (PRE1992), university region (REGION), 
university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
Table: Test of Normality Model 4  
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
RGF 0.0000 0.0311 0.0000 
BMFS 0.0000 0.0215 0.0000 
BEDIV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TRST 0.4768 0.8427 0.7600 
PTTSR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TONLY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ENDWTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FSF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TST 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RGROUP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
YEAR 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: RGF denotes research grant fraction; BMFS denotes governing board meeting 
frequency; BEDIV denotes governing board ethnic diversity; TRST denotes teaching and 
research staff; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio;  TONLY denotes teaching only 
staff; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; FSF denotes female staff fraction; 
CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TST), university mission (RGROUP), 
university region (REGION), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 4  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
RGF 0.83981 0.00000 
BMFS 0.98897 0.00000 
BEDIV 0.92987 0.00000 
TRST 0.97349 0.00000 
PTTSR 0.96883 0.00000 
TONLY 0.94243 0.00000 
ENDWTA 0.60558 0.00000 
FSF 0.99104 0.00000 
TST 0.94317 0.00000 
RGROUP 0.99476 0.00006 
YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
Notes: RGF denotes research grant fraction; BMFS denotes governing board meeting 
frequency; BEDIV denotes governing board ethnic diversity; TRST denotes teaching and 
research staff; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio;  TONLY denotes teaching only 
staff; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; FSF denotes female staff fraction; 
CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TST), university mission (RGROUP), 











Table: Test of Normality Model 5  
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
TPI 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
ES 0.0000 0.0615 0.0000 
SSR 0.2449         0.0980 0.1301 
TFEE 0.0000 0.4537 0.0000 
CTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BEDIV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BGDIV 0.3930 0.9951 0.6931 
SFSPEND 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TA 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
PRE1992 0.0000 - - 
REGION 0.0000 0.0000 - 
YEAR 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: TPI denotes teaching performance index; ES denotes entry standards; SSR student to 
staff ratio; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CTA 
denotes cash to total assets; BEDIV denotes governing board ethnic diversity; BGDIV 
denotes governing board gender diversity; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per 
student; CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TA), university mission 
(PRE1992), university region (REGION), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 5  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
TPI 0.98251 0.00000 
ES 0.94915 0.00000 
SSR 0.99634 0.00975 
TFEE 0.95476 0.00000 
CTA 0.83072 0.00000 
BEDIV 0.92987 0.00000 
BGDIV 0.99856 0.49881 
SFSPEND 0.96707 0.00000 
TA 0.98578 0.00000 
PRE1992 0.99930 0.88816 
REGION 0.02060 0.00000 
YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
Notes: TPI denotes teaching performance index; ES denotes entry standards; SSR student to 
staff ratio; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; FSF denotes female staff fraction; CTA 
denotes cash to total assets; BEDIV denotes governing board ethnic diversity; BGDIV 
denotes governing board gender diversity; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per 
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student; CONTS denotes control variables for university size (TA), university mission 







Table: Test of Normality Model 6  
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
TGF 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 
TFEE 0.0000 0.4537 0.0000 
FSF 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PTTSR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RONLY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ENDWTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TRST 0.4768 0.8427 0.7600 
ETFS 0.0011 0.0861 0.0025 
BSIZE 0.7400 0.0198 0.0633 
VCPAY 0.0049 0.0043 0.0006 
IGOV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RGROUP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PRE1992 0.0000 - - 
YEAR 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: TPI denotes teaching performance index; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; FSF denotes 
female staff fraction; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio; RONLY denotes research only 
staff; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; TRST denotes teaching and research staff; ETFS 
denotes executive team meeting frequency; BSIZE denotes governing board size; VCPAY denotes 
vice-chancellor emolument; IGOV denotes independent governors; CONTS denotes control 
variables for university mission (RGROUP), university age (PRE1992), university code (CODE) 
and year (YEAR). 
 
 
Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 6  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
TGF 0.97575 0.00000 
TFEE 0.95476 0.00000 
FSF 0.99104 0.00000 
PTTSR 0.96883 0.00000 
RONLY 0.86026 0.00000 
ENDWTA 0.60558 0.00000 
TRST 0.97349 0.00000 
ETFS 0.95971 0.00000 
BSIZE 0.99724 0.03635 
VCPAY 0.99486 0.00031 
IGOV 0.94569 0.00000 
RGROUP 0.99476 0.00006 
PRE1992 0.99930 0.88816 
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YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
Notes: TPI denotes teaching performance index; TFEE denotes tuition fee fraction; FSF denotes 
female staff fraction; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio; RONLY denotes research only 
staff; ENDWTA denotes endowment to total assets; TRST denotes teaching and research staff; ETFS 
denotes executive team meeting frequency; BSIZE denotes governing board size; VCPAY denotes 
vice-chancellor emolument; IGOV denotes independent governors; CONTS denotes control 
variables for university mission  (RGROUP), university age (PRE1992), university code (CODE) 
and year (YEAR). 
 
Table: Test of Normality Model 7   
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
AT 0.0000 0.0000 - 
FTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DTA 0.0000 0.1711 0.0000 
CTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SFSPEND 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ENDWTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RONLY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TONLY 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
UGCOM 0.0000 0.0790   0.0000 
PTTSR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GBMFS 0.0000 0.0215 0.0000 
VCPAY 0.0049 0.0043 0.0006 
INTS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PGINT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ADSIZE 0.1419 0.0000 0.0000 
TA 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
RGROUP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PRE1992 0.0000 - - 
REGION 0.0000 0.0000 - 
YEAR 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: AT denotes asset turn over; FTA denotes fixed to total assets; DTA denotes debt to total assets; CTA 
denotes cash to total assets; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per student; ENDWTA denotes 
endowment to total assets; RONLY denotes research only staff; TONLY denotes teaching only staff; UGCOM 
denotes the existence of a unique governance committee; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio; BMFS 
denotes governing board meeting frequency ; VCPAY denotes vice-chancellor emolument; INTS denotes 
fraction international students; PGINT denotes postgraduate intensity; ADSIZE denotes number of audit 
committee members; CONTS denotes control variables for size (TA); university mission (RGROUP), 
university age (PRE1992), university code (CODE) and year (YEAR). 
 
Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 7  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
AT 0.50566 0.00000 
FTA 0.94275 0.00000 
DTA 0.97250 0.00000 
CTA 0.83072 0.00000 
SFSPEND 0.96707 0.00000 
ENDWTA 0.60558 0.00000 
RONLY 0.86026 0.00000 
TONLY 0.94243 0.00000 
UGCOM 0.99550 0.00157 
PTTSR 0.96883 0.00000 
GBMFS 0.98897 0.00000 
VCPAY 0.99486 0.00031 
INTS 0.91629 0.00000 
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PGINT 0.97922 0.00000 
ADSIZE 0.96246 0.96246 
TA 0.98578 0.00000 
RGROUP 0.99476 0.00006 
PRE1992 0.99930 0.88816 
REGION 0.02060 0.00000 
YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
Notes: AT denotes asset turn over; FTA denotes fixed to total assets; DTA denotes debt to total assets; CTA denotes 
cash to total assets; SFSPEND denotes service and facility spend per student; ENDWTA denotes endowment to 
total assets; RONLY denotes research only staff; TONLY denotes teaching only staff; UGCOM denotes the 
existence of a unique governance committee; PTTSR denotes part-time to total staff ratio; BMFS denotes governing 
board meeting frequency ; VCPAY denotes vice-chancellor emolument; INTS denotes fraction international 
students; PGINT denotes postgraduate intensity; ADSIZE denotes number of audit committee members; CONTS 
denotes control variables for size (TA); university mission (RGROUP), university age (PRE1992), university code 




Table: Test of Normality Model 7  
Variables Skewness Kurtosis  Prob>chi2 
ES 0.0000         0.0615 0.0000 
YEAR 1.0000         10.0000 0.0000 
CODE 1.0000         10.0000 0.0000 
RGROUP 0.0000         0.0000 0.0000 
TST 0.0000         0.0000 0.0000 
REGION 0.0000         0.0000 - 
BSIZE 0.7400         00.0198 0.0633 
BEDIV 0.0000         0.0000 0.0000 
BGDIV 0.0000         0.0000  0.0000 
IGOV 0.3930         0.9951 0.6931 
GBMFS 0.0000         0.0215 0.0000 
SSR 0.2449         0.0980 0.1301 
TRST 0.4768         0.8427 0.7600 
SFSPEND 0.0000         0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: RPI denotes entry standard (ES); Variables are defined as follows: governing board size (BSIZE); 
governing board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); governing board gender diversity (BGDIV); independent 
governors on the board (IGOV); governing board meeting frequency (GBMFS); student staff ratio (SSR); 
teaching and research staff (TRST); service and facility spend per student (SFSPEND); total staff (TST); 












Table: Test of Normality Shapiro-Wilk Test Model 7  
Variables W Prob>chi2 
ES 0.94915 0.00000 
YEAR 0.98142 0.00000 
CODE 0.95851 0.00000 
RGROUP 0.99476 0.00006 
TST 0.94317 0.00000 
REGION 0.02060 0.00000 
BSIZE 0.99724 0.03635 
BEDIV 0.92987 0.00000 
BGDIV 0.94569 0.00000 
IGOV 0.99856 0.49881 
GBMFS 0.98897 0.00000 
SSR 0.99634 0.00975 
TRST 0.97349 0.00000 
SFSPEND 0.96707 0.00000 
Notes: RPI denotes entry standard (ES); Variables are defined as follows: governing board size (BSIZE); 
governing board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); governing board gender diversity (BGDIV); independent 
governors on the board (IGOV); governing board meeting frequency (GBMFS); student staff ratio (SSR); 
teaching and research staff (TRST); service and facility spend per student (SFSPEND); total staff (TST); 






























APPENDEX TABLE 4: MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST 
 
Table : Test of Multicollinearity - Model 1 Research Performance Index (RPI) 
Variables VIF Tolerance  
ES 3.61     0.276720 
SSR 2.49     0.401978 
PRE1992 2.42     0.414051 
REGION 2.16     0.461977 
CODE 2.07     0.483555 
TST 1.92     0.521183 
FSF 1.73     0.576529 
TRST 1.65     0.604635 
IGOV 1.65     0.607302 
INTS 1.57     0.635718 
BSIZE 1.42     0.703281 
YEAR 1.25     0.801972 
CTA 1.19     0.842079 
UGCOM 1.19     0.840934 
Mean VIF 1.88  
Notes: Entry standards (ES); fraction international students (INTS); governing board size (GBSIZE); teaching 
and research staff; the existence of a separate governance committee (GCOM); student to staff ratio (SSR);  
independent governors (IGOV); female staff fraction (FSF); cash to total assets (CTA); total staff (TST); pre-








Table: Test of Multicollinearity - Model 3 Research Grant Fraction (RGF) 
Variables VIF Tolerance  
TONLY  6.30     0.158760 
TRST 5.94     0.168354 
RGROUP 2.79     0.358397 
PTTSR 2.51     0.397733 
TST 1.72     0.581081 
FSF 1.67     0.598010 
ENDWTA 1.62     0.615501 
GBMFS 1.16     0.859637 
BIDIV 1.15     0.869919 
CODE 1.13     0.884663 
YEAR 1.09     0.921190 
Mean 2.46  
Notes: Board meeting frequency (BMFS); board ethnic fraction (BEDIV); teaching and research staff fraction 
(TRST); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); teaching only staff fraction (TONLY);  endowment to total 
assets (ENDWTA); female staff fraction (FSF); total staff (TST);  russell group university  (RGROUP); year 
(YEAR); and code (CODE). 
Table : Test of Multicollinearity - Model 2 Research Quality (RQ) 
Variables VIF Tolerance  
PGINT 22.86     0.043741 
PGINT2 20.60     0.048547 
YEAR 3.95     0.252926 
ES 3.81     0.262366 
TFEE 3.41     0.293004 
SFSPEND 3.04     0.329039 
TI 2.91     0.343501 
REGION 2.65     0.377993 
PRE1992 2.49     0.402219 
VCPAY  2.32     0.431635 
CODE 2.12     0.472280 
FSF 2.06     0.486331 
ENDWTA  1.73     0.579376 
PTTSR  1.59     0.627308 
BGDIV  1.25      0.802127 
BIG4A  1.23      0.812852 
Mean 4.88  
Notes: Entry standards (ES); if HEI is audited by a big four auditor (BIG4A); governing board size (GBSIZE); 
female staff fraction (FSF); board gender diversity (BGDIV);  vice-chancellor emolument (VCPAY); 
endowment to total asset (ENDWTA); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); 
tuition fee fraction (TFEE); service and facility spend per student (SFSPEND); total income (TI);  pre-1992 
(PRE1992); region (REGION); year (YEAR); and code (CODE). 
Table: Test of Multicollinearity - Model 4 Teaching Performance Index (TPI) 
Variables VIF Tolerance  
ES 4.18     0.239299 
YEAR 4.11     0.243454 
TFEE 3.61     0.276860 
SFSPEND 3.04     0.329159 
SSR 2.46     0.405922 















Table: Test of Multicollinearity - Model 5 Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF) 
Variables VIF Tolerance  
RONLY 11.17     0.089527 
TFEE 3.98     0.251322 
PTTSR 3.65     0.273879 
PRE1992 3.43     0.291481 
RGROUP 3.28     0.304760 
FSF 3.16     0.316037 
YEAR 2.98     0.335677 
TRST 2.71     0.369120 
VCPAY 2.31     0.432936 
ENDWTA 2.25     0.444757 
IGOV 1.77     0.566153 
CODE 1.52     0.657830 
ETMFS 1.51     0.664353 
BSIZE 1.49     0.670816 
Mean 3.23  
Notes: Tuition fee fraction (TFEE); female staff fraction (FSF); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); 
research only staff fraction (RONLY); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); teaching and research staff 
fraction (TRST); executive team meeting frequency (ETFS); governing board size (BSIZE); vice-
chancellor pay (VCPAY); independent board governors (IGOV); russell group university  (RGROUP); 
pre-1992 universities (PRE1992); year (YEAR); and code (CODE). 
TA 2.15     0.466054 
PRE1992 2.10      0.476931 
CODE 1.97     0.507046 
FSF 1.70     0.588339 
BGDIV 1.21     0.828455 
BEDIV 1.20     0.833862 
CTA 1.16     0.860580 
Mean 2.40  
Notes: Entry standards (ES); student staff ratio (SSR); tuition fee fraction (TFEE); female staff fraction (FSF); 
cash to total assets (CTA); board ethnic diversity fraction (BEDIV); board gender diversity fraction (BGDIV); 
service and facility spend per student (SFSPEND); total assets (TA); pre-1992 (PRE1992); region (REGION); 




















Table : Test of Multicollinearity Model 6 Asset Turnover (AT) 
Variables VIF Tolerance  
RONLY 5.87     0.170220 
TA 4.85     0.206306 
PTTSR 4.29     0.233097 
REGION 4.04     0.247353 
SFSPEND 3.38     0.296051 
RGROUP 3.30     0.302935 
CODE 3.18     0.314219 
TONLY 2.76     0.361803 
VCPAY 2.71     0.368355 
YEAR 2.49     0.401164 
INTS 2.33     0.429887 
PRE1992 2.11     0.472974 
PGINT 2.09     0.478123 
ENDWTA 1.99     0.503612 
CTA 1.79     0.557813 
DTA 1.47     0.682481 
FTA 1.45     0.688841 
UGCOM 1.30     0.768994 
GBMFS 1.23     0.809854 
ADSIZE 1.16     0.864172 
Mean 2.69  
Notes: Fixed to total assets (FTA); debt to total assets (DTA); cash to total assets (CTA); service and facility 
spend per student (SFSPEND); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); research only staff (RONLY); teaching 
only staff (TONLY); presence unique governance committee (UGCOM); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); 
governing board meeting frequency (GBMFS); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); fraction of international 
students (INTS); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); audit committee size (ADSIZE); total assets (TA); russell 

































Table : Test of Multicollinearity Model 7 Entry Standard (ES) 
Variables VIF Tolerance  
SFSPEND 2.54    0.393719 2.54    0.393719 
TST 2.22    0.450467 2.22    0.450467 
SSR 2.20    0.453962 2.20    0.453962 
REGION  2.18    0.458396 2.18    0.458396 
CODE 2.13    0.470013 2.13    0.470013 
RGROUP 2.01    0.496883 2.01    0.496883 
YEAR 1.98    0.504492 1.98    0.504492 
IGOV 1.56    0.642529 1.56    0.642529 
TRST 1.50    0.664872 1.50    0.664872 
BSIZE 1.34    0.748646 1.34    0.748646 
BGDIV 1.25    0.802734 1.25    0.802734 
GBMFS 1.21    0.826438 1.21    0.826438 
BEDIV 1.14    0.877597 1.14    0.877597 
MEAN 1.79  
Notes: Governing board size (BSIZE); governing board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); governing board gender 
diversity (BGDIV); independent governors on the board (IGOV); governing board meeting frequency 
(GBMFS); student staff ratio (SSR); teaching and research staff (TRST); service and facility spend per student 




APPENDIX TABLE 5: HETEROSCEDASTICITY TEST 
 
Table: Heteroscedasticity Test for all Models  
Dependent Variable  Breusch-Pagan Test  White Test  
Research Performance Index (RPI) Chi2(1) = 5.54 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0186 
 
Chi(117) = 193.85 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Research Quality (RQ) Chi2(1) = 3.43 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0639 
 
Chi2(167) = 401.21 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
Research Grant Fraction (RGF)  Chi2(1) = 228.73 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Chi2(76) = 591.58 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Teaching Performance Index (TPI) Chi2(1) = 17.30 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Chi2(103) = 234.36 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF) Chi2(1) = 0.40 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.5256 
 
Chi2(116) = 184.80 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0001 
Asset Turnover (AT) Chi2(1) = 1724.17 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Chai2(227) = 506.83 
Prob > Chai = 0.000 
Entry Standard (ES) Chi2(1) = 0.25 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.6191 
 
Chai(103) = 337.74 


























APPENDIX TABLE 6: ENDOGENEITY TEST - Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) 
 
 
Table: Endogeneity Testing  
Dependent: Research Performance Index (RPI) Prob > F 
Entry Standards (ES) 0.0000 
International Students Ratio (INTS) 0.3360 
Board Size (BSIZE) 0.5711 
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) 0.7264 
Unique Governance Committee (GCOM) 0.4892 
Student Staff Ratio (SSR) 0.3215 
Independent  Board Members (IGOV) 0.5455 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 0.3723 
Cash to Total Assets (CTA) 0.5172 
 
 
Table: Endogeneity Testing  
Dependent: Research Quality (RQ) Prob > F 
Entry Standards (ES) 0.0000 
Big-4 Auditor (BIG4A) 0.3969 
Board Size (BSIZE) 0.0669 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 0.0205 
Board Gender Diversity (BGDIV) 0.403 
Vice-Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 0.358 
Endowment to Total Assets  (ENDWTA) 0.051 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT) 0.0275 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT2) 0.0237 
Part-time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 0.0643 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 0.553 






Table: Endogeneity Testing 
Dependent: Research Grant Fraction (RGF) Prob > F 
Board Meeting Frequency (BMFS) 0.076 
Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) 0.4719 
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) 0.0000 
Part-time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 0.144 
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) 0.0000 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 0.7678 















Table: Endogeneity Testing  
Dependent: Teaching Performance Index (TPI) Prob > F 
Entry Standard (ES) 0.0000 
Student Staff Ratio (SSR) 0.263 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 0.1701 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 0.0719 
Cash to Total Assets (CTA) 0.4951 
Board Ethnic Diversity (BEDIV) 0.7389 
Board gender Diversity (BGDIV) 0.1651 





Table: Endogeneity Testing 
Dependent: Teaching Grant Fraction (TGF) Prob > F 
Tuition Fee Fraction (TFEE) 0.0000 
Female Staff Fraction (FSF) 0.1486 
Part-time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 0.0209 
Research Only Staff (RONLY) 0.0000 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 0.6571 
Teaching and Research Staff (TRST) 0.2185 
Executive Team Meeting Frequency (ETFS) 0.2915 
Board Size (BSIZE) 0.6582 
Vice-Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 0.6999 




Table: Endogeneity Testing  
Dependent: Asset Turnover (AT) Prob > F 
Fixed to Total Assets (FTA) 0.0000 
Debt to Total Assets (DTA) 0.2646 
Cash to Total Assets  (CTA) 0.0642 
Service and Facility Spend per Student 
(SFSPEND) 
0.4357 
Endowment to Total Assets (ENDWTA) 0.0070 
Research Only Staff (RONLY) 0.0000 
Teaching Only Staff (TONLY) 0.0480 
Unique Governance Committee (UGCOM) 0.0972 
Part-Time to Total Staff Ratio (PTTSR) 0.0395 
Board Meeting Frequency (GBMFS) 0.1137 
Vice-Chancellor Pay (VCPAY) 0.1570 
International Students Ratio (INTS) 0.7509 
Postgraduate Intensity (PGINT) 0.0234 
Audit Size Committee (ADSIZE) 0.9746 
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Appendix Table 7: Fixed-Effects (FE) and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) comparison 
 
 RPI  RQ  RGF 
Governance 
Variables: 
Panel OLS Model GLS FE Governance 
Variables: 
Panel OLS Model GLS FE Governance 
Variables: 
Panel OLS Model GLS FE 
ES 2.005(.054)*** .3291(.129)*** ES 0.881(.048)*** -0.073(.084) BMFS -0.032(.004)*** 0.006(.003)** 
INTS 15.356(5.404)*** -46.184(17.541)*** BIG4A 1.873(.799)** 1.378(1.534) BEDIV -0.033(.012)*** -0.017(.010)* 
BSIZE 4.999(2.383)*** 7.662(4.720)* BSIZE 9.971(2.261)*** 6.400(3.821)* TRST -0.459(.022)*** -0.100(.023)*** 
TRST -4.289(2.542)* 0.102(4.286) FSF -43.510(6.619)*** -90.104(22.074)*** PTTSR -0.044(.012)*** -0.022(.009)** 
GCOM -2.221(.953)** -5.637(2.516)** BGDIV 9.339(3.926)** -2.544(4.672) TONLY -0.429(.025)*** -0.094(.024)*** 
SSR -0.641(.198)*** 0.015(.273) VCPAY -4.977(2.135)** 0.242(2.459) ENDWTA 0.012(.024) 0.008(.028) 
IGOV -7.620(3.821)** 2.884(7.768) ENDWTA 26.757(5.040)*** -33.280(19.349)* FSF -0.077(.023)*** 0.037(.045) 
FSF 20.730(7.878)*** -
180.745(29.939)*** 
PGINT 103.630(15.226)*** 99.782(46.112)**    





  PTTSR 13.787(2.972)*** -11.419(5.775)** TST 0.021(.002)*** 0.006(.005) 
TST 2.496(.825)*** 7.290(3.931)* TFEE -6.859(3.604)* -9.788(4.802)** RGROUP 0.020(.005)*** - 
PRE1992 13.579(1.282)*** - SFSPEND 0.003(.000)*** -0.006(.001)*** YEAR 0.001(.000)*** - 
REGION -1.827(.735)*** - Controls 
Variables: 
  CODE 0.000(.000)** - 
YEAR -1.772(.143)*** - TI 1.886(.765)** -29.120(3.452)*** Constant -2.377(.686)*** 0.114(.037)*** 
CODE -0.014(.0146) - PRE1992 12.298(1.177)*** - Number of 
Obs 
1,042 1,042 
Constant 3623.785(.194)***   REGION -3.665(.627)*** - F-Value 585.36 6.65 
Number of 
Obs 
827 827 YEAR -3.090(.220)*** - R2 0.8900 0.8354 
F-Value 899.34 10.92 CODE 0.039(.011)*** -    
R2 0.9257 0.5547 Constant 6197.516(433.996)*** 411.119(44.521)***    
   Number of Obs 883 883    
   F-Value 471.67 42.13    








 TPI  TGF  AT 
Governance 
Variables: 
Panel OLS Model GLS FE Governance 
Variables: 
Panel OLS Model GLS FE Governance 
Variables: 
Panel OLS Model GLS FE 
ES 1.188(.036)*** 0.277(.096)*** TFEE -0.773(.035)*** -0.876(.027)*** FTA -1.109(.132)*** -0.039(.085) 
SSR -0.272(.134)** -0.372(.169)** FSF -0.386(.078)*** 0.336(.108)*** DTA -0.188(.113)* -0.126(.082) 
TFEE 13.408(2.660)*** 18.730(4.181)*** PTTSR -0.260(.034)*** -0.115(.043)*** CTA 0.472(.241)* -0.289(.137)** 
FSF 26.855(5.018)*** -5.365(17.151) RONLY -0.735(.043)*** -0.403(.104)*** SFSPEND -0.000(.000) .00004(.0001)*** 
CTA -6.708(3.304)** -0.968(5.913) ENDWTA -0.060(.023)** -0.051(.051) ENDWTA -0.639(.143)*** -0.138(.159) 
BEDIV -9.529(4.433)** 1.860(5.772) TRST -0.085(.019)*** -0.044(.018)** RONLY 1.603(.363)*** -0.330(.298) 
BGDIV -6.396(2.608)** 2.080(3.304) ETFS -0.017(.005)*** -0.004(.004) TONLY -0.305(.132)** -0.044(.065) 
SFSPEND 0.000(.000) 0.002(.001)* BSIZE 0.027(.015)* -0.039(.011)*** UGCOM -0.069(.027)** -0.008(.019) 
Controls 
Variables: 
  VCPAY 0.021(.016) -0.026(.010)** PTTSR 0.457(.180)** -0.044(.157) 
TA 0.859(.426)** 3.354(2.304) IGOV -0.011(.024) 0.045(.019)** GBMFS 0.103(.039)*** 0.081(.030)*** 
PRE1992 3.110(.694)*** (omitted 
collinearity) 
Controls Variables:   VCPAY 0.160(.079)** 0.091(.030)*** 
REGION 0.736(.483) (omitted 
collinearity) 
RGROUP 0.022(.010)** - INTS -0.084(.141) 0.822(.241)*** 
YEAR 0.305(.162)* - Pre1992 -0.158(.007)*** - PGINT -0.609(.217)*** -0.143(.140) 
CODE -0.024(.008)*** - YEAR 0.001(.001) - ADSIZE 0.001(.040) 0.056(.022)** 
Constant -
536.552(323.354)* 
109.639(26.111)*** CODE 0.003(.000)*** - Controls 
Variables: 
  
Number of Obs 849 849 Constant -2.754(2.813) 1.300(.143)*** TA -0.303(.050)*** -0.402(.030)*** 
F-Value 571.69 17.69 Number of Obs 273 273 RGROUP -0.045(.039) - 
R2 0.8784 0.6923   F-Value 491.11 275.12 Pre1992 0.063(.026)** - 
   R2 0.9200 0.5865 REGION  -0.097(.0186)*** - 
      YEAR -0.003(.005) - 
      CODE 0.001(.000)*** - 
      Constant 10.173(10.711) 4.364(.489)*** 
      Number of Obs 543 543 
      F-Value 14.44 24.56 
      R2 0.6291 0.1231 
Notes: The tables reports  regressions comparing panel ordinary least square (Panel OLS model) and generalised least square fixed-effects (GLS FE) in all six models. governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender 
diversity (BGDIV); board ethnic diversity (BEDIV); independent governors (IGOV); frequency of governing board meetings (GBMs); frequency of executive team meetings (EFMs); student to staff ratio (SSR); entry 
standards (ES); part-time to total staff ratio (PTTSR); female staff fraction (FSF); teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching only staff (TONLY); research only staff (RONLY); postgraduate intensity (PGINT); tuition 
fee (TFEE); international students (INTS); endowment to total assets (ENDWTA); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); vice-chancellor (VCG); audit firm size (BIG4); and governance committee (GCOM); service and facility 
spend (SFSPEND); cash to total asset (CTA); debt to total asset (DTA); fixed to total assets (FTA); number of governance sub-committees (SUBCOM); audit committee size (ADSIZE); total assets (TA); total income 
(TINC); total staff (TST); russell group (RGROUP); pre-1992 university (PRE92); region (REGION). The table fully defines all the variables used. *,**,***,**** Correlation is significant at 5, 1, 0.1 and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively.. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 8: Asset Turnover (AT) and Return on Equity (ROE) Comparison 
 
Financial Performance Indicators 
Variable Asset Turnover Return on Equity 
BSIZE  0.0658** -0.0361 
BGDIV  -0.0154 0.1244***     
BEDIV  -0.0689** -0.0047     
IGOV  0.0493 0.1007***     
GBMS  0.0361 -0.0327     
ETMS  0.2310*** 0.1351**     
SSR  -0.0061 0.1016***     
ES  -0.1253*** -0.0856***     
PTTSR  -0.1088*** 0.0726***     
FSF  -0.0964*** 0.0998***     
TRST  -0.1095*** 0.0379     
TONLY -0.0712*** 0.0385     
RONLY 0.1192*** -0.0999***     
PGINT  -0.1474*** -0.0322     
TFEE  -0.1754*** 0.2462***     
INTS  -0.1267*** -0.0529*     
ENDWTA  -0.0604** -0.0586**     
VCPAY  -0.1697*** 0.1120***     
BIG4 -0.0067 -0.1037***     
UGCOM -0.0768*** 0.0167     
SFSPEND -0.2153*** 0.1236***     
CTA 0.2704*** 0.2725***     
DTA -0.1567*** 0.0172     
FTA -0.3722*** -0.3046***     
SUBCOM 0.0573** 0.0418     
ADSIZE 0.0695* 0.0817**     
TA -0.3836*** -0.0605**     
TINC -0.1055*** -0.0289     
TST -0.3125*** -0.0829***     
RGROUP -0.0742*** -0.0186     
PRE92 -0.0510* -0.0806***     
REGION 0.1450*** -0.0806***     
Notes: The table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients for independent variables with the teaching 
variables. Variables are defined as follows: governing board size (GBSIZE); board gender diversity (BGDIV); board 
ethnic diversity (BEDIV); independent governors (IGOV); frequency of governing board meetings (GBMs); frequency 
of executive team meetings (EFMs); student to staff ratio (SSR); entry standards (ES); part-time to total staff ratio 
(PTTSR); female staff fraction (FSF); teaching and research staff (TRST); teaching only staff (TONLY); research only 
staff (RONLY)postgraduate intensity (PGINT); tuition fee (TFEE); international students (INTS); endowment to total 
assets (ENDWTA); vice-chancellor pay (VCPAY); vice-chancellor (VCG); audit firm size (BIG4); and governance 
committee (GCOM); service and facility spend (SFSPEND); cash to total asset (CTA); debt to total asset (DTA); fixed 
to total assets (FTA); number of governance sub-committees (SUBCOM); audit committee size (ADSIZE); total assets 
(TA); total income (TINC); total staff (TST); russell group (RGROUP); pre-1992 university (PRE92); region 
(REGION). The table fully defines all the variables used. *,**,***,**** Correlation is significant at 5, 1, 0.1 and 10 per 
cent levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 9: LIST OF UNIVERSTIES 
 University Names 
1 Anglia Ruskin University 
2 Aston University 
3 Bath Spa University 
4 The University of Bath 
5 University of Bedfordshire 
6 Birmingham City University 
7 The University of Birmingham 
8 Bishop Grosseteste College- University College Lincoln 
9 The University of Bolton 
10 The Arts Institute at Bournemouth 
11 Bournemouth University 
12 The University of Bradford 
13 The University of Brighton 
14 The University of Bristol 
15 Brunel University 
16 Buckinghamshire Chilterns University College 
17 The University of Buckingham 
18 The University of Cambridge 
19 Canterbury Christ Church University 
20 The University of Central Lancashire 
21 University of Chester 
22 University of Chichester 
23 City University 
24 Coventry University 
25 
The University College for the Creative Arts at Canterbury, Epsom, Farnham, 
Maidstone, Rochester 
26 Cumbria Institute of the Arts-University of Cumbria 
27 De Montfort University 
28 University of Derby 
29 University of Durham 
30 The University of East Anglia 
31 The University of East London 
32 Edge Hill College of Higher Education 
33 The University of Essex 
34 The University of Exeter 
35 University College Falmouth 
36 University of Gloucestershire 
37 Goldsmiths College 
38 The University of Greenwich 
39 Harper Adams University College 
40 University of Hertfordshire 
41 The University of Huddersfield 
42 The University of Hull 
43 Imperial College of Science, Technology & Medicine 
44 The University of Keele 
45 The University of Kent 
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46 King's College London 
47 Kingston University 
48 The University of Lancaster 
49 Leeds Metropolitan University-Leeds Beckett University 
50 The University of Leeds 
51 Leeds Trinity and All Saints University 
52 The University of Leicester 
53 The University of Lincoln 
54 Liverpool Hope University 
55 Liverpool John Moores University 
56 The University of Liverpool 
57 University of the Arts, London 
58 London Metropolitan University 
59 London South Bank University 
60 London School of Economics and Political Science 
61 Loughborough University 
62 University of Luton 
63 The Manchester Metropolitan University 
64 The University of Manchester 
65 Middlesex University 
66 The University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
67 Newman College of HE-University 
68 The University of Northampton 
69 The University of Northumbria at Newcastle 
70 The Nottingham Trent University 
71 The University of Nottingham 
72 Oxford Brookes University 
73 The University of Oxford 
74 University College Plymouth St Mark and St John 
75 The University of Plymouth 
76 The University of Portsmouth 
77 Queen Mary and Westfield College 
78 The University of Reading 
79 Ravensbourne University London 
80 Roehampton University 
81 Royal Holloway and Bedford New College 
82 The University of Salford 
83 The School of Oriental and African Studies 
84 Sheffield Hallam University 
85 The University of Sheffield 
86 Southampton Solent University 
87 The University of Southampton 
88 Staffordshire University 
89 The University of Sunderland 
90 The University of Surrey 
91 The University of Sussex 
92 The University of Teesside 
93 Thames Valley University 
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94 University College London 
95 The University of Warwick 
96 University of the West of England, Bristol 
97 The University of West London 
98 The University of Westminster 
99 The University of Winchester 
100 The University of Wolverhampton 
101 University of Worcester 
102 York St John College 
103 The University of York 
104 University of Wales, Aberystwyth 
105 University of Wales, Bangor 
106 Cardiff University 
107 University of Wales Institute, Cardiff-Cardiff Metropolitan University 
108 University of Glamorgan 
109 Glyndŵr University 
110 The University of Wales, Lampeter 
111 The University of Wales, Newport 
112 University of Wales, Swansea - Swansea University 
113 Trinity College, Carmarthen-University of Wales Trinity Saint David 
114 University of South Wales 
115 The University of Aberdeen 
116 University of Abertay Dundee 
117 The University of Dundee 
118 Edinburgh Napier University 
119 The University of Edinburgh 
120 Glasgow Caledonian University 
121 The University of Glasgow 
122 Heriot-Watt University 
123 The University of Paisley 
124 Queen Margaret University College, Edinburgh 
125 The Robert Gordon University 
126 The University of St Andrews 
127 The University of Stirling 
128 The University of Strathclyde 
129 UHI Millennium Institute-University of the Highlands and Islands 
130 The University of the West of Scotland 
131 The Queen's University of Belfast 
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